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ABSTRACT	
	
The	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	understand	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	in	the	global	
response	to	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS),	through	the	theoretical	lens	of	
Social	 Constructivism,	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 ideational	 factors	 and	
normative	power	constructed	through	them	contributed	to	the	shaping	of	Global	Health	
Governance	(GHG)	surrounding	infectious	disease	outbreaks.	 	The	methodology	of	this	
thesis	 combined	 key	 informants	 interviews	 with	 archival	 document‐based	 research.	
Archival	 research	 consisted	 of	 gathering	 and	 reviewing	 government	 documents,	
publications	 of	 intergovernmental	 organizations,	 media	 reports,	 press	 briefings,	 and	
policy	 papers.	 	 Discourse	 analysis	 was	 employed	 to	 systematically	 examine	 the	wide	
range	of	data	gathered.		
The	thesis	explored	how	different	discourses	have	driven	the	changes	in	public	health	
reasoning	 and	 practice,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 prioritisation	 of	 certain	 actions	 in	 the	 global	
response	to	SARS	at	various	points	in	time.		In	order	to	show	the	ideational	shifts	over	
time,	the	SARS	story	was	divided	into	three	key	phases	in	terms	of	the	progress	of	the	
outbreak.	 	This	 thesis	 finds	 that	 the	global	 response	 to	 the	SARS	outbreak	over	 three	
phases	 was	 shaped	 by	 contestation	 among	 various	 discourses,	 which	 framed	 the	
perceived	 priority	 issues	 and	 policy	 responses	 pursued.	 	 These	 ideas	 did	 not	 simply	
arise	 as	 governing	 norms,	 but	 ideational	 success	 occurred	 as	 a	 result	 of	 collective	
advancement	by	actors	who	were	coalesced	around	particular	policy	ideas.		The	thesis	
provided	an	account	of	the	interplay	between	policy	ideas	and	key	actors,	in	the	form	of	
epistemic	 communities,	 and	 how	 epistemic	 communities	 served	 as	 key	 sources	 of	
advice	to	policy	making	during	the	SARS	outbreak.			
The	thesis	demonstrates	that	in	many	ways,	the	GHG	of	SARS	mirrored,	the	GHG	of	other	
global	health	issues	in	terms	of	framing	of	issues	and	the	actors	in	the	formation	of	and	
justification	for	interests	in	global	health.		By	illustrating	the	origins	and	significance	of	
the	multiplicity	of	ideas	shaping	collective	action	on	SARS,	this	thesis	underscores	that	
governance	 response	 in	 terms	of	policy	outcomes	 is	 the	product	of	 reconciling	health	
with	 a	 plethora	 of	 competing	 priorities,	 and	 political	 economic	 goals	 via	 social	
construction	 of	 reality.	 	 The	 thesis	 considered	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 findings	 for	
conceptual	understanding	of	GHG	of	infectious	diseases,	and	for	strengthening	policies	
and	practices	to	address	the	global	infectious	disease	outbreaks.	
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CHAPTER	ONE	
INTRODUCTION	
	
1.1.	RATIONALE	FOR	THE	STUDY	
	
Throughout	history	the	threat	posed,	and	the	disastrous	consequences	brought	upon	
human	societies,	by	acute	infectious	diseases	are	a	story	that	has	been	told	and	retold.	
Despite	their	tremendous	destructive	power,	epidemics	by	definition	with	some	
exceptions	(such	as	the	bubonic	plague	of	12th	century)	are	confined	within	a	certain	
geographical	territory.		Transmission	has	been	commensurate	with	prevailing	forms	
and	reach	of	human	mobility,	largely	in	a	linear	geographical	manner	historically,	until	
the	20th	century.		The	“traditional”	response	under	the	existing	international	states	
system	was	correspondingly	focused	within	a	specific	geographical	territory	and/or	
conceived	by	a	limited	set	of	actors	who	were	directed	by	a	national	government	with	
the	requisite	authority.		The	sometimes	conflicting	interests	of	nation‐states,	in	
addressing	these	epidemics,	created	considerable	tensions	in	achieving	collective	
action.	
Today,	it	is	now	widely	recognised	that	many	infectious	diseases	are	not	as	readily	
bound	by	territorial	geography	or	national	borders.1		The	contemporary	intensification	
of	globalisation	has	increased	the	potential	speed,	frequency	and	geographical	reach	of	
certain	types	of	infectious	diseases.		As	a	result,	the	transnational	spread	of	pathogens	
has	come	to	be	seen	as	emanating	from	a	range	of	globalising	forces	beyond	the	control	
of	individual	states	or	governments,	making	infectious	diseases	a	key	collective	action	
challenge.		The	traditional	division	between	the	national	and	international	domains,	in	
particular,	is	no	longer	an	accurate	reflection	of	the	institutional	terrain	with	which	we	
are	familiar.		Outbreaks	such	as	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS),	and	the	
H5N1	avian	influenza	and	H1N1	influenza	have	demonstrated	that	the	governance	
needs	surrounding	infectious	diseases	are	more	multifaceted	and	complex,	and	confront	
existing	jurisdictional	designations.		In	short,	infectious	diseases	have	come	to	exemplify	
most	starkly	the	complexity	and	interconnectedness	of	the	world	we	live	in.		
Growing	awareness	of	the	specific	governance	challenges	posed	by	what	can	be	
described	as	transnational	disease	outbreaks	has	been	at	the	centre	of	global	health	
policy	debates.		Of	particular	concern	has	been	the	need	to	build	effective	forms	of	
governance	which	manage	the	new	kinds	of	threats	posed.		With	special	reference	to	
(acute)	disease	outbreaks	of	potential	global	reach,	scholars	from	a	variety	of	disciplines	
have	begun	to	explore	the	challenges	of	Global	Health	Governance	(GHG).		In	particular,	
it	has	been	argued	that	the	transnational	spread	of	pathogens	has	exposed	
                                                            
1	Saker	L,	Lee	K,	Cannito	B,	Gilmore	A,	Campbell‐Lendrum	D	(2004),	Globalisation	and	infectious	diseases:	
a	review	of	linkage,	Geneva:	World	Health	Organisation.	
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vulnerabilities	in	existing	governance	structures	defined	by	the	territorial	boundaries	of	
sovereign	states.2		Scholars	highlight	the	expanding	roles	that	non‐state	actors,	for	
example,	might	play	in	an	increasingly	globalised	world.3		The	potential	capabilities	of	
information	and	communication	technologies	for	data	collection	and	dissemination	
have	been	described	as	challenging	the	authority	of,	as	well	as	potentially	reinforcing	
the	role	of	existing	and	new	actors	within	emerging	configurations	of	GHG.4		In	this	
process,	many	authors	link	the	increasingly	fluid	and	diffused	global	health	arena	with	
specific	disease	problems	or	issues,	leading	to	changing	modes	of	GHG.5	
The	existing	literature	appears	to	allude	to	mounting	evidence	that	transnational	nature	
of	policy	making	(often	understood	as	a	process	in	which	the	role	of	the	sovereign‐state	
is	diminishing)	appears	to	be	a	growing	feature	of	collective	action	in	infectious	disease	
policy.6		As	will	be	discussed	fully	in	section	1.3,	much	of	this	is	ascribed	to	changes	in	
material	power	such	as	the	role	of	powerful	state	or	non‐state	actors.		To	date,	few	
analyses	have	examined	the	role	of	ideational	power	in	global	health	policy	making;	in	
particular,	to	explain	why	certain	ideas	and	norms	were	promoted	and	prevailed	over	
others,	thereby	defining	global	health	problems	and	guiding	responses	in	particular	
ways.7		For	example,	during	the	H1N1	outbreak	in	2009‐2010,	why	did	full‐scale	
vaccination	programmes	become	a	dominant	response	to	the	pandemic	across	many	
countries?		Why	did	the	vast	majority	of	governments	compete	with	each	other	to	
stockpile	H1N1	vaccines,	while	growing	concerns	from	the	public	regarding	the	safety	
of	the	vaccines,	arising	from	Guillain‐Barré	Syndrome,	were	largely	disregarded?		Were	
there	alternative	ways	to	address	the	challenges	posed	by	the	pandemic	and	why	were	
they	not	taken	forward?		How	did	the	consensus	on	vaccination	emerge	as	the	major	
international	response?		How	does	such	consensus	emerge?		In	short,	how	do	the	ideas	
which	determine	practice	in	GHG	surrounding	disease	outbreaks	evolve	the	way	they	
do?		
                                                            
2	Lee	K	and	Fidler	D	(2007),	“Avian	and	pandemic	influenza:	progress	and	problems	in	global	health	
governance,”	Global	Public	Health,	2	(3):	215‐234.	
3	 Zacher	 M	 (2007),	 “The	 transformation	 in	 global	 health	 collaboration	 since	 the	 1990s,”	 In	 Cooper	 A,	
Kirton	 J	 and	 Schrecker	 T	 (eds.),	 Governing	 Global	 Health:	 Challenge,	 Response,	 Innovation,	 Aldershot:	
Ashgate	 Publishing;	Kickbusch	 I	 (2005),	 “Action	 on	 global	 health:	 addressing	 global	 health	 governance	
challenges,”	Public	Health,	119:	969‐973.	
4	Calain	P	(2007),	“Exploring	the	international	arena	of	global	public	health	surveillance,”	Health	Policy	
and	Planning,	22:	2‐12;	Fidler	D	(2004),	“Constitutional	Outlines	of	Public	Health’s	New	World	Order”,	
Temple	Law	Review,	77:	247‐290;	Fidler	D	(2004),	SARS,	Governance	and	the	Globalisation	of	Disease,	
London:	Macmillan;	Fidler	D	(2004),	“Germs,	Governance	and	Global	Public	Health	in	the	Wake	of	SARS”.	
The	Journal	of	Clinical	Investigation,	113(6):	799‐804;	Fidler	D	(2005),	“Health,	Globalisation	and	
Governance:	An	Introduction	to	Public	Health’s	New	World	Order”,	in	Lee	K	and	Collin	J	(eds.),	Global	
Change	and	Health,	Berkshire:	Open	University	Press.	
5	Kathryn	W	and	Banda	M	(2009),	“The	role	of	civil	society	in	pandemic	preparedness,”	in	Cooper	A	and	
Kirton	J	(2009),	Innovation	in	Global	Health	Governance:	Critical	Cases,	Surrey:	Ashgate	Publishing:	105‐
127;	Lee	K	et	al.	(2009),	“Global	governance	for	health,”	in	Labonte	R,	Schrecker	T,	Packer	C	and	Runnels	
V	(eds.),	Globalization	and	Health:	Pathways,	Evidence	and	Policy,	New	York:	Routledge:	289‐316.	
6	Zacher	M	and	Keefe	T	(2008),	The	Politics	of	Global	Health	governance:	United	By	Contagion,	New	York:	
Palgrave	MacMillan.			
7	Lee	K	(2003),	Globalization	and	Health:	An	Introduction.	Palgrave	Macmillan:	Hampshire.	
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These	questions	have	largely	been	neglected	in	the	mainstream	GHG	literature	to	date,	
amid	a	preoccupation	with	the	quest	to	identify	the	most	“effective”	technical	
intervention	or	institutional	mechanisms	for	delivering	it.		What	is	“effective”,	however,	
raises	fundamental	questions	about	how	effectiveness	is	defined	and	decided.		Based	on	
the	assumptions	of	inherent	material	conditions	and	institutional	setting,	the	existing	
literature	has	been	engrossed	with	assessing	the	operational	requirements	with	regard	
to	international	collaboration	between	multiple	actors,	or	the	administrative	
effectiveness	of	global	health	institutions.		Little	attention	has	been	given	to	the	
normative	basis	of	how	the	GHG	of	disease	outbreaks	has	been	constructed.		Some	
studies,	such	as	by	Shiffman,	McInnes	et	al.	and	others,	have	begun	to	provide	insights	
into	how	different	paradigms	or	normative	frameworks	shape	global	health	
cooperation.8			To	date,	however,	few	studies	offer	a	detailed	critical	examination	of	
what	norms	have	been	influential,	and	how	such	norms	come	to	dominate	the	GHG	of	
specific	infectious	diseases.9	
Understanding	ideational	power	in	GHG	is	important,	not	only	because	it	fills	an	
important	knowledge	gap	in	mainstream	GHG	studies,	which	has	largely	neglected	the	
role	of	ideas	contributing	to	the	shaping	of	policy,	but	because	it	helps	clarify	why	
certain	issues	assume	a	position	of	priority	attention	(if	not	domination)	in	the	global	
agenda	while	others	are	overlooked.		In	this	regard,	what	Kelley	Lee	calls	a	“contested	
landscape”	of	GHG	is	inspiring.		Based	on	Robert	Cox’s	writings	on	critical	theory	in	
International	Relations,	Lee	seeks	to	reframe	current	debates	on	GHG	by	focusing	
attention	on	underlying	normative	differences	in	perspectives	about	what	agreed	goals	
should	be	achieved	in	global	health,	and	how	to	pursue	them	most	effectively.10		It	
therefore	might	be	interesting	to	see	and	comprehend	the	rise	and	fall	of	different,	and	
sometimes	competing,	perspectives	in	a	given	issue	area,	and	to	explain	the	factors	that	
promote	certain	perspectives	to	prominence	over	others.		An	analysis	of	the	manner	in	
which	global	health	issues	are	articulated	and	institutionalised	provides	a	fuller	
understanding	of	the	power	of	ideas	and	the	emerging	nature	of	GHG.				
This	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	this	critical	approach	to	the	study	of	GHG	by	
understanding	how	the	global	policy	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	was	shaped	by	
normatively‐based	perspectives.		The	argument	presented	in	this	thesis	is,	not	that	the	
                                                            
8	Stuckler	D	and	McKee	M	(2008),	“Five	metaphors	about	global‐health	policy,”	The	Lancet,	vol.	372:	95‐
97.	
9	Shiffman	J	(2009),	“A	social	explanation	for	the	rise	and	fall	of	global	health	issues,”	Bulletin	of	World	
Health	Organisation,	vol.	87:	608‐613;	McDougall	C,	Upshur	R,	and	Wilson	K	(2008),	“Emerging	norms	for	
the	control	of	emerging	epidemics,”	Bulletin	of	World	Health	Organization,	vol.	86(8):	643‐645;	Labonte	R	
and	Gagnon	M	(2010),	Framing	health	and	foreign	policy:	lessons	for	global	health	diplomacy,	
Globalisation	and	Health,	6:	14;	McInnes	C,	Kamradt‐Scott	A,	Lee	K,	Romer‐Mahler	A,	Rushton	S,	Williams	
OD	(2014),	The	Transformation	of	Global	Health	Governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	McMillan;	Lee	K	and	
Kamradt‐Scott	A	(2014),	The	multiple	meanings	of	global	health	governance:	a	call	for	conceptual	clarity,	
Globalisation	and	Health,	10:	28.		
10	Lee	K	(2009),	“Understanding	global	health	governance:	the	contested	landscape,”	in	Kay	A	and	
Williams	O	(eds.),	Global	Health	Governance:	Crisis,	Institutions	and	Political	Economy,	London:	Palgrave	
Macmillan.	
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ideational	dimension	provides	a	complete	account	of	GHG,	or	that	material	based	
accounts	do	not	contribute	to	the	understanding	of	global	policy	responses	to	infectious	
disease	outbreaks.		Rather,	it	suggests	that	fuller	understanding	of	the	GHG	of	infectious	
diseases	must	include	both	analysis	of	material	and	ideational	factors	which	underpin	
the	emerging	GHG	landscape.		As	Lee	puts	it,	“any	debates	about	the	future	of	GHG	must	
begin	with	a	critical	analysis	of	the	normative	basis	of	its	study	and	practice.”11	
To	fulfil	this	task,	this	thesis	draws	on	conceptual	and	analytical	insights	from	the	
discipline	of	International	Relations	–	specifically	the	theoretical	approach	of	Social	
Constructivism	–	to	examine	how	the	terms	of	discourse	on	infectious	disease	issues,	
and	SARS	in	particular,	have	been	socially	constructed	over	time.		Social	Constructivism,	
discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	is	crucial	to	this	study	in	two	ways.	First,	it	highlights	the	role	
of	discourse	and	ideas	in	analysing	policy	decisions	and	collective	action,	which	is	so	far	
largely	ignored	in	the	current	literature.		From	a	Social	Constructivist	perspective,	the	
evolution	of	ideas	is	more	than	just	a	rational	response	by	self‐interested	powerful	
actors.		Rather,	it	is	about	the	way	that	actors	form	intersubjective	understandings	of	
ideas	which,	in	turn,	influence	material	reality.		Second,	it	uncovers	the	processes	that	
have	generated	consensus	on	public	health	measures,	through	which	policy	ideas	and	
the	rationale	that	underpins	them	have	been	developed.		Thus	Social	Constructivism	
helps	us	to	understand	why	certain	policies	were	developed	and	implemented	over	
others,	whose	ideas	informed	these	developments	and	predominated.	
Understanding	the	ideational	aspects	of	GHG	leads	us	to	the	need	to	identify	and	explain	
whose	ideas	are	deemed	legitimate	and	important,	and	how	these	ideas	are	played	out	
in	the	GHG	landscape.	In	this	thesis,	the	researcher	focuses	particularly	on	the	role	of	
key	“experts”	and	their	networks,	what	Peter	Haas	calls	“epistemic	communities”12,	to	
explain	how	the	process	of	ideational	development	shaping	GHG	is	inextricably	
intertwined	with	individuals	engaged	in	fostering	policy	changes.		The	epistemic	
communities	concept	is	particularly	relevant	to	this	study	because	it	demonstrates	that	
the	key	to	understanding	policy	evolution	lies	in	understanding	the	actors	whose	
control	over	knowledge	is	vital	in	providing	the	rationale	for	policy	and	in	creating	and	
sustaining	a	normative	and	ideational	framework.		Additionally,	the	epistemic	
communities	concept	aids	in	explaining	how	such	ideational	construction	contributes	to	
our	understanding	of	the	changing	nature	of	GHG	for	infectious	diseases	with	a	global	
reach,	and	wider	responses	to	disease	issues	in	particular.		The	concept	of	epistemic	
communities,	by	recognising	the	discursive	terrain	of	policy	making,	will	broaden	the	
study	of	global	health	by	enhancing	the	understanding	of	how	global	health	policy	
                                                            
11	Lee	K	(2009),	“Understanding	of	global	health	governance:	the	contested	landscape,”	p.	28.	
12	 Haas	 P	 (1992),	 “Introduction:	 Epistemic	 Communities	 and	 International	 Policy	 Coordination”,	
International	 Organization,	 Vol.	 46,	 N0.1:	 1‐35,	 p.	 3;	 Haas	 P	 (2001),	 “Policy	 Knowledge:	 Epistemic	
Communities”,	 in	Smelse	N	and	Bates	P	(eds.),	International	Encyclopaedia	of	the	Social	and	Behavioural	
Sciences,	Amsterdam:	Elsevier,	pp.	11579‐60.	
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making	takes	place.		A	fuller	discussion	of	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities	is	
found	in	Chapter	Two.		
Using	the	above	conceptual	and	analytical	approach,	this	study	provides	an	empirical	
account	of	the	evolution	of	global	policy	making	on	the	SARS	outbreak	through	a	two‐
pronged	strategy.		First,	it	identifies	key	individuals	and	their	linkages	with	each	other	
during	the	course	of	policy	development,	their	underlying	rationales	and	ideas,	and	the	
major	issue‐areas	that	have	been	shaped	by	such	actors.		Second,	it	uses	this	account	to	
explore	and	understand	wider	questions	concerning	the	changing	nature	of	the	GHG	of	
infectious	diseases.	In	this	process,	the	practices	of	global	health	policy	making,	where	
certain	ideas	become	the	legitimizing	principles	of	global	health	policy	actions	battling	
against	SARS,	will	be	more	fully	assessed.		
1.	2.	RESEARCH	AIM	AND	OBJECTIVES	
	
The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	understand	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	in	the	global	
response	to	SARS,	through	the	lens	of	Social	Constructivism,	to	explain	the	extent	to	
which	ideational	factors	and	the	normative	power	constructed	through	them	
contributed	to	the	shaping	of	GHG	surrounding	infectious	disease	outbreaks.		In	
undertaking	the	above	research,	this	study	seeks	to	enrich	understanding	of	GHG	on	
infectious	diseases	through	both	conceptual	and	empirical	analyses.		Conceptually,	this	
thesis	aims	to	strengthen	the	existing	literature	on	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	by	
demonstrating	how	the	ideational	power	which	epistemic	communities	hold	and	
exercise	influences	policy	action	in	GHG.		In	doing	so,	this	research	bolsters	our	
understanding	of	Social	Constructivism	as	a	useful	theoretical	perspective	in	health	
policy	analysis,	filling	explanatory	gaps	in	the	area	of	GHG.		Practically,	this	thesis	
enhances	the	understanding	of	the	process	of	global	policy	making	towards	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	through	an	in‐depth	investigation	of	the	mechanisms	by	which	
epistemic	communities	serve	as	key	sources	of	advice	to	policy	making.		This	serves	to	
address	a	significant	gap	in	the	existing	global	policy‐making	literature	as	to	how	
certain	practices	come	to	be	constructed	as	legitimate.		Ultimately,	during	a	period	of	
much	policy	debate	about	how	to	achieve	effective	and	appropriate	forms	of	collective	
action	in	a	globalising	world,	such	knowledge	may	contribute	to	more	reflective	and	
critical	debates	on	GHG.	
	
To	achieve	the	above	aim,	the	research	will	fulfil	a	number	of	specific	objectives,	
supported	by	key	research	questions,	as	presented	in	Table	1.1.		
Table	1.1.	Objectives	of	the	research	and	key	research	questions	
	
Objectives	 Key	Research	Questions	
1. To	critically	review	the	existing	
literature	on	GHG	of	infectious	
 How	has	the	term	GHG	been	defined	
and	applied	in	relation	to	infectious	
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disease	outbreaks	 diseases in	the	literature	to	date?	
 How	has	the	governance	of	SARS	been	
analysed	to	date?			
 To	what	extent	has	discourse	been	
analysed	in	the	GHG	of	infectious	
diseases,	SARS	in	particular?			
 What	are	the	current	limitations	of	the	
existing	literature?	
2. To	develop	a	conceptual	framework	
to	analyse	the	SARS	outbreak	based	
on	the	concept	of	epistemic	
communities		
 To	what	extent	can	the	concept	of	
epistemic	communities	be	used	to	
analyse	SARS?			
 What	are	the	strengths	and	
weaknesses	of	such	a	conceptual	
framework?	
3. To	locate	the	transnational	epistemic	
communities	concerned	with	SARS	
by	identifying	key	actors	and	their	
linkages	to	each	other	
 What	key	actors	contributed	to	the	
global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak?	
 What	interests	and	ideas	characterised	
these	individual	and	institutional	
actors?			
 How	did	these	actors	interact	with	
other	actors?			
 What	institutional	linkages	were	
formed?	
4. To	analyse	the	discourses	
constructed	by	this	epistemic	
community	
 How	was	the	problem	of	SARS	framed?	
 Which	actors	can	be	identified	with	
which	discourses?	
 In	which	issue‐areas	was	it	dominant?	
5. To	understand	how,	and	to	what	
extent,	the	discourses	put	forth	by	
the	epistemic	communities	impacted	
on	the	practical	policy	response	to	
SARS	
	
 How	did	each	discourse	influence	
policy	decisions	and	actions	on	SARS	
over	time?	
 Was	any	discourse(s)	distinct	in	
shaping	the	global	response	to	SARS?	
 Which	actors	have	been	dominant?	
6. To	draw	conclusions	about	the	
nature	of	emerging	forms	of	GHG	
	
 What	does	this	analysis	tell	us	about	
how	the	policy	agenda	and	action	have	
been	defined	and	pursued	at	the	global	
level?			
 What	characterises	the	political	nature	
of	the	GHG	of	SARS?			
 How	do	we	revisit	the	notion	of	GHG,	
particularly	of	infectious	diseases	in	
light	of	this	analysis?		
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1.	3.	A	REVIEW	OF	THE	LITERATURE		
1.3.1.	Global	governance:	multiplicity,	intersection	and	blurred	boundaries	
	
The	concept	of	global	governance	arose	within	the	academic	fields	of	Government,	
Politics	and	International	Relations	during	the	1980s.		Over	the	past	four	decades,	the	
global	governance	literature	has	expanded	in	breadth,	depth	and	sophistication.		The	
literature	expanded	especially	alongside	the	study	of	globalisation.		
Globalisation	can	be	defined	as	“the	widening,	deepening	and	speeding	up	of	worldwide	
interconnectedness	in	all	aspects	of	contemporary	social	life,	from	the	cultural	to	the	
criminal,	the	financial	to	the	spiritual”.13		The	process	of	globalisation	is	best	
summarised	as	the	intensification	and	acceleration	of	cross‐border	flows	of	people,	
goods,	services	and	ideas.14		Globalisation	indeed	can	be	understood	by	the	following	
three		characteristics:	First,	the	spatial	reach	and	density	of	global	and	transnational	
interconnectedness	weave	complex	webs	and	networks	of	relations	among	
communities,	states,	international	institutions,	non‐governmental	organisations	and	
corporations,	and	these	overlapping	and	interacting	networks	both	empower	and	
constrain	communities,	states	and	social	forces.		Second,	social	and	political	activities	
are	increasingly	“stretched”	across	the	globe	and	significantly,	they	may	no	longer	
primarily	and	solely	be	organised	according	to	territorial	principles.		At	the	same	time,	
they	may	generate	pressures	for	socio‐activities	to	be	re‐territorialised	in	the	form	of	
sub/supra‐national	zones	or	modes	of	governance.		Third,	globalisation	is	concerned	
with	the	expanding	scale	by	which	power	is	organised	–	the	exercise	of	power	in	one	
locale	can	have	effects	on	another.		
Through	its	principal	drivers,	globalisation	has	brought	about	a	large	number	of	
unprecedented	problems,	and	intensified	existing	ones,	by	modifying	their	individual	
nature	and	cross‐linking	the	issues	to	form	a	myriad	and	sophisticated	network	of	
challenges.		This	network	of	interconnectedness,	which	is	the	principal	theme	behind	
the	idea	of	globalisation,	essentially	reduces	the	constraints	of	time	and	space	through	
the	following	five	drivers:15	(a)	the	changing	infrastructure	of	global	communications	
linked	to	the	information	technology	revolution;	(b)	the	development	of	the	global	
market	in	goods	and	services,	facilitated	by	new	information	distribution	channels;	(c)	
the	pressure	of	migration	and	the	movement	of	people,	linked	to	shifts	in	patterns	of	
economic	demand,	demography	and	environmental	degradation;	(d)	the	end	of	the	Cold	
War	and	the	diffusion	of	democratic	and	consumer	values	across	many	of	the	world’s	
regions,	alongside	some	marked	reactions	to	this;	and	(e)	the	emergence	of	a	new	type	
and	form	of	global	civil	society,	with	the	crystallisation	of	elements	of	a	new	global	
public	opinion.		Globalisation	has	therefore	created	a	public	domain	by	which	various	
                                                            
13	Held	D,	McGrew	A,	Goldblatt	D,	Perraton	J	(eds.)	(1999),	Global	Transformations:	Politics,	Economics	and	
Culture,	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	chapter	1,	in	particular	p.	27.	
14	Ibid.,	pp.	15‐16.		
15	Held	D	(2006),	“Reframing	Global	Governance:	Apocalypse	Soon	or	Reform!”	New	Political	Economy,	
11(2):	157‐176.	
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actors	assert	their	claims,	defend	their	interests,	debate	rules	and	policies,	contest	
truths	and	construct	norms.	In	short,	the	globalisation	process	has	intensified	the	
density	of	social	and	political	interactions	on	a	global	scale.16	
Experts	disagree	on	the	implications17	18	of	globalisation	–	on	whether	the	process	of	
globalisation	brings	about	more	opportunities19	20	than	threats.21	22		But	as	debate	
rages,	there	is	consensus	that	new	models	of	transnational	governance	are	needed	to	
supersede	the	existing	forms	of	“international	co‐operation”	mandated	by	the	
Westphalian	system.		The	need	for	new	forms	of	governance	stems	from	the	challenges	
humanity	is	facing	on	a	daily	basis	as	they	grow	in	intensity	and	extensity,	but	the	
approaches	in	handling	these	challenges	are	weak	and	incomplete.		Even	as	humanity	
stands	at	the	forefront	of	the	knowledge	frontier,	with	remarkable	progress	in	the	field	
of	science	and	technology,	humanity	stands	at	the	edge	of	an	abyss	of	a	range	of	global	
externalities	which	could	lead	to	catastrophic	consequences	for	humanity’s	continued	
survival,	if	left	unaddressed.	There	are	many	of	these	challenges.		The	lack	of	a	
framework	to	tackle	the	risks	of	global	warming	and	environmental	degradation;	the	
absence	of	an	overarching	supra‐national	authority	to	control,	if	not	eliminate,	weapons	
of	mass	destruction;	the	deficiency	in	capacity	to	deal	with	illicit	activities	and	criminal	
acts;	and	the	inability	of	existing	global	institutions	to	work	towards	effectively	
achieving	equitable	human	development	goals	in	areas	of	education,	poverty	
eradication,	sustainable	development	and	health;	all	of	which	goes	to	highlight	the	
ineffectiveness	and	inefficiency	of	humanity	in	tackling	these	challenges.	The	perceived	
inadequacy	of	existing	institutional	frameworks	to	tackle	these	challenges,	as	well	as	the	
rise	of	the	global	civil	society	from	the	1970s	onwards,	is	often	attributed	to	the	
increasing	“ineffectiveness”	of	current	international	co‐operation.23	
                                                            
16	Ruggie	JG	(2004),	Reconstituting	the	Global	Public	Domain	–	Issues,	Actors	and	Practices,	European	
Journal	of	International	Relations,	10(4):	499‐531.	
17	For	example,	see	Dahlman	C	(2007),	“Technology,	globalization,	and	international	competitiveness:	
Challenges	for	developing	countries.”	Available	at:	
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/industrial_development/1_2.pdf		
18	Davis	LE	(2003),	Globalization’s	Security	Implications,	Rand	Issue	papers,	
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2005/IP245.pdf;	also	see	Werlhof	C	
(2008),	The	Consequences	of	Globalization	and	Neoliberal	Policies.	What	are	the	Alternatives?	Centre	for	
Globalization	Paper,	http://www.globalresearch.ca/the‐consequences‐of‐globalization‐and‐neoliberal‐
policies‐what‐are‐the‐alternatives/7973.	
19	Depending	on	the	individual	state’s	attributes,	including	its	size,	relative	power	and	economy	structure,	
globalisation	is	thought	to	have	very	different	implications	for	different	countries.	See	Friedman	TL	
(2000),	The	Lexus	and	the	Olive	Tree:	Understanding	Globalization,	New	York:	Picador.	
20	Bhagwati	J	(2007),	In	Defense	of	Globalization,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press;	also	see	Chamberlain	W,	
Bhagwati	J,	Armington	P	(2012),	Globalization,	Free	Trade	and	World	Health:	Set	the	People	Free,	Create	
Space	Independent	Publishing	Platform.		
21	Mishkin	F	(2008),	The	Next	Great	Globalization:	Disadvantaged	Nations	Can	Harness	Their	Financial	
Systems	to	Get	Rich,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	chapters	4	to	7	in	particular	discuss	the	
challenges	financial	globalization	brings	to	emerging	markets.	
22	Serra	N	and	Stiglitz	J	(2008),	The	Washington	Consensus	Reconsidered:	Towards	a	New	Global	
Governance,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
23	Stiglitz	J	(2002),	Globalization	and	its	Discontents,	New	York:	W.W.	Norton	and	Company.		
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In	response	to	this,	there	appears	to	be	a	consensual	voice	with	the	opinion	that	a	new	
form	of	concerted	effort	to	tackle	global	collective	action	problems	is	needed,	and	this	is	
loosely	termed	as	global	governance.		This	form	of	governance	is	increasingly	seen	as	
critical	to	the	survival	of	mankind.	Scholars	have	therefore	in	recent	years	worked	
towards	building	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	concept	of	global	
governance	and	what	it	entails.		The	problems	envisaged	by	scholars	belong	to	very	
different	domains,	even	though	they	are	interlinked,	and	almost	all	require	complex	
solutions	that	would	involve	efforts	across	geographical	boundaries	and	disciplinary	
divides.		These	domains	include	international	peace	and	security,	economy	and	finance,	
environment,	sustainable	development	and	health,	among	others.		These	problems	all	
require	herculean	efforts	and	wisdom	to	solve,	beyond	the	means	of	a	single	nation‐
state	regardless	of	how	powerful	it	is.		This	indicates	that	global	governance	requires	a	
range	of	institutions,	regimes,	processes,	partnerships,	and	networks	to	contribute	to	
global	collective	action	and	problem	solving.		This	definition	subsumes	formal	and	
informal	arrangements,	as	well	as	the	role	of	non‐state	actors,	in	global	settings.	
Regional	cooperation	may	also	be	regarded	as	an	element	of	global	governance	insofar	
as	it	contributes	to	broader	efforts.		
Conceptually,	governance	differs	from	government,	the	latter	of	which	implies	sovereign	
prerogatives	and	hierarchical	authority.		Thus,	global	governance	does	not	equate	to	
world	government.24	The	absence	of	a	world	government	per	se	is	not	a	new	
phenomenon	in	the	study	of	International	Relations.		In	fact,	anarchy,	defined	as	the	
absence	of	a	supra‐arching	nationality,	is	a	fundamental	assumption	in	both	the	realist	
and	liberal	theories	of	International	Relations.		This	traditional	understanding	of	
international	relations	is	founded	on	negotiations	among	national	governments	based	
on	an	aggregate	of	positions	achieved	from	domestic	consensus	at	the	national	level	(in	
turn,	a	result	of	negotiation	among	national	governments,	interest	groups,	businesses,	
and	unions,	etc.).		The	events	at	the	international	level	are	a	direct	result	of	negotiations	
among	states.		Both	neo‐realists	and	neo‐liberals	agree	that	this	essentially	is	a	question	
of	material	power.		Globalisation,	however,	has	established	transnational	spaces	that	
prevent	the	aggregation	of	interests	at	this	level,	and	this	in	turn	encourages	the	
interaction	between	state	and	non‐state	actors	that	limits	the	political	options	of	
states.25		
In	terms	of	ability,	there	are	four	difficulties26	with	the	traditional	interpretation	of	
International	Relations	in	regards	to	interstate	relations.		First,	there	is	no	clear	division	
between	intergovernmental	agencies,	as	their	functions	often	overlap,	mandates	
frequently	conflict,	and	aims	and	objectives	too	often	get	blurred.		Second,	there	is	
inertia	in	the	system	of	intergovernmental	agencies,	and	far	too	often	these	agencies	fail	
                                                            
24	Global	Governance	2025:	At	a	Critical	Juncture,	p.	17,	available	at:	
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Global__Governance_2025.pdf		
25	Hein	W	and	Moon	S	(2013),	Informal	Norms	in	Global	Governance,	United	Kingdom:	Ashgate,	pp.	18‐19.	
26	 Held	 D	 (2006),	 “Reframing	 global	 governance:	 apocalypse	 soon	 or	 reform!”	New	 Political	 Economy,	
11(2),	pp.	166‐167.	
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to	mount	collective	problem‐solving	solutions,	when	faced	with	disagreement	over	
means,	objectives,	costs,	and	so	on.		Third,	a	growing	number	of	issues	can	be	
characterised	as	intermestic	–	that	is,	issues	which	cross	the	international	and	domestic.		
Fourth,	there	is	the	question	of	an	accountability	deficit	which	in	turn	is	related	to	
power	imbalances	between	states,	and	between	state	and	non‐state	actors,	in	the	
shaping	of	global	policies	and	practices.		All	point	to	the	changing	nature	of	global	
governance	characterised	by	a	multiplicity	of	actors,	no	overarching	authority,	and	
inability	to	set	a	coherent	agenda.		The	result	has	been,	according	to	McInnes	et	al.,	a	
failure	to	grasp	a	consensual	meaning	of	global	governance:		
It	is	unclear	whether	[global	governance]	really	does	refer	to	governance	
of	the	world	on	a	global	scale,	or	of	whatever	governance	there	is	taking	
place	in	the	world.		Although	clearly	more	than	a	“worldwide	tilt	from	
states	to	markets”,	there	is	no	consensus	about	what	this	diverse	set	of	
changes	to	actors,	norms	and	procedures	actually	means.		Held	and	
McGrew	argue	that	it	represents	a	shift	from	states	to	regimes;	Avant	et	
al.	suggests	a	change	in	agenda	setting,	rule‐making,	implementation	and	
monitoring;	Rossenau	suggests	the	emergence	of	a	multi‐centric	
globalised	space,	where	political	agendas	are	set	and	different	rule	
systems	collide;	whereas	others	point	to	the	emergence	of	new	
transnational	networks.27	
Recognising	multiplicity	in	global	governance,	marked	by	a	diverse	range	of	actors	and	
interests,	McInnes	et	al.	characterize	the	nature	of	global	governance	by	arguing	that:	
(1)	global	governance	is	contested;	(2)	the	transformative	change	is	clear	and	rooted	in	
the	narrative	of	globalisation;	(3)	this	transformation	in	global	governance	is	far	more	
than	an	increase	in	the	speed	and	intensity	of	inter‐state	exchanges	–	it	is	on	a	
horizontal	axis	linking	states	as	well	as	a	vertical	axis	linking	supranational	actors	with	
sub‐national	ones;	and	(4)	multi‐level	governance	is	observed	within	an	overall	context	
of	transformed	global	governance.28		
What	the	above	characterisation	implies	is	that	global	governance	constitutes	a	number	
of	different	domains	(for	example,	global	financial	governance,	global	environmental	
governance,	and	global	health	governance;	see	figure	1.1)	with	substantially	
overlapping	(often	competing)	agendas	and	interests.		At	the	same	time,	within	each	
domain,	one	can	expect	that	different	actors	would	be	competing	over	the	
representation	of	the	issues	at	multiple	levels	in	pursuit	of	common	global	goals.	As	we	
will	see	in	the	next	sub‐section,	the	emergence	of	GHG	reflects	on	many	of	these	features	
identified	in	global	governance.	
	
                                                            
27	 Mcinnes	 C,	 Kamradt‐Scott	 A,	 Lee	 K,	 Roemermahler	 A,	 Rushton	 S	 and	 Williams	 OD	 (2014),	 The	
Transformation	of	Global	Health	Governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.	6.	
28	Ibid.,	p.	6.	
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Figure	1.1.	Global	governance	as	overlapping	interests	
Source:		McInnes	et	al.	(2014),	The	transformation	of	global	health	governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	
Macmillan.	
1.3.2.	Changing	institutional	architecture	and	actors	in	GHG		
	
The	subfield	of	Global	Health	Governance	(GHG)	has	received	growing	attention	since	
the	late	1990s.		GHG	lies	at	the	intersection	between	International	Relations	and	Public	
Health.		The	concept	of	global	governance	has	emerged	in	response	to	a	large	number	of	
non‐traditional	actors	that	have	taken	on	roles	of	governance	due	to	changes	in	global	
contexts	and	to	the	capacity	of	sovereign	states.		The	concept	of	global	governance	has	
been	applied	to	the	health	field	since	the	early	2000s.		Focusing	on	the	challenges	
creating	a	governance	gap	from	International	Health	Governance	(IHG)	to	GHG,	this	
literature	provides	an	important	provenance	to	the	analysis	of	GHG.29	Dodgson	et	al.30	
coined	the	term	Global	Health	Governance	as	“the	actions	and	means	adopted	by	a	
society	to	organize	itself	in	the	promotion	and	protection	of	the	health	of	its	
                                                            
29	 Dodgson	 R	 et	 al.	 (2002),	 “Global	 Health	 Governance:	 A	 Conceptual	 Review”,	Discussion	 Paper	No.	 1,	
Centre	 on	 Global	 Change	 and	 Health	 and	World	 Health	 Organization;	 Fidler	 D	 (2002),	 “Global	 Health	
Governance:	Overview	of	the	Role	of	International	Law”,	Discussion	Paper	No.	3,	Centre	on	Global	Change	
and	 Health	 and	World	 Health	 Organization;	 Lee	 K	 (2003);	 Loughlin	 K	 and	 Berridge	 V	 (2002),	 “Global	
Health	Governance:	Historical	Dimensions	of	Global	Governance”,	Discussion	Paper	No.	2,	Centre	on	Global	
Change	and	Health	and	World	Health	Organization.			
30	Dodgson	R	et	al.	(2002),	“Global	Health	Governance:	A	Conceptual	Review”,	p.	16.	
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population”.		GHG	is	driven	by	the	need	to	address	health	determinants	and	outcomes	
that	spill	over	and	disregard	territorial	space.31		Although	the	term	has	come	to	be	
widely	used	by	scholars	and	policy	makers,	the	term	“GHG”	does	not	have	a	shared	
understanding.		
	
In	their	systematic	review	of	the	GHG	literature,	Lee	and	Kamradt‐Scott	identified	that	
three	distinct	meanings	of	GHG	emerged	in	GHG	scholarship	on	the	basis	of	their	
ontological	variations:	“globalisation	and	health	governance”,	“global	governance	and	
health”,	and	“governance	for	global	health”.32		The	conceptualisation	of	“globalisation	
and	health	governance”	primarily	deals	with	the	institutional	actors,	arrangements	and	
policymaking	processes	that	govern	health	issues	in	an	increasingly	globalising	world.	
The	use	of	“global	governance	and	health”	focuses	on	policy	decisions	of	multilateral	
financial	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank,	IMF	and	WTO,	and	the	need	to	improve	
good	governance	within	these	institutions.		The	meaning	of	“governance	for	global	
health”,	which	seems	close	to	what	this	study	intends	to	use	given	the	normative	
underpinnings	reflected	in	the	term,	concerns	what	governance	arrangements	are	
needed	to	further	agreed	global	health	goals.		As	Lee	and	Kamradt‐Scott	suggest,	this	
conceptual	diversity	is	derived	from	the	multidisciplinary	nature	of	GHG	scholarship,	
where	the	theory	and	practice	of	GHG	are	rarely	brought	together.		Arguably,	the	
conceptual	imprecision	would	also	mean	a	greater	complexity	in	defining	existing	
institutional	arrangements	within	emerging	GHG	and	their	normative	underpinnings.	
Indeed,	structures	of	global	health	have	emerged	alongside	increased	state	
interdependency,	a	growth	in	global	trade,	and	the	movement	of	goods	and	people.		
With	the	accelerated	impact	of	globalisation,	there	has	been	a	flourishing	of	actors	and	
arrangements	to	address	and	harness	issues	pertaining	to	global	health	inequality,	
creating	what	Rosenau	terms	as	“multiple	spheres	of	autonomy.”33		Today,	like	global	
governance	as	a	whole,	global	health	is	characterised	by	a	shift	from	the	traditional	idea	
of	international	health	cooperation,	with	a	nation‐state	as	a	central	actor,	towards	
multiple	approaches	to	global	health	issues	through	concerted	efforts	by	both	supra	and	
sub‐national	actors.		Scholars	have	discussed	the	role	of	emerging	actors	with	the	
common	interest	of	global	health	but	differing	approaches	as	to	how	this	goal	can	be	
achieved.		The	following	briefly	outlines	the	role	some	of	these	actors	play	and	how	
these	approaches	to	global	health	present	policy	and	practice.		
The	World	Health	Organization,34	together	with	the	World	Bank,35	remains	a	significant	
actor	in	GHG.		The	WHO	is	the	United	Nations	specialised	agency	for	health	with	194	
                                                            
31	Lee	K	(2003),	Globalization	and	Health:	An	Introduction;	Fidler	D	(2005),	“Health,	Globalisation	and	
Governance:	An	Introduction	to	Public	Health’s	New	World	Order”.	
32	Lee	K	and	Kamradt‐Scott	A	(2014),	The	multiple	meanings	of	global	health	governance:	a	call	for	
conceptual	clarity,	Globalisation	and	Health,	10:	28.		
33	Rosenau	JN	(1990),	Turbulence	in	World	Politics,	New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	p.	192;	also	
see	Rosenau	JN	(2003),	Distant	Proximities:	Dynamics	beyond	Globalization,	New	Jersey	&	Oxford:	
Princeton	University	Press,	chapter	3	in	particular.	
34	See	the	official	World	Health	Organization	website,	available	at	http://www.who.int/en/		
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member	states.	Established	in	1948,	it	played	a	leading	role	in	the	eradication	of	
smallpox,	and	a	central	role	in	the	control	of	HIV/AIDS,	tuberculosis	and	malaria,	as	well	
as	non‐communicable	diseases,	mental	health,	and	sexual	and	reproductive	health,	
amongst	others.		The	budget	of	the	WHO	in	2012‐2013	was	$3,959	million.36	
Underpinning	the	WHO	is	the	fundamental	idea	that	health	is	a	human	right	and	
intrinsic	to	the	personal,	social	and	economic	development	of	individuals,	states	and	the	
societies	in	which	we	live.		The	WHO	therefore	has	prioritised	these	concerns	through	
sustained	interventions	into	specific	health	issues	and	diseases,	and	emphasises	the	
need	for	primary	healthcare	provisions	and	the	role	of	health	system	strengthening.		
The	WHO	has,	however,	struggled	to	balance	its	fundamental	commitment	to	a	right	to	
health	against	the	growing	presence	of	market‐based	health	policies.		This	has	created	
what	Lee	calls	the	problem	between	an	idealised	version	of	health	for	all,	and	the	
practical	aspects	of	implementing	governance	of	global	health	that	have	defined	the	
WHO.37		
The	World	Bank,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	an	institution	that	has	a	direct	mandate	for	
health,	but	rather	a	financial	institution	that	is	a	constituent	of	the	World	Bank	Group	
and	a	member	of	the	United	Nations	Development	Group.		The	World	Bank’s	main	
mandate	is	providing	financing	for	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
Through	its	programs	aimed	at	the	promotion	of	international	trade	and	investment,	it	
is	often	the	main	funding	source	for	certain	health	programs.		The	Bank’s	approach	to	
global	health	can	be	outlined	by	its	co‐financing	of	health	sector	programs,	neoliberal	
reform	and	structural	adjustment	in	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s.		Underpinning	the	
Bank’s	health	lending	are	neoliberal	values38	supporting	the	reduction	of	state	
provision,	the	role	of	market	and	decentralisation	within	health	sector	reform.		Studies	
have	found	that	these	policies	have	led	to	the	reduction	of	healthcare	provision	in	many	
developing	countries.39		The	Bank	has	expanded	its	role	in	global	health	through	its	
poverty	reduction	strategy	as	part	of	a	broader	approach	to	development.			It	promoted	
a	good	governance	agenda	with	an	aim	to	ensure	transparency,	accountability	and	
participation	within	borrower	states.		The	idea	of	good	governance	is	held	up	by	some	
as	a	transformative	concept	that	can	facilitate	poverty	eradication.		Yet,	critics	argue	
that	aid	donors	and	the	Bank	tend	to	use	good	governance	in	a	narrow	and	technocratic	
                                                                                                                                                                                        
35	See	World	Bank	Website,	available	at	http://www.worldbank.org		
36	The	Budget	of	the	World	Health	Organization,	published	on	the	WHO	Website.	See	
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/pb/2012‐2013/PB_2012–2013_eng.pdf?ua=1		
37	Lee	K	(2009),	The	World	Health	Organisation,	London:	Routledge.	
38	Harman	S	(2009),	“The	World	Bank	and	health,”	In	Kay	and	Williams	O	(eds.),	Global	Health	
Governance:	Crises,	Institutions	and	Political	Economy,	London:	Palgrave.	
39	Ugalde	A	and	Jackson	J	(1995),	“The	World	Bank	and	international	health	policy:	a	critical	review”	
Journal	of	International	Development,	7(3):	525‐41;	Nuruzzaman	M	(2007),	“The	World	Bank,	health	
policy	reforms	and	the	poor,”	Journal	of	Contemporary	Asia,	37(1):	59‐72.		
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sense,	leading	to	focus	on	the	effectiveness	of	state	rather	than	the	equity	of	the	
economic	system	and	the	legitimacy	of	the	power	structure.40				
The	governments	of	high‐income	countries	have	growing	interests	in	health	mandates	
and	initiatives,	and	are	often	involved	in	a	host	of	initiatives	not	only	independently,41	
but	also	bilaterally42	and	multilaterally.43	44		In	particular,	the	G8	countries	–	the	US,	
Russia,	Japan,	Canada,	the	UK,	France,	Italy	and	Germany	–	engage	in	health	financing	
and	service	provision	as	exemplified	in	the	development	of	the	Global	Fund	to	Fight	
AIDS,	Tuberculosis	and	Malaria	(Global	Fund).	The	Global	Fund	was	created	by	G8	
members	in	2001	to	combat	three	diseases	(HIV/AIDS,	malaria	and	Tuberculosis).	
Infectious	diseases	have	been	the	focus	of	G8’s	agendas	as	part	of	wider	social	aspects	of	
development	particularly	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	along	with	the	UN	Millennium	
Development	Goals.45		In	terms	of	the	G8’s	contribution	to	GHG,	a	great	deal	of	attention	
is	paid	to	vertical	interventions	into	big	diseases,	with	HIV/AIDS	at	the	top	of	the	
agenda,	while	socioeconomic	determinants	of	health	such	as	health	system	
strengthening	remain	unaddressed	in	this	forum.		This	is	partly	because,	according	to	
Harman,	health	is	not	fundamental	to	G8’s	agenda	and	is	in	fact	a	second	tier	to	issues	of	
the	global	political	economy.	46		Indeed,	the	G8	have	not	considered	global	health	in	
either	their	2011	or	2012	agendas.	47	
Beyond	the	G8,	a	notable	initiative	by	the	government	of	nation‐states	is	also	found	in	
the	US’s	engagement	in	global	health.		The	US	government	stands	as	one	of	the	largest	
donors	to	many	global	health	initiatives,	ranging	from	HIV/AIDS	and	malaria	
                                                            
40	Stiglitz	J	(2003),	"Democratizing	the	International	Monetary	Fund	and	the	World	Bank:	governance	
and	accountability",	Governance:	An	International	Journal	of	Policy,	Administration	and	Institutions,	16	
(l):		111‐139;	Santiso	C	(2002),	“Governance	Conditionality	and	the	Reform	of	Multilateral	Development	
Finance:	The	Role	of	the	Group	of	Eight,”	G8	Governance,	No	7.	
41	For	example,	Japan	has	been	a	supporter	of	G8	efforts	and	multilateral	efforts	such	as	the	Global	Fund	
to	Fight	HIV/AIDS,	Tuberculosis	and	Malaria	and	non‐communicable	diseases.	In	2013,	Japan	established	
the	Global	Health	Innovative	Technology	Fund,	essentially	something	Japan	perceives	as	the	new	model	
for	funding	health	research.	See	Prime	Minister’s	Abe’s	commentary	on	Japan’s	Strategy	on	Global	Health.	
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000014304.pdf;	Also	see	Japan’s	Centre	for	International	Exchange,	JCIE’s	
website	for	more	information	on	Japan’s	grant	activities.	http://www.jcie.or.jp/cross/globalhealth/cgh‐
jc01.pdf		
42	For	example,	Canada‐Australia	Research	Partnership	for	the	Prevention	of	Emerging	Diseases,	available	
at	http://www.ghri.ca	
43	For	an	example	of	a	multilateral	G8	co‐operation	on	the	Muskoka	initiative,	see	http://www.acdi‐
cida.gc.ca/acdi‐cida/acdi‐cida.nsf/En/FRA‐119133138‐PQT		
44	In	June	2010,	Prime	Minister	Stephen	Harper	announced	at	the	G‐8	Summit	in	Muskoka,	Canada’s	
commitment	of	US	$2.85	billion	over	five	years	to	help	save	the	lives	of	mothers,	children	and	newborns	
in	developing	countries.	Of	that,	$1.1	billion	was	new	funding	for	the	Muskoka	Initiative	on	Maternal,	
Newborn	and	Child	Health	while	the	remaining	$1.75	billion	maintained	current	funding	levels	for	similar	
initiatives	through	the	Canadian	International	Development	Agency	(CIDA).		
45	Kirton	J	and	Kokotis	E	(2007),	“Keeping	faith	with	Africa’s	health:	catalyzing	G8	compliance,”	In	Cooper	
A,	Kirton	J,	Schrecker	T	(eds.),	Governing	Global	Health:	Challenges,	Response,	Innovation,	Aldershot:	
Ashgate.		
46	Harman	S	(2012),	Global	Health	Governance,	New	York:	Routledge.	
47	Glassman	A	(2012),	What	happened	to	health	at	the	G8?	Washington:	Centre	for	Global	development.	
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eradication	to	maternal	health.	48		As	one	of	the	largest	donors,	the	US	has	committed	at	
least	USD$15	billion	to	fight	HIV/AIDS,	as	embodied	by	the	President	Emergency	Fund	
for	AIDS	Relief	(PEPFAR).49		The	initiative	involves	government	bodies	formulating	and	
implementing	policies,	but	more	often	than	not,	it	involves	them	collaborating	with	
other	entities	such	as	NGOs	or	transnational	civil	society	organizations	to	effect	
change.50		PEPFAR	is	seen	by	many	as	a	key	part	of	the	effort	to	scale	up	universal	
access	to	antiretroviral	treatment	for	people	living	with	HIV/AIDS.		While	humanitarian	
at	first	sight,	PEPFAR	was	very	slow	to	allow	the	use	of	cheaper	generic	drugs	as	part	of	
the	HIV/AIDS	treatment	regimen.	Some	believe	that	PEPFAR	was	put	into	place	to	
protect	the	commercial	interests	of	the	US	pharmaceutical	industry	and	preserve	these	
corporations’	place	in	the	global	supply	chain	for	the	rolling‐out	of	HIV/AIDS	treatment	
during	the	early	years	of	its	programme.51		
One	relatively	recent	phenomenon	is	the	increasing	role	of	private	actors	(both	for	and	
not‐for‐profit)	in	GHG.		Although	private	actors	have	long	played	a	role	in	the	financing	
and	provision	of	health	care,	the	scope	and	scale	of	their	involvement	in	global	health	
agenda	setting	have	somewhat	transformed	the	landscape	of	GHG	in	a	way	that	was	
unseen	two	decades	ago.		Besides	the	emergence	of	private	businesses,	we	are	also	
seeing	public‐private	partnerships	and	philanthropic	organisations	in	setting	and	
contributing	to	the	global	health	agenda.		The	private	for	profit	actors,	often	out	of	
direct	business	interests,	partake	in	activities	making	them	important	actors	in	GHG.		
Large	pharmaceutical	companies,	such	as	GlaxoSmithKline	and	Pfizer52	intervene	
directly	through	the	research	and	manufacture	of	drugs.	They	negotiate	with	
governments	and	international	regimes	over	a	host	of	health	issues,	regulations	and	
questions	pertaining	to	medicines.		These	actors	have	often	been	criticized	for	their	
apparent	disregard	for	the	poor	and	focus	on	profits,	concentrating	efforts	on	research	
and	development	of	drugs	for	the	relatively	wealthy.		There	has	also	been	a	significant	
rise	in	the	number	and	scope	of	private	philanthropic	organisations	(e.g.	Clinton	
Foundation,	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation,)	since	the	1990s,	with	many	focusing	
their	efforts	on	selected	diseases	such	as	HIV/AIDS.		These	organisations	shape	the	
international	agenda	on	health	cooperation	through	funding	specific	health	
interventions,	notably	biomedical	research.		These	organisations	are	described	by	
literature	as	having	employed	business	tools	to	select	projects	where	progress	can	be	
monitored.53		While	this	results‐oriented	and	entrepreneurial	approach	is	claimed	to	
                                                            
48	For	a	full	list	of	the	US	government’s	Health	initiative’s	health	targets,	see	Annex	A,	
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/136504.pdf		
49	See	the	Fund’s	website,	http://www.pepfar.gov		
50	Maclean	S	and	Brown	S	(2009),	“Introduction:	The	Social	Determinants	of	Global	Health	–	Confronting	
Inequities”	In	Maclean	S,	Brown	S	and	Fourie	P	(eds.),	Health	for	Some:	The	Political	Economy	of	Global	
Health	Governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.	12.	
51	Ingram	A	(2009),	“The	international	political	economy	of	global	responses	to	HIV/AIDS,”	In	Kay	and	
Williams	O	(eds.),	Global	Health	Governance:	Crises,	Institutions	and	Political	Economy,	London:	Palgrave.	
52	For	an	overview	of	Pfizer’s	global	programs,	see	
http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility/global_health/global_health		
53	The	Lancet	editorial	(2007),	“Governance	questions	at	the	Gates	Foundation,”	The	Lancet,	369:	163.	
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demonstrate	innovations	in	terms	of	efficiency	gains	and	project	selection,	some	view	
that	it	leads	to	the	neglect	of	certain	health	issues	that	do	not	demonstrate	an	adequate	
return	on	donor	investment	but	are	nonetheless	significant	in	improving	the	health	of	
the	marginalised	population.54		Studies	highlight	that	the	redirection	of	functions	
towards	private	not	for	profit	organisations	has	significant	consequences	for	global	
health	priority‐setting.		For	example,	the	initiatives	of	the	Gates	Foundation	primarily	
focus	on	disease	eradication	through	vaccine	research	on	malaria,	HIV/AIDS,	guinea	
worm	and	polio.			Although	the	foundation	provides	increased	funding	support,	it	has	
been	criticised	by	some	scholars	for	skewing	attention	towards	biomedical	and	
technological	interventions	into	selected	diseases.55				
A	shift	from	international	to	global	health	is	also	marked	by	the	rise	of	global	public‐
private	partnerships	(GPPPs).	GPPPs,	formalized	as	a	central	feature	of	international	
health	in	the	mid	to	late	1990s,	have	been	portrayed	as	an	opportunity	to	expand	
funding	and	improve	efficiency	in	global	health	efforts.		Examples	of	GPPPs	include	the	
Global	Alliance	for	Vaccines	and	immunisation	(GAVI),	Roll	Back	Malaria	(RBM),	Stop	TB	
Partnership	(Stop	TB),	and	Global	Polio	Eradication	Program	(PEI),	among	others.	The	
GPPPs	involve	a	private	for‐profit	organisation,	an	intergovernmental	organisation	and	
civil	society,	and	the	core	partners	have	joint	shares	in	both	the	efforts	and	rewards.	
While	these	three	parties	are	collaborating,	they	aim	to	achieve	a	win‐win	outcome.	56	
For	multilateral	organisations,	partnership	with	the	private	sector	seems	to	extend	and	
increase	resources	available,	whereas	for	private	entities,	a	partnership	with	non‐state	
actors	offers	increased	corporate	influence	in	global	policy‐making	and	enhanced	
corporate	authority	through	association	with	the	UN	and	other	international	bodies.57	
The	GPPPs	have	been	driven	by	multiple	bilateral	and	multilateral	agencies	such	as	the	
World	Bank,	Rockefeller	Foundation,	United	States	Agency	for	International	
Development	(USAID),	and	UK	Department	for	International	Development	(DFID).	
Sridhar	and	Woods	examine	the	impact	of	“multi‐bi”	aid	–	the	practice	of	donors	
choosing	to	route	non‐core	funding	earmarked	for	specific	themes,	countries	or	regions	
through	multilateral	agencies.		“Multi‐bi”	aid	is	characterized	by	narrower	problem‐
based	mandates,	individual	country‐driven	goals	and	governance,	outcome‐oriented	
legitimacy,	and	voluntary	and	discretionary	funding	as	opposed	to	long‐term	
                                                            
54	Global	Health	Watch	(2008),	Global	Health	Watch	2:	An	Alternative	World	Health	Report,	London:	Zed	
Book.	
55	Ibid.;	also	see	Sridhar	D	and	Batiji	R	(2008),	“Misfinancing	global	health:	a	case	for	transparency	in	
disbursements	and	decision	making,”	The	Lancet,	372(9644):	1185‐91;	McCoy	D,	Chand	S	and	Sridhar	D	
(2009),	“Global	health	funding	–	how	much,	where	it	comes	from	and	where	it	foes,”	Health	Policy	&	
Planning,	24(6):	40‐417;	McCoy	D	and	McGoey	L	(2011),	“Global	health	and	the	Gates	Foundation	–	in	
perspective,”	In	Ruston	S	&	William	OD	(eds.)	(2011),	Partnership	and	Foundation	in	Global	Health	
Governance,	London:	Palgrave	MacMillan.		
56	McCoy	D	and	McGoey	L	(2011),	“Global	health	and	the	Gates	Foundation	–	in	perspective”;	also	see	
Youde	J	(2011),	“The	Clinton	Foundation	and	global	health	governance”,	In	Ruston	S	&	William	OD	(eds.),	
Partnership	and	Foundation	in	Global	Health	Governance,	London:	Palgrave	MacMillan.	
57	Buse	K	and	Harmer	AM	(2007),	“Seven	habits	of	highly	effective	global	public‐private	health	
partnerships:	practice	and	potential,”	Social	Science	and	Medicine,	64(2):	259‐271.	
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commitments	and	no	in‐country	based	presence	for	service	delivery.	58		The	scope	of	
GPPPs	has	been	mainly	limited	to	the	big	three	diseases	(HIV/AIDS,	malaria	and	TB)	
with	a	focus	on	new	vaccines	and	drug	delivery.		This	means	that	“win‐win”	or	mutually	
beneficial	strategies	would	primarily	receive	the	funding	and	attention	necessary	for	
success,	leaving	broader	and	systemic	global	health	goals	including	the	burden	of	non‐
communicable	diseases	largely	unaddressed.59		Williams	and	Rushton60	note	that	
whereas	global	health	partnerships	and	private	not‐for‐profit	foundations61	perform	
their	own	specific	global	health	functions,	they	are	motivated	by	the	similar	ideas	and	
worldviews	of	the	nature	of	global	health	problems	and	how	they	should	be	tackled	
within	larger	governance	arrangements	–	prioritisation	of	vertical	disease‐specific	
programmes	underpinned	by	the	belief	in	the	power	of	science	and	biomedicine	and	the	
principles	of	modern	business	practice.		The	role	of	these	partnerships	and	foundations	
has	been	debated	over	the	claims	that:62	(a)	these	partnerships	and	foundations	are	
filling	gaps	in	the	GHG;	(b)	they	bring	new	sources	of	knowledge	and	expertise;	(c)	they	
provide	higher	levels	of	efficiency;	and	(d)	they	have	huge	reserves	to	draw	on.	There	
are	no	obvious	conclusions,	but	what	is	certain	is	that	these	partnerships	and	
foundations	have	been	criticized	for	their	lack	of	accountability	and	transparency	but	at	
the	same	time	noted	for	their	influence	and	impact	in	GHG.63	
As	described	above,	the	number	and	diversity	of	actors	and	initiatives	makes	GHG	a	
complex	phenomenon	based	on	multiple	relationships	that	represent	a	combination	
between	health	and	non‐health	specific	policies.		Additionally,	the	number	of	actors	and	
initiatives	involved	in	global	health	creates	a	policy	space	characterised	by	contestation	
of	ideas	emanated	from	different	approaches,	perspectives	and	definitions	of	the	
problem	at	hand.		Recognising	the	perceived	and	apparent	inadequacies	in	GHG,	
suggestions	have	been	made	as	to	how	the	current	GHG	mechanisms	can	be	improved.	
While	some	suggest	that	the	structures	of	political	economy	that	underpin	GHG	should	
be	addressed,64	others	agree	that	GHG	needs	to	identify	areas	of	dysfunction	to	enhance	
                                                            
58	Sridhar	D	&	Woods	N	(2013),	“Trojan	multilateralism:	global	cooperation	in	health,”	Global	Policy,	4	(4):	
325‐335.		
59	Sridhar	D,	Brolan	CE,	Durrani	S,	Edge	J,	Gostin	L,	Hill	P,	McKee	M	(2013),	“Recent	shifts	in	global	
governance:	implications	for	response	to	non‐communicable	diseases,	PLOS	Medicine	10:	7.		
60	Ruston	S	&	William	OD	(eds.)	(2011),	Partnership	and	Foundation	in	Global	Health	Governance,	London:	
Palgrave	MacMillan.	
61	The	private	foundation	is	distinguished	from	NGOs	by	the	sources	of	wealth.	NGOs	draw	from	multiple	
sources	whereas	foundations	such	as	the	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	or	the	Rockefeller	
Foundation	draw	on	their	corporate	reserves	or	private	wealth.	
62	See	Ruston	S	&	William	OD	(2011),	pp.	14‐18.	
63	Editorial	(2009),	“Who	runs	global	health?,”	The	Lancet,	373	(968):	2083;	McCoy	D,	Chand	S	and	Sridar,	
D	(2009),	“Global	health	funding:	how	much,	where	it	comes	from	and	where	it	goes,”	Health	Policy	and	
Planning,	 vol.	 24(6):	 407‐17;	 Buse	 K	 and	 Harmer	 AM	 (2007),	 “Seven	 habits	 of	 highly	 effective	 global	
public‐private	 health	 partnership:	 practice	 and	 potential,”	 Social	 Science	 and	Medicine,	 64(2):	 259‐71;	
Buse	K	and	Walt	G	(2002),	“Globalisation	and	Multilateral	Public‐Private	Health	Partnerships:	Issues	for	
Health	Policy,”	 In	Lee	K,	Buse	K	and	Fustukian	S	(eds.)	Health	Policy	 in	a	Globalising	World,	Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press.		
64	See	Kay	A	and	Williams	OD	(2009),	Global	Health	Governance:	Crisis,	Institutions	and	Political	Economy,	
New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan;	Maclean	S,	Brown	S	and	Fourie	P	(2009)	(eds.),	Health	for	Some:	The	
Political	Economy	of	Global	Health	Governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan.		
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harmonisation	of	diverse	actors	and	processes,	thereby	building	up	effective	
mechanisms.65		What	is	common	in	these	suggestions	is	that	innovation	is	needed	in	the	
approaches	to	tackling	global	health	challenges.	However,	there	remains	a	lacuna	in	
how	a	complex	interplay	of	multiple	actors	with	competing	interests	and	resources	is	
compromised,	given	the	differing	ideas	as	to	which	global	health	issues	should	be	
prioritized	and	promoted.		This	is	crucial	to	understanding	why	the	structures	of	GHG	
have	evolved	the	way	they	have.	This	aspect	has	not,	to	date,	received	sufficient	
analytical	attention.		The	next	sub‐section	critically	discusses	how	GHG	of	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	has	been	defined	and	understood	in	the	existing	academic	work	and	
elaborates	on	where	the	limitations	lie.		
1.3.3.	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks:	approaches	and	limitations		
	
To	date,	the	state	of	scholarship	on	the	subject	of	the	GHG	of	(acute)	infectious	diseases	
with	pandemic	potential	has	shifted	focus	from	national	policies	to	understanding	how	
these	policies	are	shaped	by	broader	structures	and	processes	emanating	from	global	
forces.66		As	we	will	see	below,	the	literature	seeks	to	understand	the	GHG	of	infectious	
diseases	by	employing	theoretical	lenses	that	can	be	classified	broadly	as	being	
rationalist	or	liberal	institutionalist	perspectives	in	orientation.		With	a	particular	focus	
on	global	efforts	to	respond	to	emerging	and	re‐emerging	infectious	diseases,	studies	
analysed	diverse	issues	such	as	regime	changes,67	the	North‐South	divide,68	
International	Health	Regulations,69	health	system	strengthening,70	mapping	global	
health	actors,71	interfaces	between	national	and	global	policy	making,72	and	
                                                            
65	Cooper	AF,	Kirton	J	(2009)	(eds.),	Innovation	in	Global	Health	Governance:	Critical	Cases,	Aldershot:	
Ashgate.		
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Palgrave	MacMillan.			
67	Fidler	D	(2004),	“Constitutional	Outlines	of	Public	Health’s	New	World	Order”;	Fidler	D	(2004)	SARS,	
Governance	and	the	Globalisation	of	Disease;	Fidler	D	(2004),“Germs,	Governance	and	Global	Public	Health	
in	the	Wake	of	SARS”;	Fidler	D	(2005),	“Health,	Globalisation	and	Governance:	An	Introduction	to	Public	
Health’s	New	World	Order”.	
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International	Health	Regulations”,	JAMA,	291(21);	Gostin	L	(2004),	“The	International	Health	Regulations	
and	Beyond”,	The	Lancet,	Vol.	4	October;	Baker	M	and	Fidler	D	(2006),	“Global	Public	Health	Surveillance	
under	New	International	Health	Regulations”,	Emerging	Infectious	Diseases,	12(7):	1058‐1065;	Fidler	D	
and	Gostin	L	(2006),	“The	New	International	Health	Regulations:	An	Historic	Development	for	
International	and	Public	Health”,	Journal	of	Law,	Medicine	&	Ethics,	spring:	85‐94;	Rushton	S	(2009),	
“Global	governance	capacities	in	health:	WHO	and	infectious	diseases,”	In	Kay	A	and	Williams	OD	(2009),	
Global	Health	Governance:	Crisis,	Institutions	and	Political	Economy,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan;	
Kamradt‐Scott	A,	Rushton	S	(2012),	The	revised	International	Health	Regulations:	socialization,	
compliance	and	changing	norms	of	global	health	security.	Global	Change,	Peace	and	Security,	24(1):	57‐70.	
70	Siddiqi	S	et	al.	(2009),	“Framework	for	assessing	governance	of	the	health	system	in	developing	
countries:	gateway	to	good	governance,”	Health	Policy,		90(1):	13‐25.	
71	Kickbusch	I	(2000),	“The	Development	of	International	Health	Policies	–	Accountability	Intact?”	Social	
Science	 and	Medicine	 51:	 979‐989;	 Kickbusch	 I	 (2002),	 “Global	 Health	 Governance:	 Some	 theoretical	
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securitisation	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks.73		In	recent	years,	there	has	also	been	a	
growing	literature	on	the	global	governance	of	pandemic	influenza,	primarily	pertaining	
to	legal	preparedness	and	governing	functions	respectively	.74		While	these	scholarly	
works	have	broadened	the	GHG	landscape	for	infectious	disease	outbreaks	conceptually	
and	empirically,	much	of	the	literature,	it	is	argued	here,	does	not	sufficiently	capture	
the	underlying	complexity	of	emerging	GHG.		As	presented	below,	this	research	divides	
the	literature	into	two	broad	categories	in	terms	of	their	analytic	focus,	thereby	
systematically	critiquing	the	current	scholarship’s	preoccupation	with	governing	
mechanisms	and	functions:		(a)	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	witnesses	the	decline	of	
sovereignty	with	the	corresponding	ascendance	of	a	new	framework	for	global	health	
(i.e.	Post‐Westphalian	governance);	and	(b)	the	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	has	been	
overwhelmed	by	the	magnitude	of	newly	emerging	actors	and	their	interests.	
Regardless	of	their	analytical	focus,	both	perspectives	maintain	that	the	result	has	been	
institutional	deadlock,	or	lack	of	a	“system”,	in	the	face	of	serious	disease	risks,	and	that	
there	is	a	need	to	strengthen	institutional	arrangements	to	create	an	innovative	GHG	
system.		
	
The	first	category	of	literature	maintains	that	there	has	been	erosion	in	the	authority	of	
the	sovereign	state.	Increased	participation	in	global	surveillance	and	monitoring	by	
global	entities	(e.g.	Global	Outbreak	Alert	&	Response	Network,	European	Centre	for	
Disease	Prevention	and	Control),	supported	by	both	state	and	non‐state	actors,	and	the	
global	spread	of	new	information	and	communication	technologies,	is	believed	to	
undermine	the	ability	of	governments	to	control	epidemiological	information	within	
                                                                                                                                                                                        
considerations	on	the	new	political	space”,	In	Lee	K	(ed.),	Health	Impacts	of	Globalization:	Towards	Global	
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their	territories.		This	change	is	suggested	to	have	been	prompted	by	the	experiences	
from	SARS	and	the	revision	of	the	IHR	(2005)	which	allowed	the	WHO	to	collect	
information	from	non‐state	actors	and	authorise	WHO	to	act	upon	such	information.75	
Scholars	contend	that	the	IHR	revision	process	demonstrate	that	the	surveillance	
system	for	Public	Health	Emergencies	of	International	Concern	(PHEIC)	operates	within	
a	framework	of	GHG,	with	sovereignty	now	subordinated	to	the	collective	interests	and	
technologies	of	global	disease	surveillance.76		For	instance,	Fidler	and	Gostin77	note	that	
the	new	IHR,	not	only	radically	departs	from	the	traditional	approach	to	international	
disease	control,	but	also	privileges	GHG	over	state	sovereignty.		
Among	others,	Fidler’s	argument	that	there	has	been	a	“radical	transformation”	in	GHG	
architecture,	and	a	consequent	decline	of	state	sovereignty	in	health	governance,	is	
particularly	noteworthy	in	this	regard	(see	Table	1.2).		As	an	expert	in	international	law	
on	infectious	diseases,	he	identifies	two	models	of	health	governance	–	the	Wesphalian	
and	Post‐Westphalian	–	and	describes	the	governance	“revolution”	triggered	by	the	
global	containment	of	SARS.		He	states	that	the	pathology	of	SARS	revealed	that	the	
governance	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	requires	a	firm	transition	from	Westphalian	
to	Post‐Westphalian	models.78		He	contends	that	the	WHO’s	new	competency,	to	gather	
and	disseminate	information,	has	given	the	organisation	a	new	authority	to	compel	the	
actions	of	member	states	to	the	extent	that	state	sovereignty	has	been	curtailed	within	
national	borders.		This	assumption	resonates	through	the	subsequent	GHG	literature.		
Some	scholars	discuss	the	nature	of	GHG	on	the	basis	of	this	assumption.79		For	example,	
Kirton	and	Cooper	claim	that	the	world	is	moving	away	from	the	Westphalian	model,	
with	the	state	as	the	dominant	pillar,	and	that	sovereignty	as	the	defining	principle	of	
GHG	is	eroding.80		Using	WHO’s	independent	authority	during	the	SARS	outbreak	as	an	
                                                            
75	World	Health	Organization	(2005),	International	Diseases	of	Potential	Risk	for	travellers,	International	
Travel	 and	 Health,	 Geneva.	 Available	 at	 http://libdoc.who.int/publications/2005/9241580364.pdf;	
Fidler,	2005b.	
76	Baker	M	and	Fidler	D	(2006),	“Global	Public	Health	Surveillance	under	New	International	Health	
Regulations”.	
77	Fidler	D	and	Gostin	L	(2006),	“The	New	International	Health	Regulations:	An	Historic	Development	for	
International	and	Public	Health”,	p.	86.	
78	Fidler	D	(2004),	“Constitutional	Outlines	of	Public	Health’s	New	World	Order”;	Fidler	D	(2004),	SARS,	
Governance	and	the	Globalisation	of	Disease;	Fidler	D	(2004),	“Germs,	Governance	and	Global	Public	
Health	in	the	Wake	of	SARS”;	Fidler	D	(2005),	“Health,	Globalisation	and	Governance:	An	Introduction	to	
Public	Health’s	New	World	Order”.	
79	Budd	L,	Bell	M	and	Brown	T	(2009),	“Of	plagues,	planes	and	politics:	controlling	the	global	spread	of	
infectious	diseases	by	air,”	Political	Geography,	28(7):	426‐435;	Hein	W	and	Kohlmorgen	L	(2007),	
“Transnational	norm‐building	in	global	health:	the	important	role	of	non‐state	actors	in	Post‐Wesphalian	
politics,”	presented	at	the	Sixth	Pan‐European	Conference	on	International	Relations,	Turin	(12‐15	
September	2007);	Roger	K	and	Harris	A	(2007),	“Governing	the	sick	city:	urban	governance	in	the	age	of	
emerging	infectious	diseases,”	Antipode,	39(5):	846‐873.	
80	Cooper	AF	and	Kirton	J	(2009),	“Innovation	in	global	health	governance,”	In	Cooper	A	and	Kirton	J	
(eds.),	Innovation	in	Global	Health	Governance:	Critical	Cases,	Aldershot:	Ashgate.	
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example,	Cortell	and	Peterson	similarly	argue	that	a	shift	to	a	post‐Westphalian	
framework	is	occurring.81	
	
Table	1.2.	Fidler’s	Typology	of	Health	Governance	
	
Model	 Westphalian	Health	
Governance	
Post‐Westphalian	Health	
Governance	
Period	 Pre‐SARS Post‐SARS
Role	of	Nation‐State	 State	Monopoly Restricted	Power	
Role	of	
Intergovernmental	
Organization	
Restricted
(e.g.	IHRs)	
Independent	Authority	
(e.g.	travel	advisory)	
Role	of	Non‐state	actors	 Limited	role	 Inclusion	of	non‐state	
actors	(i.e.	global	
surveillance	networks)	
Response	to	Infectious	
Disease	
Manage	germ	traffic	
between	States	
(Horizontal	Strategies)	
Reduce	disease	threats	
within	States	(Vertical	
Strategies)	
This	table	is	based	on	Fidler	D	(2004),	SARS,	Governance	and	the	Globalisation	of	Disease,	London:	
Macmillan.	
	
The	perceived	decline	of	sovereignty,	and	the	resultant	regime	transformation	
suggested	by	Fidler	and	others,	has	elicited	considerable	debate.		Some	maintain	that	
the	current	governance	system	for	infectious	disease	is	still	founded	on	principles	
articulated	by	sovereign	states,	particularly	the	“powerful”	few.		Hein	and	Wogart	82	
suggest	that	states	continue	to	be	formally	sovereign,	to	a	very	different	degree,	to	
aggregate	power	resources.		Aginam83	addresses	the	power	of	developed	countries,	
stating	that	advancing	microbial	forces	paradoxically	reinforce	the	powers	of	the	state	
in	the	global	North.		Similarly,	based	on	the	linking	of	acute	infections	and	national	
security,	as	observed	by	McInnes	and	Lee,	the	global	health	agenda	has	become	skewed	
in	favour	of	the	interests	of	selected	states.84		In	their	study	of	SARS	in	China	and	
Canada,	Price‐Smith	and	Huang	also	found	that	the	epidemic	did	not	generate	
significantly	increased	compliance	by	sovereign	states	with	the	international	health	
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in	the	WHO	and	WTO,”	In	Hawkins	DG,	Lake	DA,	Bielson	DL,	and	Tierney	MJ	(eds.),	Delegation	and	Agency	
in	International	Organisations,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.			
82	Hein	W	and	Wogart	JP	(2006),	“Global	Health	Governance	and	the	Poverty‐Oriented	Fight	of	Diseases:	
Conclusion”.	
83	Aginam	O	(2004),	“Salvaging	Our	Global	Neighbourhood:	Critical	Reflections	on	the	G8	Summit	and	
Global	Health	Governance	in	an	Interdependent	World”,	p.	301.	
84	 McInnes	 C	 and	 Lee	 K	 (2006),	 “Health	 Security	 and	 Foreign	 Policy”,	 Review	 of	 International	 Studies,	
32(1):	5‐23.	
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regime.85		Referring	to	the	IHR	2005,	Davies	argues	that	assertions	it	heralds	the	
supremacy	of	global	governance	over	sovereign	states	in	the	area	of	infectious	diseases	
are	premature	because	developing	states	may	be	reluctant	to	cede	their	sovereignty	for	
fear	of	the	WHO	serving	as	a	Trojan	horse	for	external	interferences	in	their	domestic	
affairs.86		In	short,	the	role	and	function	of	state	sovereignty	within	the	GHG	of	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	remain	contested	in	the	current	literature.	
	
However,	what	is	common	in	the	first	category	of	literature	is	the	assumption	that	GHG	
of	infectious	diseases	is	a	discrete	area,	driven	by	the	rise	and	fall	of	particular	actors	
(i.e.	nation‐state	versus	non‐state	actors)	leading	to	the	perpetuation	or	reform	of	the	
existing	regime.	It	also	has	tendency	to	take	a	linear	or	uni‐dimensional	view	of	the			
GHG	architecture	suggesting	that	the	WHO’s	use	of	unofficial	information	in	outbreak	
detection	brought	about	new	order	of	governance	which	changed	the	way	in	which	
states	exercise	their	sovereignty.		As	a	result,	the	first	category	of	literature		does	not	
seek	to	explain	why	particular	governance	responses,	whether	Westphalian	or	Post‐
Wesphalian,	persist	or	change.		Additionally,	it	neglects	to	acknowledge	the	complex	
and	multi‐dimensional	process	of	policy	evolution	related	to	infectious	diseases	in	GHG	
which	constitutes	different	domains,	overlapping	interests	and	agendas,	and	competing	
ideas.			.			In	short,	this	literature	takes	an	institutional	perspective,	limiting	the	focus	to	
appraising	how	collective	action,	and	shift	in	power	within	the	global	infectious	disease	
arena,	takes	place.		It	provides	little	understanding	of	what	underlying	factors	facilitate	
and	constrain	the	development	of	GHG	in	the	first	place.		The	recurring	theme	in	these	
analyses	is	the	critique	of	the	current	architecture	of	GHG,	with	the	risks	posed	by	the	
globalisation	of	infectious	diseases		as	given,	and	how	the	GHG	can	best	be	operationally	
achieved.		What	remains	unexplored	is	why	forms	of	GHG	come	to	be	shaped	the	way	
they	are.	
The	second	category	of	literature	pays	particular	attention	to	the	increasingly	complex	
institutional	arrangements,	linking	the	emergence	of	GHG	with	the	growth	of	new	actors	
entering	the	policy	sphere	and	playing	governance	roles.		As	observed	in	Section	1.3.2,	
this	is	not	unique	to	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks.	Indeed,	like	the	policy	
landscape	of	GHG	in	general,	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	began	to	embrace	
new	set	of	actors	who	play	an	ever	more	important	role,	with	the	redirection	of	their	
functions	shaping	what	Kickbusch	terms	“a	new	political	ecosystem	of	health.”87	The	
literature	maps	the	emergence	of	these	new	actors,	alongside	the	“old”	
intergovernmental	organisations	such	as	the	WHO,	World	Bank,	FAO	(Food	and	
Agriculture	Organization),	OIE	(United	Organization	for	Animal	Health),	and	UNDP	
(United	Nations	Development	Program).	The	existing	intergovernmental	organisations	
were	joined	by		UNSIC	(United	Nations	System	Influenza	Coordination)	in	2005,	
                                                            
85	Price‐Smith	A	and	Huang	Y	(2009),	“Epidemic	of	fear:	SARS	and	the	political	economy	of	contagion,”	in	
Cooper	A	and	Kirton	J	(2009),	Innovation	in	Global	Health	Governance:	Critical	Cases,	Aldershot:	Ashgate	
Publishing,	pp.	23‐47.	
86	Davies	S	(2010),	Global	Politics	of	Health,	Cambridge:	Polity	Press.	
87	Kickbusch	I	(2005),	“Action	on	Global	Health:	Addressing	Global	Health	Governance	Challenges,”	p.	970.	
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launching	various	programmes	and	initiatives	aimed	at	strengthening	surveillance	of	
and	response	to	infectious	diseases.	
The	emergence	of	regional	players	is	noteworthy.		For	instance,	ASEAN	(Association	of	
South‐East	Asian	Nations),	along	with	other	institutions	such	as	the	ADB	(Asia	
Development	Bank),	has	shown	a	fair	amount	of	political	will	and	commitment	through	
the	promotion	of	regional	cooperation	initiatives	in	response	to	the	challenges	posed	by	
pandemics	and	other	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	although	it	has	been	less	active	on	
other	global	health	issues.88		In	the	wake	of	SARS,	APEC	established	Health	Taskforce	in	
late	2003	recognising	the	importance	of	ongoing	regional	cooperation	in	the	response	
to	emerging	infectious	diseases.89		In	2006,	ASEAN	created	a	stockpile	of	antiviral	
medications	for	the	explicit	use	of	ASEAN	countries	in	the	event	of	an	outbreak.	90		
Similarly,	the	EU	created	the	ECDC	(European	Centre	for	Disease	Control	and	
Prevention)	in	2004	with	the	aim	of	pooling	Europe’s	health	knowledge,	so	as	to	
develop	authoritative	scientific	opinion	about	the	risk	posed	by	emerging	infectious	
diseases.91		In	addition	to	these	intergovernmental	initiatives,	a	number	of	international	
partnerships	have	been	established	to	enhance	response	capabilities	and	facilitate	
international	collaboration.		For	example,	Offlu	(FAO/OIE	Network	of	Expertise	on	
Animal	Influenza)	was	jointly	established	in	2005	by	the	World	Organisation	for	Animal	
Health	(OIE)	and	the	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	of	the	United	Nations	(FAO)	to	
coordinate	and	support	global	efforts	to	strengthen	the	links	between	animal	and	
human	health	sectors.	92		While	there	may	be	differences	in	resources	and	capacity	
among	these	networks,	institutions	and	partnerships,	the	experiences	of	SARS	and	the	
potential	threat	of	pandemic	influenza	were	clearly	the	driving	forces	behind	the	
development	of	these	players.While	some	consider	this	proliferation	a	significant	
achievement	for	GHG,	others	raise	the	question	of	whether	the	emergence	of	new	actors	
translates	into	an	effective	system	for	responding	to	the	challenges	posed	by	global	
disease	risks.		Coordination	and	cooperation	among	actors	are	one	of	the	challenges	
focused	on	by	scholars	as	the	global	response	to	emerging	infectious	disease	risks	has	
become	crowded	by	a	range	of	agencies,	funds,	and	programmes,	together	with	
partnerships	and	alliances.		They	regard	it	as	“congestion”	which	leads	to	unproductive	
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duplication,	competition	and	waste	of	scarce	resources.		In	addition	to	problems	of	
coordination,	there	are	also	concerns	about	the	diffusion	and	reconfiguration	of	power	
among	various	players.		This	has	led	to	questions	of	whether	emerging	forms	of	GHG	of	
infectious	disease	outbreaks	fulfil	ideal	notions	of	“good	governance”,	“global	public	
goods”,93	“humane	global	health	order”94	or	“global	social	rights”.95		For	example,	
scholars	argue	96	that	despite	attempts	to	strengthen	international	rules	for	responding	
to	infectious	diseases,	systems	for	responding	to	infectious	disease	epidemics	and	
pandemics	are	hindered	by	a	lack	of	standards	of	practice,	as	indicated	by	the	
Indonesia’s	controversial	decision	to	cease	sharing	H5N1	avian	influenza	virus	samples	
with	the	Global	Influenza	Surveillance	Network	in	2007.		Although	PIPF	(Pandemic	
Influenza	Preparedness	Framework)	was	passed	by	the	World	Health	Assembly	in	
2011,	following	four	years	of	lengthy	negotiations,	scholars	such	as	Kamradt‐Scott	and	
Lee	view	that	the	new	framework	agreement	has	done	little	to	amend	the	existing	
governance	structures	or	ensure	the	benefits	that	it	was	designed	to	address.97		Policy	
harmonization,	institutional	deficits,	jurisdictional	overlaps	or	procedural	gaps	have	
been	identified	as	major	obstacles	to	achieving	an	effective	governance	mechanism	in	
the	response	to	emerging	infectious	diseases.98		The	regulatory	and	policy	vacuum	that	
spans	human	and	animal	health	and	agriculture	underlines	the	deficiencies	of	the	
existing	governance	system	and	the	need	for	building	multisectoral	collaboration	as	
well	as	for	articulating	an	agreed	operational	definition	among	key	global	institutions.99		
The	engagement	of	commercial	sectors,	specifically	pharmaceutical	manufacturers,	in	
the	provision	of	influenza	vaccine	has	proven	controversial	and	raises	questions	about	
transparency	and	accountability	in	GHG	of	infectious	diseases.100		
To	summarise,	the	second	category	of	GHG	literature	points	to	the	role	that	emerging	
institutional	actors	have	come	to	play	in	the	collective	response	to	infectious	diseases,	
yet	describes	current	governance	as	deficient	in	dealing	appropriately	with	the	
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aspirations	of	these	diverse	actors.101		The	limitation	of	this	literature	is	that	it	tends	to	
emphasise	the	institutional	and	technical	features	of	GHG	actors	and	policies,	and	their	
impacts	on	mechanisms	operating	in	GHG.		Logically,	this	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	
operation	and	reform	of	the	existing	governance	mechanisms	with	more	resources,	
better	coordination	and	stronger	political	will	would	sufficiently	address,	for	example,	
the	persistent	lack	of	coherence,	duplication	of	efforts	and	neglect	of	certain	issues	and	
populations.		However,	it	is	argued	in	this	research	that,	while	institutional	reforms	or	
innovations	may	be	important	in	terms	of	technical	outcomes,	it	inevitably	neglects	to	
understand	why	certain	global	infectious	disease	policies	are	made	over	time.		As	a	
result,	scant	attention	is	devoted	to	the	question	of	why	there	is	a	gap	between	
perceived	health	needs	and	governance	mechanisms	and,	more	fundamentally,	why	
certain	agendas	and	actions	surrounding	disease	outbreaks	are	pursued	and	forged	
instead	of	others	at	different	points	in	time,	amid	an	eternal	plethora	of	competing	and	
divergent	priorities	and	limited	resources.102		Moreover,	the	existing	literature	does	not	
adequately	address	a	number	of	fundamental	questions	–	In	what	ways	and	how		major	
challenges	related	to	disease	outbreaks	are	framed?		What	ideas	matter	in	responding	
to	the	aforementioned	problems?		Why	are	particular	forms	of	collective	action	
advanced	over	others?	In	other	words,	much	of	the	existing	literature	sees	GHG	from	a	
rationalist	perspective	(i.e.	looking	for	the	“best”	technical	and	institutional	solutions	to	
existing	global	health	challenges),	largely	neglecting	what	is	termed	the	world	of	ideas	in	
shaping	the	perceived	nature	and	causes	of	global	health	problems,	and	the	appropriate	
solutions	to	address	them.103		To	more	fully	understand	the	GHG	architecture,	and	the	
range	of	actors	taking	part,	this	research	argues	that	it	is	necessary	to	critically	
scrutinize	how	ideas	shape	what	defines	or	sustains	a	particular	GHG	mechanism.			
1.3.4.	Broadening	the	focus:	GHG	as	a	policy	space	of	contestation	
	
In	recent	years,	there	has	been	an	emerging	body	of	literature	that	problematises	
current	approaches	to	the	study	of	GHG.		This	sub‐section	briefly	reviews	these	works	
and	locates	this	thesis	within	this	developing	body	of	scholarship.		The	important	
departure	point	in	this	emerging	literature	is	recognition	of	the	plurality	of	interests,	
ideas	and	institutions	in	terms	of	priority	setting	in	GHG.		A	seminal	work	is	done	by	
Shiffman	who	argues	that	the	ascendance	and	sustainability	of	particular	issues	in	
global	health	is,	not	only	driven	by	the	objective	severity	of	the	nature	of	the	problem,	
but	by	how	such	issues	are	framed	as	imperative	and	crucial.104		Through	analyses	of	
cases	such	as	newborn	survival,	HIV/AIDS,	and	maternal	mortality,	he	identifies	factors	
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behind	the	emergence	of	certain	global	health	issues	as	global	health	priorities.105	He	
notes,	
	
The	rise,	persistence	and	decline	of	a	global	health	issue	may	best	be	explained	by	
the	way	in	which	its	policy	community	–	the	network	of	individuals	and	
organisations	concerned	with	the	problem	–	comes	to	understand	and	portray	the	
issue,	and	establish	institutions	that	can	sustain	this	portrayal.	This	explanation	
emphasises	the	power	of	ideas	and	challenges	interpretations	of	issue	ascendance	
and	decline	that	place	primary	emphasis	on	material,	objective	factors	such	as	
mortality	and	morbidity	levels,	and	the	existence	of	cost‐effective	interventions	
[emphasis	added].106		
Central	to	Shiffman’s	argument	is	an	understanding	of	the	manner	in	which	health	
issues	are	framed,	thereby	generating	particular	response	to	the	issues.		An	important	
cross‐cutting	work	by	McInnes	et	al.	further	identifies	the	way	in	which	GHG	has	been	
influenced	by	“worldviews”	(pathways	of	governance	response	based	upon	shared	
understandings)	across	a	range	of	health	issues	such	as	tobacco,	access	to	medicine,	
HIV/AIDS	and	pandemic	influenza.107		They	contend	that	the	nature	of	emerging	global	
health	problems,	and	the	necessary	mechanisms	of	GHG	to	deal	with	them,	have	
historically	been	narrowly	understood	in	both	the	policy	and	academic	worlds.		They	
also	maintain	that	these	limitations	have	failed	to	understand	how	GHG	is	shaped	by	
different	and,	at	times,	competing	perspectives	and	worldviews.		
As	this	sub‐section	describes	below,	normative	understandings	of	GHG	has	become	the	
subject	of	growing	scholarship	in	recent	years.		For	example,	Ruger	identifies	the	lack	of	
an	ethical	framework	in	GHG	for	solving	global	health	problems	and	suggests	the	need	
for	advancing	the	concept	of	“human	flourishing”	for	delivering	health	equity	on	a	global	
scale.108		Noting	the	importance	of	values,	Brown	argues	that	the	current	theorizing	
about	global	health	rests	on	opposing	ontological	perspectives	about	what	global	health	
should	prioritize	and	that	these	presuppositions	result	in	distinctively	antagonistic	
normative	demands	about	how	we	should	distribute,	who	gets	what	and	why.109	
Framing	as	a	tool	of	persuasion	in	generating	actions	on	global	health	issues	has	been	a	
particular	focus	in	recent	scholarly	work.		For	example,	in	their	analysis	of	policy‐
related	documents	and	academic	literature,	Labonte	and	Gagnon	identify	seven	policy	
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frames	–	security,	development,	global	public	goods,	trade,	human	rights,	and	
ethical/moral	reasoning	–	that	prevail	and	their	influences	on	the	state’s	actual	foreign	
policy	decision‐making.110		Kamradt‐Scott	and	McInnes	examine	how	pandemic	
influenza	has	been	presented	as	a	security	issue	to	generate	support	for	emergency	
plans	and	preparation,111	while	Kamradt‐Scott	explores,	in	a	separate	paper,	the	
influence	of	evidence‐based	medicine	on	pandemic	influenza	preparedness	and	how	
vaccines	and	antiviral	medicines	are	promoted	as	indicators	of	pandemic	
preparedness.112		In	particular,	he	notes	how	evidence‐based	medicine	has	further	
reinforced	the	advocacy	of	drug‐based	solutions,	placing	vaccines	and	antivirals	in	the	
focus	of	attention	while	downplaying	alternative	preparedness	measures.		Reubi	
identifies	how	a	network	of	activists	successfully	framed	tobacco	control	as	a	human	
rights	issue	in	order	to	link	it	into	existing	legislation	on	human	rights,113	while	
Williams	identifies	how	the	patent	system	has	been	framed	in	economic	terms	as	
necessary	in	establishing	a	system	that	allows	new	drugs	to	be	developed	and	traded.114		
He	finds	that	this	has	created	a	range	of	difficulties	for	access	to	medicines	and	
ultimately	a	dysfunctional	global	drug	market.		Woodling	and	colleagues	examine	how	
economic	development	framing	strategically	repositioned	HIV/AIDS	as	a	co‐dependent	
of	a	wider	development	project,	stressing	AIDS’	dependency	on	broader	development	
progress	rather	than	merely	its	contribution	to	it.115		They	argue	that	framing	is	a	
strategic	activity,	used	in	order	to	forward	particular	claims	about	prioritisation,	and	in	
order	to	maintain	resources	for	HIV/AIDS.		
Overall,	this	recent	body	of	scholarship,	located	within	Social	Constructivism,	seeks	to	
understand	GHG	as	a	process	of	contestation	among	normative	frameworks.		This	
approach	requires	fuller	reflexivity	on	the	origins	and	significance	of	the	multiplicity	of	
ideas	shaping	collective	action	on	global	health	issues.		This	literature	directly	informs	
this	thesis.		Drawing	from	Social	Constructivism,	and	building	on	this	recent	literature	
on	normative	approaches	to	GHG,	this	research	begins	with	the	argument	that	
understanding	of	ideas,	and	the	process	through	which	such	ideas	are	legitimised	or	
institutionalised	by	epistemic	communities,	provide	key	insights	into	the	underlying	
nature	of	GHG	in	a	constitutive	way	rather	than	taking	it	for	granted.		A	fuller	discussion	
of	these	ideas,	and	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities,	is	provided	in	Chapter	Two.		
The	next	section	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	global	SARS	outbreak,	and	discusses	
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why	SARS	is	particularly	relevant	to	the	study	of	the	normative	frameworks	shaping	the	
global	governance	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks.	
1.	4.	SARS	AND	GLOBAL	HEALTH	GOVERNANCE	
1.4.1.	A	Brief	Overview	of	Global	SARS	Outbreak	
	
SARS	provides	a	useful	case	study	for	understanding	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	
in	the	governance	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	because,	for	the	first	time,	the	
outbreak	brought	together	state	and	non‐state	actors	to	address	what	Fidler116	
describes	as	the	first	pandemic	of	the	21st	century.	SARS	is	a	newly	identified	human	
infection	caused	by	a	type	of	coronavirus	unlike	any	other	known	human	or	animal	
virus	in	its	family.		An	analysis	of	epidemiological	information	from	the	various	
outbreak	sites	shows	that	the	overall	case	fatality	ratio	approached	11	per	cent,	with	
much	higher	rates	among	elderly	people.117		Transmission	mainly	occurred	person‐to‐
person	through	exposure	to	infected	respiratory	droplets	expelled	during	coughing	or	
sneezing,	or	following	contact	with	body	fluids	during	certain	medical	interventions.118	
Contamination	of	the	environment,	arising	from	faecal	shedding	of	the	virus,	is	thought	
to	have	played	a	small	role	in	disease	transmission.		Management	of	SARS	relied	on	
standard	epidemiological	interventions:	identification	of	those	fitting	the	case	
definition,	isolation,	infection	control,	contact	tracing,	active	surveillance	of	contacts,	
and	evidence‐based	recommendations	for	international	travellers.		Though	demanding	
and	socially	disruptive,	particularly	when	a	large	number	of	people	were	placed	in	
quarantine,	these	standard	interventions,	backed	by	high‐level	political	commitment,	
were	said	to	be	sufficiently	effective	to	contain	the	global	outbreak	less	than	four	
months	after	the	initial	alert.119	
	
The	earliest	cases	of	SARS	are	now	thought	to	have	emerged	on	November	16,	2002	in	
China	when	the	first	patient	was	hospitalised	and	treated	in	Foshan	No.	1	Hospital.	The	
patient	went	on	to	infect	11	other	people,	including	nine	medical	workers.120		On	
December	15,	two	SARS	patients	were	hospitalised	in	the	city	of	Heyuan	and	five	
medical	workers	were	then	infected.	Driven	by	a	rumour	that	Heyuan	was	being	
attacked	by	an	unknown	and	highly	contagious	virus,	this	prompted	panic	buying	of	
vinegar	and	anti‐viral	medicine	in	late	December.121		The	atypical	pneumonia	cases	
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were	reported	to	the	Guangdong	Health	Bureau	on	January	2,	2003.		The	next	day	the	
Heyuan	Centre	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention	(CDC)	became	the	first	official	
Chinese	voice	discussing	the	outbreak	by	publishing	a	notice	in	the	Heyuan	News.	It	
claimed	that	there	was	no	epidemic	in	Heyuan,	and	that	the	symptoms,	which	were	
caused	by	unusually	cold	weather,	could	be	cured	with	immediate	medical	treatment.	
On	January	16,	a	patient	from	Zhongshan,	whose	symptoms	were	similar	to	the	Heyuan	
atypical	pneumonia	cases,	was	transferred	to	the	Guangzhou	People’s	Liberation	Army	
Hospital.	However,	a	CDC	official	in	Zhongshan	denied	the	existence	of	any	cases	of	
atypical	pneumonia	in	the	city	and	called	the	news	“mere	rumour”.		On	January	21,	the	
Guangdong	Health	Bureau	produced,	but	did	not	release	to	the	public,	a	full	report	on	
the	outbreak	situation.122	
The	initial	phase	of	the	Guangdong	outbreak,	characterized	by	small,	independent	
clusters	and	sporadic	cases,	was	subsequently	followed	by	a	sharp	rise	in	cases	during	
the	first	week	of	February	2003.		This	was	thought	to	result	from	amplification	during	
the	care	of	initial	patients	in	hospitals.	Cases	gradually	declined	thereafter.		Altogether,	
some	1,512	clinically	confirmed	cases	occurred	in	the	Guangdong	outbreak,	with	
healthcare	workers	in	urban	hospitals	accounting	for	up	to	27	per	cent	of	cases.		This	
pattern	was	repeated	as	the	disease	began	to	spread	outside	Guangdong	Province	to	
other	areas	in	China,	and	then	internationally.			
On	February	10,	GPHIN	and	other	GOARN	partners	identified	reports	of	a	“strange	
contagious	disease”	with	respiratory	symptoms	affecting	health	workers	in	Guangdong	
hospitals	and	causing	widespread	panic.		An	urgent	alert	was	sent	to	network	members.		
The	next	day,	the	WHO	received	reports	from	the	Chinese	Ministry	of	Health	confirming	
the	outbreak	of	an	acute	respiratory	syndrome	with	300	cases	and	five	deaths	in	
Guangdong	Province,	with	the	government	claiming	that	the	situation	was	coming	
under	control.	Concern	intensified	on	February	19,	when	authorities	in	Hong	Kong	
reported	an	outbreak	of	avian	influenza	in	members	of	families	who	had	recently	
travelled	to	southern	China.		The	WHO	alerted	its	collaborating	laboratories	and	
activated	its	influenza	pandemic	plans.123	
After	the	disease	had	spread	from	the	southern	Chinese	province	of	Guangdong,	Hanoi,	
Hong	Kong,	Singapore	and	Toronto	became	“hot	zones”124	of	SARS,	characterised	by	a	
rapid	increase	in	the	number	of	cases,	especially	among	healthcare	workers	and	their	
close	contacts.		In	these	locations,	SARS	first	took	root	in	hospital	settings	where	staff,	
unaware	that	a	new	disease	had	surfaced,	exposed	themselves	to	the	infectious	agent	
without	barrier	protection.		All	of	these	initial	outbreaks	were	subsequently	
characterized	by	chains	of	secondary	transmission	(i.e.	direct	human‐to‐human	
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transmission	between	a	primary	care	who	is	infected	and	the	secondary	case	who	
becomes	infected	or	ill	from	that	contact)	within	and	outside	the	healthcare	
environment	such	as	hospitals	and	clinics.	Secondary	attack	rates	of	greater	than	50	per	
cent	were	observed	among	healthcare	workers	caring	for	patients	with	SARS	in	both	
Hong	Kong	and	Hanoi.125		Within	two	weeks,	similar	outbreaks	occurred	in	various	
hospitals	in	Singapore	and	Toronto.126		This	eventually	culminated	in	a	global	alert	and	
the	institution	of	worldwide	surveillance	measures,	as	declared	by	the	WHO	on	March	
12,	2003.127		
The	WHO	issued	a	global	alert	after	being	notified	of	mounting	cases	of	severe	atypical	
pneumonia	among	staff	in	Hanoi	and	Hong	Kong	hospitals.		After	receiving	additional	
reports	of	cases	in	Singapore	and	Toronto	over	the	next	three	days,	the	WHO	responded	
by	issuing	a	series	of	emergency	travel	recommendations	to	alert	health	authorities,	
physicians,	travellers,	airlines	and	the	public	to	the	potential	threat	which	this	then	
unidentified	illness	could	have	on	healthcare	systems	all	over	the	globe.128		These	travel	
recommendations	marked	a	turning	point	in	the	early	course	of	the	SARS	pandemic.129	
Areas	with	cases	detected	before	the	WHO	recommendations	were	issued	–	namely	
Vietnam,	Hong	Kong,	Singapore	and	Toronto	–	experienced	the	largest	and	most	severe	
outbreaks.	After	the	recommendations	were	issued,	all	countries	with	imported	cases,	
with	the	exceptions	of	Taiwan	and	the	interior	provinces	of	China,	were	able,	to	either	
prevent	further	transmission	or	keep	the	number	of	additional	cases	at	a	level	
manageable	with	existing	resources	through	prompt	detection	and	isolation	of	cases,	
strict	infection	control	measures,	rigorous	contact	tracing,	and	quarantine	measures	in	
some	circumstances.130		
During	the	last	week	of	April,	the	outbreaks	in	Hanoi,	Hong	Kong,	Singapore	and	
Toronto	showed	signs	of	peaking.		On	April	28,	Vietnam	became	the	first	country	to	stop	
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local	transmission	of	SARS.	However,	new	probable	cases,	including	cases	among	
hospital	staff,	additional	deaths,	and	first	cases	imported	to	new	areas	continued	to	be	
reported	from	several	countries.		The	cumulative	total	number	of	cases	surpassed	5,000	
on	April	28,	6,000	on	May	2,	and	7,000	on	May	8.	By	then,	cases	had	been	reported	from	
30	countries	on	six	continents.		Most	new	cases	were	reported	from	Beijing	and	
increasingly	other	parts	of	Mainland	China.		Of	the	cumulative	global	total	of	7,761	
probable	cases	and	623	deaths	reported	on	May	17,	5,209	cases	and	282	deaths	had	
occurred	in	Mainland	China.	Also	of	concern	was	a	rapidly	growing	outbreak	in	Taiwan	
with	a	cumulative	total,	on	May	18,	of	344	cases,	including	many	hospital	staff,	and	40	
deaths.131		This	was	particularly	worrying	given	that	Taiwan	was	not	a	recognised	
member	state	of	the	WHO	and	thus	had	limited	access	to	information	or	international	
support.	
On	July	5,	2003,	the	WHO	reported	that	the	last	human	chain	of	transmission	of	SARS	
had	been	broken.132		On	the	same	day,	the	WHO	declared	that	outbreaks	of	SARS	had	
been	contained	worldwide.	While	there	have	been	a	few	cases	of	infection	with	the	
SARS	virus	in	Singapore,	Taiwan	and	China	since	the	summer	of	2003,	the	WHO	did	not	
put	forward	recommendations	concerning	travel	or	other	restrictions.133		Nevertheless,	
SARS	demonstrated	dramatically	the	widespread	global	effects	that	can	be	created	by	a	
single	yet	deadly	new	emerging	infectious	disease.		
1.4.2	Why	study	SARS?	
 
Infectious	diseases,	in	general,	have	received	the	bulk	of	attention	to	date	in	the	study	of	
GHG.		In	selecting	the	case	study	for	this	thesis,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	there	
are	many	different	types	of	infectious	disease,	each	posing	particular	governance	
challenges.		As	shown	in	Table	1.3,	infectious	diseases	can	be	classified	by	a	range	of	
characteristics	including		morbidity	and	mortality	rate,	existing	knowledge,	current	and	
potential	geographical	reach,	transmissibility	(likelihood	to	be	transmitted	to	others),	
pathogenicity	(likelihood	to	cause	disease),	and	rate	of	spread.		This	table	seeks	to	offer	
a	simple	conceptualisation	of	the	main	types	of	risk	posed	by	specific	infectious	
diseases.		The	nature	of	the	main	risks	presented	in	the	table	indicate	the	actual	risks	in	
medical	terms,	but	these	risks	may	typically	intensify	and	heighten	the	perceived	risks,	
mediated	by	other	factors	such	as	rapid	international	travel,	changing	human	
behaviour,	and	the	inadequacy	in	healthcare	infrastructure.		While	additional	categories	
of	classification	could	be	added	(e.g.	incubation	period),	and	some	diseases	classifiable	
                                                            
131	World	Health	Organization	(2003),	SARS:	Status	of	the	Outbreak	and	Lessons	for	the	Immediate	Future,	
Geneva:	World	Health	Organization.	(http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars_wha.pdf)		
132	World	Health	Organization	(2003),	Update	96.	“Taiwan,	China:	SARS	Transmission	interrupted	in	last	
outbreak	area”,	5	July	2003.	Available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_05/en/		
133	World	Health	Organization	(2003),	Update.	“SARS	in	Singapore”.	10	September	2003.	Available	at	
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_09_10/en/index.html;	World	Health	Organization	(2003),	Update.	
“SARS	in	Taiwan,	China”.	17	December	2003.	Available	at	
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_12_17/en/index.html;	World	Health	Organization	(2004),	Update	7.	
“China’s	latest	SARS	outbreak	has	been	contained,	but	biosafety	concerns	remain”,	18	May	2004.	
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across	multiple	categories,	the	key	point	here	is	the	need	for	more	careful	
categorisation	of	infectious	disease	when	analysing	GHG	responses.	
	
Table	1.3.	Definition	and	classification	of	infectious	diseases	
	
Degree	 Relatively	low Relatively	high	
Characteristics	of	
diseases	
Morbidity	rate Common	cold
scabies	
vCJD	
HIV/AIDS	
Ebola	
SARS	
Geographical	reach	
(local/global)	
Ebola
Kuru	
Rift	Valley	Fever	
Influenza	
Tuberculosis	
HIV/AIDS	
SARS	
Mortality	rate West	Nile	Virus
Caliciviruses	
Hepatitis	A	
Ricin	toxin	
Salmonella	
Diarrheagenic	E	
coli	
Anthrax	
Botulism	
Plague	
Smallpox	
Tularemia	
Viral	hemorrhagic	
fevers	(e.g.	Ebola,	
Marburg)	
Influenza	
Transmissibility	 West	Nile	Virus
Caliciviruses	
Hepatitis	A	
Ricin	toxin	
Salmonella	
Diarrheagenic	E	
coli	
Anthrax	
Botulism	
Plague	
Smallpox	
Tularemia	
Viral	hemorrhagic	
fevers	(e.g.	Ebola,	
Marburg)	
SARS	
Influenza	
Pathogenicity	 Polio Smallpox	
Existing		
knowledge	
Influenza
Tuberculosis	
SARS	
vCJD	
Impact	on	social	
and	economic	
stability	
Intestinal	
hemorrhagic	
Escherichia	coli	
HIV/AIDS	
Influenza	
SARS	
Multi‐drug	
resistant	
tuberculosis	
	 Mode	of	diseases  Food	borne	and	water	borne:	
Hepatitis	A,	Typhoid	fever,	
Cholera	
 Vector‐borne:	Yellow	fever,	
Dengue	fever,	Tick‐borne	
42	
	
encephalitis
 Zoonoses:	Rabies,	Brucellosis,	
Leptospirosis,	Viral	haemorrhagic	
fevers,	Avian	influenza,	SARS	
 Sexually	transmitted:	Hepatitis	B,	
HIV/AIDS,	Syphilis	
 Blood	borne:	Hepatitis	B,	C,	
HIV/AIDS,	Malaria	
 Airborne:	Influenza,	
Meningococcal	disease,	
Tuberculosis,	SARS	
This	 table	 is	 compiled	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Lee	 K	 (2005),	 “Decision	 Making	 in	 the	 Face	 of	 Public	 Health	
Emergencies	of	International	Concern”,	in	Drager	N	and	Smith	R	(eds.),	Rapid	Assessment	of	the	Economic	
Impacts	 of	 Public	 Health	 Emergencies	 of	 International	 Concern:	 Lessons	 from	 SARS.	 Geneva:	 WHO	
Department	 of	 Communicable	 Disease	 Surveillance	 and	 Response	 5;	 GAO	 (2004).	 Emerging	 Infectious	
Diseases:	 Review	 of	 States	 and	 Federal	 Disease	 Surveillance	 Efforts,	 United	 States	 Government	
Accountability	Office,	GAO‐04‐877;	World	Health	Organization	(2005),	International	Diseases	of	Potential	
Risk	 for	 travellers,	 International	 Travel	 and	 Health,	 Geneva	 available	 at	
http://libdoc.who.int/publications/2005/9241580364.pdf		
	
From	this	table,	it	can	be	seen	that	some	infectious	diseases	pose	a	particular	threat	
within	a	globalising	world,	given	their	high	rates	of	morbidity	and	mortality,	
geographical	reach,	transmissibility,	social	and	economic	impact,	and	at	the	time	
uncertainty	in	their	nature,	and	that	consequently	there	is	a	greater	need	for	effective	
GHG	to	address	them.		From	this	subcategory	of	infectious	diseases,	there	are	a	number	
of	reasons	why	SARS	provides	an	appropriate	case	study	for	understanding	GHG	for	
infectious	disease	outbreaks.		Interesting	here	is	that	SARS	produced	a	considerable	gap	
between	actual	risk	and	perceived	risk	due	to	the	combination	of	its	unique	
characteristics	described	below.	
First,	SARS	was	distinct	from	other	infections	in	its	ability	to	strike	fear	in	people	by	its	
combined	spatial	and	temporal	aspects	of	global	reach.		Infectious	diseases	that	have	
emerged	in	the	past	tended	to	“burn	out”	within	a	relatively	located	geography.		
However,	an	airborne	disease	such	as	the	SARS	virus,	with	an	incubation	period	of	a	few	
days,	can	be	transmitted	farther	afield	via	global	air	travel.		Given	that	nearly	1.5	billion	
passengers	travel	by	air	every	year,	creating	countless	opportunities	for	diseases	to	
spread	rapidly	across	the	globe,	the	number	of	infections	and	deaths	caused	by	the	SARS	
outbreak	highlighted	the	risk	to	infectious	disease	control	posed	by	globalisation	and	In	
this	respect,	the	confluence	of	globalisation	and	the	characteristics	of	SARS	led	to	it	
becoming	the	first	pandemic	of	the	21st	century.		Its	epidemiology	changed	the	
perception	of	disease	risk	that	global	outbreaks	pose.	
Second,	SARS	was	different	from	other	infectious	disease	outbreaks	in	the	recent	past	
(such	as	plague,	avian	influenza	and	cholera),	in	a	sense	that,	the	source	of	the	contagion	
was	unknown.		Before	the	SARS	outbreak,	there	was	almost	no	knowledge	of	the	virus	
that	caused	the	disease.	Initially,	it	was	believed	that	the	outbreak	of	the	mysterious	
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respiratory	disease	might	have	been	linked	to	avian	influenza.		In	fact,	the	disease	
constituted	a	novel	coronavirus	that	was	not	previously	identified	in	human	
populations.	Some	coronaviruses	undergo	frequent	mutation,	thereby	frustrating	the	
development	of	effective	vaccines.		At	the	time,	both	the	epidemiology	and	pathogenesis	
of	SARS	were	not	known.		Accordingly,	the	novel	virus	and	the	severe	disease	it	caused,	
generated	significant	concern	worldwide.	Although	the	emergence	of	a	new	virus	in	
human	populations	occurs	regularly,	combined	with	the	mortality	rate	and	geographical	
reach	of	the	virus,	SARS	generated	significant	worldwide	attention	in	a	short	period	of	
time.		These	features	evoked	an	unprecedented	governance	response	which	makes	the	
virus	especially	useful	for	this	analysis.	
Third,	the	SARS	virus	was	highly	transmissible	person‐to‐person,	and	therefore	had	the	
potential	to	spread	more	readily.	Some	infectious	diseases	have	limited	capacity	to	
threaten	large	populations	because	of	inefficient	human‐to‐human	transmission.		Or	
their	transmission	was	dependent	on	food	products,	animals	or	vectors	such	as	
insects.134		This	limited	the	vulnerability	of	such	infection	to	discrete	populations.		
Compared	with	influenza	or	smallpox,	the	respiratory	transmissibility	of	SARS	was	
relatively	low.		However,	even	when	the	1997	avian	influenza	virus	outbreak	occurred,	
which	was	caused	by	the	H1N1	virus	moving	from	poultry	to	humans,	it	did	not	lead	to	
onward	person‐to‐person	transmission.	In	contrast,	SARS	was	readily	transmitted	from	
human	to	human.	
Fourth,	a	key	defining	feature	of	SARS	was	the	rapid	speed	of	its	spread.	SARS	is	widely	
believed	to	have	originated	from	Foshan	in	Guangzhou	Province,	China	in	November	
2002.		The	disease	found	its	way	to	Hong	Kong,	and	then	was	spread	rapidly	onwards	to	
countries	such	as	Singapore,	Taiwan,	Vietnam	and	Canada.		The	disease	spread	swiftly	
around	the	world:	the	number	of	worldwide	cases	exceeded	1,500	by	the	end	of	March,	
and	then	rapidly	soared	to	4,000	on	23	April,	5,000	on	28	April,	6,000	on	2	May,	and	
7,000	on	8	May,	when	cases	were	reported	from	30	countries.	During	the	peak	of	the	
outbreak,	near	the	start	of	May	2003,	more	than	200	new	cases	were	being	reported	
each	day	across	the	globe.135		The	rate	with	which	SARS	spread	and	infected	multiple	
people	alarmed	both	governments	and	the	international	community,	and	caused	much	
concern,	panic	and	even	fear	among	the	populace	in	countries	most	severely	affected.	
Whereas	SARS	did	not	turn	into	an	epidemic,	scientists	and	experts	were	concerned	that	
the	disease	might	still	spread	widely	among	the	general	population,	given	the	
potentially	highly	contagious	nature	of	the	SARS	virus.			
Lastly,	while	the	number	of	cases	and	deaths	from	the	initial	SARS	outbreak	was	
relatively	small	in	comparison,	for	instance,	with	tuberculosis,	the	considerable	impacts	
of	SARS	on	social	and	economic	stability	worldwide	distinguished	the	outbreak	from	
previous	events.		The	perceived	risk	of	SARS	was	many	times	greater	than	the	actual	
                                                            
134	World	Health	Organization	(2003),	SARS:	Status	of	the	Outbreak	and	Lessons	for	the	Immediate	Future,	
Geneva:	World	Health	Organization.	
135	Bloom	BR	(2003),	Lessons	from	SARS.	Science	300:	701.		
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risks.136		However,	in	retrospect	the	responses	proved	disproportionate	partly	because	
SARS	occurred	amidst	the	context	of	increasing	fears	about	the	intentional	use	of	
pathogens	(i.e.	bioterrorism),	especially	following	the	events	of	11	September	2001	and	
the	US	anthrax	attacks.137		Many	governments	–	such	as	those	of	Singapore,	Australia	
and	the	US	–	therefore	adopted	increased	health	security	measures	including	stricter	
border	screening	and	controls,	suspension	of	air	transportation,	and	regulation	of	
migration	to	and	from	certain	locations.		At	the	same	time,	public	anxiety	about	
becoming	infected,	represented	best	by	the	mass	donning	of	white	surgical	masks	
across	Asia,	led	to	individual	choices	to	reduce	unnecessary	contacts.		Further	afield,	
individuals	decided	not	to	travel	to	the	region	for	business,	tourism	and	other	purposes,	
adversely	impacting	on	the	region’s	economy.138		As	a	consequence,	GDP	growth	rates	
seriously	declined	in	countries	affected	by	SARS.	The	US	National	Intelligence	Council	
estimates	nearly	US$100	billion	was	lost.139		While	the	economic	impact	caused	by	
infectious	disease	outbreaks	was	not	new,	SARS	sparked	growing	concerns	about	
national	security	and	economic	stability	amongst	both	governments	and	the	
international	community.		The	instability	created	by	SARS	offers	the	opportunity	to	
conduct	empirical	analysis	of	the	framing	of	the	issue	by	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders.	
Given	the	above,	this	research	argues	that	an	analysis	of	SARS	offers	an	important	
opportunity	to	analyse	the	ideational	factors	that	shape	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	
outbreaks.		In	practice,	the	nature	of	the	SARS	outbreak	meant	that	traditional	divisions	
between	national	and	global	health	policy	was	inadequate.		During	the	outbreak,	this	
prompted	governments	to	pursue	collective	action	to	address	a	global	disease	outbreak.	
At	the	same	time,	there	was	contestation	throughout	the	outbreak	and	beyond	in	terms	
of	the	form	that	GHG	should	take	and	the	corresponding	responses	deemed	appropriate.		
Hence,	the	SARS	outbreak	illustrates	that	global	collaboration	against	infectious	disease	
outbreaks	is	not	only	a	matter	of	institutional	and	technical	interventions,	but	of	
discursive	power	embedded	within	diverse	normative	frameworks.		In	short,	the	
outbreak	offers	a	particularly	valuable	opportunity	to	understand	the	interplay	between	
the	material	and	ideational,	showing	how	the	ideas	and	normative	frameworks	held	by	
epistemic	communities	shape	GHG	responses.	
1.5.	OUTLINE	OF	THE	THESIS		
	
This	chapter	has	introduced	some	of	the	main	research	objectives	and	rationale	for	this	
study.		The	chapter	examined	the	gaps	in	the	existing	literature	on	GHG	by	highlighting	
                                                            
136	Smith	RD	(2006),	“Responding	to	Global	Infectious	Disease	Outbreaks:	Lessons	from	SARS	on	the	Role	
of	Risk	Perception,	Communication	and	Management”,	Social	Science	and	Medicine,	vol.	63(12):	3113‐23.	
137	Stolberg	S	(2003),	“The	SARS	epidemic:	the	American	scene;	Lessons	of	anthrax	attacks	help	US	
respond	to	SARS,”	The	New	York	Times,	2	May	2003.	
138	Lau	et	al.	(2005),	SARS	related	perceptions	in	Hong	Kong,	Emerging	Infectious	Diseases,	11:	417‐424.	
139	 US	 National	 Intelligence	 Council	 (2003),	 SARS:	 Down	 But	 Still	 a	 Threat,	 Intelligence	 Community	
Assessment	ICA	2003‐09,	Washington	DC:	National	Intelligence	Council.		
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the	paucity	of	normative	understanding	of	GHG	research,	which	has	received	little	
attention	thus	far.		Conceptually,	this	research	seeks	to	complement	existing	GHG	
literature	as	it	provides	the	normative	underpinnings	to	how	SARS	was	governed.	
Following	a	brief	overview	of	how	the	world	battled	against	the	SARS	outbreak,	the	
chapter	explained	that	a	case	study	of	an	acute	infectious	disease	outbreak	such	as	SARS	
can	illuminate	how	certain	ideas	became	dominant	over	others	and	what	this	means	for	
GHG	of	infectious	diseases.		The	conceptual	framework	provides	a	window	into	
ideational	explanations	of	why	GHG	has	evolved	as	it	has	to	date,	and	may	hold	answers	
to	the	puzzles	concerning	the	underlying	drivers	that	shape	the	current	architecture	of	
global	infectious	disease	governance.	
	
Chapter	Two	provides	the	theoretical	anchor	used	to	ground	the	basic	arguments	that	
will	be	put	forward	in	this	thesis.		The	chapter	draws	upon	Social	Constructivism	in	
International	Relations,	focused	on	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities,	to	explain	
why	certain	actions	and	agendas	at	the	global	level	are	formed	amid	diverse,	and	often	
contested,	ideas	and	material	interests.		The	significance	of	this	theoretical	framework	
for	the	thesis	is	that	it	offers	an	explanation	of	how	ideas,	stemming	from	key	
knowledge‐based	actors	about	how	certain	health	issues	should	be	addressed,	may	
crucially	influence	public	health	policy	making	and	collective	action	on	global	health.		In	
order	to	substantiate	this	ideational	framework,	this	chapter	then	identifies	a	number	of	
discourses	in	terms	of	their	core	tenets.		Through	a	chronological	account,	the	
researcher	draws	particular	attention	to	how	respective	discourses	have	established	a	
pervasive	presence	in	global	infectious	disease	control	over	time,	thus	informing	GHG.		
	
Chapter	Three	describes	the	research	design	and	methodology	used	in	this	research.		
The	methodology	of	this	thesis	combines	key	informants’	interviews	with	archival	
document‐based	research.		In	order	to	understand	the	role	that	ideas	play	within	the	
context	of	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	archival	research	on	the	global	
response	to	SARS	was	undertaken,	consisting	of	gathering	and	reviewing	government	
documents	(Hong	Kong,	Singapore,	China,	Vietnam,	and	Canada),	publications	of	
intergovernmental	organizations	(WHO,	UNDP,	FAO,	ADB,	ASEAN,	and	OIE),	media	
reports,	press	briefings,	and	policy	papers.	Unpublished	materials	pertaining	to	the	
SARS	outbreak	were	included	in	the	review.		The	primary	focus	in	this	archival	research	
was	on	the	discursive	framing	of	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak.		To	this	end,	
the	researcher	also	consulted	published	articles	on	the	SARS	outbreak	that	she	had	
collected	through	public	health	databases.		In	addition	to	the	archival	document‐based	
research,	semi‐structured	interviews	with	35	key	informants	were	conducted	at	four	
major	locations	(Geneva,	Manila,	Hong	Kong	and	Singapore)	to	gain	a	fuller	
understanding	of	the	policy	“process”	and	to	supplement	and	“triangulate”	the	
documentary	sources.	Discourse	analysis	was	usefully	employed	to	systematically	
examine	the	wide	range	of	data	gathered.	
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In	Chapter	Four,	the	researcher	applies	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities	to	
identify	the	SARS	epistemic	community.		In	order	to	locate	possible	members	of	the	
SARS	epistemic	community,	the	chapter	begins	by	examining	the	terrain	of	global	
infectious	disease	outbreaks	involving	research	and	policymaking	in	mid	and	late	
1990s.		This	enables	the	researcher	to	account	for	the	backdrop	of	how	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	were	problematised	and	what	coherent	set	of	norms	was	developed	
by	which	actors	prior	to	SARS	outbreak.		The	chapter	then	proceeds	to	trace	experts	
who	came	to	hold	a	central	position	in	the	shaping	of	global	knowledge	on	SARS	and	
identify	the	factors	facilitated	this	process.		In	order	to	demonstrate	the	collective	
nature	of	these	actors,	which	centers	on	the	explanation	of	the	epistemic	communities	
concept,	the	chapter	examines	the	mechanism	by	which	members	interacted	with	one	
another	to	generate	and	influence	policy	discourses.		In	essence,	the	chapter	draws	
attention	to	the	factors	which	cohere	key	actors	with	one	another	in	terms	of	Hass’s	
three	defining	criteria:	a)	a	set	of	shared	normative	principles;	b)	mutual	engagement	
based	on	a	common	notion	of	validity;	and	c)	common	policy	enterprise.		Through	the	
analysis,	the	chapter	intends	to	introduce	key	features	of	the	SARS	epistemic	
community.		
	
In	Chapter	Five,	the	research	presents	empirical	analysis	of	how	issues	surrounding	
SARS	were	normatively	framed	in	the	context	of	GHG.		The	analytic	stance	of	the	chapter	
takes	up	the	discourse	as	constituent	of	the	reality	which	shapes	how	public	health	
issues	(i.e.	SARS)	are	conceived	and	portrayed,	including	what	should	be	done	to	
address	them.		The	chapter	explores	how	different	discourses	have	driven	the	changes	
in	public	health	reasoning	and	practice,	in	the	form	of	the	prioritisation	of	certain	
actions	in	the	global	response	to	SARS	at	various	points	in	time.		The	researcher	seeks	to	
demonstrate	that,	where	a	particular	discourse	gained	dominance,	other	ways	of	
conceiving	in	global	public	health	practices	were	largely	marginalized,	which	is	indeed	a	
clear	reflection	of	the	pivotal	role	that	ideas	play	amid	the	contestation	of	global	health	
policy	making	processes.		In	order	to	show	the	ideational	shifts	over	time,	the	SARS	
story	is	divided	into	three	key	phases	in	terms	of	the	progress	of	the	SARS	outbreak.		
Through	analysis	of	discourses,	the	chapter	also	illustrates	that	ideas	do	not	simply	
arise	as	governing	norms,	but	ideational	success	occurs	as	a	result	of	collective	
advancement	by	the	key	agents	(i.e.	epistemic	community)	who	are	mobilized	around	
an	idea.			
Next,	Chapter	Six	draws	together	the	empirical	findings	presented	in	Chapters	Four	
and	Five	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	global	response	to	SARS	outbreak	as	socially	
constructed,	and	draws	broader	implications	for	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	more	
generally.		The	chapter	first	links	key	discourses	constructed	during	the	outbreak	and	
the	agents	who	advanced	them	to	elucidate	the	idea‐agency	nexus	in	the	global	
response	to	the	SARS.		It	then	proceeds	to	focus	on	discourses	outlining	how	different	
framing	was	used	to	gain	influence	and	policy	purchase.		It	explains	why	certain	
discourses	came	to	the	fore	or	receded	at	different	points	in	time	and	places	during	the	
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outbreak,	and	examines	the	contexts	within	which	the	cooperation	and	contestation	
within	and	between	different	discourses	take	place.		In	so	doing,	it	illustrates	the	
importance	of	framing	in	the	formation	and	legitimation	of	interests	underpinning	
global	health	policies.		Next,	the	chapter	discusses	key	analytic	elements	characterising	
the	SARS	epistemic	community	and	assesses	the	extent	to	the	SARS	epistemic	
community	confirms	or	challenges	the	epistemic	communities	framework	that	Haas	
originally	suggested.		The	chapter	then	considers	the	implications	of	the	findings	of	this	
study	for	conceptual	understanding	of	GHG	of	infectious	diseases,	and	for	practical	
policies	and	practices	to	address	the	global	disease	outbreaks.		
Chapter	Seven	summarises	the	main	findings	of	the	study,	and	discusses	the	
contributions	this	study	makes.		It	also	considers	limitations	of	the	study,	and	suggests	
possible	future	research	directions.		The	chapter	concludes	with	a	reflection	on	what	
this	study	tells	us	about	the	nature	of	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	and	the	prospects	for	
strengthening	collective	action	for	shared	global	health	needs.					
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CHAPTER	TWO	
THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK	
	
	
2.1.	INTRODUCTION	
	
This	thesis	seeks	to	understand	how	ideas	shape	the	process	of	global	health	
policymaking	and,	in	particular,	collective	action	surrounding	infectious	disease	
outbreaks	by	exploring	the	ideational	role	of	epistemic	communities.		The	research	aim,	
articulated	in	Chapter	One,	raises	the	following	key	questions:	what	is	an	epistemic	
community,	and	how	can	such	a	community	effectively	promote	and	bargain	certain	
ideas	over	others	that	inform	policy‐decision	for	addressing	the	transnational	problems	
at	hand?		In	order	to	explore	these	questions,	a	theoretical	framework	that	allows	the	
ideational	dimension	of	power	to	be	examined	is	required.		Together,	the	theory	of	
social	constructivism	and	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities	described	in	this	
chapter	provide	a	framework	to	explore	these	questions,	and	develop	a	more	
comprehensive	understanding	of	Global	Health	Governance	(GHG).		Briefly,	this	
framework	argues	that	convergence	in	ideas	and	the	placement	of	experts	in	positions	
of	power,	by	means	of	a	distinct	sort	of	legitimacy	they	possess	and	credibility	related	to	
their	work,	facilitate	international	coordination	and	enhance	the	prospect	for	certain	
norms	and	ideas.		As	Goldstein	and	Keohane	noted,	such	a	concept	may	provide	the	
“transmission	mechanisms	that	propel	a	particular	set	of	ideas	forward.”140	
	
This	chapter	first	outlines	the	basic	tenets	of	Social	Constructivism,	and	the	concept	of	
epistemic	communities,	and	demonstrates	how	these	explanations	can	be	applied	to	a	
fuller	understanding	of	the	global	response	to	SARS	outbreak.		These	explanations	have	
been	selected	for	their	distinctive	applicability	to	the	role	of	ideational	factors	within	
GHG,	which	elucidate	the	nature	of	global	SARS	governance.		The	chapter	then	provides	
an	exploration	of	a	range	of	discourses	in	terms	of	the	core	ideas	that	underpin	them,	
and	how	the	respective	discourses	have	informed	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	
outbreaks.		In	short,	the	primary	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	provide	a	theoretical	
framework	to	understand	the	role	of	ideas	in	the	global	health	policy	making	process,	
and	the	actors	responsible	for	these	ideas,	in	relation	to	the	empirical	analysis	
presented	in	Chapters	Four	and	Five.		
	
                                                            
140	Goldstein	J	and	Keohane	RO	(1993),	“Ideas	and	foreign	policy:	an	analytic	framework”,	Goldstein	J	and	
Keohane	RO	(eds.),	Ideas	and	Foreign	Policy:	Beliefs,	Institutions,	and	Political	Change,	Ithaca:	Cornell	
University	Press,	p.	14.		
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2.2.	A	CONCEPTUAL	REVIEW:	SOCIAL	CONTRUCTIVISM	AND	EPISTEMIC	
COMMUNITIES	
2.2.1.	Social	Constructivism	
	
The	core	assumption	of	social	constructivism	is	that	ideas,	norms,	values,	and	shared	
beliefs	shape	behaviour.		Here,	social	construction	refers	to	an	underlying	
understanding	of	the	social	world	that	places	meaning‐making	at	the	centre.	Human	
interpretations	of	the	world,	in	turn,	produce	social	reality;	shared	understandings	
among	people	give	rise	to	rules,	norms,	identities,	concepts,	and	institutions.		According	
to	Ruggie,	constructivism	is	about	human	consciousness	and	its	role	in	international	
life.141	
	
Social	constructivism	has	several	distinct	arguments	that	are	useful	in	analysing	the	role	
of	epistemic	communities	in	GHG.		First,	it	holds	that	“material	resources	only	acquire	
meaning	for	human	action	through	the	structure	of	knowledge	through	which	they	are	
embedded.”142		Constructivism	also	emphasizes	the	importance	of	normative	and	
ideational	structures	in	shaping	the	social	identity	of	political	actors.		Second,	
constructivism	stresses	the	importance	of	understanding	how	actors	develop	their	
interests,	as	“identities	are	the	basis	of	interests”.143	This	means	that	communally	held	
thoughts	and	beliefs	construct	the	interests	and	identities	of	such	actors,	not	the	other	
way	around.144		Third,	constructivism	argues	that	normative	and	ideational	structures	
cannot	exist	in	the	absence	of	knowledgeable	practices	of	those	actors.	Therefore,	
constructivists	claim	that	knowledge	is	a	socio‐cultural	process	in	which	learning	occurs	
through	communicative	processes	among	people.			
	
Two	crucial	features	distinguish	Social	Constructivism	from	more	mainstream	power‐
based	and	interest‐based	theories	of	International	Relations:	it	has	a	different	
conception	of	power	and	a	different	conception	of	interest‐formation.	First,	unlike	
power‐based	theory,	shared	ideas	rather	than	material	forces	determine	the	structures	
of	human	association,	and	shared	ideas	construct	actors’	identities	and	interests.	
Therefore,	how	ideas	evolve	is	a	central	concern	for	social	constructivists.	In	contrast,	
power‐based	theory	views	that	ideas	arise	from	and	reflect	the	material	conditions	in	
which	they	are	generated.	Thus	power‐based	theory	presents	an	overly	materialist	
conception	of	ideas	(where	ideas	are	materially	dependent).	Second,	unlike	interest‐
based	theory,	the	evolution	of	ideas	is	not	simply	a	result	of	the	most	powerful	
(economic)	actors	satisfying	their	interests,	and	it	is	more	than	just	a	rational	response	
                                                            
141	Ruggie	JG	(1998)	“What	makes	the	world	hang	together?	Neo‐utilitarianism	and	the	social	
constructivist	challenge”,	International	Organization	52	(4):	855‐885.	p.	856.	
142	Wendt	A	(1994),	“Collective	identity	formation	and	international	state”,	American	Political	Science	
Review,	vol.	88	(2):	384‐396,	p.	390.	
143	Wendt	A	(1994),	“Collective	identity	formation	and	international	state”.	
144	Finnemore	and	Sikkink	(2001),	“Taking	stock:	the	constructivist	research	program	in	international	
relations	and	comparative	politics”,	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science,	vol.	4:	396‐416.		
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by	self‐interested	actors	to	ensure	more	legitimate	and	effective	governance.	The	
evolution	of	ideas	is	also	about	the	way	that	social	actors	form	intersubjective	
understandings	of	assumptions	and	definitions.	In	other	words,	Social	Constructivism	
follows	a	“logic	of	appropriateness”	while	the	other	two	perspectives	follow	a	“logic	of	
consequentialism.”145		The	logic	of	appropriateness	dictates	that	actors	do	the	right	
thing	and	treat	interests	as	capable	of	changing	through	interaction,	whereas	per	the	
latter	logic,	egoistic	actors	are	driven	to	cooperate	and	collaborate	only	when	such	
cooperation	promises	to	maximize	their	own	utility.146	In	contrast	to	the	power‐based	
and	interest‐based	theories	that	do	not	accord	an	important	and	independent	causal	
force	to	ideas,	social	constructivism	argues	that	ideas	matter,	and	seeks	to	explain	why	
and	how	they	matter.	
	
Constructivist	principles	of	“intersubjectivity”	and	“shared	ideas”	are	useful	in	
understanding	the	nature	of	the	GHG	of	SARS.		First,	whereas	the	existing	material	‐
based	understandings	are	unable	to	explain	fully	how	agreed	goals	for	addressing	
imminent	public	health	problems	such	as	disease	outbreaks	were	achieved,	Social	
Constructivism	allows	room	for	such	an	exploration.	In	the	former,	commitment	to	
rationalism	leads	one	to	assume	interests	and	identities	as	given	a	priori	and	
exogenously	–	“that	is	to	say	external	to	and	unexplained	within	the	terms	of	their	
theories.”147	By	contrast,	the	latter	enables	one	to	understand	these	interests	as	socially	
constructed	on	the	basis	of	intersubjectively	shared	meanings	and	understandings.	
Thus	under	this	assumption,	one	can	safely	argue	that	dominance	of	particular	types	of	
global	disease	governance	does	not	mean	the	understanding	of	the	reality	itself.	Rather,	
it	may	be	understood	as	the	construction	of	experienced	reality.	Secondly,	Social	
Constructivism	views	that	cooperation	is	not	a	given	that	is	forced	upon	actors	(or	
states).		Instead,	it	can	be	seen	how	particular	ideas	and	norms	are	effectively	
persuaded	and	shape	cooperative	practices.		In	other	words,	cooperation	between	
actors	(or	states)	is	dependent	on	the	way	actors	(states)	view	each	other	via	social	
construction	of	reality.		In	the	eyes	of	social	constructivist,	cooperation	is	a	result	of	
perceptions	towards	other	actors	(states),	not	a	mere	outcome	of	material	structure	or	
self‐interest.		In	looking	at	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	this	constructivist	
view	allows	one	to	explore	the	motivations	of	identity	construction	and	the	formation	of	
preferences	in	the	policymaking	process.		What	constructivist	called	“intersubjective	
beliefs”	rest	on	collective	intentionality,	and	thus	offers	room	to	take	into	account	the	
mechanisms	through	which	consent	and	credibility	for	particular	policy	choices	are	
created	in	bringing	about	and	consolidating	consensus	between	various	social	forces.		
	
                                                            
145	Keohane	R	(1988),	“International	institutions:	two	approaches”,	International	Studies	Quarterly,	vol.	
32:	379‐396,	p.	381.	
146	Risse	T	(2000),	“Let’s	Argue!:	communicative	action	in	world	politics”,	International	Organization,	vol.	
54(1),	winter	2000:	3‐4.	
147	Ruggie	J	(1998),	Constructing	the	World	Polity:	Essays	on	International	Institutionalisation,	London:	
Routledge,	p.	9.	
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In	relation	to	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	the	type	of	questions	arising	is:	why	did	the	
idea	of,	for	example,	a	“health	security”	threat	emerge	when	it	did;	why	was	it	accepted;	
how	was	it	possible;	who	were	the	actors	involved	in	advocating	for	such	idea?	
	
Methodologically,	in	order	to	analyse	the	ideational	basis	of	governance,	constructivists	
have	often	turned	to	discourse	analysis.	As	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	discourse	
analysis	performs	best	as	a	way	to	understand	the	social	context	and	meanings	that	
constrain	and	enable	certain	policy	choices	and	regulate	social	conflict.	It	can	generate	
revealing	descriptions	that	identify	competing	discourses	and	how	such	contestation	
might	influence	the	legitimacy	of	particular	policy	choices.	This	thesis,	which	seeks	to	
examine	the	ideas	underpinning	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	attempts	to	
unveil	the	nature	of	norms	as	based	in	intersubjective	meanings	through	the	analysis	of	
what	constructivists	refer	to	as	discourse.	A	focus	on	epistemic	communities,	as	an	idea	
producer	and	disseminator,	further	accomplishes	this	task.	
	
Unlike	most	studies	of	GHG,	that	focus	on	how	best	to	structure	institutions	or	address	
institutional	shortcomings	to	achieve	effective	GHG,	this	research	begins	by	asking	why	
a	particular	configuration	of	institutional	arrangements	are	formed	and	how	they	are	
produced	amid	contested	discourses	that	seek	to	inform	policy	decisions	on	infectious	
disease	outbreaks.		In	this	context,	a	discourse	is	defined	in	this	research	as	a	set	of	
normative	frames	that	provide	legitimisation	or	generate	support	for	a	particular	
response.	Thus,	discourse	here	is	referred	to	as	shared	meanings	of	core	norms	that	set	
out	the	foundations	of	framework	for	policy	action.	.	The	importance	of	ideational	
elements	in	International	Relations	comes	about	through	their	collective	legitimation	–	
that	is,	ideas	constructed	through	individuals	or	groups	with	causal	properties	can	
become	institutionalised.	The	material‐based	approach	in	IR	does	not	explain	this	
ideational	content	of	institutions,	primarily	because	interests	are	exogenous,	thus	failing	
to	explain	the	construction	of	an	interest.	The	attention	to	the	role	of	ideas	in	
international	politics	arose	to	overcome	the	limitations	of	rationalist	approaches	by	
including	explanations	of	why	a	reconceptualisation	of	interests	occurs.148	This	is	where	
the	idea‐based	explanation,	i.e.	social	constructivism,	actually	comes	in.		
2.2.2.	The	concept	of	the	epistemic	communities	
	
The	concept	of	epistemic	communities	has	garnered	much	attention	in	the	international	
relations	literature	especially	on	environmental	issues,	where	it	has	been	used	to	
explain	international	cooperation,	policy	change	and	learning.	Many	scholars	argue	that	
epistemic	communities	are	indispensable	actors	in	the	making	of	international	eco‐
regimes.	While	it	has	not	yet	made	inroads	into	the	field	of	international	health	policy	
and	politics,	it	is	argued	here	that	the	concept	may	be	valuable	for	explaining	the	
mechanisms	of	how	global	health	policy	making	takes	place.	The	epistemic	communities	
                                                            
148	McInnes	C	&	Lee	K	(2012),	“Introduction”	in	Global	Health	and	International	Relations,	London:	Polity	
Press.	
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concept	has	been	most	closely	associated	with	the	work	of	Peter	Haas,	who	developed	
and	applied	the	concept	in	a	study	of	efforts	by	Mediterranean	countries	to	coordinate	
marine	pollution	control	practices.	In	Saving	the	Mediterranean,	he	examined	the	
influence	of	knowledge	held	by	expert	actors	operating	in	networks.	Haas	subsequently	
edited	a	special	issue	of	the	journal	International	Organization	in	which	a	more	
developed	conceptual	framework	was	outlined.	Building	on	the	idea	of	a	central	role	of	
science	in	the	formation	of	environmental	regimes,	Haas	developed	a	knowledge‐based	
account	of	state	behaviour	in	which	epistemic	influence,	derived	from	a	positive	and	
normative	understanding	shared	by	an	elite	community	of	experts,	explains	much	of	the	
observed	international	coordination	and	policy	change.			
	
According	to	Haas,	an	epistemic	community	is	defined	as	“a	network	of	professionals	
with	recognised	expertise	and	competence	in	a	particular	domain	area	and	an	
authoritative	claim	to	policy‐relevant	knowledge	within	that	domain	or	issue‐area.”149	
Epistemic	communities	are	qualitatively	different	from	interest	groups	or	the	
population	of	a	particular	profession	or	discipline.	What	brings	individuals	together	as	
an	epistemic	community	is	their	shared	“knowledge	about	the	causation	of	social	or	
physical	phenomena”,	and	a	“common	set	of	normative	beliefs	about	what	actions	will	
benefit	human	welfare”	within	a	specific	issue	area.150	Although	often	drawn	from	a	
variety	of	disciplines,	these	professionals	share	a	common	set	of	characteristics:	(1)	a	
shared	set	of	normative	and	principled	beliefs,	which	provide	a	value‐based	rationale	
for	the	social	action	of	community	members;	(2)	shared	causal	beliefs,	which	are	
derived	from	their	analysis	of	practices	leading	or	contributing	to	a	central	set	of	
problems	in	their	domain	and	which	then	serve	as	the	basis	for	elucidating	the	multiple	
linkages	between	possible	policy	actions	and	desired	outcomes;	(3)	shared	notions	of	
validity	–	that	is,	inter‐subjective,	internally	defined	criteria	for	weighing	and	validating	
knowledge	in	the	domain	of	their	expertise;	and	(4)	a	common	policy	enterprise	–	that	
is,	a	set	of	common	practices	associated	with	a	set	of	problems	to	which	their	
professional	competence	is	directed,	presumably	out	of	the	conviction	that	human	
                                                            
149	Haas	P	(1992),	“Introduction:	Epistemic	Communities	and	International	Policy	Coordination”,	
International	Organization,	46	(1):	1‐35,	p.	3.	
150	On	the	notion	of	epistemic	communities,	other	analysts,	while	not	denying	that	epistemic	communities	
are	communities	of	experts,	underline	a	common	policy	enterprise	or	a	common	vision	that	defines	these	
communities.	For	instance,	Sebenius	argues	that	an	epistemic	community	can	be	understood	as	a	special	
kind	of	de	facto	natural	coalition	of	believers	whose	main	interest	lies	not	in	the	material	sphere	but	
instead	in	fostering	the	adoption	of	the	community’s	policy	project.	Stone	notes	that	an	epistemic	
community	is	a	network	of	specialists	with	a	common	world‐view	about	cause	and	effect	relationships	
and	common	political	values	about	the	type	of	policies	to	which	they	should	be	applied.	See	Sebenius	J	
(1992)	“Challenging	Conventional	Explanations	of	International	Co‐operation:	Negotiation	Analysis	and	
the	Case	of	Epistemic	Communities”	International	Organisation,	vol.	46	(1):	321‐34,	p.	324;	Stone	D	
(2005),	“Knowledge	networks	and	global	policy”,	In	Stone	D	and	Maxwell	S	(eds.),	Global	Knowledge	
Networks	and	International	Development,	Abingdon:	Routledge:	89‐105;	Stone	D	(2001),	“Think	Thank,	
Global	Lesson‐Drawing	and	Networking	Social	Policy	Ideas”,	Global	Social	Policy,	1(3):	338‐360;	Stone	D	
(2002).	“Introduction:	Global	Knowledge	and	Advocacy	Networks,	Global	Network”,	2(1):	1‐11	
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welfare	will	be	enhanced	as	a	consequence.151	This	definition	is	founded	on	the	premise	
that	control	over	knowledge	and	information	is	an	important	dimension	of	power,	and	
that	the	diffusion	of	ideas	and	information	can	generate	“new”	patterns	of	behaviour	
and	thereby	determine	the	course	of	international	policy	coordination.	The	suggestion	
here	is	that	an	epistemic	community	is	capable	of	developing	some	form	of	“prospect”	
concerning	a	particular	issue	before	introducing	it	into	the	political	policy	arena.152		
	
In	terms	of	membership,	while	often	associated	with	the	natural	sciences	community,	
members	of	an	epistemic	community	need	not	be	natural	scientists.153	They	can	be	
“social	scientists	or	individuals	from	any	discipline	or	profession	who	have	a	sufficiently	
strong	claim	to	a	body	of	knowledge	that	is	valued	by	society.	Nor	need	an	epistemic	
community’s	causal	beliefs	and	notions	of	validity	be	based	on	the	methodology	
employed	in	the	natural	sciences;	they	can	originate	from	shared	knowledge	about	the	
nature	of	social	or	other	processes,	based	on	analytic	methods	or	techniques	deemed	
appropriate	to	the	disciplines	or	professions	they	pursue.”154	The	notion	of	“an	area	
highly	valued	by	society”	is	perhaps	open	to	interpretation,	for	there	are,	in	practice,	
manifest	conflicts	between	things	valued	by	society	and	actions	taken	on	behalf	of	
society	by	officials.	Mass	quarantine	policy	during	a	disease	epidemic	is	a	good	example.	
Through	a	Quarantine	Order,	the	interests	of	society	are	clearly	served	by	protecting	
citizens	from	the	spread	of	disease,	but	not	if	officials	are	allowed	to	use	practices	that	
infringe	on	individual	human	rights	without	valid	evidence.	It	is	the	existence	of	such	
sets	of	principled	values	that	marks	out	epistemic	community	members	from	other	
social	groups.	
	
Importantly,	the	epistemic	community	is	not	content	to	provide	information	passively,	
at	the	request	of	decision‐makers.	Rather,	they	actively	strive	to	bring	about	better	
policy	by	seeking	access	to	governing	institutions.155		Moreover,	given	the	speed	of	
modern	communication	and	the	relatively	free	flow	of	information	internationally,	
these	networks	of	specialists	often	operate	(but	not	always)	transnationally.		Thus	
members	of	epistemic	communities	today	do	not	need	to	meet	regularly	in	a	formal	
setting	to	promote	their	ideas.		Instead,	epistemic	communities	can	diffuse	their	ideas	
worldwide	through	in	person	and	virtual	“conferences,	journals,	research	collaboration,	
                                                            
151	 Haas	 P	 (1992),	 “Introduction:	 Epistemic	 Communities	 and	 International	 Policy	 Coordination”,	
International	 Organization,	 Vol.	 46,	 N0.1:	 1‐35,	 p.	 3;	 Haas	 P	 (2001),	 “Policy	 Knowledge:	 Epistemic	
Communities”,	 in	Smelse	N	and	Bates	P	(eds.),	International	Encyclopaedia	of	the	Social	and	Behavioural	
Sciences,	Amsterdam:	Elsevier,	pp.	11579‐60.	
152	According	to	Haas,	they	are	also	distinct	from	the	broader	scientific	communities,	professions	and	
disciplines,	and	bureaucrats	since	the	latter	do	not	necessarily	hold	a	consensual	understanding	of	the	
problem	and	solution.				
153	Haas	P	and	Haas	E	(2002),	“Pragmatic	constructivism	and	the	study	of	international	institutions”,	
Millennium,	vol.	31(3):	573‐602	
154	Haas	P	(1992),	“Introduction:	Epistemic	Communities	and	International	Policy	Coordination”,	p.	16.	
155	Haas	P	(2000),	“International	institutions	and	social	learning	in	the	management	of	global	
environmental	risks”,	Policy	studies	Journal,	vol.	28	(3):	558‐575.	
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and	a	variety	of	informal	communications	and	contacts.”156		New	findings	are	conveyed	
and	discussed	across	national	borders.		As	long	as	the	members	of	an	epistemic	
community	can	reach	consensus	on	important	issues	in	their	field	of	study,	they	
establish	relatively	independent	sources	of	scientific	evidence	and	authority.	As	a	result,	
a	transnationally	interacting	epistemic	community	can	serve	as	a	central	vehicle	for	
international	collective	action.			
	
According	to	Haas,	there	are	three	conditions	that	determine	whether	scientists	or	
other	experts	will	have	a	greater	or	lesser	impact	on	international	policy	coordination.	
First,	if	a	high	degree	of	uncertainty	about	the	problem	exists	among	policymakers,	
there	is	a	stronger	likelihood	of	impact.157	It	often	takes	a	crisis	or	a	shock	to	overcome	
institutional	inertia	and	habit	to	spur	policy	makers	to	seek	help	from	an	epistemic	
community.158		He	states	that	“failed	policies,	crises,	and	unanticipated	events	that	call	
into	question	their	understanding	of	an	issue‐area	are	likely	to	precipitate	searches	for	
new	information,	as	are	the	increasing	complexity	and	technical	nature	of	problems.”159		
Indeed,	as	globalisation	increases	the	interdependency	of	human	action,	and	also	makes	
networks	more	complex,	it	may	be	argued	that	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	will	
become	even	stronger.		Such	uncertainty	disrupts	power	(creating	a	vacuum	into	which	
ideas–explanations	can	step),	and	focuses	attention	(which	requires	analysis	and	
interpretation).		Second,	scientific	convergence	within	an	epistemic	community	is	
necessary	to	effect	policy	change.160		Members	of	an	epistemic	community	derive	power	
domestically	and	internationally	from	their	authoritative	claim	to	knowledge.		They	
increase	their	effectiveness	by	exhibiting	a	strong	consensus	on	the	nature	of	the	
problem	and	policy	conclusion.		Leaders	of	governments	turn	to	the	epistemic	
community	to	help	them	identify	their	own	interests	and	policies	in	areas	where	they	
are	poorly	informed	and	uncertain.		An	epistemic	community	can	help	limit	the	range	of	
policy	options	governments	consider	by	identifying	the	parameters	of	the	problem	and	
solutions	based	on	their	own	causal	and	value	framework.		Third,	the	members	of	an	
epistemic	community	gain	ideational	power	in	order	to	influence	policy	implementation	
and	regime	formation.161		Decision	makers	seek	advice	that	will	justify	or	legitimate	a	
policy	that	they	wish	to	pursue	for	“political	ends.”162		While	Haas	does	not	explicitly	
acknowledge	the	possibility	that	epistemic	community	members	may	offer	and	tailor	
advice	in	ways	that	make	it	congruent	with	the	preferences	of	decision‐makers,	such	a	
view	runs	counter	to	the	idea	that	community	members	are	pure	“idea	brokers”,	
suggesting	that	they	are	both	constrained	by,	and	reflectively	aware	of	political	and	
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also	see	Haas	P	(2002),	“UN	Conferences	and	constructivist	governance	of	the	environment”,	Global	
Governance,	vol.	8	(1):	73‐91.	
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159	Ibid.,	p.	29.	
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161	Haas	P	(2001),	“Policy	Knowledge:	Epistemic	Communities”,	p.	11583.	
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social	conditions.		Haas	in	fact	suggests	“epistemic	communities	called	in	for	political	
reasons	may	succeed	in	imposing	their	views	and	moving	towards	goals	other	than	
those	initially	envisioned	by	the	decision‐makers.”163		This	does	seem	to	acknowledge	
that	policy‐related	ideas	are	considered	within	a	prevailing	social	and	political	context,	
thus	illuminating	the	potential	nexus	between	“knowledge”	and	social	processes	in	
framing	the	issues	(to	be	demonstrated	in	Chapter	Five).	
	
Drawing	on	a	number	of	case	studies,	although	none	from	the	global	health	field,	Hass	
argues	that	epistemic	communities	can	influence	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	
international	regimes	at	four	stages	of	the	policy	process.164		First,	epistemic	
communities	can	influence	the	framing	of	issues	at	the	policy	innovation	stage.	
Subsequent	negotiations	are	then	conditioned	by	the	information	initially	provided	by	
the	epistemic	community.		The	framing	of	issues	is	of	particular	relevance	to	this	thesis	
in	that	it	has	important	implications	for	the	nature	of	processes	in	which	certain	
explanations	are	marginalised	and	delegitimised	through	increased	emphasis	on	the	
scientific	or	professional	logic	of	epistemic	communities.	This	framing	function	has	been	
explored	in	a	wide	range	of	empirical	studies	on	nuclear	arms	control,165	international	
management	of	whaling,166protection	of	the	stratospheric	ozone	layer,167	the	European	
Commission’s	framework	of	programme,168	EU	acid	rain	policy,169	and	labour	migration	
policy	in	the	UK.170		Second,	epistemic	communities	can	exert	influence	at	the	highly	
politicised	stage	of	policy	selection	if	they	are	able	to	provide	integrative	formulas	to	
resolve	complex	negotiations.171	Dunlop	finds	in	her	study	on	the	policy	surrounding	
hormone	growth	promoters	in	the	EU	that	policy	credibility	was	achieved	when	
decision‐makers	selected	an	epistemic	community	whose	views	were	socially	
legitimate.172	Third,	epistemic	communities	can	be	important	agents	for	policy	diffusion.	
Due	to	their	transnational	links,	experts	can	communicate	new	ideas	and	policy	
                                                            
163	Ibid.,	p.	16.	This	indicates	that	one	should	not	assume	that	“experts”	within	an	epistemic	community	
derive	their	expertise	from	objective	facts.	Instead,	they	are	shaped	by	their	respective	normative	
frameworks	and	thus	their	expertise	can	be	subject	and	interest‐based.	Epistemic	communities	as	such	
can	be	highly	political	in	their	interaction	with	policy	making.	
164	Haas	P	(2004),	“Addressing	the	global	governance	deficit”,	Global	Environmental	Politics,		4	(4):	1‐15;	
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innovations	to	their	colleagues	in	other	countries,	who,	in	turn,	influence	their	
governments.	Adler173	found	that	an	American	epistemic	community	played	a	key	role	
in	creating	an	internationally	shared	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	nuclear	arms	
control	that	led	to	the	Anti‐Ballistic	Missile	Treaty.	Similarly,	Dolowitz	et	al.174	and	
Hulme175	respectively	argued	that	epistemic	communities	have	been	instrumental	in	the	
exchange	of	ideas	leading	to	the	Americanisation,	in	form	and	content,	of	British	higher	
education	and	social	policy.		Ervik	pointed	out	that	particular	concepts	and	policy	
solutions	on	pension	programmes	have	been	diffused	around	the	world	by	epistemic	
communities,	attaining	global	status	as	a	means	of	describing	the	future	financing	
burden	of	public	pay‐as‐you‐go	pension	systems.176		Fourth,	epistemic	communities	can	
play	a	key	role	in	regime	persistence	by	defending	established	regimes	as	the	best‐suited	
means	to	eliminate	or	alleviate	the	problems	they	were	meant	to	resolve.177	Once	in	
place,	ideas	put	forth	by	epistemic	communities	are	likely	to	persist	and	eventually	
become	the	basis	for	policy	enforcement.178	For	instance,	analysts	of	International	
Political	Economy	identified	the	ideational	dynamics	in	the	dissemination	of	major	
economic	doctrines	through	a	process	of	epistemic	persuasion,	which	became	
institutionally	embedded.	The	Washington	Consensus	or	neoliberal	understanding	of	
macroeconomics	behind	the	vertical/selective	programmes	of	global	disease	policy	can	
be	an	example	for	this.	
	
Overall,	empirical	research	findings	from	across	a	variety	of	disciplines	have	found	
epistemic	communities	to	impact	in	defining	ideas	and	problems,	and	then	carrying	
them	through	the	decision‐making	process.		It	is	also	clear	that	there	has	been	a	
growing	appreciation	for	the	role	of	ideas	and	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities,	
particularly	in	the	literature	of	International	Relations	and	policy	studies.		Within	the	
health	field	to	date,	however,	there	have	been	limited	accounts	of	how	epistemic	
communities	can	shape	how	global	health	policy	making	takes	place	or	what	processes	
enable	certain	ideas	to	be	translated	into	policy.		The	main	utility	of	the	epistemic	
community	concept	is	to	shed	light	on	the	ways	in	which	the	generators	and	carriers	of	
ideas	and	expertise	shape	particular	global	health	policies.		One	example	is	Lee	and	
Goodman	who	apply	the	epistemic	community	concept	to	examine	the	global	policy	
network	related	to	health	care	financing	reform	(HCF).179	Mapping	the	key	
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individuals/institutions	and	their	formal	linkages,	they	found	evidence	of	a	strong	
influence	by	an	elite	community	on	decision‐making	with	regard	to	HCF	reform	at	the	
global	level.		Similarly,	Youde	describes	a	“counter‐epistemic	community”,	defined	as	“a	
network	of	professionals	with	recognised	expertise	in	opposition	to	the	recognised	
expertise	of	the	dominant	epistemic	community”,	in	his	analysis	of	the	development	of	
AIDS	discourses	in	South	Africa.180		He	argues	that	the	South	African	government	
responds	to	the	fundamental	disjuncture	between	the	international	AIDS	control	regime	
and	the	South	African	government	by	embracing	a	counter‐epistemic	community,	which	
translates	South	Africa’s	history	with	public	health	interventions	and	its	identity	into	
policy	outcomes.		Mukherjee	and	Rkanayake	explore	the	role	that	key	individuals,	the	
WCTOH	(World	Conference	on	Tobacco	or	Health),	scientific	research	and	research	
networks	play	in	the	making	of	the	FCTC	(Framework	Convention	on	Tobacco	Control).	
They	observe	that	epistemic	communities	played	a	crucial	role	by	being	better	able	to	
convince	public	policy	makers	about	the	need	for	the	FCTC,	by	relying	on	and	
successfully	disseminating	its	knowledge,	expertise	and	ideas.		They	maintain	that	the	
key	to	the	success	of	the	FCTC	was	overwhelming	scientific	evidence	as	to	the	need	for	
effective	tobacco	control	measures.	Its	common	policy	enterprise	brought	about	
globally	effective	measures	of	tobacco	control	by	means	of	a	binding	treaty	under	the	
auspices	of	the	WHO.181		Eyles	and	his	colleagues	examined	the	existence	and	shape	of	
epistemic	communities	for	heart	health	promotion	in	Canada.		They	found	that	there	is	
an	epistemic	consensus	on	risk	factors	which	are	portrayed	in	terms	of	cause	and	
effect.182		This	literature,	while	limited	and	applied	to	varying	levels	of	analysis,	offer	
important	insights	on	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	in	health	policy.		
	
The	emphasis	on	scientific	expertise	renders	the	epistemic	community	concept	highly	
applicable	to	global	policy‐making	on	the	SARS	outbreak.		Haas	argues	that	epistemic	
communities	are	most	likely	to	be	found	where	scientific	or	highly	specialised	technical	
disciplines	have	been	applied	to	policy‐oriented	work.		Thus,	epistemic	communities	
arise	in	disciplines	associated	with	the	natural	sciences,	as	well	as	ecology,	law,	
engineering	and	even	economics.183		In	this	sense,	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities	
is	pertinent	to	the	analysis	of	medicine/public	health	as	this	field	is	predominantly	
occupied	by	technical	and	medical	experts	whose	composition	is	more	exclusive	and	
specialised	in	its	scientific	knowledge	base.		A	case	study	on	the	SARS	outbreak	offers	
favourable	conditions	to	assess	the	role	of	epistemic	community	influence	as	an	issue	
requiring	specialist	scientific	knowledge.		In	the	GHG	of	an	infectious	disease	outbreak,	
the	power	of	expertise,	it	is	argued,	is	likely	to	matter	a	great	deal.		
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Haas	also	argues	that	the	importance	of	epistemic	communities	is	even	greater	during	
times	of	uncertainty,	such	as	following	a	shock	or	amid	a	crisis.		This	is	directly	relevant	
to	this	analysis,	given	the	features	of	an	infectious	disease	outbreak	such	as	SARS.		
Under	conditions	of	uncertainty,	over	the	identification	and	control	of	a	disease	
outbreak,	policy‐makers	may	not	be	able	to	make	a	decision	on	the	basis	of	existing	
knowledge	or	past	experience,	and	may	therefore	turn	to	expert	groups	in	an	effort	to	
ameliorate	uncertainties.		Faced	with	uncertainty,	policy‐makers	who	are	also	required	
to	address	a	broad	range	of	issue	areas	can	understandably	often	look	to	epistemic	
communities	for	information	and	guidance.		As	will	be	shown	in	this	research,	the	SARS	
outbreak	was	a	case	in	point.		As	Adler	and	Bernstein	put	it,	normative	ideas	of	science	
are	more	than	just	a	resource	that	encourages	states	to	act	in	ways	that	are	consistent	
with	the	specific	knowledge	in	question.		Rather,	the	most	far‐reaching	effect	of	
epistemic	communities	“may	be	the	reproduction	or	transformation	of	identities	and	
interests,	on	the	basis	of	which,	new	types	of	islands	of	global	governance	are	
conceived.”184		Thus	the	epistemic	community	concept	can	illuminate	how	communities	
of	experts	emerge	and	become	active	in	shaping	the	terms	of	a	policy	discourse	in	an	
ambiguous	policy	environment	where	causes	of	and	cures	for	a	disease	are	poorly	
understood.		At	the	same	time,	this	concept	will	demonstrate	the	extent	to	which	the	
political	domains	of	the	SARS	outbreak	are	distinctively	influenced	by	scientific	
knowledge	and	those	who	interpret	it.		
	
In	sum,	this	research	argues	that	the	epistemic	community	concept	can	stimulate	
empirical	assessment	of	the	mechanics	and	dynamics	of	decision‐making	around	
international/global	health	issues.		It	focuses	on	the	participants	in	this	process,	
drawing	attention	to	the	role	of	knowledge	and	ideas	in	affecting	outcomes	with	the	
complexities	of	transnational	interaction.		We	can	view	epistemic	communities	as	being	
the	channels	that	circulate	ideas	from	research	institutions	to	policymakers	beyond	
territorial	space.		Thus	the	heuristic	value	of	this	concept	is	particularly	relevant	to	this	
study.	
2.2.3.	Applying	the	epistemic	communities	concept	
	
Defining	the	boundaries	of	an	epistemic	community	is	a	challenging	proposition.	Before	
we	look	at	the	major	features	of	an	epistemic	community	on	SARS,	it	is	important	to	
have	a	clear	understanding	of	who,	in	fact,	constitutes	an	epistemic	community.		Haas	
points	out	that	the	research	techniques	to	identify	the	epistemic	community	are	
straightforward	but	painstaking:	
	
Identifying	community	membership,	determining	the	community	members;	
principled	and	causal	beliefs,	tracing	their	activities	and	demonstrating	their	
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influence	on	decision‐makers	at	various	points	in	time;	identifying	alternative	
credible	outcomes	that	were	foreclosed	as	a	result	of	their	influence,	and	exploring	
alternative	explanations	for	the	actions	of	decision‐makers.185	
	
Additionally,	Haas	suggests	that	epistemic	communities	are	not	part	of	the	trans‐
governmental	and	international	bureaucratic	elite	(in	which	states	retain	formal	
decision‐making	power);	they	are	somehow	autonomous	from	these	structures.186	This	
conception	may	clearly	demarcate	the	epistemic	community	from	other	type	of	actors	
such	as	policy	elites	or	policy	entrepreneurs.		
	
Stemming	from	elite	theory,	the	concept	of	policy	elites	suggests	that	a	small	number	of	
people	influence	policy	either	directly	through	their	positions	or	through	the	utilization	
of	interests	groups	in	the	political	system	of	many	countries.187	This	small	minority	is	
often	drawn	from	either	economic	or	policy	realms188	and	holds	their	influence	
independent	of	democratic	elections.		They	often	draw	their	power	from	corporations,	
think	tanks,	and	policy	discussion	groups.		Similarly,	a	policy	entrepreneur	is	defined	as	
an	individual	who	exploits	an	opportunity	in	order	to	influence	political	results	for	
his/her	own	benefit,	in	the	absence	of	the	resources	required	for	such	activity.189	Policy	
entrepreneurs	generally	refer	to	business	entrepreneurs,	politicians	and	policymakers	
or	actors	who	attempt	to	pursue	a	certain	policy.		The	idea	of	policy	entrepreneurs	has	
not	reached	a	consensual	definition.	Scholars	have	used	different	terms	(political	
entrepreneur190;	institutional	entrepreneur191;	public	entrepreneur192;	policy	
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entrepreneur193)	loosely	to	refer	to	this	notion	in	a	wide	variety	of	cases,	thus	making	
this	term	nebulous	and	difficult	to	define.	Mintrom	and	Norman194	have	stipulated	four	
elements	central	to	policy	entrepreneurship:	(1)	displaying	social	acuity	in	terms	of	
locating	social	interests;	(2)	defining	and	framing	problems	(which	is	always	a	political	
act);	(3)	building	teams	and	mobilizing	other	players	(in	the	policy	arena);	and	(4)	
leading	by	example	to	advocate	policy	change	(to	reduce	risk).			
While	the	concepts	of	policy	elites	or	policy	entrepreneurs	provide	a	useful	explanation	
for	collective	policymaking,	there	is	a	distinction	between	these	concepts	and	the	
epistemic	community.		First,	policy	elites	or	policy	entrepreneurs	seek	to	study	and	
influence	policy,	even	if	they	do	not	agree	on	the	definition	of	the	problem	or	how	to	
solve	it.		In	contrast,	the	epistemic	community	concept	embraces	the	notion	of	shared	
normative	principles	and	causal	belief	among	members.		Second,	policy	elites	and	policy	
entrepreneurs	may	not	necessarily	be	characterized	by	professional	expertise	whereas	
specialist	knowledge	and	technical	expertise	coheres	members	of	the	epistemic	
community	together.		Third,	policy	elites	and	policy	entrepreneurs	are	inclined	to	take	
actions	to	influence	public	opinion	on	particular	policy	in	a	manner	to	their	advantage.	
By	contrast,	as	conceptualized	by	Haas,	members	of	the	epistemic	community	are	
primarily	concerned	with	gaining	the	support	of	policymakers.			
	
Given	the	focus	of	this	study,	looking	at	the	role	of	the	community	of	scientific	experts	in	
defining	policy	issues	and	shaping	the	way	responses	are	made	on	the	basis	of	shared	
normative	beliefs,	the	concept	of	epistemic	communities	appears	to	be	more	pertinent	
as	a	theoretical	lens.195		While	the	difference	between	an	epistemic	community	and	
other	type	of	policy	actors	reflects	the	importance	of	epistemic	element,		it	should	be	
acknowledged	that	the	line	between	epistemic	communities	and	policy	communities	
and/or	policy	entrepreneurs	is	not	as	easy	to	distinguish	in	practice.		In	fact,	the	idea	of	
policy	communities	is	likely	to	be	incorporated	into	considerations	of	epistemic	
communities	since	they	share	the	similar	definitional	characteristics.		For	example,	if	
policy	experts	are	active	for	normative	reasons	in	debates	over	policy	issues	and	they	
define	policy	issues	by	exchanging	knowledge	about	a	particular	subject,	they	can	be	
regarded	as	an	epistemic	community	as	well	as	policy	communities/entrepreneurs,	
because	they	would	pursue	a	policy	informed	by	their	shared	normative	beliefs	and	
preferred	value	judgments.			
	
Additionally,	distinguishing	members	of	epistemic	community	from	those	of	other	
groups	renders	some	analytical	difficulties	in	the	study	of	the	GHG	of	SARS.		First,	it	fails	
to	take	sufficient	account	of	the	complex	and	diverse	career	patterns	of	public	health	
                                                            
193	Kingdon	JW	(1984),	Agendas,	Alternatives	and	Public	Policies,	Boston:	Little	and	Brown	Company;	
Mintrom	M	&	Normal	P,	(2009)	Policy	Entrepreneurship	and	Policy	Change,	Policy	Studies	Journal,	37(4),	
pp.	649‐667.	
194	Mintrom	M	&	Norman	P	(2009),	Policy	Studies	Journal,	37(4).	
195	Keck	ME	&	Sikkink	K	(1998),	Activists	Beyond	Borders:	Advocacy	Networks	in	International	Politics,	
London,	Cornell	University	Press.	
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professionals	involved	in	SARS	who	may	hold	positions	across	different	types	of	social	
groups	including	academic	institutions,	governmental	and	intergovernmental	
organizations,	and	the	private	sector	at	different	times.		For	instance,	it	appeared	that	
many	experts,	if	not	all,	joined	the	global	SARS	operation	at	various	stages	of	the	
outbreak.		Some	were	recruited	on	short‐term	contracts	during	the	outbreak,	due	to	the	
lack	of	required	expertise	at	the	WHO	Secretariat,	and	then	became	regular	staff	during	
or	in	the	aftermath	of	SARS.196		Others,	having	served	in	national	bureaucracies	during	
SARS	as	technical	advisors,	joined	WHO	after	the	outbreak	ended.		In	a	similar	vein,	
some	experts	joined	the	global	research	network	while	in	government	positions.		Others	
joined	while	based	in	their	respective	academic	institutions.		This	indicates	that	
individuals	can	have	multiple	social	identities	and	thus	should	be	characterised	by	their	
expertise.		If	we	do	take	into	account	the	various	individuals	who	shared	similar	
normative	principles,	yet	may	have	held	different	social	positions,	we	capture	a	fuller	
picture	of	the	way	different	experts	and	their	ideas	interacted	in	the	response	to	the	
SAR	outbreak.	
	
Second,	WHO	Secretariat	officials,	while	assuming	the	role	of	coordinators	in	various	
operations,	were	arguably	also	deeply	engaged	in	the	idea	construction	stage	of	the	
policy‐making	process.		Due	to	the	nature	of	their	expertise	and	experience	in	the	field	
of	public	health	and	infectious	diseases,	instead	of	turning	to	other	specialists	for	advice,	
they	appeared	to	offer	or	tailor	advice	in	ways	that	made	it	congruent	with	the	
preferences	of	their	policy	decisions.		Therefore,	these	individuals	were	not	simply	
carrying	out	“policy	prescription”,	but	shaping	the	policy	making	process	by	virtue	of	
the	gatekeeping	nature	of	having	specialist	technical	knowledge.		Without	taking	
sufficient	account	of	the	role	of	these	technocrats	within	the	international	bureaucracy,	
an	analysis	of	how	agenda	and	actions	on	SARS	were	actually	formulated	or	shaped	
would	only	result	in	a	partial	depiction.	
	
Indeed,	when	one	reviews	research	practices	previously	used	by	other	scholars	in	the	
literature	of	epistemic	communities	(in	particular,	articles	appeared	in	the	International	
Organisation’s	special	issue	in	1992),	one	would	find	the	analytical	problems	related	to	
the	identification	of	the	epistemic	community.		That	is,	researchers	tend	to	assume	that	
there	is	a	clear	and	undisputed	set	of	shared	normative	belief	regarding	the	specific	
issue	or	policy	in	question.		Consequently,	there	is	no	difficulty	in	identifying	who	is	to	
be	a	member	of	the	epistemic	community	with	respect	to	that	particular	issue.		It	is	
argued	in	this	research	that	a	shared	causal	and	normative	belief	must	be	defined	
empirically	rather	than	assumed	a	priori.		In	other	words,	one	needs	to	explore	defining	
ideas	‐	be	they	causal	or	normative	beliefs	‐	related	to	the	particular	policy	issue	and	see	
                                                            
196	For	example,	Dr.	Angela	Marianos	was	an	academic	in	an	Australian	institution.	She	joined	the	WHO	
during	SARS	as	a	temporary	technical	expert.	She	later	played	a	role	as	the	SARS	focal	point	overseeing	
the	SARS	coordination	effort.	In	the	aftermath	of	SARS,	she	became	a	full‐time	staff	member	of	the	WHO.	
Likewise,	Dr.	Keiji	Fukuda	was	Chief	of	the	Epidemiology	Unit,	Influenza	Branch	at	the	US	CDC.	He	was	
dispatched	to	several	countries	including	Hong	Kong	and	China	during	SARS.	After	the	SARS	epidemic,	he	
moved	to	the	WHO	in	2005	working	as	coordinator	of	the	global	influenza	programme.	
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if	these	ideas	are	congruent	among	certain	experts.		Such	analysis	allows	a	researcher	to	
identify	whether	there	is	more	than	one	episteme/normative	belief	(i.e.	discourse)	and	
thus	the	existence	of	multiple	epistemic	communities	which	may	consist	of	different	
sets	of	actors.			
	
Given	the	discussion	above,	this	thesis	excludes	those	actors	who:	a)	do	not	share	the	
common	set	of	normative	principles	that	underlie	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	
outbreak;	b)	work	outside	a	framework	of	shared	notions	of	validity	that	cohere	
individuals	together;	c)	do	not	hold	shared	commitments	and	consensus	about	the	goals	
of	policy	practice	to	arrive	at	a	joint	acceptance	of	policy	issues	and	present	a	unified	
response	to	the	SARS	outbreak.		These	criteria	come	at	the	expense	of	considerable	
simplification;	nonetheless,	one	can	effectively	circumscribe	the	members	of	epistemic	
communities	and	integrate	participating	individuals.		
	
Hence	in	terms	of	membership	of	an	epistemic	community,	this	thesis	suggests	that	
potentially	important	technical	actors,	regardless	of	their	affiliation	with	national	
governments	or	intergovernmental	organizations,	public	or	private	sector,	must	have	
been	engaged	in	the	analysis	of	SARS.		Following	Haas’s	terminology	and	criteria,	but	
taking	into	consideration	the	analytical	difficulty	in	drawing	boundaries	around	the	
epistemic	communities	concept	in	global	public	health	policy	field,	this	thesis	defines	
the	epistemic	community	related	to	the	SARS	outbreak	as	a	group	of	professionals	from	
disciplines	pertaining	to	infectious	disease	outbreaks	who	were	centrally	involved	in	global	
response	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	in	a	position	to	offer	an	authoritative	claim	to	SARS,	and	
critically	involved	in	norm	articulating	events.	
	
How	epistemic	communities	emerge	and	form,	and	to	what	extent	the	discourses	
emanating	from	epistemic	communities,	exert	influence	on	the	way	SARS	was	
addressed	globally,	will	be	analysed	in	Chapters	Four	and	Five.		A	brief	overview	of	the	
evolution	of	international/global	discourses	surrounding	infectious	diseases	is	provided	
in	the	next	section.		
2.3.	COMPETING	DISCOURSES	IN	THE	GHG	OF	INFECTIOUS	DISEASES		
	
Public	health	policy	response	to	infectious	diseases	has	changed	over	time.		Before	
analysing	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	in	collective	action,	and	in	turn	the	power	
that	ideas	exert	on	the	GHG	of	SARS,	it	is	necessary	to	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	
key	discourses	surrounding	infectious	diseases.		This	will	enable	us	to	determine	the	
extent	to	which	they	were	prominent	or	not	in	the	GHG	of	SARS.	
	
The	existing	literature	suggests	that	GHG	has	been	shaped	by	a	number	of	competing	
discourses.		Lee	proposes	that	global	public	health	issues	have	been	shaped	by	four	key	
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discourses.	197		First,	the	biomedical	discourse	is	a	branch	of	medical	science	that	applies	
biological	and	other	natural‐science	principles	to	clinical	practice.	The	biomedical	
sciences	generate	atomised	approach	to	health	alongside	the	scientific	search	for	“magic	
bullets”	at	the	macro‐level	rather	than	interventions	at	the	level	of	community.	Second,	
the	economic	discourse	frames	global	public	health	issues	from	a	utilitarian	viewpoint	
whereby	economic	rationales	take	priority.		Third,	the	security	discourse	frames	global	
public	health	issues	as	threats	to	national	(and	by	extension	global)	interests;	for	
example,	placing	emphasis	on	biological	weapons	and	emerging	acute	infections.	Lastly,	
the	social	medical	discourse	is	inspired	by	the	health	as	a	human	right	perspective,	
where	the	emphasis	is	placed	on	equitable	access	to	medicines	and	healthcare,	as	well	
as	life	opportunities	to	meet	basic	needs	and	achieve	personal	well‐being	(e.g.	poverty	
reduction).	These	discourses	are	neither	unified,	containing	diverse	perspectives	within	
each,	nor	mutually	exclusive.		
	
A	number	of	scholars	have	sought	to	analyse	specific	discourses	in	relation	to	global	
health	issues.		The	work	of	the	STEPS	(Social,	Technological	and	Environmental	
Pathways	to	Sustainability)	Centre	at	the	University	of	Sussex	identifies	“narratives”	
focusing	mainly	on	avian	and	pandemic	influenza.		Scoones	and	Forster	observe	that	the	
response	to	avian	and	pandemic	influenza	has	been	largely	defined	as	an	“outbreak	
narrative”	which	has	placed	emphasis	on	tracking	disease	events	and	incidents	on	the	
basis	of	scientific	techniques,	risk	management,	a	protectionist	security	stance,	
universal	application	of	disease	control	or	public	education,	and	activity‐based	outcome	
assessment.198		While	they	used	the	term	“narrative”199	200	as	recurring	features	that	
emerged	in	the	global	avian	and	pandemic	influenza	response,	their	analysis	broadly	
focused	on	how	particular	narratives	became	dominant	and	associated	with	actors	and	
networks	in	the	policy	process.		In	this	sense,	the	narratives	in	their	work	can	be	viewed	
as	socially	constructed	ideas	on	outbreak	issues	through	which	actors,	interests	and	
institutions	interact.		Likewise,	Tuong	Vu	identifies	in	his	analysis	of	the	response	to	
avian	influenza	in	Vietnam	five	key	narratives:	the	power	narrative,	the	nationalist	
narrative,	the	populist	narrative,	the	technical	narrative,	and	the	protectionist	
narrative.201	
	
                                                            
197	Lee	K	(2009),	“Understanding	of	global	health	governance:	the	contested	landscape”,	in	Kay	A	and	
Willams	O	(eds.)	Global	Health	Governance:	Crisis,	Institutions	and	Political	Economy,	London:	Palgrave	
Macmillan.	
198	Scoones	I	and	Foster	P	(2008),	The	International	Response	to	Highly	Pathogenic	Avian	Influenza:	
Science,	Policy	and	Politics,	STEPS	Working	Paper	10,	Brighton:	STEPS	Centre.	
199	Wald	P	(2008)	Contagious:	Cultures,	Carriers,	and	the	Outbreak	Narrative,		
Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press.	
200	Narrative	in	its	original	term	refers	to	a	representation	of	a	particular	situation	or	process	in	such	a	
way	as	to	reflect	or	conform	to	an	overarching	set	of	aims	and	values.	Donald	E.	Polkinghorne,	Narrative	
Knowing	and	the	Human	Sciences.	Albany	New	York:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1988.	
201	Vu	T	(2009).	The	Political	Economy	of	Asian	Influenza	Response	and	Control	in	Vietnam,	STEPS	Working	
Paper	19,	Brighton:	STEPS	Centre.	
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Similarly,	Foster	explored	the	failure	of	Indonesia	to	address	the	Highly	Pathogenic	
Avian	Influenza	(HPAI)	in	terms	of	three	conceptual	factors.	The	first	one	was	the	lack	of	
a	modern	Weberian	bureaucracy,	coupled	with	the	assumption	by	many	in	the	
international	agencies	leading	the	H5N1	response	that	such	bureaucratic	structure	
should	exist.		The	second	conceptual	factor	that	contributed	to	the	Indonesia’s	relative	
failure	to	address	the	HPAI	effectively	was	the	mismatch	that	existed	between	the	global	
construction	of	risk	associated	with	H5N1,	which	was	driven	most	significantly	by	the	
global	public	good,	as	illustrated	by	slogans	such	as	‘One	World	One	Health’,	and	the	
weak	Indonesian	conception	of	a	national	public	good.	.	The	highly	stratified	nature	of	
Indonesian	society	–	the	rich	and	the	poor,	the	urban	and	the	rural	and	many	other	
groups	–	made	the	promotion	of	the	idea	of	common	goods	particularly	challenging.	.		
The	third	conceptual	factor	was	related	to	the	fracture	between	the	national	and	the	
international	in	the	conception	of	a	human	influenza	pandemic.		The	HPAI	response	in	
Indonesia	was	primary	driven	by	an	overarching	scientific	and	biomedical	narrative	
with	international	agencies	driving	the	implementation	of	a	set	of	programmes	
including	epidemiological	surveillance,	mass	poultry	vaccination,	and	culling.		Yet,	such	
an	international‐led	narrative,	justified	by	science,	was	at	odds	with	local	narratives	
that	concerned	the	livelihood	of	farmers,	food	security,	and	the	welfare	of	poultry.			.		
	
Additionally,	Shiffman	proposes	an	explanation	based	on	Social	Constructionism,	
concerning	the	rise,	persistence	and	fall	of	specific	issues	in	global	health.	He	argues	
that	global	health	issues	may	have	less	to	do	with	how	“important”	it	is,	in	any	objective	
sense,	than	with	how	supporters	of	the	issue	come	to	understand	and	portray	its	
importance.202	Specifically,	those	issues	that	attract	attention	may	be	the	ones	in	which	
policy	community	members	have	discovered	frames	which	resonate	with	global	and	
national	political	elites,	and	then	established	institutions	that	can	sustain	these	
frames.203	Although	Shiffman	did	not	specifically	identify	the	core	discourses	that	
shaped	the	framing	of	global	disease	control	priorities,	drawing	on	several	empirical	
communicable	disease	cases	such	as	polio,	tuberculosis,	malaria,	HIV/AIDS	and	infant	
mortality,	he	demonstrated	that	the	framing	of	global	health	issues	are	backed	by	
powerful	institutions	and	understood	in	the	organizational	sense	of	the	term.	He	
proposes	that	the	emergence	of	disease	control	campaigns	requires	a	convergence	of	
three	conditions:	a)	a	disease	should	be	widely	considered	to	be	a	major	threat;	b)	a	
disease	should	be	perceived	to	be	amenable	to	containment	through	human	
intervention;	and	c)	there	should	exist	a	coalition	of	powerful	institutional	actors	that	
believe	it	to	be	worthwhile	to	fight	the	disease.204	This	proposition	is	highly	relevant	to	
                                                            
202	Shiffman	J	(2009),	“A	social	explanation	for	the	rise	and	fall	of	global	health	issues”,	Bulletin	of	World	
Health	Organization,	87:	608‐613.	
203	Shiffman	J	(2010),	“Issue	attention	in	global	health:	the	case	of	newborn	survival”,	The	Lancet,	375:	
2045‐49.	
204	Shiffman	J,	Beer	T	and	Wu	Y	(2002),	“The	emergence	of	global	disease	control	priorities”,	Health	Policy	
and	Planning,	17(3):	225‐234;	Shiffman	J	(2006),	“HIV/AIDS	and	the	rest	of	the	global	health	agenda”,	
Bulletin	of	the	World	Health	Organization,	84(12):	923;	Shiffman	J	(2010),	“Issue	attention	in	global	
health:	the	case	of	newborn	survival”,	The	Lancet,	375:	2045‐2049.	
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the	approach	taken	by	this	research	in	that	it	recognises	the	importance	of	ideational	
construction	that	may	become	a	framework	for	understanding	and	shaping	the	material	
context	within	which	international	infectious	disease	policies	are	carried	out.		
	
Overall,	a	number	of	scholars	have	argued	that	the	realm	of	ideas	is	important	in	
shaping	emerging	forms	of	GHG.		Referred	to	variably	as	normatively‐based	discourses,	
perspectives	and	frames,	these	sets	of	ideas	are	held	and	used	to	influence	how	global	
health	issues	are	defined	as	problems,	and	the	potential	solutions	available	to	address	
them.	For	the	purposes	of	this	research,	we	will	refer	to	these	sets	of	ideas	as	discourses.	
While	scholars	have	identified	a	range	of	different	discourses,	and	the	ideas	which	
define	them,	as	described	above,	the	following	section	provides	a	brief	discussion	of	the	
core	ideas	of	discourses	that	appear	to	have	informed	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	
outbreaks.			
2.3.1	Biomedical	Discourse	
	
The	dominance	of	the	biomedical	model	in	public	health	is	reflected	in	the	rapid	growth	
of	scientific	research,	observation	and	technology	which	emphasises	a	biomechanical	
approach	to	disease	and	the	human	body.205	This	model	takes	a	reductionist	approach	
to	the	health	of	the	human	body	because	it	views	ill‐health	as	resulting	from	physical	
causes	such	as	infection	or	injury.	Within	this	discourse,	the	way	to	pursue	solutions	to	
health	problems	is	a	linear,	compartmentalised	approach	that	seeks	to	answer	specific	
problems	without	taking	sufficient	cognisance	of	the	fact	that	these	problems	are	
embedded	within	complex	systems	in	which	positive	and	negative	feedback	occurs	in	
response	to	changes	in	one	or	another	area,	and	with	consequent	effects.	Thus	
biomedical	discourse	is	based	upon	the	notion	that	biological	processes	can	(and	
should)	be	separated	from	each	other,	and	from	wider	social	contexts.		
	
Biology	has	traditionally	been	regarded	as	naturally	given	and	thus	unchangeable.	The	
result	of	this	notion	is	that	there	is	a	general	tendency	to	shift	attention	away	from	the	
social,	economic	and	environmental	fundamentals	of	health.	In	respect	to	infectious	
diseases,	it	is	widely	believed	that	clinical	intervention	has	played	a	major	part	in	
understanding	the	biology	of	why	diseases	occur	and	how	they	can	be	treated;	new	
developments	in	diagnosis	and	treatment	would	therefore	provide	further	
improvement	to	health.	It	focuses	on	the	clinical	and	epidemiological	characteristics	and	
modes	of	the	transmission	of	disease.	Favoured	strategies	stress	prevention	of	
individual	risk	behaviours	and	methods	of	prevention,	treatment	and	care.206		
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Under	the	assumptions	of	the	biomedical	discourse,	infectious	diseases	are	primarily	a	
problem	requiring	scientific	knowledge	and	medical/technical	solutions,	with	a	focus	on	
medical	rather	than	social	interventions	and	on	addressing	diseases	for	which	technical	
solutions	exist.207		This	assumption	is	largely	driven	by	the	improvements	in	clinical	
knowledge	and	practice,	including	mass	vaccination	campaigns	or	the	use	of	antibiotics,	
based	on	the	belief	that	scientific	interventions	hold	the	key	to	the	improved	health	of	
individuals	and	populations.208		The	basic	argument	is	that,	with	the	right	scientific	
tools,	health	interventions	will	lead	to	improvements	in	population	health.	What	is	
therefore	needed	is	the	institutional,	technocratic	and	financial	bases	for	achieving	
international	cooperation	to	develop	and	apply	such	tools.		It	has	been	observed,	
however,	that	biomedical	solutions	to	infectious	disease	problems	often	result	in	large‐
scale	investments	promoting	private	profit	over	public	goods.		For	example,	developing	
and	providing	new	drugs	are	more	imperative	in	this	discourse	than	the	use	of	existing	
resources.209		It	therefore	prioritises	the	biomedical	sciences	and	technological	
innovation	as	the	solutions	to	infectious	disease	problems,	overlooking	available	
knowledge,	appropriate	(sometimes	low)	technologies,	or	complementary	social‐based	
solutions.	
	
The	biomedical	discourse	is	evident	in	the	infectious	disease	control	programme	of	the	
Rockefeller	Foundation	(RF)	during	the	early	20th	century.		As	part	of	medical	
philanthropy,	the	RF	was	set	up	to	promote	more	active	prevention,	control	and	
treatment	of	infectious	diseases,	particularly	in	poor	countries.		The	RF	promoted	health	
activities	in	Latin	America	and	Asia	involving	(a)	basic	health	research,	(b)	training	
health	personnel,	and	(c)	setting	up	a	demonstration	of	model	health	programmes.210		
Some	historians	noted	that	the	RF	was	the	most	influential	international	agency	in	
shaping	the	priorities	and	ideologies	of	international	health	cooperation	based	upon	the	
primacy	of	biomedical	solutions	to	public	health	problems.211		The	RF’s	biomedical	
episteme	was	clear	in	its	support	for	selected	infectious	disease	control	initiatives,	and	
its	establishment	of	an	international	network	of	public	health	professionals	to	
implement	them.212		Through	its	focus	on	training	and	institution	building,	the	RF	was	
fundamental	in	creating	an	international	network	of	public	health	experts,	drawing	on	
the	universalism	of	biomedical	science	and	reinforcing	the	biomedical	episteme.		This	is	
evidenced	by	the	RF’s	funding	for	disease	campaigns	against	yellow	fever,	hookworm	
and	malaria,	and	for	supporting	the	establishment	of	several	dozen	schools	of	public	
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health	across	the	world.213	Interestingly,	the	RF	funded	the	appointment	of	Rene	Sand	
as	Professor	of	Social	Medicine	in	1945	at	Brussels	University,	who	played	an	active	role	
in	the	international	promotion	of	the	social	medicine	discipline,	especially	in	Latin	
America.214		Social	medicine	locates	health	and	ill‐health	within	a	broader	social	context,	
and	seeks	to	address	the	impact	of	society	on	individuals,	notably	those	who	are	
disadvantaged.		Yet,	while	the	RF	claimed	to	be	an	ardent	supporter	of	social	medicine,	
which	explains	the	focus	by	the	Foundation	on	health	needs	in	poor	countries,	others	
question	the	rationale	for	the	RF’s	health	activities.		Based	on	the	programmes	funded,	it	
is	arguable	whether	the	RF	supported	a	social	medicine	approach,	namely	locating	
health	within	a	broader	social‐economic	context.	Rather,	its	activities	and	overall	
approach	had	a	strong	biomedical	focus	orientated	towards	social	improvement	via	
disease	control	and	eradication.		
	
On	the	surface,	the	League	of	Nations	Health	Organization	(LNHO),	established	in	1920	
to	provide	a	collective	response	to	Europe’s	concern	for	the	prevention	and	control	of	
disease,	also	supported	social	medicine	principles.	From	the	time	of	its	establishment,	
the	governing	committee	of	the	LNHO	prioritized	the	development	of	social	medicine.215		
For	example,	the	International	Labour	Organization	(ILO)	’s	representative	on	the	
committee	persistently	argued	that	issues	of	social	medicine	could	not	be	separated	
from	the	question	of	access	to	services	that	fundamentally	affected	the	health	of	
people.216		However,	the	primary	concern	of	the	LNHO’s	work	programme	quickly	
became	the	universalisation	of	scientific	standards	and	nomenclature	in	terms	of	the	
collection	of	biomedical	and	morbidity/mortality	statistics.217	The	organization	also	put	
strong	emphasis	on	the	biomedical	sciences	in	terms	of	epidemiologic	surveillance,	
health	commissions,	expert	scientific	research	committees,	and	the	exchange	of	health	
personnel.		For	example,	in	1919,	an	epidemic	of	typhus	spread	through	Russia	and	
Poland.		In	addition,	a	major	worldwide	pandemic	of	influenza	occurred,	which	was	
estimated	to	cause	as	many	as	50	million	deaths	by	1920.		Yet	the	LNHO’s	role	in	
providing	technical	assistance	to	address	infectious	disease	outbreaks	of	these	kinds	
proved	to	be	limited.		Instead,	its	focus	remained	predominantly	on	surveillance,	
monitoring	and	reporting	rather	than	on	rapid	response	to	prevent,	control	and	treat	
such	diseases.		As	Weindling	argues,	set	against	such	scientific	expert‐based	strategies	
were	defects	in	the	elite	structures	of	the	LNHO.218		The	LNHO’s	model	of	public	health	
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supported	a	technocratic	vision	of	public	health	reform,	failing	to	address	health	
promotion	at	the	level	of	primary	health	care.219	
	
The	established	domain	of	the	biomedical	episteme	continued	with	the	creation	of	the	
WHO	in	1948	and	its	disease‐specific	programmes	in	the	form	of	mass	campaigns	in	the	
1950s	and	1960s.220		Major	attention	was	focused	on	selected	infectious	diseases	
afflicting	people	in	developing	countries.		This	was	because,	while	in	theory	health	
policy	was	decided	on	“consensual	grounds”,	as	the	WHO	rarely	evokes	its	voting	
system,	in	practice	its	activities	were	largely	defined	by	medical	professionals.221		There	
was	also	a	high	priority	given	to	standardization	of	drugs	and	vaccines,	and	disease‐
focused	research	and	policy	such	as	the	Malaria	Eradication	Programme.222		Leading	
scientists,	most	notably	Fred	Lowe	Soper,	a	former	RF	employee,	believed	that	residual	
insecticides	could	progressively	eradicate	a	disease.		This	strongly	influenced	what	
health	needs	were	prioritised,	as	well	as	the	specific	types	of	activities	the	WHO	
supported.		In	turn,	broad‐based	approaches	that	championed	integrated	economic	
development	were	given	limited	attention.		The	organisation	began	to	favour	relatively	
simple	medical	interventions,	such	as	vaccines	and	prophylaxis,	rather	than	more	
complex	interventions	that	addressed	economic	and	social	circumstances.223		This	
vertical	approach	to	infectious	diseases,	what	Mills	calls	“directed,	supervised	and	
executed,	either	wholly	or	to	a	great	extent	by	a	specialized	service	using	dedicated	
health	workers”,	became	the	norm	during	this	period.		It	is	also	an	approach	that	
remains	subject	to	debate	to	the	present	day.		Critics	argue	that	this	vertical	approach	to	
disease	control	fails	to	address	fundamental	social	and	economic	conditions,	which	
directly	effects	the	populations	of	developing	countries.224	
	
In	response	to	this	failure,	longer‐term	and	more	holistic	strategies		‐	i.e.	attention	to	
individual	wellbeing	as	well	as	societal	factors	shaping	health	determinants	and	
outcomes	‐	were	recognised	as	needed	to	target	ill‐health	generally	rather	than	specific	
diseases	individually.	The	Primary	Health	Care	(PHC)	movement	emerged	as	a	key	part	
of	the	response	to	this	failure	(discussed	under	the	human	rights	discourse).		This	
“horizontal”	approach	claims	that	major	diseases	need	to	be	addressed	within	a	broader	
social	context	where	health	care	delivery	may	need	to	take	account	of	equity	and	social	
justice.		In	contrast,	the	vertical	approach	contends	that,	within	the	context	of	scarce	
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resources,	it	is	imperative	to	target	the	diseases	of	greatest	prevalence	in	terms	of	
morbidity	and	mortality,	or	diseases	where	effective	interventions	were	available.	225	
The	vertical	approach	gained	particularly	strong	support	from	action‐oriented	
institutions	such	as	UNICEF.	In	this	context,	for	instance,	then	UNICEF	Director	James	
Grant,	inspired	by	polio	expert	Jonas	Salk,	and	Robert	McNamara,	then	the	president	of	
the	World	Bank,	supported	the	acceleration	of	the	expanded	programme	on	
immunization	and	selective	primary	care	in	the	early	1980s.226	
	
The	biomedical	discourse	was	given	an	additional	boost	from	the	mid	1990s	with	the	
initiation	of	new	global	health	initiatives	to	address	a	myriad	of	disease	areas.		Many	
public‐private	partnerships	were	formed	to	tackle	specific	diseases	such	as	malaria	(e.g.	
Rollback	Malaria	Campaign),	tuberculosis	(e.g.	Stop	TB)	and	HIV/AIDS	(e.g.	
International	AIDS	Vaccine	Initiative),	as	well	as	tropical	diseases	such	as	
schistosomiasis	(e.g.	Mectizan	Donation	Programme),	trachoma	(e.g.	Trachoma	
International	Trachoma	Initiative)	and	onchocerciasis	(e.g.	African	Programme	for	
Onchocerciasis	Control).227		These	public‐private	partnerships	mobilised	billions	of	
dollars	for	global	health	activities	and	transformed	the	GHG	landscape.228		Two	very	
significant	players	in	these	partnerships	are	the	Global	Fund	to	Fight	HIV/AIDS,	
Tuberculosis	and	Malaria	(GFATM)	and	the	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation.229	
GFATM	was	established	in	2002	as	an	independent	financing	entity,	and	disburses	
approximately	two‐thirds	of	its	funds	to	combat	tuberculosis,	one‐half	for	malaria	and	
one‐quarter	for	HIV/AIDS.		Essentially,	GFATM	focuses	largely	on	treatment	rather	than	
prevention	of	diseases.	Its	grant‐making	process	requires	applicant	countries	to	
propose	technical,	measurable	short‐term	approaches	to	fighting	disease	rather	than	
measures	to	address	the	underlying	social	determinants	of	health	needs.		Bhatia	and	
Rifkin	point	out	that,	consistent	with	a	biomedical	approach,	GFATM	has	a	strong	
preference	for	technological	solutions	directed	towards	re‐enforcing	and	implementing	
the	vertical	disease	programme	approach.230	
	
Another	important	player	is	the	Gates	Foundation	(established	in	2000)	which	has	
demonstrated	a	strong	preference	for	targeted	medical	interventions	and	research	over	
broad‐based	health	sector	development	and	strengthening.231	Lee	argues	that	the	Gates	
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Foundation	has	been	among	the	most	ardent	followers	of	the	biomedical	model.	Its	
focus	upon	a	single	disease	approach	by	developing	vaccines	and	drugs	through	
unparalleled	levels	of	funding	has	reflected	a	strong	faith	in	biomedical	science.232		
Similarly,	Birn	argues	that	the	shortcomings	of	the	Gate’s	Grand	Challenges	has	been	a	
failure	to	take	into	consideration	the	social	determinants	of	health.233		As	the	
Foundation	has	become	the	most	influential	institutional	actor	in	global	health,	by	
virtue	of	its	funding	resources	and	increasingly	agenda	setting	expertise,	it	has	also	had	
a	profound	impact	on	how	infectious	diseases	have	been	addressed	on	a	global	scale.234	
	
In	summary,	the	core	ideas	of	the	biomedical	discourse,	as	applied	to	infectious	disease	
outbreaks,	are:	
	
 Infectious	disease	is	a	problem	best	understood	and	addressed	through	the	
biological	sciences	as	applied	to	clinical	medicine	
 Clinical	intervention	should	play	a	core	role	in	diagnosis	and	treatment	
 Biological	processes	should	be	separated	from	the	social	context	
 Clinical	and	epidemiological	characteristics	and	mode	of	transmission	of	the	disease	
should	be	the	key	focus	
 There	should	be	a	linear	and	compartmentalised	solution	to	specific	diseases	
 Individual	risk	behaviours	and	methods	of	prevention,	treatment	and	care	should	be	
prioritised	
 Large‐scale	investments	in	clinical	research	should	be	promoted	
 Development	of	new	drugs	should	be	emphasised	
	
2.3.2.	Health	and	the	Human	Rights	Discourse	
	
The	human	rights	discourse	is	based	upon	the	claim	that	there	is	a	basic	human	right	to	
health	held	by	all	individuals.		This	perspective	gained	international	legitimacy	
following	the	adoption	of	the	WHO	Alma	Ata	Declaration	of	1978.		Human	rights	are	
best	understood	as	high‐priority	minimal	moral	entitlements	of	all	persons,	and	as	
implying	both	fairly	determinate	obligations	on	the	part	of	states	and	more	
indeterminate	obligations	on	individuals	to	work	with	others	to	promote	the	protection	
of	rights,	if	they	have	the	opportunity	and	resources	to	do	so.235		Under	the	concept	of	
human	rights,	individuals	possess	a	universal	claim	to	certain	rights	regardless	of	their	
nationality,	location,	or	health	status.		Human	rights	thus	transcend	formal	state	
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sovereignty	and	impose	obligations	on	states	to	respect,	protect,	and	fulfil	the	human	
rights	of	all	persons.236	
	
Within	the	human	rights	discourse,	good	health	is	cited	as	a	human	right	that	everyone	
–	regardless	of	race,	class,	gender,	nationality	or	age	–	should	be	entitled	to.		Indeed,	
literature	on	human	rights	contends	that	health	is	a	social	right	that	everyone	must	
enjoy	in	order	to	make	the	most	of	their	civil	and	political	rights.237	The	human	rights	
discourse	argues	that,	in	order	for	people	to	become	and	remain	healthy,	they	need	
access	to	medical	services	as	well	as	a	decent	standard	of	living,	including	good	
sanitation,	proper	food	staples,	clean	drinking	water,	and	shelter.238		In	this	sense,	
health	should	be	promoted,	not	only	because	of	the	positive	externalities	healthy	people	
generate,	as	put	forth	by	the	economic	discourse	(discussed	below),	but	because	health	
is	a	‘good’	in	and	of	itself	that	contributes	to	one’s	own	and	society’s	overall	well‐being.		
As	such,	health	policy	needs	to	be	wide‐ranging	and	target	underlying	conditions	that	
may	not	be	directly	seen	as	health‐related,	such	as	reproductive	health,	education,	and	
development.			
	
A	shift	in	attention	in	GHG,	to	the	achievement	of	human	rights	to	health,	has	been	
largely	driven	by	the	perceived	lack	of	effective	governance	at	the	national	level	to	
address	unequal	distributions	of	health.		Proponents	of	this	discourse	therefore	seek	to	
push	the	national	and	global	community	to	deliver	the	right	to	health	in	two	ways.		First,	
states	should	remove	barriers	to	access	to	existing	health	care	resources,	eliminate	
discrimination	in	health	services,	and	ensure	that	the	health	needs	of	all	citizens	are	
taken	into	account	in	developments	that	can	have	serious	health	effects.		Second,	there	
should	be	a	standard	for	ensuring	that	all	citizens	enjoy	a	core	set	of	positive	health	
entitlements,	including	for	example	clean	drinking	water,	basic	sanitation	and	shelter	as	
well	as	access	to	basic	prenatal	care	and	immunization	for	the	most	serious	infectious	
diseases.		Therefore,	the	discourse	seeks	to	identify	structural	inequalities	in	health	and	
impose	upon	states	and	the	global	community	the	obligation	to	protect	and	improve	
their	populations’	right	to	health.239		
	
The	human	rights	discourse	prioritises	equitable	access	to	basic	healthcare	according	to	
one’s	need,	and	is	strongly	associated	with	contemporary	civil	society	engagement	in	
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infectious	diseases	and	other	health	issues	such	as	access	to	medicines.240	As	human	
rights	have	helped	inform	the	goals	and	strategies	of	non‐state	actors,	these	actors	have	
likewise	played	an	increasingly	prominent	role	in	influencing	the	development	of	
human	rights	structures	and	norms	that	impact	health.	Many	non‐governmental	
organizations,	civil	society	organisations,	and	policy	programmes	incorporate	a	human	
rights	approach	in	their	efforts	to	improve	health,	which	include	the	establishment	of	
the	procedural	and	jurisdictional	contours	of	monitoring,	oversight	and	enforcement	
that	uphold	human	rights	which	are	relevant	to	health.241		While	supporting	the	basic	
assumptions	of	human	rights,	the	civil	society	movement	takes	a	more	radical	approach	
to	the	structural	factors	that	systematically	erode	human	rights.		Overall,	the	human	
rights	discourse	provides	a	compelling	approach	to	understanding	and	protecting	
health	at	both	the	national	and	global	level.	
	
The	human	rights	discourse	can	be	found	at	the	heart	of	the	Primary	Health	Care	(PHC)	
movement	of	the	1970s.		The	concept	of	PHC	emerged	when	the	biomedical	model	faced	
a	“crisis	of	faith”	among	public	health	practitioners.		This	resulted	from	the	
embarrassing	failure	of	disease‐specific	programmes	developed	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s,	led	by	the	Malaria	Eradication	Programme.242		This	was	coupled	with	evidence	of	
the	successful	mobilisation	of	community	health	care	in	developing	countries	–	for	
example,	the	famous	“barefoot	doctors”	in	China	as	the	first	line	of	health	care	–	and	also	
challenged	the	prevailing	biomedical/public	health	episteme.		The	PHC	movement	was	
epitomised	by	the	Alma	Ata	Declaration	where	134	member	states	of	the	WHO	affirmed	
their	commitment	to	equity	–	as	embodied	in	the	slogan	“Health	for	All	by	the	Year	
2000”.	The	declaration	emphasized	social	justice,	equity	and	an	understanding	of	the	
socioeconomic	underpinnings	of	health.		This	movement	shifted	the	focus,	from	mere	
provision	of	disease‐specific	control	and	treatment	programmes,	to	tackling	broader	
socioeconomic	development	needs	within	which	health	is	achieved.		Health	care,	in	
turn,	would	be	more	integrated	and	accessible.		A	range	of	experts	including	
epidemiologists,	economists,	and	other	social	scientists	began	to	place	emphasis	on	the	
social	and	economic	dimensions	of	health	and	disease.		TB	expert	and	Director‐General	
of	the	WHO	from	1973	to	1988,	Halfdan	Mahler,	among	others,	markedly	contributed	to	
this	concept	by	initiating	a	new	social	paradigm	of	health	care	with	an	emphasis	on	
disease	prevention	and	health	promotion,	in	contrast	to	the	earlier	focus	on	technical	
expertise.	His	leadership	and	long‐term	commitment	to	social	justice	led	to	the	
proposed	goal	of	the	PHC	movement	at	the	WHA	in	1976.243	
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While	the	PHC	movement	offered	a	new	normative	framework,	focused	on	the	human	
right	to	health,	the	1980s	saw	a	policy	shift	in	other	international	health	institutions,	
such	as	UNICEF	and	the	World	Bank,	away	from	the	human	rights	discourse.		Many,	if	
not	all,	were	unconvinced	that	addressing	social	justice	and	economic	development	
were	as	vital	to	health	improvements	as	direct	biomedical	interventions	and	targeted	
disease‐focused	efforts.		As	described	in	the	previous	subsection,	the	renewal	of	
disease‐specific	programmes,	reflected	in	the	growth	of	extra‐budgetary	funds	
(voluntary	contributions),	was	seen	by	many	as	a	reassertion	of	power	by	major	donor	
countries,	after	a	decade	of	activism	among	low	and	middle‐income	countries	in	the	UN.		
The	donor‐led	policy	of	zero	real	growth	in	the	WHO’s	budget,	along	with	choices	by	
these	countries	about	what	health	issues	to	prioritise	and	the	types	of	activities	to	
support	to	address	them,	added	up	to	undue	influence	by	a	small	number	of	countries	
over	priority	setting	within	WHO	and	other	international	institutions	towards	selected	
disease‐focused	initiatives.244		All	of	these	developments	modified	and	eventually	
derailed	the	comprehensive	PHC	approach.		Instead,	“selective	PHC”,	which	was	
initiated	by	James	Grant	at	UNICEF	and	subsequently	supported	by	the	RF	and	the	
World	Bank,	became	the	dominant	mantra.245	UNICEF	adopted	the	GOBI‐FF	strategy	
(growth	monitoring,	oral	rehydration	therapy,	breastfeeding	and	immunization,	family	
planning,	female	education	and	food	supplementation).		In	terms	of	policy	response,	this	
meant	a	focus	on	targeted	disease	interventions,	rather	than	an	integrated	approach	to	
address	the	underlying	socioeconomic	context	that	shaped	health	determinants.	The	
human	rights	discourse	was	therefore	gradually	diminished	in	favour	of	the	economic	
(see	below)	and	biomedical	discourses.	The	close	complementarity	between	the	
neoliberal	emphasis	on	the	role	of	the	market	economy,	in	improving	efficiency	and	
effectiveness,	and	specific	disease‐oriented	health	interventions,	often	embedded	in	the	
principle	of	an	individually‐focused	understanding	of	health,	has	been	explored	in	a	
number	of	highly	critical	publications.246		
	
In	the	late	1980s,	the	human	rights	discourse	was	reinvigorated	by	Jonathan	Mann,	the	
first	Director	of	the	WHO’s	Global	Programme	on	AIDS.	He	played	a	pivotal	role	in	
advocating	the	human	rights	approach	despite	resistance	by	WHO	Director‐General	
Hiroshi	Nakajima,	who	favoured	a	biomedical	approach	to	the	disease.	Criticism	of	such	
an	approach	by	Mann,	who	left	the	organisation	in	1990,	and	then	major	donor	
countries,	UNDP,	UNICEF	and	other	organisations,	led	to	the	creation	of	the	Joint	United	
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Nations	Programme	on	HIV/AIDS	(UNAIDS)	in	1996.247		Mann,	Larry	Gostin	and	
colleagues	famously	framed	the	connection	between	health	and	human	rights	as	an	
“inextricable	linkage.”248	The	model	linking	health	and	human	rights,	based	on	Mann’s	
work	of	applying	human	rights	to	combat	HIV/AIDS	during	his	time	at	the	WHO,	
recognised	that	promoting	human	rights	is	linked	with	protecting	health.249	Without	
good	health,	it	was	argued	that	people	may	have	great	difficulty	advocating	for	and	
benefiting	from	other	human	rights.	Conversely,	without	adequate	human	rights	
protections,	harmful	conditions	and	practices	that	undermine	health	may	persist.	The	
advancement	of	health	and	human	rights	can	and	should	thus	occur	
contemporaneously.250	In	short,	the	intersection	of	human	rights	and	health	goes	
beyond	the	right	to	health	and	implicates	a	number	of	other	rights	(life,	liberty,	judicial	
redress,	privacy,	education,	etc.)	that	have	an	impact	on	the	ability	of	a	person	to	
achieve	good	health.		
	
The	human	rights	discourse,	in	the	context	of	infectious	diseases,	has	often	progressed	
concurrently	within	UN	organisations.	For	example,	UNDP	and	UNAIDS	have	recognised	
the	impact	of	human	rights	on	health	and	have	explicitly	adopted	human	rights	norms	
into	their	health	strategies	and	policy	guidance.251	Human	Rights	Watch	has	generally	
focused	on	health	issues	and	used	their	human	rights	expertise	to	highlight	health	
concerns	such	as	HIV/AIDS.252	Paul	Hunt,	former	UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	rights	to	
health,	similarly	argues	that	Article	2(1)	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	
Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR)	obligates	“developed	states…to	provide	
international	assistance	and	cooperation	to	ensure	the	realization	of	economic,	social	
and	cultural	rights	in	low‐income	countries	a	normative	affirmation	of	which	exists	in	
the	MDGs.”253	
	
The	revised	IHR	provides	another	example	of	the	incorporation	of	human	rights	
principles	into	a	GHG	instrument.	Countries	adhering	to	the	IHR	must	coordinate	efforts	
to	stop	the	spread	of	public	health	emergencies	of	international	concern.254	In	
implementing	the	IHR,	countries	are	required	to	ensure	“full	respect	for	the	dignity,	
human	rights,	and	fundamental	freedom	of	persons”	and	“shall	treat	travellers	with	
respect	for	their	dignity,	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedom,	and	minimize	any	
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discomfort	or	distress	associated	with	such	measures”	taken	to	prevent	the	spread	of	
disease.255		
	
A	further	example	can	be	drawn	from	Michael	Marmot	who	chaired	the	WHO	
Commission	on	the	Social	Determinants	of	Health,	intended	to	be	a	counterbalance	to	
the	Commission	on	Macroeconomics	and	Health.256		He	advocates	understanding	of	the	
underlying	factors	contributing	to	population	health,	which	is	broader	than	the	
predominant	biomedical	perspective.257	The	final	report	of	the	Commission	is	infused	
with	references	to	rights	and	places	the	attainment	of	health	equity	as	a	moral	
imperative.		The	Commission	identifies	the	importance	of	rights‐based	approaches	for	
reducing	health	inequities.		The	report	states,	“There	are	clear	links	between	a	rights	
approach	to	health	and	the	social	determinants	of	health	approach	to	health	equity.	The	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	points	to	the	interdependence	of	civil,	cultural,	
economic,	political	and	social	rights	–	dimensions	of	social	exclusion	highlighted	in	the	
social	determinants	of	health	framework.”258		The	case	for	health	equity	shares	much	in	
common	with	the	drive	to	realise	human	rights.		The	Commission’s	vision	to	close	the	
gap	in	a	generation	strongly	affirms	the	right	to	health	as	it	is	articulated	in	the	WHO	
Constitution.	
	
In	summary,	the	core	ideas	of	the	human	rights	discourse,	as	applied	to	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	are:	
	
 Individuals	possess	a	universal	claim	to	certain	rights	regardless	of	their	nationality,	
location	or	health	status	
 There	should	be	a	standard	for	ensuring	that	all	citizens	enjoy	a	core	set	of	positive	
health	entitlements	
 Universal	access	to	a	basic	level	of	healthcare	should	be	prioritised	
 The	broad	underlying	conditions	that	may	cause	ill	health	should	be	targeted	
 National	and	international	community	should	deliver	the	right	to	health	
 Civil	society	organizations	should	be	closely	engaged	
 Prevention,	multi‐sectoral	collaboration	and	poverty	reduction	are	seen	as	key	to	
health	improvements	
2.3.3.	Economic	Discourse		
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The	economic	discourse	focuses	on	the	utilitarian	argument	that	healthy	people	
contribute	positively	to	economic	growth/development,	whereas	ill	health	is	a	drain	on	
individual	households	and	national	economies.	It	substitutes	human	rights’	insistence	
on	equity	and	social	justice	for	a	focus	on	relative	poverty	reduction.259	Economics	is	
about	analyzing	the	production,	distribution	and	consumption	of	goods	and	services.	
Drawing	on	economically‐derived	statistics,	methodologies	such	as	cost‐benefit	and	
cost‐effectiveness	analyses,	and	measures	of	productivity	and	efficiency,	the	economic	
discourse	emphasizes	the	setting	of	health	policy	priorities	to	achieve	quantifiable	
measures	of	gains	in	material	wealth.	This,	in	turn,	encourages	an	understanding	of	
health	and	well‐being	in	terms	of	economic	notions	of	value	based	on	the	
commoditisation	of	health	status	and	entitlements.	
	
The	discourse	begins	with	the	assumption	that	resources	are	limited.		The	challenge	for	
health	policy	is	how	to	best	allocate	those	resources	to	achieve	optimal	population	
health	gains.		Within	this	neoliberal	economic	discourse,	it	is	argued	that	competitive	
market	forces	are	regarded	as	the	most	efficient	allocative	mechanism.	Certain	health	
system	reforms	adopted	during	this	period	have	reflected	this	market‐oriented	
approach.	The	introduction	of	user	charges,	privatisation,	decentralisation	of	budgets	
and	responsibilities,	contracting	out,	fundholding,	and	the	promotion	of	private	sector	
and	public‐private	partnerships	in	health	care	services	and	financing	are	examples	
found	in	countries	of	widely	varying	levels	of	socioeconomic	development.	In	low‐
income	countries,	health	reform	measures	introduced	as	part	of	Structural	Adjustment	
Programmes	have	also	been	closely	allied	with	this	discourse.		
	
In	terms	of	infectious	disease	response,	the	economic	discourse	leads	to	the	
prioritisation	of	certain	population	groups,	namely	those	most	economically	productive	
within	society,	at	the	expense	of	others	(i.e.	the	young,	old	or	disabled).	The	economic	
discourse	has	extensive	significance	for	health	strategies	in	requiring	economic	
justifications	for,	and	weighting	of,	different	disease	control	interventions.260	It	also	
influences	which	infectious	diseases	in	which	settings	are	prioritised.		For	example,	the	
basic	package	of	health	care	interventions	aim	to	concentrate	scare	resources	on	
interventions	which	provide	the	best	“value	for	money”	prioritising	particular	disease	
groups	–	HIV/AIDS,	mental	health,	and	maternal,	newborn	and	child	health	–	in	low‐
income	countries.261	Strategically,	the	discourse	pursues	the	middle	way,	which	avoids	
the	selectivity	of	the	vertical	approach	but	seeks	to	ensure	that	general	health	resources	
are	devoted	to	interventions	prioritized	on	the	basis	of	their	contribution	to	wealth	
generation.		This	discourse,	however,	was	seen	as	lacking	evidence	of	success	by	vertical	
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programme	proponents,	and	as	overly	technocratic	by	advocates	of	the	horizontal	
philosophy.262	
	
The	economic	discourse	enjoyed	a	strong	surge	from	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	
when	the	WHO	began	to	wane	in	influence	compared	with	the	World	Bank,	which	had	
become	the	main	source	of	funding	for	health	development	at	that	time.	On	top	of	this	
institutional	shift	in	material	power,	the	1980s	saw	an	economic	downturn	and	
resultant	ideological	shift	towards	an	increased	market	orientation	within	the	public	
sector	in	the	form	of	a	greater	emphasis	on	economic	measures	and	efficiencies	through	
such	policies	as	privatization	and	decentralization.	In	conjunction	with	various	bilateral	
agencies,	the	World	Bank	instilled	this	neoliberal	ideology	into	health	development	
policy.		The	modification	of	the	changing	relationships	among	key	institutions,	and	the	
ascendance	of	neoliberal	economics,	was	reflected	in	an	increasing	involvement	of	
economists	in	health	policy	making.		Neoliberal	ideas	were	apparent	in	a	range	of	key	
reports	published	by	the	Bank,	notably	Financing	Health	Services	in	Developing	
Countries	(1987),	and	World	Development	Report	1993:	Investing	in	Health,	which	
recognised	the	importance	of	health	to	economic	development.	Drawing	on	such	
concepts	as	the	“burden	of	disease	and	‘DALY’	(disability‐adjusted	life	years)”,	this	new	
circle	of	economists	advocated	reforms	to	achieve	greater	efficiency	through	cutting	
government	spending	on	health	and	other	social	sectors,	decentralisation,	privatisation,	
market	competition	and	the	delivery	of	basic	packages	of	technical	interventions.263	In	
terms	of	infectious	disease	response,	this	approach	led	to	the	setting	of	priorities	based	
on	disease	burden	and	the	cost‐effectiveness	of	health	interventions.		
	
It	is	also	worth	mentioning	that	during	the	early	2000s,	Intellectual	Property	Rights	
derived	from	neoliberal	discourse	drew	significant	attention	with	the	issue	of	AIDS	
medicines	in	developing	countries.	Until	early	2001,	enabling	access	to	essential	
medicines	received	little	attention	in	international	efforts	to	address	emerging	
infectious	diseases	with	global	implications.	Measures	such	as	compulsory	licensing	
were	included	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement	to	maintain	a	balance	between	commercial	
interests	and	public	health	needs.	However,	their	use	had	been	extremely	limited	in	
practice	due	to	corporate	litigations	and	governmental	trade	sanctions.264	The	growing	
number	of	people	with	HIV/AIDS	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	and	its	corresponding	scale	of	
deaths	shifted	the	issue	of	affordable	ART	(Anti‐retroviral	Treatment)	medicines	from	
merely	a	question	of	intellectual	property	protections	under	the	TRIPS	Agreement	to	a	
grave	human	rights	concern.265	The	anthrax	attacks	in	2001	following	September	11	
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further	underlined	that	no	country	is	immune	to	a	health	crisis.	The	US	government	was	
initially	in	objection	to	compulsory	licensing	in	South	Africa	and	Brazil.	Subsequently,	
however,	the	US	government	openly	threatened	Bayer	with	a	compulsory	license	to	
stockpile	ciproflaxin	against	potential	anthrax	attacks.	This	incident	proved	to	be	a	
critical	moment	that	helped	developing	countries	to	strengthen	their	negotiating	
position	at	Doha,	and	pushed	for	a	confirmation	of	the	legality	of	TRIPS	flexibilities.		
The	move	towards	neoliberal	economism	has	been	followed	by	the	IMF	and	the	WHO	
Commission	on	Macroeconomics	and	Health,	and	the	highly	influential	work	on	the	
Global	Burden	of	Disease,	undertaken	by	a	group	of	economists	at	Harvard	University	in	
2001.266	The	Commission’s	report	concluded	that	ill	health	(caused	by	infectious	
diseases)	is	a	key	impediment	to	economic	development	in	low‐income	countries,	and	
needs	to	be	addressed	as	an	enabler	of	the	development	process.	Economic	discourse	
once	again	heightened	interest	in	specific	diseases,	namely	those	which	were	seen	as	
posing	the	greatest	economic	burden	on	societies,	as	well	as	those	for	which	there	were	
interventions	deemed	most	favourable	based	on	cost‐effective	or	cost‐benefit	analyses,	
and	galvanised	some	dedicated	funding	for	those	diseases.267	The	Global	Fund	to	Fight	
HIV/AIDS,	Malaria	and	TB,	as	well	as	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	(MDGs),	were	
strongly	informed	by	this	economic	“evidence	base”.	Former	World	Bank	economist	and	
chair	of	the	Commission,	Jeffrey	Sachs,	led	the	application	of	this	approach	in	global	
health	policy	from	the	late	1990s	as	described	in	The	End	of	Poverty:	Economic	
Possibilities	for	Our	Time.268	
	
One	variant	of	economic	discourse	is	the	rather	widely	held	global	public	goods	
discourse,	269	and	it	is	worth	mentioning	here	since	it	is	derived	from	economics	and	is	
particularly	related	to	disease	control	efforts	at	the	global	level.	As	Smith	and	MacKellar	
argue,	
	
The	GPG	[Global	Public	Good]	perspective	supports	collective	action	in	the	area	of	
infectious	disease	control	when	reduction	in	disease	prevalence	in	Country	A	has	a	
benefit	for	Country	B	as	well.	Areas	in	which	this	is	particularly	true	are	diseases	
for	which	eradication	is	feasible	(polio)	and	diseases	that	are	highly	transmissible	
around	the	world,	whether	by	human	carriers	(SARS),	by	trade	in	products	(BSE),	
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or	by	animal	vectors	(West	Nile	Virus,	avian	influenza).	The	control	of	antibiotic	
resistance	is	a	closely	related	GPG	problem.270	
	
The	public	good	concept	emerged	from	economics	and	is	informed	centrally	by	
rationalist	cost‐benefit	analysis.	Conceptually,	public	good	possess	two	defining	
properties.	The	first	is	“non‐excludability”,	which	means	that	it	is	infeasible	to	exclude	
someone	from	consuming	the	good	even	if	the	user	has	not	paid	for	it.	The	second	is	
“non‐rivalry”	in	consumption.	Nonrivalry	indicates	that	an	actor’s	consumption	of	the	
good	does	not	detract	from	the	good’s	availability	to	others	whatsoever.271	The	non‐
excludable	and	non‐rivalrous	properties	of	public	goods	mean	that	they	are	non‐zero	
sum;	one	person’s	use	of	the	good	does	not	lessen	the	amount	of	it	available	to	other	
users,	nor	can	anyone	be	excluded	from	consuming	a	piece	of	the	proverbial	pie.	There	
is	no	consensus	on	the	boundaries	demarcating	a	global	public	good	or	its	corollary,	a	
global	public	bad;	but	by	narrow	economic	definition,	there	are	only	a	few	pure	global	
public	goods:	peace	and	security,	protection	against	and	prevention	of	the	spread	of	
epidemics,	financial	stability,	fundamental	human	rights,	a	stable	climate,	free	access	to	
knowledge,	opportunities	to	travel	freely,	and	globally	agreed	rules	on	trade	and	
investment	all	have	characteristics	of	such	goods.272	A	reasonable	functional	definition	
of	global	public	goods	for	health	was	suggested	by	Woodward	and	Smith:	a	good	which	
it	is	rational,	from	the	perspective	of	a	group	of	nations	collectively,	to	produce	for	
universal	consumption,	and	for	which	it	is	irrational	to	exclude	an	individual	nation	
from	consuming,	irrespective	of	whether	that	nation	contributes	to	its	financing.273	
	
Collective	defence	against	acute	public	health	risks	that	can	spread	internationally	and	
devastate	human	health	are	often	cited	as	a	global	public	good.	Disease	eradication	at	
both	the	national	and	international	level	is	one	such	example.	For	instance,	the	world	
has	successfully	eradicated	smallpox.	This	means	that	the	disease	no	longer	exists	in	the	
natural	environment.	As	a	result,	no	one	can	contract	smallpox	and	we	no	longer	have	to	
spend	money	on	expensive	vaccination	campaigns	and	routine	smallpox	inoculation.	No	
one	can	be	excluded	from	consuming	the	benefits	of	living	in	a	smallpox	free	world	
because	the	disease	no	longer	exists	anywhere.	From	a	government	point	of	view,	global	
public	goods	for	health	in	the	form	of	eradication	reduces	long‐term	spending	on	
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vaccination	campaigns,	healthcare	and	medical	services,	and	decreases	civilian	
morbidity	and	mortality.	
	
The	new	revised	IHR	is	also	considered	as	global	public	goods	for	health	in	terms	of	its	
reporting	requirements.	Under	the	new	IHR,	there	has	been	a	change	in	the	diseases	for	
mandatory	notification	and	a	more	generic	requirement	that	countries	report	any	
extraordinary	public	health	event	which	constitutes	a	public	health	risk	to	other	states	
through	the	international	spread	of	disease,	and	may	require	a	coordinated	
international	response.	
	
In	summary,	the	core	ideas	of	the	economic	discourse,	as	applied	to	infectious	disease	
outbreaks	are:	
	
 Health	interventions	should	be	supported	based	on	utilitarian	arguments	that	
healthy	people	contribute	positively	to	economic	growth	and	development	whereas	
unhealthy	people	are	a	drain	on	national	economies.	
 Limited	resources	should	be	allocated	on	the	basis	of	efficiency	measures.	
 Wider,	relatively	unfettered	market‐based	approach	(i.e.	neoliberal	economism)	
should	be	adopted.	
 What	is	good	for	business	and	the	nation’s	economic	interests	is	good	for	everyone.	
 Certain	population	groups,	namely	those	most	economically	productive,	should	be	
prioritized	at	the	expense	of	others.	
 Interventions	should	be	prioritized	on	the	basis	of	cost‐effectiveness.	
 Provision	of	health	care	should	be	based	upon	nonexcludability	and	nonrivalry.	
 Collective	action	to	produce	for	universal	consumption	should	be	promoted	
irrespective	of	whether	an	individual	nation	contributes	to	its	financing	(e.g.	access	
to	influenza	vaccines	regardless	of	national	contribution)		
2.3.4.	Security	Discourse	
	
The	concept	of	security	has	been	interpreted	in	several	different	ways.		Security	
concerns	were	first	explored	as	human	security.	The	original	meaning	of	human	
security	can	be	found	in	the	1994	Human	Development	Report,	published	by	the	United	
Nations	Development	Program	(UNDP).274	The	concept	of	human	security	is	focused	on	
the	security	of	the	individual	rather	than	the	state,	and	is	thus	concerned	with	a	wide	
range	of	issues	including	economic,	food,	health,	environmental,	personal,	community	
and	political	securities.	The	approach	therefore	encompasses	not	only	the	role	of	
national	governments,	but	also	other	actors	such	as	international	organizations	and	
international	nongovernmental	organizations.		
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An	alternative	conceptualisation	of	security,	which	has	been	more	dominant	in	recent	
global	health	policy	debates,	is	defined	as	threats	to	national	security	and	regional	
stability.		This	approach	frames	public	health	hazards	such	as	infectious	disease	
outbreaks	or	biological	weapons	as	existential	threats	to	national	security.		A	series	of	
global	crises	triggered	by	emerging	and	re‐emerging	infectious	diseases	further	
strengthened	the	link	between	the	notion	of	national	security	and	global	public	health,	
and	changed	the	way	policymakers	and	expert	groups	view	public	health	issues.	
Security	in	this	approach	therefore	conceives	public	health	challenges	as	political	ones,	
requiring	national	and	international	endeavours	to	overcome	such	threats.	Pandemics,	
for	instance,	have	recently	been	framed	as	a	security	issue,	and	have	garnered	expanded	
attention	within	not	only	international	and	national	security	policy	circles,	but	also	
international	health	communities	because	such	diseases	are	perceived	to	be	a	clear	and	
present	danger	to	national	interest.275		
	
The	security	discourse,	defined	in	terms	of	national	security,	has	become	prominent	
since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	response	to	perceived	new	threats	to	national	interests,	
including	disease	outbreaks.		In	its	most	powerful	expression,	infectious	disease	has	
been	presented	by	the	security	discourse	as	a	clear	and	present	danger	to	vital	national	
interests.		The	uncontrolled	spread	of	acute	and	severe	infectious	diseases	are	
presented	as	national,	regional	and	global	threats	that	cannot	be	controlled	by	
traditional	public	health	means	alone.	In	utilizing	a	security	framework,	these	types	of	
health	concerns	are	often	treated	in	terms	of	external	contagion:	how	can	we	protect	
domestic	populations	from	the	health	problems	originating	from	outside	the	territorial	
boundaries	of	the	state?		Health	policy,	in	this	context,	is	framed	in	militaristic	terms,	
focused	on	“at	the	border”	measures	to	defend	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	state	and,	if	
necessary,	to	undertake	action	beyond	the	state	to	address	the	causal	root	of	the	
problem.		
	
Another	dominant	assumption	of	the	national	security	discourse	is	that	the	disease	
burden	within	a	state	can	be	a	factor	significantly	affecting	the	capacity	or	stability	of	a	
state	or	a	cause	for	foreign	policy	conflict	between	states.		Therefore,	this	discourse	
clearly	captures	the	essence	of	state	sovereignty	and	national	interest.		In	this	discourse,	
the	individual	is	perceived	by	the	state	as	a	quantifiable	element	of	the	human	capital	of	
the	state.		It	is	also	widely	recognized	that	the	state	is	the	major	actor	in	fighting	a	
disease	while	infectious	diseases	are	considered	to	be	a	transnational,	as	well	as	a	
political	threat,	which	may	impact	on	the	state.276		Particularly,	outbreaks	of	infectious	
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diseases	such	as	Ebola,	SARS,	HIV/AIDS,	and	pandemic	influenza	are	regarded	as	
security	issues	because	they	have	a	potentially	global	reach,	create	a	heightened	
perception	of	uncertainty	and	fear,	and	can	contribute	to	huge	socio‐economic	and	
political	impacts	on	countries.277	In	recent	decades,	the	security	discourse	has	emanated	
mostly	from	national	security	policy	groups,	analysts	and	policymakers	in	developed	
countries,	framed	in	terms	of	how	such	diseases	may	affect	their	own	national	interests.	
The	security	discourse	assumes	that	infectious	disease	outbreaks	could	directly	
threaten	national	security	by	reducing	military	strength	and	preparedness,	harm	
economic	resources	and	capacity,	and	undermine	social	stability	by	eroding	governance	
capacities	and	undermining	a	population’s	confidence	in	the	political	leadership.		
Outbreaks	could	also	indirectly	harm	national	security	by	causing	political	and	
economic	damage	in	other	countries	where	a	state	may	have	security,	foreign	policy	and	
trade	interests.278		For	example,	US	President	Bill	Clinton	stated	in	2000,	“These	
diseases	will	endanger	US	citizens	at	home	and	abroad,	threaten	US	armed	forces	
deployed	overseas,	and	exacerbate	social	and	political	instability	in	key	countries	and	
regions	in	which	the	United	States	has	significant	interests.”279	Additionally,	the	US	
National	Intelligence	Council	asserted,	“New	and	reemerging	infectious	diseases	will	
pose	a	rising	global	health	threat	and	will	complicate	US	and	global	security	over	the	
next	20	years.”280	Therefore,	it	is	not	surprising	that	policy	documents	containing	
countermeasures	for	the	emergence	and	resurgence	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	
employ	security	terms	in	an	attempt	to	deal	with	the	sense	of	national	(and	global)	
insecurity.	
There	are	resonances	of	the	security	discourse	in	the	history	of	infectious	disease	
outbreak	responses,	particularly	in	relation	to	what	Lee	and	Fidler	call	the	“protection”	
of	the	population	from	a	circulating	virus.281	One	case	is	the	path	of	the	Black	Death	
(bubonic	plague)	in	14th	century	Europe	which	followed	international	travel	and	trading	
routes,	and	subsequently	afflicted	Europe	and	North	America.282	Medical	historians	
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observe	that	trading	powers	began	to	recognize	the	devastation	wrought	on	
populations	by	such	diseases	and	that	a	purely	local	level	response	would	not	be	
effective.		Quarantine	measures	were	subsequently	developed	specifically	to	prevent	
pandemic	diseases	from	crossing	territorial	borders.		The	rapid	growth	of	populations,	
and	intensified	human	interactions	from	the	16th	century,	followed	by	industrialization	
from	the	18th	century,	offered	many	infectious	diseases	new	opportunities	to	spread	
more	widely	geographically.		Early	forms	of	international	health	cooperation	focused	on	
a	small	number	of	epidemic	diseases	that	could	potentially	interrupt	trade	interests.		
Notably,	this	form	of	cooperation	was	widely	supported	during	the	19th	century	by	
economic	and	political	elites	in	developed	countries,	as	they	believed	that	the	spread	of	
epidemic	diseases	would	hamper	the	expansion	of	trade	and	the	development	of	
international	commerce.283	Therefore,	this	early	form	of	international	health	diplomacy	
was	based	upon	recognition	that	health	issues	required	diplomatic	negotiation	as	part	
of	a	country’s	foreign	policy284	and	this	emerged	as	a	mechanism	for	responding	to	the	
perceived	threat	that	epidemic	diseases	posed	to	European	powers.	
	
Another	classic	example	of	the	security	discourse,	defined	in	terms	of	national	interests	
and	sovereignty,	was	the	eleven	International	Sanitary	Conferences	that	took	place	from	
the	latter	half	of	the	19th	century.		As	Norman	Howard‐Jones	observed,	the	international	
conferences	were	not	primarily	motivated	by	a	wish	for	the	general	betterment	of	
human	health,	but	by	the	desire	to	protect	powerful	trading	nations	from	the	
international	spread	of	infection.285		This	is	illustrated	by	the	limiting	of	measures	to	
those	that	would	control	such	epidemics,	with	the	intention	of	inflicting	the	least	harm	
on	trade	interests.		Additionally,	the	focus	of	the	conferences	was	on	selected	epidemic	
diseases,	rather	than	the	broad	scope	of	health	cooperation	and	development.		The	
conferences	gradually	led	to	the	agreement	of	rules	which	were	initially	limited	to	
controlling	cholera,	plague	and	yellow	fever.		Typhus,	relapsing	fever	and	smallpox	were	
later	added	for	varying	periods	between	the	1920s	and	1970s.286		As	a	complement	to	
the	International	Sanitary	Conferences,	Latin	American	countries	established	the	Pan	
American	Sanitary	Bureau	(PASB)	in	1902.		The	establishment	of	PASB	represented	a	
direct	response	to	epidemics	among	countries	at	the	regional	level.	Another	milestone	
embedded	in	security	discourse	was	the	establishment	of	a	permanent	public	health	
office	in	Europe	in	1907,	the	Office	International	d’Hygiene	Publique	(OIHP).	In	effect,	
the	purpose	of	setting	up	such	an	institution	was	to	protect	national	populations	from	
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imported	diseases	based	on	a	fear	in	high‐income	countries	that	infectious	diseases	
would	cross	their	borders	from	poorer	countries.		
	
As	with	classic	examples,	the	security	discourse	demonstrated	its	presence	when	the	UN	
Security	Council	declared	in	2000	that	HIV/AIDS	was	severely	undermining	the	security	
of	Africa	and	the	world	at	large.287		The	expert	panel	argued	that	the	HIV/AIDS	
pandemic	should	be	investigated	within	the	mandate	of	the	UN,	which	is	primarily	
responsible	for	maintaining	international	peace	and	security.	Subsequently,	in	2001,	a	
report	provided	by	the	WHO	Secretariat	of	the	provisional	agenda	items	for	the	World	
Health	Assembly	attempted	to	use	global	health	security288	as	a	framework	for	its	
response	to	globalizing	disease	outbreaks	and	biological	weapons.	In	the	report,	as	a	
means	to	battle	against	such	threats,	activities	such	as	harnessing	new	information	
technologies	and	ensuring	rapid	global	disease	surveillance	and	response	were	strongly	
suggested	through	building	a	network	of	networks.		The	report	asserted	that,	
	
Partnerships	are	the	key	to	effective	cooperation	around	the	world	in	order	to	
detect	and	contain	outbreaks	promptly.	In	April	2000,	WHO	took	the	lead	in	
creating	the	global	outbreak	alert	and	response	network,	in	order	to	formalise	its	
partnerships	with	various	institutions	and	networks.	This	new	network,	which	
complements	and	strengthens	existing	networks,	aims	to	ensure	that	the	best	
expertise	is	harnessed	wherever	and	whenever	it	is	needed,	as	cost‐effectively	as	
possible.	To	maintain	global	public	health	security	it	provides	coordinated	
mechanisms	for	epidemic	alert	and	response.	289	
	
Essentially,	strong	technical	collaboration	between	the	WHO	and	partners	in	the	area	of	
epidemic	response,	encompassing	“relevant	public	sectors,	intergovernmental	
organizations,	nongovernmental	organizations	and	the	private	sector”,	was	pushed	as	
the	best	way	to	accomplish	global	health	security.290	Implicit	in	the	above	statement	
were	principles	on	how	global	health	security	challenges	should	be	dealt	with,	and	what	
strategies	and	response	should	be	prioritized.	The	security	discourse	also	drew	
attention	to	the	need	to	revise	IHR	by	means	of	reinforcing	the	surveillance	and	disease	
reporting	capacity	in	developing	countries.291			
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The	security	discourse	was	pushed	by	more	powerful	political	forces,	most	notably	the	
US,	for	a	set	of	responses	that	emphasised	the	protection	of	healthy,	rich	northern	
populations.	This	reflects	the	long	traditional	attempts	to	protect	the	population	of	the	
nation	state	from	foreign	disease	threats	before	they	become	problems	within	their	
territory.	For	example,	President	Clinton	identified	the	need	to	bolster	biodefense	
capabilities,	recognising	that	infectious	diseases	and	deliberate	release	of	pathogens	
could	threaten	US	national	interest.292	In	2000,	a	report	published	by	the	US	National	
Intelligence	Council	argued	that	infectious	disease	posed	a	potential	threat	not	only	to	
US	citizens	but	also	to	international	stability	and	to	economic	growth,	presenting	it	as	
an	issue	of	national	security.293	However,	it	was	after	the	11	September	terrorist	attacks	
in	2001	and	the	deliberate	release	of	anthrax	spores	into	the	US	postal	system	in	the	
same	year	that	anxiety	about	vulnerability	to	such	an	attack	was	critically	heightened	in	
US	government	policy	circles.	A	series	of	identification	of	infections	such	as	West	Nile	
encephalitis,	multidrug‐resistant	tuberculosis	and	malaria	through	goods	and	people	
arriving	from	outside	the	territory	further	intensified	the	need	to	implement	stricter	
border	control.294	It	was	at	this	juncture	that	the	US	Homeland	Security	Department295	
was	created	to	“secure	[an]	America	that	is	better	equipped	to	confront	the	range	of	
threats.”296	The	heightened	concerns	led	to	a	range	of	activities	to	protect	national	
security	including	new	legislation	to	improve	cooperation	between	public	health	and	
the	security	services,	closer	detection	of	goods	at	points	of	entry	and	better	global	
surveillance	mechanisms.297	Critics	view	the	PEPFAR	(President’s	Emergency	Plan	for	
AIDS	relief)	programme	as	an	outcome	of	US	security	concerns	about	the	HIV/AIDS	
epidemic	in	Sub‐Saharan	Africa.		
The	WHO	has	embraced	security	concepts	and	terms	for	the	analysis	of	disease	threats,	
which	were	exemplified	by	the	World	Health	Report	2007:	A	Safer	Future	–	Global	Public	
Health	Security	in	the	21st	Century,	in	an	effort	to	enhance	the	status	of	the	organisation	
as	a	global	public	health	centre.	The	revised	IHR	2005	demonstrates	that	for	the	greater	
global	good,	international	action	is	required	in	terms	of	assuring	global	health	security.		
The	establishment	of	the	European	Centre	for	Disease	Prevention	and	Control	based	
in	Sweden	in	2004	and	the	Health	Protection	Agency	set	up	by	the	UK	government	in	
the	same	year	invariably	represented	what	Lee	and	Fidler	called	“garrison	mentality”	
among	high‐income	countries	in	a	bid	to	prevent	the	threat	posed	by	the	spread	of	
infectious	diseases	and	regulate	immigration.298	Additionally,	the	creation	of	the	
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Centre	on	Global	Health	Security	at	Chatham	House	in	London,	the	global	health	
security	programme	at	the	Stockholm	International	Peace	Research	Institute,	and	a	
similar	programme	of	work	at	the	School	of	Advanced	International	Studies,	Johns	
Hopkins	University,	appear	to	illustrate	that	there	was	a	clear	expansion	of	security	
discourse	from	the	mid‐2000s	in	understanding	global	health	issues.			
	
In	summary,	the	core	ideas	of	the	national	security	discourse,	as	applied	to	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	are:	
	
 Definitions	of	potential	threats	to	national	security	should	include	certain	health	
risks	notably	acute	and	potentially	pandemic	infectious	diseases	with	high	
morbidity	and	mortality.	
 Selected	infectious	disease	risks	should	be	considered	relevant	to	national	security	
because	of	their	potential	threat	to	military	capacity,	economic	and	political	stability	
 The	policy	response	to	infectious	diseases	which	pose	a	security	risk	should	include	
long‐range	surveillance	and	monitoring	of	external	populations,	especially	in	
countries	at	high	risk	of	outbreaks,	stockpiling	of	vaccines	and	prophylaxis,	at	the	
border	controls	of	population	movements	(e.g.	screening)	
 There	should	be	a	response	to	what	is	out	there	in	the	global	context	that	may	
threaten	the	existence	and	welfare	of	nations.		
2.3.5.	Other	discourses	
	
While	not	being	entirely	regarded	as	distinct	discourses,	there	are	other	accounts	that	
may	be	relevant	to	the	study	of	ideational	frameworks	in	relation	to	the	GHG	of	
infectious	disease	outbreaks.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Tuong	identified	five	different	
narratives	in	the	response	to	Avian	and	Pandemic	Influenza	in	Vietnam.299	Here	is	a	
brief	description	of	such	narratives:	First,	the	“power	narrative”,	produced	by	central	
officials	and	media,	advocates	harsh	policies	regardless	of	costs	which	aims	at	
generating	compliance	with	central	policies	of	mandatory	culling	and	vaccination.	The	
power	narrative	dominated	the	national	discourse	throughout,	despite	occasional	
setbacks.	Second,	the	“nationalist	narrative”,	the	main	proponents	of	which	were	central	
officials	and	the	state	media,	argues	that	a	victory	over	the	AI	epidemic	is	a	matter	of	
national	pride	and	honour	for	Vietnam.	Third,	the	“populist	narrative”,	primarily	
constructed	by	the	media,	revolves	around	the	sensational	accounts	of	farmers’	losses	in	
the	epidemic	and	the	public	criticism	of	officials	blamed	for	corruption,	incompetence	
and	mismanagement.	Fourth,	the	“technical	narrative”,	produced	by	foreign	donors,	
experts	and	central	officials,	focuses	on	issues	such	as	risk	evaluation,	disease	
prevention,	control	strategies,	vaccine	tests,	disaster	planning	and	the	restructuring	of	
livestock	production	to	meet	biosecurity	requirements.	The	epidemic	is	treated	as	a	
technical	problem	and	the	solutions	are	believed	to	be	found	in	better	planning,	
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effective	technical	strategies	such	as	vaccination,	better	research	of	risk	perceptions,	
and	the	industrialization	of	livestock	production.	Fifth,	the	“protectionist	narrative”,	
with	the	majority	of	its	proponents	in	the	feed	and	poultry	business,	views	the	AI	issue	
from	a	strictly	business	perspective	but	wrapped	in	terms	of	public	interests.	Lastly,	the	
“critical	narrative”,	voiced	by	various	players	from	central	officials	to	foreign	experts,	
focuses	on	issues	such	as	endemic	corruption,	incompetent	policymakers	and	their	poor	
relationship	with	experts,	and	tension	between	officials	and	donors.	
	
Table	2.1	summarises	the	discourses	identified	above	and	their	core	tenets.		
Table	2.1.	Contested	and	competing:	infectious	disease	(outbreak)	discourses	
	
Discourse	 Core	tenets Dominant	response	to	
infectious	disease	
(outbreaks)	
Biomedical	discourse	  Infectious	disease	is	a	
problem	best	
understood	and	
addressed	through	the	
biological	sciences	as	
applied	to	clinical	
medicine	
 Clinical	intervention	
should	play	a	core	role	
in	diagnosis	and	
treatment	
 Biological	processes	
should	be	separated	
from	the	social	context	
 Clinical	and	
epidemiological	
characteristics	and	
mode	of	transmission	
of	the	disease	should	
be	the	key	focus	
 There	should	be	a	
linear	and	
compartmentalised	
solution	to	specific	
diseases	
 Individual	risk	
behaviours	and	
methods	of	
prevention,	treatment	
and	care	should	be	
prioritised	
 The	activities	of	the	
Rockefeller	Foundation	
in	early	20th	century	in	
promoting	specific	
disease	control	
initiatives,	universalism	
of	science	and	a	
scientific	research‐
oriented	view	of	social	
improvement	
 	LNHO’s	work	in	terms	
of	disease	surveillance	
and	reporting	(rather	
than	prevention	and	
response)	based	on	
scientific	and	elitist	
strategies	
 WHO’s	disease‐specific	
programmes	of	the	
1950s	and	1960s	highly	
prioritizing	the	
standardization	of	
vaccines	and	
drugs/disease‐focused	
research	and	policy	(e.g.	
Malaria	Eradication	
Programme)	
 Technical,	measurable,	
and	short‐term	
approaches	to	specific	
diseases	and	new	public‐
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 Large‐scale	
investments	in	clinical	
research	should	be	
promoted	
 Development	of	new	
drugs	should	be	
emphasised	
private	partnership	
initiatives	in	1990s	and	
2000s	(e.g.	Rollback	
Malaria	Campaign,	Stop	
TB,	GFATM,	Bill	and	
Melinda	Gates	
Foundation)	
Health	and	human	rights	
discourse	
 Individuals	possess	a	
universal	claim	to	
certain	rights	
regardless	of	their	
nationality,	location	or	
health	status	
 There	should	be	a	
standard	for	ensuring	
that	all	citizens	enjoy	a	
core	set	of	positive	
health	entitlements	
 Universal	access	to	a	
basic	level	of	
healthcare	should	be	
prioritised	
 The	broad	underlying	
conditions	that	may	
cause	ill	health	should	
be	targeted	
 National	and	
international	
community	should	
deliver	the	right	to	
health	
 Civil	society	
organizations	should	
be	closely	engaged	
 Prevention,	multi‐
sectoral	collaboration	
and	poverty	reduction	
are	seen	as	key	to	
health	improvements	
 Primary	Health	Care	
movement	followed	by	
WHO’s	Alma	Ata	
Declaration	in	1978	
 WHO’s	Global	
Programme	on	AIDS	
(e.g.	Janathan	Maan)	in	
the	1990s	
 The	establishment	of	
UNAIDS	
 ICESCR	articles	2(1)	(e.g.	
Paul	Hunt)	
 The	revised	IHR		
 Commission	on	Social	
Determinants	of	Health	
(e.g.	Michael	Marmot)		
 Activities	of	Global	
Health	Watch	
Economic	discourse	  Health	interventions	
should	be	supported	
based	on	utilitarian	
arguments	that	
healthy	people	
contribute	positively	
to	economic	growth	
and	development	
whereas	unhealthy	
 A	series	of	World	Bank	
reports	in	1990s	based	
on	the	concepts	of	
Burden	of	Diseases	and	
DALY	(e.g.	Financing	
Health	Services	in	
Developing	Countries,	
World	Development	
Report	1993:	Investing	
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people	are	a	drain	on	
national	economies.	
 Limited	resources	
should	be	allocated	on	
the	basis	of	efficiency	
measures.	
 Wider,	relatively	
unfettered	market‐
based	approach	(i.e.	
neoliberal	economism)	
should	be	adopted.	
 What	is	good	for	
business	and	the	
nation’s	economic	
interests	is	good	for	
everyone.	
 Certain	population	
groups,	namely	those	
most	economically	
productive,	should	be	
prioritized	at	the	
expense	of	others.	
 Interventions	should	
be	prioritized	on	the	
basis	of	cost‐
effectiveness.	
 Provision	of	health	
care	should	be	based	
upon	nonexcludability	
and	nonrivalry.	
 Collective	action	to	
produce	for	universal	
consumption	should	
be	promoted	
irrespective	of	
whether	an	individual	
nation	contributes	to	
its	financing	(e.g.	
access	to	influenza	
vaccines	regardless	of	
national	contribution)		
in	Health)	
 Delivery	of	a	basic	
package	of	health	care	
interventions	
 Introduction	of	user	
charges,	
decentralization,	
contracting	out,	
promotion	of	private	
sector	and	public‐
private	partnerships	in	
financing	
 WHO	Commission	on	
Macroeconomics	and	
Health	and	the	Global	
Burden	of	Diseases	
(Jeffrey	Sachs)	
 Heightens	interests	in	
specific	disease	
problems	through	
GFATM	and	the	
Millennium	
Development	Goals	the	
in	2000s	
 Smallpox	eradication	
 The	new	revised	IHR:	
mandatory	reporting	of	
any	events	which	
constitute	a	public	
health	risks	to	other	
states	through	the	
international	spread	of	
disease	
Security	discourse	  Definitions	of	potential	
threats	to	national	
security	should	
include	certain	health	
risks	notably	acute	and	
potentially	pandemic	
infectious	diseases	
with	high	morbidity	
 Prevention	strategies	as	
a	response	to	the	Black	
Death	as	early	as	the	
14th	century	in	Europe	
 Early	forms	of	
cooperation	in	the	19th	
century	by	economic	
and	political	elites	in	
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and	mortality.
 Selected	infectious	
disease	risks	should	be	
considered	relevant	to	
national	security	
because	of	their	
potential	threat	to	
military	capacity,	
economic	and	political	
stability	
 The	policy	response	to	
infectious	diseases	
which	pose	a	security	
risk	should	include	
long‐range	
surveillance	and	
monitoring	of	external	
populations,	especially	
in	countries	at	high	
risk	of	outbreaks,	
stockpiling	of	vaccines	
and	prophylaxis,	at	the	
border	controls	of	
population	movements	
(e.g.	screening)	
 There	should	be	a	
response	to	what	is	
out	there	in	the	global	
context	that	may	
threaten	the	existence	
and	welfare	of	nations.	
developed	European	
countries	
 A	series	of	International	
Sanitary	Conferences	
occurred	in	the	latter	
half	of	the	19th	century	
with	the	aim	of	
protecting	powerful	
trading	nations	from	the	
international	spread	of	
infection	
 The	establishment	of	
PASB	and	OIHP	in	1902	
and	1907	respectively	
 HIV/AIDS	as	a	threat	to	
international	peace	and	
security	(UN	Security	
Council)	in	2000	
 WHO’s	attempt	to	
employ	the	term	“global	
health	security”	as	a	
framework	for	its	
response	to	globalizing	
diseases	and	biological	
weapons	in	2001	
 PEPFAR	programme	in	
Sub‐Saharan	Africa	
 World	Health	Report	
2007	
 The	new	revised	IHR	
Other	discourses	(and	
narratives)	
 Power	narrative	which	
advocates	harsh	
policies	regardless	of	
costs	
 Nationalist	narrative	
which	promotes	that	a	
victory	over	a	disease	
is	a	matter	of	national	
pride	
 Populist	narrative	
which	revolves	around	
the	public	criticism	of	
officials’	handling	of	
disease	
 Technical	narrative	
which	focuses	on	risk	
evaluation	and	control	
strategies	
 National	response	to	
Avian	and	Pandemic	
Influenza	from	
developing	countries’	
points	of	view	
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2.4.	SUMMARY	
 
This	chapter	discussed	Social	Constructivism,	supported	by	the	concept	of	epistemic	
communities,	as	a	conceptual	framework	which	offers	a	means	to	explore	more	fully	
questions	about	the	influence	of	ideas	in	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks.	
Through	analysis	of	the	networks	of	knowledge‐based	agents,	this	research	seeks	to	
develop	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	GHG	of	SARS.		Drawing	on	a	broad	range	of	case	
studies,	the	existing	literature	on	epistemic	communities	demonstrates	that	epistemic	
actors	play	a	crucial	role	in	setting	the	agenda,	proposing	policy	alternatives,	and	
promoting	policy	solutions,	particularly	in	times	of	uncertainty.		The	SARS	outbreak,	
given	the	uncertainty	about	the	new	disease,	its	epidemiology	and	clinical	presentation,	
as	well	as	reluctance	by	some	governments	to	fully	report	on	the	disease’s	progress,	
thus	offers	important	insights	into	the	relative	importance	of	these	transnational	actors.	
For	this	purpose,	this	chapter	set	out	the	core	tenets	of	what	have	been	identified	in	the	
existing	literature	so	far	as	key	discourses	shaping	GHG.		It	examined	the	key	ideas	of	
these	discourses	and	how	they	have	been	manifest	in	national,	regional	and	global	
responses	to	infectious	disease	outbreaks.		Specifically,	the	chapter	explored	these	
discourses	in	order	to	illustrate	how	different	discourses	have	vied	for	policy	influence	
in	global	health,	shaping	ideas,	interests	and	institutions.		Discourses	in	global	infectious	
disease	policies	have	waxed	and	waned	over	time	and,	at	times,	more	than	one	
discourse	might	have	prevailed.		In	the	myriad	of	disease	outbreak	events	in	history,	
global	health‐regime	building	has	in	fact	occurred	as	a	result	of	the	dominance	of	
certain	discourses	that	address	what	agreed	goals	should	be	achieved.		By	drawing	the	
contours	of	the	discourses	that	have	dominated	health	policy	to	date,	this	chapter	
contextualised	the	contested	landscape	within	which	this	study	of	the	GHG	of	SARS	is	
set.		
	 	
 Protectionist	narrative	
which	views	disease	
from	a	business	
perspective	
 Critical	narrative	
which	stresses	the	
endemic	corruption	
and	incompetence	of	
policymakers	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
METHODOLOGY	
	
3.	1.	INTRODUCTION:	RESEARCH	APPROACH		
	
As	stated	in	Chapter	One,	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	importance	of	the	ideational	
dimension	of	global	health	governance	(GHG)	300	and,	in	particular,	on	ideational	factors	
as	a	key	explanatory	element	behind	the	emerging	forms	of	GHG	related	to	(acute)	
infectious	disease	outbreaks.	To	briefly	summarise,	the	existing	literature	largely	deals	
with	the	concept	of	GHG	by	focusing	on	institutional	and	technical	features	of	GHG	
actors	and	policies.		Analysis	to	date	has	focused	on	the	growing	importance	of	new	
actors	in	GHG,	the	corresponding	effects	on	the	decline	of	state	sovereignty,	and	the	
impact	this	rise	has	on	institutional	forms,	given	the	global	reach	of	disease	outbreaks.	
Particular	attention	has	been	paid	to	how	this	transformation	is	shifting	its	rules,	
practices	and,	more	importantly,	power	in	the	global	health	arena.301	Studies,	for	
example,	on	the	emergence	of	political	and	judicial	regimes,	especially	in	the	area	of	
emerging	epidemics	and	human	pandemics,	are	the	focus	of	this	literature.302		Attention	
has	also	focused	on	material	factors	such	as	improved	global	disease	surveillance,	
funding	mechanisms,	and	preparedness	plans,	given	the	speed	at	which	outbreaks	can	
spread	across	vast	distances.303	The	literature	thus	seeks	to	explore	the	technical	
competencies	and	increasing	role	of	non‐state	actors	in	enhancing	“real‐time”	
knowledge	within	the	context	of	GHG.	
	
However,	there	remains	a	theoretical	and	methodological	lacuna,	in	the	sense	that,	little	
attention	has	been	paid	to	the	role	of	ideational	factors	in	explaining	GHG	including	
policy	making	surrounding	infectious	disease	outbreaks.	These	ideational	factors,	if	
explained,	can	do	much	to	enhance	our	understanding	of	GHG.	This	research	does	not	
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privilege	ideational	variables,	but	claims	that	including	ideational	factors	provide	a	
fuller	account	of	GHG.	It	is	the	starting	point	of	this	thesis	that	such	factors	influence	
global	policy	responses	to	infectious	disease	outbreaks	by	defining	the	problems	or	
issues	to	be	addressed,	as	well	as	forming	the	basis	for	policy	actions.	More	importantly,	
an	understanding	of	ideational	factors	can	provide	insights	into	why	certain	actions	
surrounding	global	disease	outbreaks	are	pursued,	or	why	certain	institutional	
responses	are	forged	instead	of	others.	
	
In	brief,	the	research	approach	that	directs	this	thesis	is	the	ideational	understanding	of	
GHG	of	infectious	diseases	through	the	conceptual	lens	of	epistemic	communities.304	
This	thesis	sets	out	the	following	assumptions	derived	from	epistemic	communities’	
concepts	that	underpin	the	research	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	they	can	be	verified:	
	
1) Epistemic	communities	are	experts	in	the	sphere	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	
encompassing	research	scientists,	scholars,	public	health	practitioners,	policy	
elites	and	technical	advisors;	
	
2) One	or	more	epistemic	communities	working	within	the	context	of	the	SARS	
outbreak	engaged	in	coordinated	action	to	promote	their	value‐based	agendas;	
	
3) The	ideas	of	epistemic	communities	played	an	important	role	in	framing	policy	
debates	surrounding	SARS,	leading	to	a	prioritising	of	certain	policy	practices	
over	others,	and	perhaps	even	predisposing	outcomes	surrounding	such	issues;		
	
4) The	ideas	held	within	(or	across)	epistemic	communities	can	be	contested,	with	
the	outcomes	of	such	contestations	resulting	in	the	legitimisation	of	certain	
policy	and	political	actions	and	interests.		
	
Taken	together,	these	assumptions	examine	whether	the	ideational	factor	is	a	factor	
used	by	epistemic	communities	to	influence	the	outcome	of	the	policymaking	process	
and	therefore	adds	a	critical	component	to	analysis	of	why	certain	policies	become	
dominant	while	others	do	not.	In	empirically	corroborating	these	assumptions,	this	
thesis	takes	a	qualitative	methodological	approach	which	is	based	on	following	several	
core	tenets:	a	commitment	to	a	naturalistic,	situational	and	interpretational	approach	to	
understanding	the	world;	an	emphasis	on	the	socially	constructed	nature	of	reality;	and	
an	understanding	of	the	deep	influence	of	contextual	factors	in	research.305		The	
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subsequent	sections	describe	the	data	sources	and	methods	used	to	conduct	the	
research.	
3.	2.	DATA	SOURCES	AND	METHODS	OF	DATA	COLLECTION	
	
This	thesis	employed	two	methods	for	data	collection.		First,	a	systematic	literature	
search	of	published	and	unpublished	“grey”	materials	on	the	development	of	the	global	
and	national	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	was	undertaken.		Here,	“systematic”	means	
that	the	researcher	used	an	organised	method	of	locating,	assembling	and	reviewing	a	
body	of	literature	related	to	SARS	that	can	be	used	to	address	research	questions	
formulated	in	Chapter	One.		The	search	was	based	on	a	search	strategy	(scope,	time	
period,	databases	and	keywords)	and	if	necessary,	explicit	inclusion/exclusion	criteria	
were	used	to	identify	relevant	literature	as	much	as	possible.		Second,	a	series	of	open‐
ended	and	semi‐structured	interviews	with	key	individuals	involved	in	the	national	and	
global	response	to	SARS	were	carried	out.		The	data	gathered	enabled	the	researcher	to	
identify	and	locate	the	epistemic	communities	involved	and	the	key	ideas	held	which	
shaped	the	policy	responses	surrounding	SARS.			
3.2.1.	Documentary	sources	
	
Official	publications	
	
A	series	of		searches	using	internet	search	engines,	as	well	as	a	variety	of	international	
institutions’	official	websites	–	WHO,	US	CDC,	Ministries	of	Health	in	countries	affected	
by	SARS,	and	NGOs	such	as	the	Red	Cross,	Médecins	Sans	Frontières,	all	of	which	were	
actively	involved	in	addressing	outbreak	related	issues	during	SARS	–	were	conducted.		
“SARS”	was	initially	used	as	a	keyword	search	term	and	the	researcher	manually	
reviewed	each	document	retrieved	for	relevance.	Official	publications	included	policy	
documents,	mission	statements,	speeches,	statistics,	mandates,	budgets,	reports	and	
legislations	of	relevant	institutions	dealing	with	the	SARS	outbreak.		These	were	
collected	through	visits	to	the	WHO	Headquarters	in	Geneva	and	the	Western	Pacific	
Regional	Office	(WPRO)	in	Manila,	the	Philippines,	and	solicited	from	key	informants	or	
institutional	websites.		These	materials	were	collected	to	identify	and	understand	what	
discourses	were	present	among	the	key	institutions	involved	during	and	after	the	SARS	
outbreak	as	they	either	contain	“speech	acts”	or	statements	located	within	specific	
discourses,	or	reflect	actions	that	are	framed	within	such	discourses	(for	the	process	of	
recognising	a	specific	discourse,	see	section	3.3.1).		International	conference	
proceedings	and	papers	(abstracts)	were	included	to	identify	conference	attendees.		
National	policy	reports	in	affected	countries	–	particularly,	Hong	Kong,	Singapore,	
China,	Vietnam,	Taiwan,	and	Canada	–	were	collected	and	searched	either	online	or	on	
site.	
	
Journals	
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A	systematic	search	on	the	SARS	outbreak	was	undertaken	using	public	health	
databases	and	other	science	search	engines	including	Bath	Information	and	Data	
Services,	JSTOR,	EBSCO,	Medline	(PubMed)	and	IngentaConnect	to	identify	peer‐
reviewed	journal	articles	published	between	November	2002	and	December	2007.		This	
timeframe	was	determined	as	it	corresponded	to	the	years	where	the	discussion	of	
SARS	issues	was	relatively	active.		The	collection	of	journal	articles	served	to	identify	
evidence	of	discourses	being	present	in	the	scholarly	community.	Initially,	(SARS	AND	
name	of	jurisdiction)	OR	(SARS	AND	World	Health	Organisation),	OR	(SARS	AND	
global),	OR	(SARS	AND	policy)	OR	(SARS	AND	public	health	measure)	were	used	as	
keyword	search	terms	(American	and	British	spellings	both	used).		Subsequently	
searches	were	conducted	using	the	names	of	known	authors	(e.g.	David	Heymann,	
Guenael	Rodier,	Albert	Osterhaus,	Malik	Peiris,	and	Roy	Anderson)	or	the	titles	of	
known	studies.		Searches	were	conducted	primarily	on	abstract	and	title	searches,	and	
then	expanded	to	full	text	searches	when	relevant	articles	were	identified.	The	
reference	lists	of	all	included	publications	were	scanned	for	any	additional	papers.	
Articles	were	included	if	they	meet	the	following	inclusion	criteria:	1)	concerns	the	
national	response	to	SARS;	2)	identifies	the	role	intergovernmental,	non‐governmental	
and	national	agencies	played	during	SARS	outbreak;	3)	concerns	the	policymaking	
process	during	SARS;	4)	assesses	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak;	and	5)	
provides	information	on	laboratory,	epidemiological	and	biostatistical	analysis	of	SARS	
with	a	discussion	of	SARS	containment	measures.	Case	reports,	reviews,	editorials,	
letters	and	commentaries	were	also	included.		Papers	that	solely	concern	clinical	trials	
and	laboratory	tests	without	further	discussion	of	containment	strategies	and	policy	
actions	were	excluded.	Citations	in	articles	were	used	to	identify	the	level	of	readership	
among	the	scholarly	and	policy	communities.		A	total	of	2,993	papers	were	identified	by	
electronic	database	searches.		The	papers	were	reviewed,	applying	inclusion	and	
exclusion	criteria	for	eligibility.	After	both	duplicates	and	ineligible	articles	were	
excluded,	219	publications	were	retained	for	analysis.		
	
Books	
	
Books	published	between	2003	and	2011	were	searched	using	keywords	(SARS	AND	
name	of	jurisdiction)	–	China,	Vietnam,	Singapore,	Hong	Kong,	Taiwan,	and	Canada	‐	to	
gain	understanding	of	the	local	response	to	SARS	at	different	locations	and	its	interface	
with	global	policymaking.		Books	were	also	used	to	further	identify	prevailing	
discourses	in	the	national	response	to	SARS.	These	books	were	identified	through	
library	catalogues	and	internet	sources.	A	total	of	12	books	exclusively	dedicated	to	the	
topic	of	SARS	were	identified.306		Each	book	has	a	list	of	references	and	they	were	
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followed	up	to	identify	further	information.	Books	and	book	chapters	were	often	
written	by	national	policymakers,	officials	in	international	organisations,	and	scientists	
(as	well	as	academics	and	journalists),	and	thus	provided	to	be	useful	and	rich	sources	
of	information	about	how	issues	surrounding	SARS	were	portrayed	and	understood	by	
these	actors.		
	
Media	reports	
	
Electronically	searchable	archives	of	the	leading	newspapers	and	magazines	using	the	
Lexis‐Nexis	Academic	Database	for	the	period	between	November	2002	and	December	
2008	were	examined.	This	source	was	used	to	identify	and	assess	the	prevailing	
discourses	surrounding	the	SARS	outbreak	and	also	to	confirm	the	existence	and	
composition	of	the	epistemic	community	concerned	with	the	SARS	outbreak.	Key	search	
terms	used	were	(SARS	AND	name	of	jurisdiction)	OR	(SARS	AND	World	Health	
Organisation),OR	(SARS	AND	global),	OR	(SARS	AND	policy)	OR	(SARS	AND	public	
health	measure)‐	American	and	British	spellings	both	used.	Since	this	thesis	was	
focused	on	the	global	level,	a	wide	range	of	international	newspapers	and	magazines	
were	included	in	the	search.	Among	them,	the	following	were	predominantly	used	in	the	
main	analysis:	
	
 Newspapers:	BBC	Monitoring	International,	The	Globe	and	Mail,	The	Toronto	Star,	
The	New	York	Times,	The	Washington	Post,	The	Times,	The	Guardian,	South	China	
Morning	Post,	The	Straits	Times,	People’s	Daily	
 Magazines:	The	Economist,	Newsweek,	Time,	New	Scientist,	The	Scientist	
	
A	total	of	532	selected	articles	were	collected	for	analysis.	
	
Grey	materials	
	
Grey	materials	include	unpublished	internal	reports	by	the	World	Health	Organization	
(WHO)	and	other	unofficial	information.	Such	literature	includes	correspondences,	
memos,	CVs	and	list	of	participants	of	internal	meetings	on	the	SARS	outbreak	either	
convened	by	the	WHO	or	other	governing	institutions	(i.e.	FAO,	OIE).	They	were	
collected	through	meetings	with	key	informants.	Such	materials	were	an	important	
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Publishing.;	Leung	PC	and	Ooi	EE	(2003),	SARS	War:	Combating	the	Disease,	Singapore:	World	Scientific	
Publishing.;	Loh	C	and	Civic	Exchange	(eds.)	(2004),	At	the	Epicenter:	Hong	Kong	and	the	SARS	Outbreak,	
Hong	Kong:	Hong	Kong	University	Press.;	Kleinman	A	and	Watson	J	(eds.)	(2006),	SARS	in	China:	Prelude	
to	Pandemic?,	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press.;	Duffin	J	and	Sweetman	A	(eds.)	(2006),	SARS	in	
Context:	Memory,	History,	Policy,	Du	Quebec:	McGill‐Queen’s	University	Press.;	Abraham	T	(2005),	Twenty‐
First	Century	Plague:	The	Story	of	SARS,	Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press.;	Fidler	D	(2004),	
SARS,	Governance	and	the	Globalization	of	Disease,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan.;	World	Health	
Organization	(2006),	SARS:	How	a	Global	Epidemic	was	Stopped,	Geneva:	World	Health	Organization.;	
Hoong	CM	(2004),	A	Defining	Moment:	How	Singapore	Beat	SARS,	Singapore:	Ministry	of	Information,	
Communications	and	the	Arts.;	Davis	D	and	Siu	H	(2007),	SARS	receptions	and	interpretations	in	three	
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source	of	data	to	identify	the	key	actors	and	their	ideas.	The	Index	to	Theses	of	Great	
Britain	and	Ireland	was	used	to	locate	unpublished	academic	work	on	SARS	and	
epistemic	communities.	Other	grey	literature	includes	conference	abstracts,	reports	and	
statements.	
3.2.2.	Semi‐structured	interviews	of	key	informants	
	
While	primary	investigation	was	carried	out	using	policy	documents,	official	reports	
and	journal	articles,	such	sources	did	not	fully	answer	the	questions	in‐depth	about	how	
issues	in	relation	to	the	SARS	outbreak	were	understood	by	a	group	of	key	individuals	
and	why	some	events	were	constructed	the	way	they	were.	In	order	to	gain	a	fuller	
understanding	of	the	policy	process,	and	to	supplement	and	triangulate”	the	
documentary	sources,	semi‐structured	interviews	with	key	informants	were	carried	
out.	In	terms	of	selection	criteria,	a	“target”	list	of	key	informants	known	to	be	involved	
or	experienced	in	the	global	SARS	response	was	initially	drawn	up	through	systematic	
searching	of	the	above	described	documentary	sources.	Informants	were	selected	on	
the	basis	of	the	following	criteria:		
	
1) Participation	in	key	bodies,	meetings	and	conferences	concerning	SARS	which	
set	guidelines	or	undertook	actions;		
2) Publications	and	contributions	in	prominent	scholarly	journals,	policy	reports	
and	other	documents	of	the	WHO	and	relevant	organizations	in	relation	to	the	
SARS	outbreak;		
3) Frequency	of	names	(3	times	or	more)	appearing	in	the	in	documentary	
materials	collected;	and		
4) Frequency	of	names	(3	times	or	more)	appearing	in	articles	on	SARS	in	
international	newspapers	and	magazines.	
		
Those	who	met	two	of	the	abovementioned	criteria	were	listed	as	target	key	informants.		
Separately,	a	list	of	people	who	held	senior	positions	in	government	or	public	health	
institute	in	the	affected	countries	(i.e.	decision	maker)	was	drawn	up.	These	key	
informants	were	contacted	via	email	and/or	letters	informing	them	of	the	nature	of	the	
study	and	requested	to	contact	the	researcher	via	email	if	they	consented	to	participate	
in	the	study.		A	second	mailing	was	sent,	if	no	reply	was	received,	two	weeks	after	the	
first	email/letter	was	sent.		Meetings	were	sought	with	informants	who	agreed	to	
participate	in	the	study.		Snowball	or	chain	sampling	strategies	(initially,	selected	
respondents	were	invited	to	suggest	others)	were	employed	to	identify	further	
informants.		Some	national	policymakers	suggested	one	or	more	senior	government	
officials	or	external	consultants	involved	in	the	response	to	SARS.	These	individuals	
were	followed	up	if	they	were	deemed	a	rich	source	of	information	on	the	research	
questions	posed.		Indeed,	the	informant	interviews	as	a	purposive	sampling	technique	
offered	some	advantages.		The	informants	furnished	critical	information	and	offered	
scientific	and	technical	expertise	for	particular	issues	related	to	SARS.		They	also	shared	
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unpublished	documentation	including	internal	reports	and	memos.		Some	informants	
were	also	willing	to	facilitate	connections	with	colleagues,	which	fostered	acquisition	of	
new	data.		
	
A	total	of	35	interviews	were	conducted	in	four	locations	(Geneva,	Manila,	Hong	Kong	
and	Singapore).		By	profession,	the	sample	consisted	of	policymakers,	officials,	scientific	
researchers,	consultants	and	practitioners	working	in	domestic	health	institutions,	
regional	health	bodies,	international	health	organizations,	non‐governmental	
organisations,	universities,	and	government‐funded	research	institutes.		The	
organisations	with	which	key	informants	were	affiliated	were:	World	Health	
Organization	headquarters,	World	Health	Organization	Western	Pacific	Regional	Office,	
University	of	Hong	Kong,	Chinese	University	of	Hong	Kong,	Civic	Exchange	Hong	Kong,	
Hospital	Authority	Hong	Kong,	Singapore	National	University,	Singapore	Centre	for	
Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	Singapore	Ministry	of	Health,	Singapore	Ministry	of	
Defence,	Genome	Institute	Singapore,	and	Tan	Tock	Seng	Hospital,	Singapore.	
Interviews	were	held	at	the	locations	where	the	key	informants	were	based.		
	
The	aim	of	the	interviews	was	to	elucidate	and,	to	some	extent,	aid	in	understanding	the	
key	ideas	and	principles	held	by	an	individual	or	an	institution	identified	by	the	above	
described	documentary	material.		In	fact,	interview	transcripts	provided	a	more	
detailed	view	into	the	decision‐making	and	policy	processes	involved	in	addressing	
issues	on	SARS	that	usually	go	unpublished.		The	interviews	specifically	sought	to	focus	
on	the	way	the	informants	used	language	directed	towards	SARS	issues,	where	much	of	
their	beliefs,	values	and	ideas	tend	to	be	expressed.		Such	language	usage	can	hardly	be	
captured	simply	by	analysing	the	documentary	sources	and	thus	interviews	were	useful	
in	clarifying	the	ideas	and	values	of	the	key	informants	who	were	identified	during	
document	analyses.			
	
In	order	to	understand	how	SARS	was	framed	by	the	key	informants,	a	semi‐structured	
interview	guide,	comprising	15	open‐ended	core	and	supplementary	questions	
(Interview	Questions	attached	in	Appendix	II),	was	used.		The	format	of	the	interviews	
was	designed	to	allow	the	informants	to	tell	the	story	of	events,	issues	and	debates	as	
much	as	possible	in	their	own	words.		In	doing	so,	it	encouraged	them	to	express	their	
own	understanding	and	retrospective	perception	of	the	SARS	outbreak.	Given	the	global	
scope	of	the	study,	and	due	to	the	fact	that	many	participants	in	the	SARS	outbreak	had	
moved	on	to	new	institutions	by	the	time	of	the	research,	it	was	not	possible	to	
interview	all	desired	key	informants	face‐to‐face.	Thus,	face‐to‐face	interviews	were	
supplemented	by	telephone	interviews	(two	interviews	were	conducted	in	this	
manner).		Meetings	with	some	informants	were	structured	more	rigidly,	and	both	very	
specific	and	very	general	questions	were	used	flexibly	according	to	the	informants’	
unique	professional	circumstances.	Interviews	lasted	from	between	35	minutes	to	120	
minutes	in	duration.	The	researcher	ensured	that	the	interview	was	digitally	recorded	
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and	transcribed	in	a	verbatim	manner,	and	these	transcripts	were	analysed	together	
with	the	documentary	materials	collected.	
	
Throughout	the	interview,	the	key	informant	was	given	as	much	leeway	as	possible	to	
present	his/her	version	of	events	especially	in	relation	to	the	discourses	identified.	In	
other	words,	if	a	particular	informant	gave	an	explanation	as	to	whether	the	SARS	
outbreak	was	unprecedented	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	outbreak,	the	conversation	was	
guided	to	focus	on	why	he/she	thought	so.		In	this	respect,	at	the	end	of	the	interview,	
the	transcript	could	well	reflect	the	terminology	intricately	linked	with	each	respective	
set	of	discourse.	For	instance,	if	an	informant	views	SARS	from	a	security	perspective,	
terms	such	as	“threat	to	national	security”	“surveillance”	or	“war	against”	are	favoured	
by	him/her;	if	an	informant	is	more	concerned	with	neoliberal	economism,	the	
transcript	reflects	the	informants’	interest	in	the	market	approach	to	vaccines	as	
opposed	to	access	to	medicine	and	as	such,	phrases	such	as	“reward	from	scientific	
findings”	or	“patenting”	are	distinct.	If	the	informant	is	more	persuaded	by	the	
biomedical	approach	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	then	the	interview	may	be	peppered	with	
words	like	“behavioural	risk”,	“individual	responsibility”	or	“self‐discipline.”	Each	
interview	had	a	combination	of	these	words	and	elements	which	pertained	to	different	
discourses.	Some	interviews	threw	up	terms,	words	and	phrases	which	did	not	pertain	
to	any	of	the	discourses	identified.		
	
Each	interview	was	built	on	those	preceding	it	until	the	data	being	collected	no	longer	
yielded	new	information,	which	indicated	that	the	sample	size	was	sufficient.307	All	
interviews	were	conducted	in	English.	Relevant	information	and	impressions	were	
summarised	and	incorporated	into	side	bars	of	the	transcript,	taking	care	to	keep	a	
distinction	from	the	interviewees’	responses.	The	final	list	of	key	informants	is	given	in	
Appendix	I.	
	
Table	3.1	gives	a	summary	of	the	research	objectives,	methods	and	data	sources	used.		
	
Table	3.1.	Summary	of	research	objectives,	methods	and	data	sources	
	
Objective	 Methods Data	Sources	
1.	To	review	the	existing	
literature	on	GHG	
 Review	of	secondary	
documentary	
materials	
	
 Public	health	literature	
on	GHG	with	special	
reference	to	global	
infectious	disease	
outbreaks	
 International	Relations	
literature	on	global	
governance	
2.	To	develop	conceptual	  Review	of	secondary	  International	Relations	
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framework	 documentary	
materials	
literature	on	
constructivism,	
international	political	
economy,	epistemic	
communities	
3.	To	map	the	
transnational	epistemic	
community	
 Analysis	of	primary	
and	secondary	
documentary	
materials	
 Key	informant	
interviews	
 Published:	policy	
documents,	mission	
statements,	speeches,	
mandates,	reports,	
newspapers,	
magazines,	and	
journals	
 Grey:	internal	reports	
by	the	WHO,	other	
intergovernmental	
organizations,	and	
networks	of	
professionals;	
correspondence,	
memos,	CVs	
 Interviews:	on	the	
identification	of	key	
actors	
4.	To	explore	the	
discourses	
 Discourse	analysis	
based	on	key	
informant	interviews	
and	
primary/secondary	
documentary	
materials	
	
 Published:	policy	
documents,	mission	
statements,	speeches,	
mandates,	budgets,	
reports,	legislations,	
newspapers,	
magazines,	and	
journals	
 Grey:	internal	reports	
by	the	WHO,	other	
intergovernmental	
organizations,	and	
networks	of	
professionals;	
correspondence,	
memos,	CVs	
 Interviews:	ideas,	
interests,	norms	and	
policy	solutions	
surrounding	SARS	
addressed	by	the	key	
informants	
5.	To	understand	the	
impact	of	discourses	on	
the	practical	policy	
response	to	SARS	
 Discourse	analysis	
based	on	key	
informant	interviews	
and	
 Published:	policy	
documents,	mission	
statements,	speeches,	
mandates,	budgets,	
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primary/secondary	
documentary	
materials	
	
	
	
reports,	legislations,	
magazines,	journals,	
and	newspapers	
 Grey:	internal	reports	
by	the	WHO,	other	
intergovernmental	
organizations,	and	
networks	of	
professionals;	
correspondence,	
memos,	CVs	
 Interviews:	on	the	
virtual	policy	process	
and	decision‐making	
concerning	the	global	
response	to	the	SARS	
outbreak	
6.	To	draw	conclusions	
and	recommendations	
about	the	emerging	nature	
of	GHG	on	infectious	
disease	outbreaks	
 Synthesis	of	all	
findings		
 Consolidation	of	all	the	
data		
	
3.3	METHOD	OF	DATA	ANALYSIS	
3.3.1.	Discourse	analysis	
	
The	first	part	of	the	data	analysis	involved	the	identification	of	key	actors	and	the	extent	
to	which	they	held	particular	discourses	surrounding	the	SARS	outbreak;	that	is,	the	
dominant	ideas	in	which	SARS	was	understood	and	interpreted.		
	
By	definition,	discourse	refers	to	discursive	construction	of	language	that	draws	on	a	
particular	belief	and	knowledge,	and	guides	specific	forms	of	action.	There	are	various	
approaches	to	conducting	discourse	analysis	in	empirical	studies,	including	social	
linguistic	analysis,	interpretive	structuralism,	critical	discourse	analysis	and	critical	
linguistic	analysis.	They	fall	under	the	main	perspective	of	social	constructivism.	
Discourse	analysis	has	been	used	in	International	Relations	with	the	central	aim	of	
establishing	the	context,	and	analysing	the	underlying	rules	and	norms,	which	shape	the	
complex	interplay	between	discursively	embedded	agents	and	structure.308	309	It	also	
proved	useful	for	capturing	the	power	relations	among	actors	by	deconstructing	their	
                                                            
308	 Fierke	 KM	 (2002).	 “Links	 across	 the	 Abyss:	 language	 and	 Logic	 in	 International	 Relations”,	
International	Studies	Quarterly,	46(3):	331‐354.	
309	 Fierke	 KM	 (2005).	Diplomatic	 Intervention,	Conflict	and	Change	 in	a	Globalising	World,	 Houndmills,	
Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.	5‐9.	
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logic	of	constitution	and	maintenance.310	The	central	point	for	discourse	analysis	is	that	
language,	and	especially	that	of	politics,	is	problematised	and	not	seen	as	having	
objective	qualities.	Thus,	discourse	analysis	involves	a	perspective	on	language	which	
sees	this	not	as	reflecting	reality	in	a	simple	way,	but	instead	as	constructing	that	social	
reality.		
	
This	is	a	very	important	point	because	this	thesis	is	not	concerned	with	gathering	and	
reflecting	the	“reality”	of	SARS	as	such,	which	has	received	considerable	analysis	to	
date,	but	with	exploring	how	this	reality	has	been	constituted	as	an	issue	through	
ideational	factors.		In	other	words,	the	primary	concern	with	discourse	in	his	research	
was	to	identify	the	way	in	which	SARS	was	constructed	within	the	context	of	specific	
discourses,	how	such	discourses	have	led	to	certain	policy	ideas	and	actions,	and	why	
certain	discourses	have	become	salient	as	opposed	to	other	discourses.		Discourse	in	
this	sense	does	not	so	much	refer	to	language	itself,	but	how	it	is	used	within	a	given	
social	context.311		Therefore,	while	sharing	the	assumptions	of	discourse	analysis	on	the	
constructive	effects	of	language,	this	thesis	is	not	focused	on	the	dissection	and	
deconstruction	of	texts	as	called	for	by	socio‐linguistic	discourse	analysis.		Rather,	this	
thesis	focuses	on	the	themes	dealt	with	in	the	discourses	related	to	SARS,	as	well	as	on	
the	analysis	of	context,	and	of	the	discursive	practices	of	the	actors	involved.312	
	
Using	the	above	described	data	source,	analysis	involved	a	process	of	identifying	the	
ideas	and	norms	held	by	key	individuals.	These	ideas	were	critically	examined	in	order	
to	clarify	the	broad	underlying	assumptions	behind	them.	In	terms	of	analysing	
discourse,	there	are	no	universally	agreed	standard	rules	or	methodology.	According	to	
Tonkiss,313	discourse	analysis	is	a	fluid,	interpretive	process	which	relies	on	close	
analysis	of	specific	texts,	and	which	therefore	does	not	lend	itself	to	setting	up	hard‐
and‐fast	rules	of	analysis.	This	idea	is	shared	by	Potter	and	Wetherell,314	who	compare	
discourse	analysis	to	the	“skill	involved	in	bike	riding:	a	process	that	one	picks	up	by	
doing	it,	perfects	by	practising	it,	and	which	is	difficult	to	describe	in	a	formal	way.”		
	
Nonetheless,	it	is	still	important	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	to	specify	a	clear	process	
for	analysing	the	discourses	of	concern.	This	thesis	employed	pre‐conceptualised	key	
discourses	suggested	by	the	existing	analyses	on	GHG	discourses	as	departing	themes	
that	were	put	forward	to	address	problems	of	infectious	diseases	through	the	use	of	
language	or	texts.	These	discourses	are	described	in	Chapter	Two	(see	Table	2.1).	
                                                            
310	 Debrix	 F	 (2002).	 “Language	 as	 Criticism:	 Assessing	 the	 Merits	 of	 Speech	 Acts	 and	 Discursive	
Formations	in	International	Relations”,	New	Political	Science,	24(2):	201‐219.	
311	Bryman	A	(2004).	 “Qualitative	Data	Analysis,”	 in	Social	Research	Methods,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.	
312	 Hammersley	 M	 (2002),	 “Discourse	 Analysis:	 A	 Bibliographical	 Guide”	 at	
www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/capacity/Activities/Themes/In‐depth/guide.pdf	
313	Tonkiss	F	(2004),	“Analysing	Text	and	Speech:	Content	and	Discourse	Analysis,”	in	Seale	C	(ed.),	
Research	Society	and	Culture,	London:	Sage	Publications,	p.	378.	
314	 Potter	 and	Wetherell	 (1994),	 “Analysing	 Discourse,”	 in	 Bryman	 A	 and	 Burgess	 B	 (eds.),	 Analyzing	
Qualitative	Data,	London:	Routledge,	p.	55.	
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Particular	attention	was	paid	to	what	ideas	were	used	to	legitimise	or	justify	policy	
action	in	response	to	SARS,	including	calls	to	mobilise	resources	or	increase	public	
attention.	This	enabled	the	researcher	to	identify	rationales	or	reasoning	behind	
actions.	An	assessment	of	the	influence	of	different	discourses	was	considered	in	an	
analysis	through	comparative	measures	of	their	frequency,	source	of	articulation,	and	
persistence	over	time.	For	example,	WHO	press	briefings	and	media	reports	were	
arranged	in	a	sequential	order	to	check	the	dominance	of	certain	phrases,	words,	and	
rhetoric	that	constituted	tenets	of	a	particular	discourse	for	a	particular	period.	This	
helped	to	identify	the	ascendancy	of	certain	discourses	over	others	at	different	points	in	
time.		
	
While	focusing	on	the	central	themes	selected,	this	thesis	organises	the	data	by	
comparing	the	different	ways	these	themes	emerged	within	the	data.	This	led	the	
researcher	to	understand	the	different	and	perhaps	competing	discourses	surrounding	
SARS.	In	addition,	it	was	used	to	identify	what	Billig315	describes	as	“rhetorical”	use	of	
argument;	that	is,	the	way	discourse	aims	to	establish	the	authority	of	its	account	while	
dismissing	others.	Tonkiss316	provides	four	core	techniques	for	analysing	the	data	based	
on	the	following	questions:	What	ideas	and	representations	cluster	around	the	key	
themes?	What	associations	are	being	established?	Are	particular	meanings	being	
mobilised?	How	are	different	subjects	spoken	about	and	positioned	within	the	text?		
	
These	questions	offered	a	broader	guiding	principle	for	examining	and	organising	texts	
and	documents	throughout	analysis	process.	For	example,	when	certain	phrases	or	
words	such	as	threat	to	citizens,	border	control,	spread	and	boundaries,	dreadful	risk,	
attack	and	defence	emerged	consistently,	they	allowed	the	researcher	to	ask	questions	
of	the	text:	how	was	SARS	presented	as	a	threat?	How	was	the	SARS	virus	
conceptualised	in	terms	of	boundaries?	What	references	were	made	to	contexts	with	
regard	to	attack	and	defence?	What	sources	or	figures	were	referred	to	in	border	
control?	Then	it	became	evident	that	these	phrases	were	not	read	as	merely	verbal	or	
textual	utterances,	but	they	accounted	for	the	meanings	attached	to	the	text	within	
particular	social	and	structural	contexts	to	establish	the	intended	aim	of	the	language	
use	and	thus	to	enhance	assertion	and	persuasion.	This	analytic	understanding	helped	
to	open	up	what	Potter	and	Wetherell	refer	to	the	interpretive	repertoires317	–	the	ways	
of	speaking	and	modes	of	understanding	–	at	work	in	the	texts.	Through	the	interpretive	
process,	the	extracted	phrases	were	then	thematically	organised	to	assign	the	overall	
meaning	or	macrostructure	of	a	text	as	a	whole.	In	such	case,	the	researcher	determined	
that	these	phrases	fit	under	the	security	discourse	as	underlying	ideas	positioned	in	
different	ways	with	respect	to	the	understanding	of	SARS.	Again,	the	method	of	data	
extraction	involved	a	continuous	iterative	engagement	between	close	readings	of	the	
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text	and	the	development	of	themes.	Throughout	the	analysis	process,	the	same	
principles	were	applied	to	organising	and	extracting	raw	data	for	the	development	of	
other	discourses	in	a	systematic	manner.				
	
The	analysis	also	involved,	not	only	identifying	specific	discourses	that	were	used	to	
define	the	problems	in	the	pursuit	of	shaping	policy	response	surrounding	SARS,	but	
also	the	ways	in	which	the	discourses	countered	alternative	accounts	of	understanding	
SARS.		This	method	is	attentive	to	the	“silences”	in	texts	as	part	of	the	interpretive	
process,	and	this	is	consistent	with	the	general	tenets	of	discourse	analysis	which	
approaches	readings	of	silence	as	embedded	in	social	and	structural	contexts.		In	this	
sense,	silence	in	texts	becomes	a	form	of	discourse	as	“we	cannot	force	our	data	to	say	
things	that	are	not	there,	but	we	as	critical	researchers	can	point	out	those	places	where	
text	is	silent	to	think	about	what	remains	unsaid	in	the	organisation	of	discourse.”318	
Thus,	analysis	of	silence	in	texts	allows	for	consideration	of	the	marginalisation	and	
exclusion	of	certain	discourses	which	are	bound	up	in	power	relations	inherent	to	the	
text	and	broader	context.		More	specifically,	this	approach	recognised	the	importance	of	
the	“process”	by	which	certain	discourses	of	SARS	arose	and	persisted	rather	than	the	
mere	existence	of	a	discourse	per	se.	For	instance,	a	policy	option	that	calls	for	social	
rights	of	persons	at	risk	(located	within	the	human	rights	discourse)	and	one	calling	for	
an	early	identification	of	risk	including	measures	potentially	intrusive	to	civil	liberties	
(embedded	in	security	discourse)	may	be	incompatible.	Thus	a	set	of	associations	of	
discourse	may	need	to	be	mobilised	around	these	policies	to	invalidate	or	support	
alternative	policy	options.	Analysing	the	presence	and	absence	of	different	and	
competing	discourses	within	a	larger	rhetorical	context	helped	to	understand	how	a	
certain	set	of	ideas	becomes	more	dominant	and	certain	actors	more	prominent	than	
others.	
	
In	terms	of	the	data	coding,	primary	documents	and	key	informant	interview	
transcripts	were	coded	largely	under	the	themes	identified,	at	the	same	time	taking	
into	account	any	unexpected	themes	which	emerged	during	the	data	collection.	
Therefore,	initial	coding	consisted	of	reading	through	materials	and	identifying	where	
particular	themes	were	illustrated	by	the	data.319		If	some	data	proved	hard	to	fit	into	
existing	themes,	as	more	data	were	collected,	a	new	theme	was	detected	and	coded.	
Under	the	same	theme,	a	code	was	subdivided	into	topics	and	they	were	
subcategorised.		For	example,	some	data	contained	a	strong	pledge	to	biomedical	
discourse	or	a	strong	rejection	of	that	discourse;	some	documents	contained	discussion	
on	the	nature	of	SARS	but	others	focused	more	on	actions	or	the	impact	of	the	disease.		
	
This	coding	was	done	in	a	systematic	manner	using	NVivo	10	software.		Throughout	
analysis,	the	NVivo	software	was	useful	in	marking‐up	specific	features	of	sentence	and	
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phrase	and	repetitive	tropes,	and	outlining	a	map	of	patterns	and	frequency.		Upon	
completion	of	coding,	a	structured	analysis	of	materials	was	undertaken	with	pieces	of	
documents	in	sequence	to	establish	chronological	patterns	and	dominance	of	certain	
discourses	over	time.	The	raw	data	at	first	sight	appeared	rather	fragmented	and	
decontextualized.		While	the	method	of	analysis	in	approaching	the	data	relied	on	the	
coding	and	retrieval	approach	as	a	first	step,	further	attempts	were	undertaken	to	tease	
out	the	various	meanings	of	particular	codes	and	consider	an	overall	linkage	of	
contextual	ideas	within	data.		This	was	carried	out	using	the	concept	of	the	node	and	
hierarchical	logical	system	–	which	is	a	key	to	the	analysis	process	in	NVivo	–	on	top	of	
searching,	coding,	and	indexing.		In	order	to	ensure	that	codes	are	analytically	drawn	
out	to	represent	textual	relationship,	the	raw	data	were	manually	read	a	number	of	
times.	In	this	respect,	the	methodology	of	this	analysis	benefits	from	the	grounded	
theory	pioneered	by	Glaser	and	Strauss.320	321	Grounded	theory	is	an	approach		
	
…in	which	the	researchers	attempt	to	derive	a	general,	abstract	theory	of	a	process,	
action,	or	interaction	grounded	in	the	views	of	participants	in	a	study.	This	process	
involves	using	multiple	stages	of	data	collection	and	the	refinement	and	
interrelationship	of	categories	of	information.	Two	primary	characteristics	of	this	
design	are	the	constant	comparison	of	data	with	emerging	categories	and	
theoretical	sampling	of	different	groups	to	maximise	the	similarities	and	the	
differences	of	information.322	
	
In	essence,	the	grounded	theory	approach	stresses	the	development	of	theory	from	
data.	In	this	approach,	the	aim	of	analysis	is	not	to	test	the	truth	value	of	theoretical	
propositions	but	rather	to	develop	the	theory	as	data	collection	and	analysis	proceeds.	
Following	this	approach,	the	researcher	checked	and	rechecked	the	results	constantly,	
as	the	analysis	proceeded,	so	that	the	research	findings	could	be	reassessed	and	a	
conceptual	framework	could	be	formed.	During	such	iterative	processes,	the	researcher	
recorded	any	ideas	that	were	generated	as	part	of	the	coding	process	in	a	separate	
memo	to	arrive	at	a	higher	level	of	abstraction.	In	this	sense,	the	process	of	analysing	
the	discourse	on	SARS	was	both	inductive	and	deductive.		
3.3.2.	Delineating	the	epistemic	community	
	
The	second	part	of	data	analysis	involved	the	identification	of	epistemic	communities:	a	
list	of	key	actors	involved	in	the	shaping	of	terms	of	discourse	on	the	SARS	outbreak.		In	
order	to	identify	key	clusters	of	expert,	the	thesis	traces	experts	and	expertise	according	
to	the	criteria	that	the	epistemic	communities	framework	defined:	(a)	a	set	of	shared	
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normative	beliefs;	(b)	mutual	engagement	based	on	a	shared	notion	of	validity;	and	(c)	
common	policy	enterprise.323		First,	in	order	to	recognise	the	collective	features	of	
individuals	mobilised	around	similar	ideas,	the	thesis	grouped	a	range	of	policy	
discourses	presented	during	SARS	into	four	discourses	that	appeared	to	be	the	most	
dominant.			This	allowed	the	myriad	of	actors	to	be	narrowed	down	into	a	group(s)	of	
individuals,	and	for	them	to	be	demarcated	from	other	public	health	practitioners,	
officials	and	researchers	more	systematically.		Each	actor	was	allocated	to	specific	
discourse(s)	identified	so	that	a	clear	association	was	made	between	actor	and	
discourse	(note	that	the	association	between	actor	and	discourse	is	discussed	in	greater	
detail	in	Chapter	Six	as	a	way	in	which	to	conceptualise	the	SARS	epistemic	community).	
Second,	the	mutual	engagement	among	key	actors	was	assessed	by	the	review	of	official	
documents	and	conference	proceedings	relating	to	SARS.		Background	searches	on	
academic	training	and	career	trajectory	served	as	an	avenue	for	identifying	and	
confirming	common	notions	of	validity.		Informant	interviews	complemented	in	
identifying	when,	why	and	from	whom	the	ideas	behind	the	policies	were	realised,	how	
the	experts	knew	one	another,	how	regularly	they	met	on	both	formal	and	informal	
basis,	and	what	access	channels	existed	between	the	experts	and	national	decision	
makers.		The	common	policy	enterprise	was	assessed	through	a	comprehensive	review	
of	official	documents,	journals,	and	media	reports.		They	were	used	to	identify	key	
actors’	policy	agendas	and	their	involvement	in	advancing	specific	policies.		Hass	
identified	that	influence	mechanisms	are	facilitated	by	the	members	of	the	epistemic	
community’s	access	to	decision‐makers.		The	interviews	with	policy‐makers	helped	
identify	the	extent	to	which	the	key	experts	influenced	the	introduction,	selection	and	
diffusion	of	policies	derived	from	particular	discourses.		
3.4.	ETHICAL	ISSUES	
	
In	order	to	ensure	compliance	with	recognised	standards	of	research	ethics,	the	project	
received	prior	approval	from	the	London	School	of	Hygiene	and	Tropical	Medicine’s	
Research	Ethics	Committee	before	commencing	fieldwork.		Each	key	informant	was	
given	a	consent	form	explaining	the	aims	of	the	study,	the	voluntary	nature	of	their	
participation,	and	the	steps	taken	to	ensure	confidentially	(See	Appendix	III).	
Informants	then	completed	a	written	informed	consent	form	prior	to	the	interview.	In	
presenting	the	results	of	the	research,	key	informants	were	permitted	anonymity	in	
their	responses.		Some	requested	confidentiality.		Thus,	any	statements	made	in	
confidence	are	not	reported	verbatim	or	quoted	directly,	and	the	source	is	not	
identified.		
3.5.	CAVEATS	
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This	study	notes	the	following	caveats.	First,	there	were	some	difficulties	in	accessing	
key	informants	as	interviewees.		Those	occupying	very	senior	positions	in	relevant	
institutions	were	hesitant	to	be	interviewed,	perhaps	given	the	sensitivities	
surrounding	the	SARS	response,	and	often	did	not	respond	to	communications,	were	
travelling,	or	refused	requests.		Additionally,	some	potential	informants	involved	in	the	
SARS	response	moved	on	from	posts	so	that	the	researcher	could	not	interview	them	in	
person.		As	a	result,	some	high‐level	informants	who	were	identified	as	key	decision‐
makers	on	SARS	issues	did	not	participate	in	this	study.		While	it	is	not	clear	whether	
this	would	result	in	a	selection	bias,	this	factor	could	not	be	fully	eliminated.	To	address	
this,	the	views	held	by	other	high‐level	informants	were	obtained	by	documentary	
sources	and	then	incorporated	as	far	as	possible.		The	statements	made	by	these	
informants	in	official	documents	and/or	publications	proved	an	important	alternative	
and	compensatory	data	source.					
	
Second,	informant	interviews	might	have	resulted	in	respondent	bias.	Research	
suggests	that	respondents	approach	an	interview	with	their	own	objectives	and	
motivations.324		Some	informants,	particularly	senior	policymakers,	were	in	a	position	
where	they	had	to	defend	their	organisation	and	their	role,	and	therefore	might	have	
presented	biased	interpretations	of	SARS	events.		Informants	were	sometimes	unable	to	
respond	to	questions	given	the	passage	of	time	or	organisational	confidentiality.		These	
issues	to	a	certain	extent	were	mitigated	through	triangulation	and	with	documentary	
analysis.	
	
Third,	since	the	focus	of	this	research	was	an	outbreak	that	involved	institutions	located	
across	the	world	and	a	disease	with	global	reach,	the	analysis	of	GHG	proved	vast	in	
scope.		As	in	the	case	of	any	research,	important	boundaries	had	to	drawn	to	delineate	
what	should	ideally	be	done	and	what	can	feasibly	be	done	given	available	resources.	
While	fieldwork	to	conduct	interviews	provided	an	essential	avenue	into	the	empirical	
understanding	of	mechanics	by	which	individuals	were	working	on	a	global	scale,	there	
proved	to	be	many	logistical	barriers	in	gathering	relevant	information.		For	instance,	
the	researcher	visited	two	sites	–	Hong	Kong	and	Singapore	–	that	were	severely	
affected	by	the	SARS	outbreak	in	an	effort	to	understand	the	policy‐making	processes	at	
the	national	level	and	the	interface	with	the	international/global	public	health	policy	
processes.		However,	given	limited	resources,	the	researcher	could	not	carry	out	
comparable	fieldwork	in	other	locations	such	as	Canada,	Taiwan,	Vietnam	or	China	that	
were	equally	affected	by	SARS.	In	order	to	overcome	this	obstacle,	the	researcher	
instead	examined	a	wide	range	of	documents	on	these	locations.	
	
Lastly,	there	was	a	time	gap	between	data	collection,	analysis	and	write‐up	of	thesis	due	
to	personal	circumstances.		Rolling	data	collection	took	place	from	October	2007	to	
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March	2010	although	the	majority	of	interviews	were	conducted	over	an	18‐month	
period	from	October	2007	to	June	2009.		There	is	a	chance	that	this	delay	over	time	
might	have	influenced	the	methodology	unduly.		For	example,	what	was	clear	at	the	
time	of	data	collection	and	analysis	may	become	remarkably	difficult	to	remember	
months	or	years	later.		To	bridge	the	time	gap,	the	researcher	relied	on	a	logbook	which	
contained	important	information	such	as	an	outline	of	all	the	steps	the	research	needs	
to	finish,	decisions	about	coding,	ways	to	collect	data,	and	difficulties	and	problems	on	a	
day‐to‐day	basis	in	data	collection	and	analysis.		This	record	keeping	greatly	helped	to	
provide	needed	information	for	writing	up	of	this	research.		
3.6.	SUMMARY	
	
This	chapter	has	described	the	methodology	of	the	research	in	terms	of	its	design	and	
the	approach	taken.		It	has	detailed	the	sources	and	methods	of	data	collection,	and	how	
the	resultant	data	was	analysed	to	identify	the	dominant	discourses	that	characterised	
the	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	and	the	epistemic	communities	that	furthered	
those	discourses.		The	core	innovation	of	this	research,	to	apply	discourse	analysis	to	
understand	the	GHG	of	the	SARS	outbreak,	is	recognised	as	a	methodological	challenge.	
The	potential	caveats	that	arise	from	this	methodology	have	been	described	with	
recognition	that	all	study	designs	must	balance	what	is	ideal	and	what	is	practical.	
Nevertheless,	it	is	argued	that	conducting	the	research	in	this	way	provides	fuller	
understanding	as	to	why	the	SARS	outbreak	response	unfolded	as	it	did,	and	offers	new	
insights	into	the	GHG	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks.		The	next	two	chapters	will	
present	the	empirical	analysis	of	this	research.		
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CHAPTER	FOUR		
THE	ROLE	OF	EPISTEMIC	COMMUNITIES	IN	THE	SARS	
OUTBREAK	
4.1.	INTRODUCTION		
	
This	chapter,	and	the	following	chapter,	present	empirical	analysis	of	the	role	of	
epistemic	communities	in	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak.		This	chapter	in	
particular	addresses	the	question	posed	in	Chapter	One	of	what	key	actors	contributed	
to	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak.		This	chapter	argues	that	Haas’	concept	of	
an	“epistemic	community”,	defined	as	“a	relatively	distinct	knowledgeable	group	of	
actors”325,	is	useful	for	exploring	the	process	behind	the	generation	of	policy	discourses	
during	the	SARS	outbreak.		It	is	held	that	the	discourses,	which	will	be	identified	in	
Chapter	Five,	shape	global	health	action	through	“carriers”	who	function	as	“cognitive	
purveyors”,	translating	the	sets	of	ideas	into	policy	measures.		This	chapter	therefore	
suggests	that	the	actions	and	influence	of	an	epistemic	community	are	an	important	
factor	to	consider	in	understanding	the	process	by	which	the	structures	of	GHG	of	SARS	
have	evolved	the	way	they	have.		The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	examine	the	
emergence,	composition	and	influences	process	of	the	epistemic	community	related	to	
the	SARS	outbreak.		More	specifically,	this	chapter	seeks	to	identify	members	of	
epistemic	communities	in	terms	of	their	characteristics,	as	well	as	the	factors	that	led	
these	individuals	to	coalesce	into	epistemic	communities.		
	
In	pursuing	this	task,	one	important	methodological	question	is	whether	membership	of	
epistemic	communities	is	formalised	in	any	way.		According	to	the	epistemic	community	
framework	described	in	Chapter	Two,	epistemic	communities	as	social	groups	tend	to	
be	permeable	and	thus	have	no	formal	membership	procedures.	Pointing	to	the	
importance	of	episteme,	Ruggie	observed	that	“epistemic	communities	may	be	said	to	
consist	of	interrelated	roles	which	grow	up	around	an	episteme;	they	delimit,	for	their	
members,	the	proper	construction	of	social	reality.”326		Haas	puts	forth	similar	
arguments	with	respect	to	membership,	defining	epistemic	communities	primarily	in	
terms	of	their	holding	of	the	“same	worldview”.327		Haas	suggests,	“It	is	the	combination	
of	having	a	shared	set	of	causal	and	principled	(analytic	and	normative)	beliefs,	a	
consensual	knowledge	base	and	a	common	policy	enterprise	(common	interests)	that	
                                                            
325	Haas	P	(ed.)	(1992),	Knowledge,	Power	and	International	Policy	Coordination,	Columbia:	World	
Peace	Foundation.	
326	Ruggie	JG	(1975),	“International	responses	to	technology:	concepts	and	trends,”	International	
Organization,	29(3):	557‐583,	p.	570.	
327	Haas	P	(1992),	“Introduction:	epistemic	communities	and	international	policy	coordination,”	in	
Haas	P	(ed.),	Knowledge,	Power	and	International	Policy	Coordination,	Columbia:	World	Peace	
Foundation,	p.	3.		
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distinguishes	epistemic	communities	from	various	other	groups.”328		These	concepts	
point	to	the	fact	that,	it	is	the	shared	ideas	and	interests	about	the	presentation	and	
interpretation	of	social	reality,	that	distinguishes	epistemic	communities	from	other	
groups	or	individuals.		
	
However,	this	does	not	address	the	question	of	how	epistemic	communities	form	in	the	
first	place.		To	identify	possible	members	of	epistemic	communities,	this	chapter	begins	
by	examining	the	terrain	of	global	infectious	disease	outbreaks	involving	research	and	
policymaking	in	the	mid	and	late	1990s.	This	enables	us	to	account	for	the	background	
to	how	infectious	disease	outbreaks	were	problematised	before	the	SARS	outbreak,	and	
what	coherent	set	of	norms	was	developed	by	which	actors	with	the	authority	of	
epistemic	consensus.		The	chapter	then	moves	to	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	
outbreak,	tracing	what	experts	(and	their	institutions)	and	expertise	came	to	hold	a	
central	position	in	the	shaping	of	global	knowledge	on	SARS,	what	factors	facilitated	this	
process,	and	how	they	interacted	to	generate	causal	beliefs	and	influence	policy	
outcomes.		In	doing	so,	this	chapter	attempts	to	delineate	a	relatively	discrete	group	of	
experts,	namely	the	epistemic	community	surrounding	SARS.			
	
In	this	chapter,	global	meeting	records	including	conference	proceedings	and	
transcripts	from	consultation	meetings	in	the	archived	WHO	administrative	documents	
pertaining	to	infectious	diseases	are	used,	in	addition	to	informant	interviews.		These	
meeting	records	were	essential	in	investigating	how	experts	met	with	one	another	on	a	
transnational	level	and,	to	some	extent,	in	determining	who	the	key	clusters	of	experts	
prior	to	and	during	the	SARS	outbreak.					
4.2	EMERGING	INFECTIONS	AND	THE	DEVELOPMENT	OF	AN	EPISTEMIC	
COMMUNITY	
	
To	understand	how	an	epistemic	community	evolved	prior	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	this	
section	analyses	how	a	group	of	like‐minded	individuals,	with	particular	knowledge	
claims,	emerged	during	the	1990s	on	global	infectious	disease	research	and	
policymaking.		This	section	argues	that	growing	concerns	over	emerging	and	re‐
emerging	infectious	diseases	(with	acute	potential)	during	this	period	led	to	support	
for	new	ways	of	global	health	cooperation,	which	in	turn	created	opportunities	for	new	
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actors	to	emerge	and	shape	the	nature	and	management	of	infectious	disease	
outbreaks.	
4.2.1.	Global	consultations	on	emerging	infectious	diseases	in	the	mid	and	late	1990s	
	
A	review	of	archival	evidence	shows	that	infectious	disease	outbreaks	received	renewed	
attention	in	the	mid	1990s	at	the	international	level.		During	the	period	from	1960	to	
mid	1990s,	it	was	widely	believed	that	chronic	disease	had	displaced	infectious	disease	
as	the	primary	cause	of	mortality	in	what	was	called	the	epidemiological	transition.		A	
combination	of	better	nutrition,	improved	housing,	vaccines,	antibiotics	and	DDT	had	
displaced	communicable	disease	prevention	and	control	as	the	core	activity	of	public	
health	systems.		Concerns	about	infectious	diseases	were	also	outshined	by	more	
conventional	security	concerns	related	to	the	Cold	War	though	periodic	and	often	
intense	outbreaks	of	infectious	diseases	such	as	influenza	pandemics	of	1957	and	1968	
continued	to	appear.329		From	the	early	1980s	however,	the	HIV/AIDS	pandemic	
troubled	the	public	health	understanding	of	epidemiological	transition.		The	broader	
social,	economic,	technological	and	cognitive	changes	that	were	occurring	as	a	result	of	
globalisation	further	contributed	to	growing	awareness	of	human	interconnectedness.	
With	the	nuclear	threat	retreating,	and	following	an	outbreak	of	H5N1	avian	influenza,	
emerging	and	re‐emerging	infectious	diseases	gradually	gained	international	attention.		
The	realisation	that	pathogens	do	not	respect	national	borders	and	the	need	for	a	global	
approach	to	emerging	infections	was	brought	to	the	fore	of	the	WHO’s	formal	
consultation	in	1994.			
	
The	consultation	took	place	in	Geneva,	gathering	together	“international	experts	
currently	dealing	with	the	concept	of	emerging	diseases.”330		The	WHO’s	international	
consultations	took	place	in	the	broader	context	of	an	international	debate	about	how	to	
reform	the	WHO	that	was	occurring	among	its	member	states.331	Emerging	and	re‐
emerging	infectious	diseases	were	part	of	the	more	general	debate	about	the	WHO’s	
authority	and	competence.	A	total	of	22	experts	participated	in	the	consultation;	among	
them,	ten	were	from	the	USA.	The	experts	attending	included	S	Morse,	J	Lederberg	and	S	
Berkley	from	the	Rockefeller	Foundation;	J	Hughes	and	R	Berkelman	from	the	US	CDC;	
PF	Harrison	from	the	Institute	of	Medicine;	and		JR	La	Montagne	from	the	National	
Institute	of	Allergy	and	Infectious	Diseases.	WHO	officials	from	the	Division	of	
Communicable	Diseases	including	RH	Henderson,	Assistant	Director‐General,	and	J	
LeDuc	and	G	Torrigiani,	who	were	medical	officers	from	the	Division	of	Communicable	
Diseases,	also	participated	in	the	consultation.	The	consultation	recommended	four	
goals:	1)	strengthen	global	surveillance	of	infectious	diseases;	2)	strengthen	the	
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international	infrastructure	necessary	to	recognise,	report	and	respond	to	emerging	
infectious	diseases;	3)	create	an	applied	research	programme;	and	4)	strengthen	
international	capacity	for	infectious	disease	prevention	and	control.332		In	particular,	the	
meeting	participants	repeatedly	pointed	out	the	need	for	greater	coordination	within	
the	WHO	with	regard	to	surveillance	activities	and	sharing	of	information.	In	addition,	
many	participants	expressed	the	need	for	improved	collaboration	between	clinicians,	
laboratory	workers	and	epidemiologists.333			Overall,	the	outcome	of	the	consultation	
emphasised	that	a	more	“global	perspective”	was	desirable	in	the	response	to	emerging	
infectious	diseases	and	that	the	WHO	should	be	encouraged	to	take	a	leadership	role	in	
implementing	and	coordinating	collective	efforts.334		The	1994	consultation	was	
significant	in	the	sense	that	the	concept	of	emerging	and	re‐emerging	infectious	
diseases	was,	for	the	first	time,	framed	as	a	global	health	agenda.			
Nine	months	following	the	first	consultation,	the	second	WHO	consultation	on	emerging	
diseases	took	place	on	12	January	1995.		Nine	international	experts	participated	in	the	
meeting.	Two	US	experts	who	attended	the	first	global	consultation	–	Berkelman	from	
the	US	CDC	and	Morse	from	the	Rockefeller	Foundation	–	participated	in	the	second	
meeting.	Twenty‐six	members	of	the	WHO	secretariat	including	R	Henderson,	J	LeDuc	
and	G	Torrigiani	attended.	Henderson	directed	the	consultation	to	discuss	the	
framework	for	a	global	consortium	and	international	steering	committee	to	deal	with	
infectious	diseases.	The	consultation	concentrated	on	suggestions	for	modifying	the	
WHO’s	organisational	structure	in	order	to	accommodate	the	recommendations	of	the	
1994	consultation.335			The	main	outcome	was	to	create	a	“coordinating	group	composed	
of	representatives	of	internal	WHO	programmes	with	an	interest	in	emerging	infectious	
diseases.”336			The	meeting	outcome	met	with	success	with	the	formation	of	a	new	WHO	
division.	
In	1995	October,	the	WHO	established	the	Division	of	Emerging	and	other	
Communicable	Diseases	Surveillance	and	Control	and	abolished	the	Division	of	
Communicable	Diseases.	The	formation	of	the	new	Division	occurred	under	the	
mandate	of	the	World	Health	Assembly.337		David	Heymann	was	appointed	as	the	
Director	of	the	new	Division.	Heymann,	who	obtained	a	medical	degree	in	the	US	and	
had	training	in	epidemiology	at	the	London	School	of	Hygiene	and	Tropical	Medicine,	
was	recruited	into	the	smallpox	eradication	program	in	the	1970s.	He	then	worked	for	
the	US	CDC	for	fourteen	years,	mainly	based	in	Africa,	focusing	primarily	on	epidemics	
including	Ebola	in	Zaire,	with	Jonathan	Mann;	the	last	five	years	seconded	to	the	WHO.	
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He	then	was	recruited	to	the	WHO	when	Jonathan	Mann	set	up	WHO’s	HIV/AIDS	
programme.338		The	purpose	of	the	programme	was	to	get	a	better	understanding	of	the	
epidemiology	of	HIV/AIDS	and	make	sure	that	research	was	being	facilitated	by	the	
WHO.339		
In	1996,	Heymann	convened	a	third	WHO	ad	hoc	consultation,	as	part	of	a	review	of	a	5‐
year	strategic	plan	for	the	Division,	the	overarching	objective	of	which	was	to	provide	
the	WHO	with	assistance	in	order	to	“strengthen	global	communicable	disease	
surveillance	and	control.”340			The	strategic	plan	highlighted	the	importance	of	several	
initiatives	in	the	WHO’s	communicable	disease	surveillance	and	control:	global	
information	exchange,	mandate	from	WHO	member	states,	WHO	country	
representation,	WHO	collaborating	centres,	and	a	panel	of	international	experts.	To	
accomplish	these	initiatives,	Heymann	needed	the	creation	of	new	technical	apparatus.		
One	of	such	initiatives	was	the	establishment	of	formalised	outbreak	control	activities	at	
the	WHO.		Heymann	recognised	that	significant	changes	in	conditions	of	global	
communication,	particularly	the	rise	of	electronic	media,	had	not	been	sufficiently	
incorporated	into	established	methods	of	international	infectious	disease	detection	and	
response.341	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	section,	his	belief	was	shared	by	a	small	number	
of	WHO	officials.	
4.2.2.	Early	formation	of	an	epistemic	community	at	the	turn	of	the	21st	century		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	Heymann’s	causal	and	principled	belief	was	spurred	by	a	
fundamental	change	in	the	structure	of	the	WHO.		When	the	new	Director‐General	Gro	
Harlem	Bruntland	joined	the	WHO	in	1998,342	she	brought	together	the	different	
infectious	disease	programmes	into	one	cluster,	and	then	appointed	Heymann	as	
Executive	Director.		He	was	particularly	keen	to	strengthen	outbreak	control	
mechanisms	by	implementing	early	outbreak	alert,	detection	and	response.		His	
experience	in	the	WHO’s	Office	of	Research	on	Epidemiology	of	HIV/AIDS,	for	which	he	
spent	a	large	part	of	his	time	in	Africa,	greatly	impacted	on	the	ideas	around	the	
creation	of	a	new	form	of	outbreak	alert	and	response	mechanism.		He	witnessed	the	
pneumonic	plague	which	struck	Surat	Gujarat,	India	in	1994	and	the	slow	response	to	
an	Ebola	outbreak	in	Kikwit,	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	the	following	year,	both	
of	which	caused	panic	among	international	community	and	a	high	number	of	
unnecessary	deaths.		He	stated	that	“we	[WHO]	had	no	capacity	to	respond	to	outbreaks	
on	our	own,	or	even	to	deal	with	the	information	coming	in.		All	we	had	was	a	fax	
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machine.	The	switchboards	at	WHO	were	completely	overwhelmed.”343		In	a	2002	
editorial	in	the	Bulletin	of	the	World	Health	Organization,	he	stated	that	“the	resurgence	
of	infectious	diseases	has	been	viewed	as	a	factor	that	can	undermine	national	and	
international	security.		AIDS	in	particular	convinced	the	world	that	a	previously	
unknown	pathogen	could	destabilize	whole	regions.”344	
He	sought	to	demonstrate	the	“severity	of	the	problem”345	related	to	infectious	diseases	
by	defining	it	as	a	“surveillance	gap”;	that	is,	he	argued	that	the	key	problem	was	that	
there	was	a	weakness	in	surveillance,	monitoring	and	reporting	systems	notably	in	
developing	countries.		He	stated,	“It	is	the	developing	countries,	however,	that	new	
diseases	and	outbreak	occur	most	often.		It	is	there	too	that	the	laboratory	and	
surveillance	capacity	to	detect	and	contain	these	diseases	is	sometimes	lacking.”346		
Recognizing	the	disparity	among	countries	in	public	health	surveillance,	he	argued	that	
“infectious	disease	intelligence,	gleaned	through	sensitive	surveillance,	is	the	best	
defense.”347		Heymann’s	policy	enterprise	was	clear:		the	WHO	should	formalize	an	
outbreak	“infrastructure”	for	responding	to	the	heightened	need	for	early	awareness	of	
outbreaks	and	improve	preparedness	to	respond.348		This	“infrastructure”	was	designed	
in	the	name	of	Global	Outbreak	Alert	and	Response	Network	(GOARN)	and	constituted	
four	phases:		systematic	detection,	outbreak	verification,	real	time	alerts,	and	rapid	
outbreak	response.349	
While	serving	as	the	formal	head	of	the	Communicable	Disease	and	Surveillance	Cluster	
at	the	WHO,	Heymann	appeared	to	be	the	informal	leader	of	a	small	group	of	officials	
who	shared	his	normative	belief.		The	development	of	GOARN	began	to	offer	
opportunities	for	the	key	actors	to	align	around	a	common	enterprise.		Gueneal	Rodier,	
Max	Hardiman,	Michael	Ryan,	Klaus	Stohr	and	Thomas	Grein	shared	Heymann’s	vision.		
In	terms	of	training	and	career,	these	officials	followed	similar	paths,	typically	receiving	
a	medical	degree	followed	by	specialist	postgraduate	training,	pertaining	to	infectious	
diseases.		They	then	built	their	reputations	through	extensive	field	experience	in	
developing	countries	before	moving	to	a	policy	role	in	WHO.	
For	example,	Rodier	had	professional	experience	in	developing	new	approaches	for	
communicable	disease	surveillance	and	response	at	the	national	and	global	levels.		He	
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started	his	career	as	a	General	Practitioner	in	Djibouti	in	1983,	specialising	in	infectious	
diseases	and	paediatrics.350	He	received	a	Doctorate	in	Medicine	from	René	Descartes	
University,	Cochin‐Port‐Royal	Medical	School	in	France.		Like	Heymann,	he	graduated	
from	the	London	School	of	Hygiene	and	Tropical	Medicine	in	1989.		He	then	moved	to	
the	US	Navy,	where	he	did	work	on	infectious	disease	risk	assessment.		Following	his	
experience	with	plague	in	India,	plus	stints	working	on	Ebola	in	Zaire,	Heymann	invited	
him	to	join	the	epidemic	response	team	at	WHO.351	Ryan,	a	surgeon	by	training,	met	
Heymann	and	Rodier	during	the	Ebola	outbreak	in	1995.		Later,	when	the	WHO	created	
a	new	unit	called	“Emerging	Diseases,”	Ryan	joined	Heymann	and	Rodier	in	1996.352	
Following	a	series	of	outbreak	fieldworks,	he	was	intensely	involved	in	the	formulation	
of	GOARN	in	terms	of	organizing	global	meetings	and,	more	importantly,	in	the	
realization	of	the	need	for	effective	epidemic	intelligence.		Stohr	received	a	PhD	in	
infectious	disease	control	from	the	University	of	Leipzig,	worked	at	the	National	
Institute	for	Epidemiology	and	Infectious	Disease	Control,	before	joining	WHO	in	1991	
as	a	research	scientist.353		In	summary,	the	educational	backgrounds,	along	with	
international	experiences	in	infectious	disease	control	during	their	careers,	provided	
shared	understandings,	common		notions	of	validity	(i.e.	specialist	technical	knowledge)	
and	causal	beliefs	(i.e.	policy	concerns	and	interests).		According	to	Haas,	these	are	key	
characteristics	which	define	an	epistemic	community.	
In	the	early	2000s,	these	key	individuals	published	a	series	of	articles	which	set	out	
their	ideas,	positioning	the	WHO	as	an	innovator	in	the	field.		They	described	WHO’s	
efforts	to	revitalize	global	cooperation	for	detecting	and	responding	to	disease	
outbreaks	through	new	ways	of	collective	action.354		Broadly	framing	infectious	diseases	
in	terms	of	“global	health	security,”	these	actors	strongly	promoted	the	development	of	
infectious	disease	outbreak	intelligence	activities	and	capacities,	through	the	use	of	
information	technologies,	as	central	to	addressing	a	growing	infectious	disease	threat.		
For	instance,	Rodier,	by	then	Director	of	WHO’s	Communicable	Disease	Surveillance	and	
Response	Unit,355	reminded	the	international	community	of	the	need	for	heightened	
                                                            
350	Brooks	T	(2005),	Behind	the	Mask:	How	the	World	Survived	SARS,	Washington:	American	Public	
Health	Association.	p.	22.	
351	Rodier	G	(2007),	New	Rules	on	International	Public	Health	Security,	Bulletin	of	World	Health	
Organization,	June	85(6):	428‐430.		
352	Brooks	T	(2005),	Behind	the	Mask:	How	the	World	Survived	SARS,	New	York:	American	Public	
Health	Association,	p.	23.	
353	Stohr	K	(2003),	SARS	Epidemiology,	(presentation	slides)	
www.niaid.nih.gov/SARS/meetings/05_30_03/PDF/stohr.pdf;	Stohr	K	(2003),	“Multicentre	
Collaborative	Network	to	Investigative	the	Cause	of	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome”,	The	
Lancet.	361t:	1730‐1732.	
354	Heymann	D	and	Rodier	G	(1998),	“Global	Surveillance	of	Communicable	Diseases”,	Emerging	
Infectious	Diseases,	4:	362‐5;	Heymann	D	and	Rodier	G	(2001),	“Hot	Spots	in	a	Wired	World:	WHO	
Surveillance	of	Emerging	and	Re‐emerging	Infectious	Diseases”,	The	Lancet,	1:	345‐53;	Grein	MS,	
Kamara	KB,	Rodier	G,	Plant	AJ,	Bovier	P,	Ryan	MJ	(2000),	“Rumours	of	disease	in	the	global	village:	
outbreak	verification,”	Emerging	Infectious	Diseases,	6(2):	97‐102;	McNabb	S,	Chungong	S,	Ryan	M,	
Wuhib	T,	Nsubuga	P,	Alemu	W,	Carande‐Kulis	V,	Rodier	G	(2002),	“Conceptual	framework	of	public	
health	surveillance	and	action	and	its	application	in	health	sector	reform,”	BMC	Public	Health,	2:	2.	
355	Heymann	D	and	Rodier	G	(1998),	“Global	Surveillance	of	Communicable	Diseases”,	Emerging	
116	
	
surveillance	capacity.		He	argued	that	“infectious	diseases	in	one	country	would	have	a	
devastating	effect	on	the	rest	of	the	world	if	it	was	not	contained	in	an	appropriate	and	
timely	manner.”356		For	Rodier,	the	solution	to	address	a	threat	to	health	security	was,	
again,	global	epidemic	intelligence.		He	argued,	“Global	Epidemic	Intelligence	involves	
active	collection	of	information	on	ongoing	epidemics	worldwide.”357	The	best	response	to	
the	threat	posed	by	infectious	diseases,	in	his	view,	would	be	the	implementation	of	
epidemic	intelligence.	
Heymann’s	policy	enterprise,	on	the	need	for	a	“rapid	response	force”,	was	put	into	
practice	when	he	organized	a	major	international	meeting	on	Global	Outbreak	Alert	and	
Response	in	2000.		In	his	opening	speech,	Heymann	stated	that	the	meeting	was	aimed	
“to	review	current	outbreak	threats	and	international	efforts	in	alert	and	response.”358	
He	highlighted	that,	“as	globalization	creates	common	concern	for	health	worldwide,	
strengthened	national	and	global	surveillance	for	prevention	and	control	is	needed.”359	
The	meeting	participants,	one	of	whom	was	M.	McAtee	from	the	National	Security	and	
International	Affairs	Division	of	the	US	General	Accounting	Office,	“expressed	the	need	
for	the	establishment	of	Global	Outbreak	Alert	and	Response…which	will	focus	on	
maintaining	global	public	health	security	by	ensuring	coordinated	mechanisms	for	
outbreak	alert	and	response.”360	
Thus,	what	is	now	termed	as	global	health	security	was	introduced	to	a	broader	WHO	
programme	of	communicable	disease	outbreak	control	as	early	as	2000	by	the	collective	
influence	of	several	WHO‐based	individuals	led	by	Heymann.361		Their	shared	normative	
beliefs	and	policy	entrepreneurship	contributed	tremendously	to	inspiring,	conceiving	
and	directing	the	architecture	of	global	health	surveillance.	The	notion	of	“disease	as	a	
threat,”	embedded	in	the	global	health	security	discourse,	was	well	envisaged	in	the	
GOARN	document:	“GOARN	offers	an	operational	framework	to	link	expertise	and	skill	to	
keep	the	international	community	constantly	alert	to	the	threat	of	outbreaks	and	ready	to	
respond.”362	At	the	turn	of	the	21st	century,	Heymann	and	key	WHO	officials	in	the	
Department	of	Communicable	Disease	Surveillance	and	Response	were	in	the	process	of	
inventing	a	new	technical	apparatus	that	would	be	capable	of	realising	global	health	
security	with	respect	to	goals	of	containing	disease	outbreaks.		They	drew	on	a	vision	of	
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global	health	security	in	which	real	time	information	about	outbreaks	and	other	events	
was	available	to	them.			
Beyond	the	diffusion	of	the	security	discourse,	from	HIV/AIDS	to	global	attention	to	
emerging	diseases,	these	key	actors	and	their	normative	frameworks	helped	underpin	a	
fundamental	shift	in	perspective,	from	international	to	global	health.		This	shift,	in	turn,	
facilitated	WHO	to	bring	key	partners	and	expertise	together	to	achieve	a	better	system	
of	outbreak	intelligence.		Since	1948,	the	management	of	disease	outbreaks	by	the	
WHO363	involved	the	collection	of	data	on	selected	diseases	and	the	provision	of	
epidemiological	advice	through	the	convening	of	expert	groups.364		This	derived	from	
historical	practices	dating	from	the	International	Sanitary	Conventions	of	the	
nineteenth	century.		In	contrast,	in	1998,	Heymann	created	the	Global	Outbreak	Alert	
and	Response	Operations	Team	under	the	responsibility	of	the	WHO’s	Epidemic	and	
Pandemic	Alert	and	Response	Programme	to	coordinate	the	various	technical	expertise.		
Subsequently,	GOARN	was	formally	launched	in	2000	to	deal	with	growing	global	public	
health	concerns	about	the	limitations	in	national	infectious	disease	surveillance	and	
response	capacity.		GOARN	is	a	voluntary	network	of	over	140	institutions	that	pool	
human	and	technical	resources	to	identify,	confirm	and	respond	to	outbreaks	of	
international	importance.365	The	organizational	complex	of	GOARN	took	the	form	of	a	
network	that	spanned	technical	advisors,	virologists,	medical	scientists	and	
epidemiologists.	Its	experts	can	be	despatched	to	the	field	where	they	work	together	
with	WHO	officials	from	Headquarters	to	stem	any	outbreaks.		
The	efforts	of	Heymann	and	a	small	group	of	colleagues	within	WHO	to	connect	with	
external	experts	were	attributable	to	both	capacity	and	strategic	reasons.	The	technical	
expertise	and	resources	within	the	organization	were	assumed	to	have	been	insufficient	
to	drive	the	agenda	and	address	the	infectious	disease	outbreaks	alone.	To	give	some	
idea	of	the	scale	of	operations	for	outbreak	alert	and	response	at	the	WHO,	5%	of	the	
organization’s	biennial	budget	of	Epidemic	and	Pandemic	Alert	and	Response	came	
from	the	WHO’s	regular	budget,	the	remainder	of	which	was	raised	directly	from	
donors.366				While	the	US‐based	Nuclear	Fund	Initiative	provided	GOARN	with	a	
revolving	fund	of	US$	500,000	for	immediate	mobilisation	of	resource	teams,	the	field	
responses	must	be	funded	by	staff	through	fundraising	outside	WHO	each	time	a	
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response	occurs.367		Heymann	sought	to	outsource	WHO’s	outbreak	containment	
activities	to	independent	experts	and	academic	institutions.		Heymann	once	stated	that	
GOARN	was	able	to	“draw	on	the	resources	and	expertise”	of	a	broad	range	of	technical	
partners	which	“made	it	unnecessary	to	maintain	a	permanent	staff	of	dedicated	experts	
with	all	the	associated	expenses.”368		An	essential	element	within	the	GOARN	is	the	
Global	Public	Health	Intelligence	Network	(GPHIN).	This	is	a	sophisticated	internet‐
based	multilingual	early	warning	tool	for	continuously	collecting	epidemiological	
information	of	all	kinds	about	infectious	diseases.		Heymann	sought	to	set	up	a	new	
emerging	infectious	disease	programmes	that	would	collect	raw	news	feeds	from	
international	news	agencies	in	a	bid	to	detect	outbreaks.		The	development	work	on	
GPHIN	software	commenced	in	1997	with	the	support	of	US$500,000	from	the	
Canadian	government.369	Grein,	who	was	at	the	centre	of	establishing	GPHIN,	referred	
to	the	epidemic	intelligence	as	“a	new	approach	to	global	disease	surveillance.”370	As	we	
will	see	in	the	next	section,	with	the	setup	of	GOARN,	Heymann	and	a	small	group	of	
medical	officers	within	WHO	were	able	to	link	like‐minded	experts	together	to	forge	a	
common	corpus	of	professional	knowledge	and	formulate	global	policies	on	SARS.	
In	summary,	prior	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	an	epistemic	community	already	existed	
around	the	area	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks.		This	community,	consisting	of	
technical	experts	with	shared	educational	and	career	paths,	centred	around	key	
individuals	at	WHO	who,	through	their	efforts	to	strengthen	global	surveillance,	
monitoring	and	reporting	systems,	formed	networks	with	similar	technical	experts	
worldwide.		By	2000,	this	global	network	of	infectious	disease	outbreak	experts	formed	
a	close	professional	network,	sharing	biomedical	expertise,	interacting	during	major	
international	outbreaks,	and	interconnected	by	new	information	technologies.	
4.3.	DURING	SARS:	CONSOLIDATION	OF	EPISTEMIC	COMMUNITIES	
	
In	this	section,	it	is	argued	that	the	SARS	outbreak	led	to	the	above	epistemic	
community	to	expand	and	consolidate	further	its	membership,	technical	expertise	and,	
consequently,	influence	over	the	nature	of	global	responses	to	infectious	disease	
outbreaks.		It	is	argued	that	the	aforementioned	group	of	medical	experts,	largely	
working	within	or	linked	to	the	WHO	Communicable	Disease	and	Surveillance	Cluster,	
played	an	important	role	in	linking	certain	types	of	experts	as	an	epistemic	community.		
This	group,	in	turn,	advanced	particular	knowledge	claims	that,	during	a	period	of	
uncertainty	and	perceived	emergency,	reinforced	the	authority	of	these	experts.		To	
understand	the	formation	of	the	epistemic	community	surrounding	SARS,	the	following	
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sections	analyse	the	identities,	expertise	and	activities	of	these	key	individuals	who	
collectively,	as	an	epistemic	community,	shaped	the	framing	of	the	issue.		The	sections	
below	identify	who	these	actors	were,	how	they	mobilised	as	a	community	of	experts,	
and	how	they	then	deployed	specialised	knowledge	in	the	global	response	to	SARS.	The	
key	discourses	that	framed	the	global	response,	shaped	by	this	epistemic	community,	is	
analysed	in	Chapter	Five.	
4.3.1.	The	emergence	of	a	core	pool	of	knowledge			
	
In	February	2003,	when	the	SARS	outbreak	in	China	alerted	GOARN,	Heymann	and	a	
small	group	of	medical	officers	within	the	WHO,	what	this	thesis	calls	the	Heymann	
centre,	commenced	planning	immediately	to	address	the	risk	posed	by	SARS.		One	task	
was	to	arrange	for	mobile	teams	of	epidemiologists	to	travel	to	sites	most	affected	so	
far,	and	organise	teams	of	virologists	trying	to	better	understand	the	emerging	disease.	
As	discussed	below,	typically,	these	experts	were	affiliated	with	one	of	the	institutions	
of	the	GOARN	that	already	had	long‐standing	relationships	with	WHO’s	Communicable	
Disease	and	Surveillance	Cluster.		For	instance,	Stohr	worked	with	a	close	network	of	
laboratory	people	such	as	Julie	Gerberding	(US	CDC),	Albert	Osterhaus	(Erasmus	
University),	and	Malik	Peiris	(University	of	Hong	Kong)	through	the	WHO’s	Global	
Influenza	Surveillance	Network	(GISN).		Hardiman	maintained	close	links	with	an	
informal	group	of	travel	medicine	experts	who	gave	advice	when	requested.371		Ryan	
had	close	professional	connections	with	clinicians.		Grein	worked	with	a	tight	circle	of	
epidemiologists	such	as	Aileen	Plant	(who	headed	Vietnam’s	response	to	SARS),	John	
Mackenzie	(who	was	involved	in	the	epidemiological	investigations	in	China	and	Hong	
Kong),	and	Roy	Anderson	(who	pioneered	in	mathematical	modelling	research	on	
SARS).		They	were	frequently	appointed	as	advisors	to	GOARN’s	missions.		Grein	
described	the	process	of	mobilising	experts:	
I	was	in	Congo	as	there	was	an	Ebola	outbreak	which	was	coming	to	the	end.	
When	I	first	heard	about	the	[SARS]	outbreak,	the	request	[for	returning	to	HQ]	
came	almost	immediately.		I	came	back	to	Geneva	and	helped	to	organise	a	SARS	
network	but	my	team	was	responsible	for	a	more	operation	aspect	like	identifying	
experts,	sending	them	out	and	doing	the	epidemiology	of	SARS,	basically	
summarising	the	cases,	providing	updates	and	publications,	daily	counts,	etc.		We	
mobilised	experts	mainly	from	GOARN	where	we	had	technical	resources	and	quite	
a	number	of	people	we	know.	We	selected	and	negotiated	with	the	member	states	
regarding	who	is	the	right	person	you	can	post	[sic].372				
This	research	found	there	were	two	types	of	expertise	that	came	to	prevail	in	the	global	
response	to	the	SARS	outbreak.		The	first	source	of	expertise	was	the	medical	sciences,	
with	a	particular	focus	on	virology	and	microbiology.		During	SARS,	laboratories	
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equipped	with	state‐of‐art	technologies	became	crucial	sites	for	outbreak	knowledge	
production.		The	experts	in	this	group	investigated	the	molecular	or	genomic	
characteristics	of	the	virus,	virus	infection	mechanisms,	pathogenicity	of	the	virus,	host	
susceptibility	determinants,	diagnosis	and	treatments,	and	vaccines	and	drug	
development.		A	few	experts	were	particularly	salient	during	SARS,	such	as	Osterhaus	
and	Peiris.		For	example	Osterhaus,	who	leads	an	internationally	renowned	virus	lab	at	
the	Erasmus	Medical	Centre,	was	asked	by	Stohr	to	join	the	SARS	outbreak	
investigation.	Prior	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	Osterhaus	stood	at	the	global	nexus	of	every	
major	disease	outbreak.		Trained	as	a	virologist,	he	was	credited	with	being	the	first	to	
detect	the	cross‐species	infection	mechanism	of	H5N1	in	1997.		He	has	chaired	the	
European	Scientific	Working	Group	on	Influenza	since	2001	and	was	actively	involved	
in	WHO	activities	as	a	chairman	of	four	WHO	reference	centres.373	Osterhaus	wrote	
papers	together	with	like‐minded	scientists	alerting	to	the	potential	of	human	pandemic	
influenza	and	the	need	for	more	research	including	vaccination.374		At	the	height	of	the	
outbreak	in	April	2003,	his	virology	lab	was	among	the	first	to	identify	the	coronavirus	
that	caused	SARS.375		He	participated	in	WHO	press	briefings	to	explain	how	his	lab	
conducted	trials	in	monkeys	with	coronavirus	to	fulfil	Koch’s	postulates.376	
Peiris	has	a	similar	academic	training	and	career	path.		He	underwent	postgraduate	
training	in	pathology,	followed	by	an	undergraduate	medical	degree.		He	worked	in	the	
WHO	Reference	Centre	for	Rapid	Virus	Diagnosis	for	seven	years	and	subsequently	
founded	a	virology	laboratory	at	the	University	of	Hong	Kong	in	1995.		His	lab	was	
invited	to	join	the	WHO’s	GISN	in	2001.377		During	SARS,	Stohr	invited	Peiris	to	join	the	
WHO’s	collaborative	laboratory	project	on	SARS.		His	lab	was	one	of	the	few	virology	
groups	which	identified	that	SARS	outbreak	is	caused	by	coronavirus.		He	published	a	
paper,	together	with	Osterhaus	and	Stohr,	highlighting	the	need	to	develop	vaccines	and	
therapies.378		In	the	mass	media,	these	experts	were	often	portrayed	as	heroic	virus	
hunters	who	incessantly	looked	for	the	deadly	viruses	to	protect	mankind.		The	advice	
of	these	experts	was	frequently	cited	by	the	media	and	government	authorities.379			
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A	second	important	body	of	expertise	was	epidemiology.	The	experts	in	this	group	
focused	on	identifying	how	the	virus	emerged	and	was	transmitted,	what	factors	
contributed	to	its	case	fatality,	and	how	to	prevent	its	occurrence.	Because	
epidemiologists’	major	task	is	to	understand	the	incidence,	prevalence,	and	
determinants	of	disease	outbreaks,	they	conducted	critical	investigations	of	human	
activities	and	interactions,	and	compare	findings	to	the	susceptibility	of	the	population.	
Experts	in	this	group	either	conduct	field	investigation	or	work	with	disease	
surveillance	data	collected	through	other	means.		For	example,	some	experts	attempted	
to	predict	the	course	of	the	development	and	effectiveness	of	control	measures	through	
statistical	modelling.		During	SARS,	modelling	studies	were	conducted	mainly	by	
epidemiologists	based	at	Imperial	College	London	and	Harvard	University	who	sought	
to	predict	the	SARS	transmission	rate	on	a	global	scale.380		Roy	Anderson,	one	of	the	
UK’s	most	prominent	experts	on	infectious	diseases,	led	the	important	Imperial	College	
London	group.		He	was	trained	as	a	parasitologist	and	served	as	Director	of	the	
Wellcome	Centre	of	Parasite	Infections	based	at	Imperial	College.		Prior	to	SARS,	
Anderson	sat	on	various	UK	government	and	WHO	committees	advising	on	infectious	
disease	control	and	undertaking	disease	modelling,	spanning	HIV/AIDS	and	foot	and	
mouth,	to	BSE	and	vCJD.381	
The	equally	influential	Harvard	University	group	was	led	by	Marc	Lipsitch.		Trained	as	
an	epidemiologist,	he	was	involved	in	estimating	incidence	and	targeting	interventions	
for	infections.		Prior	to	SARS,	much	of	his	work	focused	on	the	bacterial	pathogen	
Streptococcus	pneumoniae	which	causes	a	significant	number	of	child	deaths	annually	
worldwide.382		His	Harvard‐based	group	made	one	of	the	earliest	estimates	of	the	
reproductive	number	of	the	SARS	virus	in	April	2003.		In	their	publications,	both	the	
Imperial	and	Harvard	groups	made	similar	observations	with	regard	to	the	
containment	of	the	SARS	virus–	the	essential	importance	of	timely	biomedical	
interventions	such	as	increased	deploying	of	influenza	vaccines,	better	diagnostics,	and	
active	tracing	and	monitoring	of	contacts.383		To	these	experts,	the	disease	transmission	
rate	informs	the	prevention	and	treatment	of	SARS.384		According	to	the	WHO	official,	
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the	WHO	convened	informal	mini	conferences	daily	for	a	week	to	bring	together	these	
two	groups	to	reach	consensus	about	the	desired	course	of	action.385	
As	an	epistemic	community	forming	around	SARS,	the	above	suggests	that,	in	the	initial	
stages	of	the	SARS	outbreak,	the	types	of	expertise	mobilised	was	firmly	located	in	
virology	and	epidemiology.		Understandably,	these	areas	of	expertise,	in	the	initial	
stages	of	an	outbreak	by	an	unknown	disease,	may	well	be	the	most	appropriate	types	
of	knowledge	needed	on	the	ground.		It	is	also	often	assumed	that	they	are	the	only	
types	of	expertise	available	and	thus	regarded	as	valuable.		What	should	be	noted	is	
that	other	types	of	expertise	such	as	to	understand	the	social	context	within	which	an	
outbreak	occurs	were	readily	available,	but	nonetheless,	they	were	not	brought	into	
global	response	to	SARS.		Governance	of	disease	outbreaks	does	not	simply	produce	
scientific	fact;	it	also	bridges	between	the	normative	and	factual.		As	we	will	see	in	
Chapter	Five,	the	formulation	of	global	policymaking	on	SARS	was	reliant	on	the	
normative	underpinning	of	differing	responses.	Global	governance	of	disease	outbreak	
is	constituted	by	diverse	understandings	of	the	disease	under	investigation.		Similar	to	
this	point,	here	what	is	seen	as	important	knowledge	in	order	to	respond	to	SARS	is	not	
merely	emanated	from	a	rational	approach	to	problems.		Rather,	the	researcher	argues	
that	the	relative	weight	of	different	inquiries	and	evidence	is	socially	constituted	rather	
than	given.		Haas	maintains	that	epistemic	communities	occupy	roles	of	legitimacy	and	
power	alongside	their	special	expertise.	In	line	with	this	argument,	this	study	finds	that	
the	loosely	coupled	group	of	experts	in	the	specialised	areas	of	virology	and	
epidemiology	did	not	gain	the	privileged	position	simply	based	on	their	knowledge	
claims	or	by	virtue	of	their	established	reputations,	but	they	were	also	granted	
legitimacy	during	SARS	through	institutional	mechanisms	facilitated	by	the	Heymann	
centre.	
For	example,	experts	at	reference	laboratories	and	collaborating	centres	have	a	
privileged	access	to	SARS	viral	samples.		The	WHO	called	upon	selected	laboratories	
that	met	the	biosafety	level	(BSL	3)	to	join	a	collaborative	multi‐centre	research	project	
on	SARS	diagnosis.		According	to	the	WHO,	the	organisation	“initiated	the	
establishment	of	this	network	because	of	the	extraordinary	willingness	for	
collaboration	of	its	members.”386		This	yielded	11	laboratories	in	9	countries.		
Subsequently,	network	members	shared	on	the	secure	WHO	web	site	electron	
microscopic	pictures	of	viruses,	sequences	of	genetic	material	for	virus	identification,	
and	characterisation	and	virus	samples.	This	indicates	that	the	WHO,	more	specifically	
Stohr	and	his	team	who	coordinated	the	laboratory	network,	determined	who	had	
access	to	viral	samples,	who	had	the	authority	to	confirm	the	cause	of	the	outbreak,	and	
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who	could	develop	vaccines	from	the	material.		Experts	affiliated	with	the	WHO	came	to	
advance	their	research	authority	and	to	some	extent	drive	the	direction	and	scope	of	
the	global	research	on	SARS.		It	is	important	to	note	that	obtaining	viruses	for	
investigation	is	challenging	for	virologists	due	to	professional	competition.		The	viral	
strains	and	genomic	sequences	of	viruses	offer	valuable	information	not	only	for	
studying	viral	evolution	but	also	developing	vaccines.	Pressure	for	publication	and	for	
vaccine	innovation	therefore	discouraged	scientists	from	sharing	materials	and	
genomic	information	of	viruses	with	others.		Given	the	research	competition	and	
interest	in	vaccine	patents,	participation	in	WHO	coordinated	international	projects	
granted	experts	in	these	laboratories	easier	access	to	research	material	and	the	latest	
information.		This	process	inevitably	excluded	experts	from	countries	most	affected	
such	as	Vietnam	and	Taiwan	from	participating	in	the	exchange	of	crucial	information,	
determining	evidence,	(and	thus	developing	pharmaceuticals)	due	to	political	and	
capacity	reasons.	387			
Additionally,	as	will	be	explained	in	detail	in	the	next	section,	WHO	officials	developed	a	
series	of	guidelines,	standards,	and	manuals	in	consultation	with	experts	of	various	
working	groups	and	ad	hoc	committees.		These	meetings	were	mostly	exclusive	and	by	
invitation	only.		This	means	that	international	guidelines	and	recommendations	were	
discussed	by	selected	experts	before	the	drafts	were	disseminated	as	recommended	
guidelines	to	national	authorities.		Meetings	were	also	held	to	identify	research	
priorities	in	particular	areas	including	diagnostic	and	serological	tests,	virus	strain	
variation	and	case	detection.		Therefore	certain	individuals	who	frequented	
international	gatherings	appeared	to	have	determined	what	areas	of	research	should	
be	prioritised	and	how	evidence	relevant	to	SARS	should	be	produced,	interpreted	and	
disseminated.		Where	medical	expertise	in	the	fields	of	laboratory	and	epidemiology	
prevailed,	understanding	the	disease	through	other	expertise	pertaining	to	an	
infectious	disease	outbreak	such	as	veterinary	medicine	(given	that	SARS	was	a	
zoonotic	disease),	risk	communication,	and	social	sciences	was	largely	limited.	Experts	
in	these	fields	thus	did	neither	compete	for	the	significance	of	their	knowledge	claims	
nor	advance	policy	ideas	in	the	global	response	to	SARS.		Consequently,	issues	such	as	
complex	dynamics	between	humans,	animals	and	the	environment,	social,	cultural,	and	
economic	causes	of	SARS,	and	the	consequences	of	control	measures	were,	albeit	
considered,	marginalised.	
4.3.2.	International	meetings	crucial	for	sharing	a	collective	identity	
	
The	findings	suggest	that	the	central	role	of	members	of	an	epistemic	community,	not	
only	in	producing	knowledge	about	a	disease	outbreak,	but	shaping	actions	in	
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response,	became	more	apparent	at	WHO‐convened	consultation	meetings,	
international	forums	and	workshops	during	the	SARS	outbreak.		These	meetings	
provided	experts	with	opportunities	to	share	common	notions	of	validity	(i.e.	
specialities)	from	their	clinical	training	and,	in	particular,	their	work	relevant	to	
infectious	disease	epidemiology,	virology	and	biomedical	science.		It	is	argued	that	
these	meetings	were	one	of	the	mechanisms	by	which	experts	strengthened	their	
transnational	ties,	and	through	which	the	knowledge	produced	among	them	was	
mutually	accepted	and	legitimised.		In	interviews	with	key	informants,	this	research	
found	some	individuals	appeared	to	have	an	established	relationships	with	one	another	
prior	to	SARS	through	international	collaborative	research	projects,	committees	and	
other	scientific	programmes	that	the	WHO	organized	(more	specifically	within	the	
Communicable	Disease	Surveillance	and	Response	Cluster	at	the	WHO).		These	
network‐building	linkages	were	described	as	regular,	yet	generally	semi‐formal	or	
informal	affairs.		As	one	expert	indicates,	“Experts	in	this	area,	almost	all	of	us	know	
because	we	are	colleagues	or	friends	or	collaborators	in	some	of	the	WHO	work.		Or	we	
know	that	they’re	experts	because	we	read	each	other’s	publications.”388		While	the	
interviewed	officials	from	the	WHO	often	referred	to	their	role	in	various	meetings	as	
being	a	secretariat,	a	catalyst,	and	a	platform	for	coordinating	other	principal	actors’	
activities,	from	the	results	of	key	informant	interviews	suggest	that	WHO	officials	
asserted	important	influence	by	deciding	who	to	invite	based	on	which	institution	and	
type	of	expertise.		Thus,	previous	affiliation	with	the	WHO	as	an	external	advisor	or	
personal	and	professional	relationships	with	WHO	officials	proved	crucial.	One	WHO	
official	described,	
	
There	were	a	number	of	pre‐existing	committees	that	WHO	has	put	up	with	
particular	member	states	to	provide	them	with	rapid	technical	advice.	These	
experts	actually	look	at	the	[infectious	disease]	events	throughout	the	course	of	
outbreak.	They	were	very	much	our	[WHO’s]	partners	that	had	long	been	involved	
very	intensively	in	the	global	outbreak	and	alert	response	network.389	
Similarly,	Hardiman	noted	a	typical	practice	of	WHO’s	outbreak	response	operation	in	
which	a	small	and	tight	knit	group	of	individuals	would	be	appointed	to	play	a	lead	role:	
We	[WHO]	have	a	list	of	experts	from	the	collaborating	centres	in	this	field.		When	
we	have	specific	questions,	they	were	able	to	provide	with	some	advice	and	
analysis	for	use	to	take	into	account.		It	was	on	informal	basis	so	relatively	small	
number	of	such	experts.390	
To	some	extent,	the	mechanisms	by	which	SARS	experts	were	invited	seem	to	reflect	
the	dominant	medical	model	attached	to	the	WHO.		As	critics	have	long	recognised,	
despite	the	multi‐sectoral	rhetoric,	the	organisation	failed	to	renounce	medical	bias	and	
                                                            
388	Interview	with	Riley,	UK	
389	Interview	with	Marianos,	WHO	
390	Interview	with	Hardiman,	WHO	
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thus	continued	to	employ	doctors	to	most	of	its	professional	posts.391		Not	surprisingly,	
when	external	expertise	is	in	need,	the	WHO	medical	officials	find	it	difficult	to	identify	
experts	outside	their	technical	expertise	or	to	explore	new	frontiers	of	knowledge.		
Many	medical	officials	admitted	that	achieving	balanced	representation	in	terms	of	
geography	and	profession	had	not	been	easy	and	thus	formal	and	informal	
relationships	were	likely	to	take	priority	over	finding	the	best	person	for	the	task	
concerned.				
The	following	quote	also	indicates	that	one’s	informal	and	professional	tie	with	WHO	
officials	prior	to	SARS	determined	participation	in	the	consultation	opportunities:		
I	had	a	very	close	communication	with	WHO	because	we	[i.e.	his	lab]	had	a	very	
good	relationship	with	Klaus	Stohr,	who	was	the	head.		We	took	part	in	the	WHO’s	
Global	Influenza	Programme.		In	the	initial	stage	of	the	SARS	outbreak,	I	was	
mainly	speaking	to	Stohr	about	the	events.		We	were	having	a	regular	call.		After	
mid‐February	[2003],	then	I	think	the	network	[WHO	laboratory	network]	was	
officially	set	up.		We,	of	course,	were	offered	to	take	part	in	the	SARS	laboratory	
network	even	before	then.		I	was	also	invited	to	a	few	workshops	and	meetings	
organised	by	the	WHO.392 
This	pattern	of	frequent	interactions	over	time	continued	throughout	the	course	of	the	
SARS	outbreak.		As	shown	below,	there	were	a	small	number	of	experts	who	were	the	
core	participants	in	most	of	the	WHO’s	meetings,	conferences	and	other	informal	
consultations	on	SARS.		From	early	March	to	October	2003,	three	international	meetings	
were	held	at	different	locations	including	the	WHO	headquarters.393		Table	5.1	
summarises	consultation	meetings	relevant	to	SARS.		
In	May	2003,	the	first	global	meeting	on	the	epidemiology	of	SARS	took	place	in	Geneva.		
A	total	of	19	international	experts	participated	in	the	meeting.	Four	experts	were	from	
Canada	(Health	Canada),	three	from	the	UK	(two	from	the	Health	Protection	Agency	
and	one	from	Imperial	College	London)	and	three	from	the	US	(two	from	Harvard	
University	and	one	from	the	US	CDC).	Among	them	were	Marc	Lupsitch	and	Roy	
Anderson.	Malik	Peiris	also	attended	the	meeting.		The	members	of	the	Heymann	centre	
including	David	Heymann,	Guenael	Rodier,	Michael	Ryan,	Max	Hardiman,	and	Klaus	
Stohr	participated	in	the	consultation.		Angus	Nicoll	from	the	UK	Health	Protection	
Agency	chaired	the	meeting.		Heymann	welcomed	the	participants	and	Rodier	
highlighted	the	importance	of	the	need	to	reach	a	consensus	on	the	epidemiology	of	
SARS.	The	meeting	focused	on	seven	main	topics:	incubation	period;	infectious	period;	
case‐fatality	ratios;	routes	of	transmission,	exposure	dose	and	risk	factors	for	
                                                            
391	Godlee	F	(1994),	“WHO	in	retreat:	is	it	losing	its	influence?”	BMJ,	309:	1491‐5.	Also	see	Godlee	F	
(1993),	“WHO	at	crossroads:	will	it	embrace	the	necessary	reforms?”,	BMJ,	306:	1143‐4;	Yamey	G	
(2002)m	“WHO’s	management:	struggling	to	transform	a	fossilised	bureaucracy,”	BMJ,	325:	1170‐73.	
392	Interview	with	Peiris,	Hong	Kong	
393	See	World	Health	Organization.	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome,	
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/press/en/index.html		
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transmission;	reproduction	number	in	different	transmission	settings	and	under	
different	control	strategies;	animal	and	environment	reservoirs.		The	main	findings	and	
recommendations	concentrated	on	rapid	case	detection,	case	isolation,	contact	tracing	
and	infection	control	including	hand	washing,	cleaning	and	disinfection.	In	addition,	the	
meeting	participants	emphasised	that	the	WHO	should	facilitate	the	development	of	an	
applied	research	plan	including	modelling	studies	to	evaluate	the	public	health	policies	
for	SARS	containment	and	control.394	Interestingly,	the	meeting	comprised	of	an	
informal	workshop	among	selected	people	to	synthesise	the	main	findings,	followed	by	
the	main	meeting.	Participants	of	this	informal	session	were	not	disclosed.	
About	20	days	following	the	first	consultation	meeting,	the	second	meeting	entitled	
SARS	virus	detection	and	survival	in	food	and	water:	setting	a	research	agenda	took	place	
on	8‐9	May	2003	in	Madrid.	This	meeting	was	held	in	collaboration	with	the	Food	and	
Agriculture	Organisation	of	the	United	Nations	(FAO)	to	better	understand	how	the	
SARS	coronavirus	survives	in	the	environment	with	particular	reference	to	food,	water	
and	sewage.	The	main	purpose	of	this	meeting	was	to	set	future	research	agendas	
related	to	detection	and	survival	of	the	SARS	virus.		The	meeting	participants	
underscored	the	“prima	facie	scientific	evidence”	that	leads	to	further	scientific	research	
by	stating	that	“the	justification	for	engaging	in	research	is	the	need	to	prepare	scientific	
basis	for	the	evaluation	of	whether	a	significant	risk	is	likely.		A	conclusion	of	no	
significant	risk	is	most	credible	when	based	on	a	firm	body	of	scientific	research.”395	
From	the	meeting	minutes,	it	was	evident	that	the	key	aim	of	the	meeting	was	to	place	
scientific	evidence	at	the	centre	of	the	global	SARS	response.		Many	would	see	this	as	
reasonable	and	appropriate	given	the	nature	of	the	issues	involved.		Nonetheless,	as	the	
next	Chapter	will	discuss,	scientific	knowledge	that	did	not	take	into	account	other	
considerations	(e.g.	human	rights)	had	unintended	consequences	on	SARS	policies.	The	
names	of	the	meeting	participants	were	not	publicly	available	and	hence	the	researcher	
was	unable	to	trace	the	role	that	certain	individuals	played	in	the	meeting.			
Recognising	the	importance	of	a	concerted	approach	to	SARS	research	and	the	need	to	
determine	a	priority	list	of	the	most	important	issues	that	should	be	addressed,	the	
WHO	established	the	SARS	Research	Advisory	Committee	and	held	the	first	of	its	
meetings	in	Geneva	on	20‐21	October	2003.396		Anarfi	Asamoa‐Baah,	Assistant	Director	
General,	noted	that	the	WHO	had	received	increased	visibility	through	its	work	in	the	
area,	crediting	much	of	the	success	to	experts,	many	of	whom	were	on	the	committee.		
                                                            
394	WHO	(2003),	Consensus	document	on	the	epidemiology	of	severe	acute	respiratory	syndrome,	
Department	of	Communicable	Disease	Surveillance	and	Response,	available	at	
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/WHOconsensus.pdf	pp.	3‐6.	
395	WHO	(2003),	SARS	virus	detection	and	survival	in	food	and	water:	setting	a	research	agenda,	A	WHO	
workshop	in	collaboration	with	the	FAO.	Available	at	
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/micro/en/sars_madrid.pdf	pp.	18‐19.	
396	WHO	SARS	scientific	research	advisory	committee	concludes	its	first	meeting,	available	at	
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/research/en/;	also	see		WHO	(2004),	WHO	scientific	advisory	
committee	on	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome:	Report	of	the	first	meeting,	available	at	
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/SRAC‐CDSCSRGAR2004_16.pdf			
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John	Mackenzie	(who	led	the	WHO’s	investigation	in	Hong	Kong	and	China)	chaired	the	
committee	and	Angus	Nicoll	outlined	the	tasks	for	the	two‐day	meeting.		A	total	of	28	
international	participants	attended	the	meeting.	In	terms	of	profession,	a	significant	
proportion	of	participants	were	national	representatives	(government	officials)	from	
SARS‐affected	countries	such	as	China,	Hong	Kong,	Singapore,	Canada	and	Vietnam,	but	
participants	also	included	a	handful	of	international	experts	affiliated	with	the	WHO	
such	as	Anderson,	Peiris,	and	Osterhaus.		The	Heymann	centre	members	such	as	
Heymann,	Rodier,	Ryan,	Hardiman,	and	Stohr	attended.	In	terms	of	expertise,	the	
committee	members,	for	the	first	time,	included	not	only	identified	experts	in	
communicable	disease	epidemiology,	mathematical	modelling,	infection	control,	and	
clinical	and	animal	virology,	but	also	individuals	with	experiences	and	knowledge	in	
risk	communication,	psychology,	and	economics.	As	a	result,	the	meeting	discussion	
ranged	widely	and	a	large	number	of	research	areas	and	issues	that	needed	to	be	
addressed	were	generated.	The	final	list	of	research	areas	and	their	priority	agreed	by	
participants	was:	1)	epidemiology	of	reducing	vulnerability	and	interrupting	
transmission;	2)	interventions	including	infection	control	in	hospitals	and	education	of	
the	public;	3)	laboratory	research	on	new	technologies	for	diagnostic	tests;	4)	animal	
reservoirs	research;	5)	social	impacts	of	effective	containment	and	control	measures;	6)	
clinical	research	including	effective	treatment	of	SARS.		
An	analysis	of	the	archived	materials	on	international	meetings	on	SARS,	notably	the	
publicly	accessible	participant	lists,	provides	a	few	notable	features	in	patterns	of	
participation.		First,	according	to	the	WHO	official	who	was	in	charge	of	organising	these	
meetings,	inclusion	of	advisors	was	on	an	“ad	hoc”	basis	but	determined	by	the	
specialized	expertise	each	individual	had.397	However,	from	Table	5.1,	one	can	note	that	
a	largely	common	group	of	people	attended	nearly	all	major	global	meetings	on	SARS.		
For	example,	Anderson,	Peiris,	and	Osterhaus	frequented	the	WHO’s	technical	
committees,	working	groups	and	consultation	meetings.	Heymann,	Rodier,	Hardiman,	
Ryan,	and	Stohr	were	either	part	of	the	influential	audience	or	active	participants.		
Therefore,	international	meetings	and	gatherings	can	be	seen	as	binding	these	
individuals	together	over	time	through	a	common	body	of	knowledge,	language	and	
experience.		Conversely,	experts	without	prior	relationships	with	WHO	officials	tended	
to	sporadically	participate	in	the	international	meetings	and	consultations	and	thus	
have	little	interaction	with	other	key	individuals	or	WHO	officials.		Indeed,	defining	
precise	boundaries	for	this	community	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	there	were	
numerous	scientists	who	conducted	work	on	SARS	and	participated	in	the	international	
meetings.		However,	they	were	neither	regular	attendees,	nor	identified	by	core	
members	as	being	significant	to	knowledge	production.	When	asked	how	participants	
were	identified	as	SARS	advisors	for	consultation,	one	informant	states	that	global	
consultation	has	often	been	implemented	selectively	and	exclusively:		“It	is	all	about	
networks.		In	practice,	you	know	someone	and	you	think	he	is	good	fit	then	you	contact	
                                                            
397	Interview	with	Marianos,	WHO	
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the	person	and	ask	if	he	is	interested	in	working	on	this.”398		Heymann	mentioned,	“We	
have	a	standard	of	selecting	people.		We	selected	experts	in	the	field	to	invite	meetings	
and	conferences	and	also	to	work	on	SARS.”399		While	he	did	not	elucidate	how	experts	
were	selected,	his	remarks	indicate	that	experts	consulted	by	the	WHO	wore	multiple	
hats	–	as	scientists,	consultants	in	WHO	meetings,	and	at	the	same	time	collaborators	
with	the	WHO	on	its	missions.		Thus	the	international	meetings	served	as	a	focal	point	
for	bringing	like‐minded	experts	together	and	sharing	their	causal	beliefs	with	the	
WHO’s	medical	officials,	framed	from	within	particular	disciplinary	lenses.		In	so	doing,	
a	shared	identity	of	experts	could	generally	be	emerged	and	consolidated.			
Second,	similar	to	the	findings	of	the	previous	section,	the	notions	of	validity	
(specialties)	were	predominantly	derived	from	the	biomedical	sciences,	notably	
microbiology	and	virology,	along	with	knowledge	of	epidemiology.		Even	in	the	WHO’s	
meeting	document,	four	areas	of	the	prioritised	research	were	concentrated	in	
epidemiological	enquiries.400		Another	multidisciplinary	WHO	meeting	document	
showed	that	issues	discussed	were	largely	focused	on	the	surveillance,	infection	control	
and	strengthening	of	laboratory	expertise.401	402		Since	the	Heymann	centre	had	long	
been	interested	in	developing	knowledge	that	improves	surveillance	and	timely	
responses,	this	explains	why	experts	in	the	areas	of	biomedical	science	formed	closer	
ties	with	the	WHO.		In	fact,	a	few	academic	researchers	and	social	scientists	who	were	
invited	to	the	SARS	Research	Advisory	Committee	meeting	stated	that	they	only	gave	
presentations	at	the	meeting,	thus	they	doubted	that	they	were	part	of	the	WHO’s	
expert	pool.		One	committee‐meeting	participant	with	psychology	expertise	states,	“The	
meeting	discussed	a	diverse	range	of	public	health	interventions	on	SARS	and	their	
implications.		We	agreed	that	yes,	the	socioeconomic	and	psychological	aspects	of	SARS	
would	certainly	be	important	to	address.		But	the	main	objective	of	the	meeting	seemed	
to	be	geared	towards	more	clinical	and	scientific	aspects	of	SARS.	So	my	role	in	the	
meeting	was,	I	would	say,	minimal.”403					
	Table	4.1.	Summary	of	international	meetings	held	during	SARS	outbreak		
(February‐October	2003)	
                                                            
398	Interview	with	Kande‐Bure,	WHO	
399	Interview	with	Heymann,	WHO	
400	Four	areas	of	research	needs	included	the	role	of	sewage,	proof	of	faecal‐oral	transmission,	evidence	of	
waterborne	transmission,	and	evidence	of	foodborne	transmission.	
401	WHO	scientific	advisory	committee	on	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome:	Report	of	the	first	
meeting,	available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/SRAC‐CDSCSRGAR2004_16.pdf		
402	Given	the	nature	of	SARS	as	an	infectious	disease,	this	is	neither	surprising	nor	unanticipated.	Yet,	the	
relative	authority	of	different	types	of	knowledge	and	expertise	within	the	official	system	may	have	
significant	policy	ramifications.	For	example,	during	the	SARS	outbreak,	although	GOARN	was	claimed	to	
be	crucial	for	international	containment	of	the	disease,	it	was	totally	unprepared	for	broader	social	issues	
arising	from	the	outbreak	such	as	the	potential	infringements	on	human	rights	and	the	privacy	of	people	
who	were	isolated	and	quarantined,	law	enforcement,	non‐compliance	to	notification,	economic	and	
psychological	responses	to	the	virus,	sustainability	of	health	infrastructure,	or	capacity	building.	This	can	
be	partly	explained	by	the	skewed	inclusion	of	certain	knowledge	over	expertise	deemed	to	be	“less”	of	a	
priority.	
403	Informal	email	conversation	with	a	psychologist	based	in	Hong	Kong.	She	felt	that	she	was	not	
considered	a	WHO	consultant.		
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Date	 Meeting/Place	 Host	
organisation	
Objective Key	
individuals	
(organization)	
participated		
	Participants’	
specialties		
16‐17	
May	2003	
Global	
Meeting	on	
the	
Epidemiology	
of	SARS,	
Geneva	
	
WHO To	produce	a	
WHO	consensus	
document	on	the	
current	
understanding	
of	the	
epidemiology	of	
SARS	and	to	
identify	gaps	in	
knowledge	for	
the	planning	of	
additional	
epidemiological	
studies	
Peiris	
Osterhaus	
Anderson		
	Lipstich		
	Heymann		
	Hardiman				
	Ryan	
	Rodier		
	Stohr	
	
	
	
Epidemiology	
Microbiology	
Public	health	
and	medicine	
8‐9	May	
2003	
Workshop	on	
SARS	virus	
detection	and	
survival	in	
food	and	
water,	Madrid		
WHO,	FAO To	gain	a	better	
understanding	
of	how	the	SARS	
virus	survives	in	
the	environment		
Participants	
undisclosed	
Epidemiology	
Microbiology	
Virology	
20‐21	
October	
2003	
WHO	
Scientific	
Research	
Advisory	
Committee	on	
SARS,	Geneva	
WHO To	review	the	
current	
knowledge	of	
clinical,	
epidemiological	
and	virological	
aspects	of	SARS	
with	respect	to	
public	health	
imperatives	
Osterhaus	
	Peiris		
	Anderson	
	Heymann	
	Hardiman	
	Stohr	
	Ryan	
	Rodier	
Epidemiology	
Microbiology	
Veterinary	
science	
Psychology	
Economics	
Risk	
communication	
	
4.3.3.	The	role	of	key	actors	in	policy‐making	process	
 
Membership	in	the	SARS	epistemic	community,	broadly	conceived,	was	further	
crystallised	by	its	influence	in	policymaking.		According	to	the	epistemic	community	
framework	examined	in	Chapter	Two,	one	of	the	key	features	characterizing	an	
epistemic	community	is	a	common	enterprise	and	vision	that	can	be	germane	to	the	
power	and	influence	of	that	community.404		An	epistemic	community	is	not	a	finite	
group	of	experts	who	simply	hold	common	causal	beliefs	and	worldviews.		It	is	also	a	
                                                            
404	Haas	P	(1992),	p.	3‐4,	27.	
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group	actively	involved	in	translating	the	beliefs	into	concrete	measures.		Hass	points	
out	that	the	translation	of	normative	beliefs	into	policies	is	not	limited	to	traditional	
methods	of	empirical	research	and	publication	of	findings.		This	process	can	also	
originate	from	knowledge	development	and	diffusion	techniques	suited	to	professions	
that	an	epistemic	community’s	members	pursue.405		Some	activities	of	an	epistemic	
community,	constituting	policy	influence,	can	be	concrete	and	readily	recorded.		Others	
are	difficult	to	observe.		As	indicated	in	Chapter	Three,	and	in	line	with	the	existing	
studies	on	epistemic	communities,406	in	this	research,	policy	influence	of	an	epistemic	
community	is	viewed	as	the	extent	to	which	an	epistemic	community	accesses	decision	
makers.		It	is	argued	that	the	policy	influence	capabilities	of	an	epistemic	community	
increase	when	they	interact	closely	and	frequently	with	key	decision	makers.		
Government	officials	and	individuals	in	decision‐making	positions,	interviewed	by	the	
researcher,	recognised	the	role	played	by	a	few	prominent	individuals,	in	particular	the	
WHO	medical	officials,	in	taking	and	leading	collective	actions.		As	one	government	
official	states,	
Without	the	ready	availability	of	the	information	about	the	SARS	virus,	incubation	
period,	and	reproduction	numbers	and	so	on,	we	may	not	have	had	the	content	
with	which	to	fill	the	public	health	response	to	this	real	and	dangerous	problem.	
Without	these	scientists	–	Peiris,	Osterhaus,	Gerberding	and	others	–	we	would	
certainly	never	have	determined	the	implementation	of	a	series	of	actions.		And	of	
course,	without	a	platform	of	relationship	among	the	principal	actors,	these	two	
may	never	have	connected	at	all.407				
As	the	remarks	above	indicate,	decision	makers	acknowledged	that	members	of	an	
epistemic	community	were	“influential”	in	the	making	of	national	SARS	policies	because	
of	their	“credibility”,	knowledge	and	expertise.		But	at	times,	decision	makers	had	no	
formal	means	for	exchanging	technical	and	normative	beliefs	with	these	key	experts.	
This	bridging	work	was	successfully	conducted	by	the	Heymann	centre	under	strong	
leadership	of	Heymann.		Heymann	was	a	key	person,	not	only	for	his	technical	
responsibilities,	but	as	a	source	of	intellectual	authority	in	shaping	policy	direction.		His	
role	within	the	epistemic	community	as	the	key	“connector”	or	“convenor”	was	
instrumental	as	he	provided	access	for	technical	experts	to	government	officials.		He	
introduced	key	experts	at	WHO	press	conferences	and	dispatched	them	to	national	field	
missions,	thereby	granting	them	access	to	government	officials	and	fusing	knowledge	
with	policy.408		Key	informants	remarked	on	the	importance	of	Heymann	in	facilitating	
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the	coordination	of	key	experts	in	the	context	of	an	emerging	shared	sense	of	urgency.	
As	a	key	expert	and	external	advisor	to	WHO	describes,	
Heymann,	Rodier	and	his	teams	brought	these	technical	experts	together	at	the	
right	time	to	work	on	the	issues	pertaining	to	SARS,	stimulating	common	thoughts	
and	common	action.	He	and	his	teams	had	supported	exchanges	and	discussion	
between	scholars	and	government	officials.	I	had	participated	in	many	meetings	
and	have	frequently	met	with	him	and	his	teams	through	these	meetings.409	
National	policy	makers	and	government	officials	interviewed	in	this	research	
unequivocally	named	Heymann	as	the	single	most	influential	figure	in	the	overall	global	
battle	against	the	SARS	outbreak.	As	one	policy	maker	described,	
Internationally,	I	would	say	David	Heymann	clearly	played	the	most	important	
role	in	the	global	response	to	SARS	and	his	[WHO]	team	played	an	important	role	
too	although	it	[the	team]	was	very	small.410	
Another	high‐level	policy	maker	supported	this	view.		
If	I	can	single	out	one	person,	I	think	he	is	the	person	who	represented	the	WHO	
very	well.	He	is	Dr.	David	Heymann.	He	was,	I	think,	behind	the	entire	series	of	
WHO’s	response	to	SARS.	He	particularly	pushed	out	key	messages	and	guidelines	
to	direct	the	ground	in	the	practices.411	
Heymann	was	key	to	what	Hass	describes	as	“a	particular	value	orientation,	perspective	
or	conscious	policy	enterprise.”412		He	is	about	as	close	as	an	approximation	to	Haas’s	
ideal‐type	of	a	member	of	epistemic	communities	as	one	could	get.		The	policy	
entrepreneur	role	that	key	senior	WHO	officials	played	during	SARS	is	reminiscent	of	
the	rise	of	the	“professionalization	of	bureaucracies.”413		According	to	Haas,	these	
individuals	serve,	not	only	as	intermediaries	between	those	who	produced	knowledge	
and	those	who	made	policies,	but	they	are	the	main	source	of	policy	advice	to	decision	
makers.		Interviews	conducted	for	this	research	with	WHO	officials	confirmed	that	
senior	WHO	officials	viewed	themselves	as	“policy	entrepreneurs”,	who	regarded	
themselves	not	merely	as	technical	experts	but	as	policymakers	and	advocates.		One	
senior	WHO	official	who	was	central	in	the	WHO’s	SARS	operation	said,	
I	am	not	really	a	technical	person.		If	you	define	a	policy‐maker	as	a	person	who	is	
responsible	for	a	final	decision,	perhaps	I	belong	to	the	technical	group.		But	I	do	
some	steps	before	that	stage	of	the	policy	process.		The	role	of	WHO	officials	like	
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myself	is	to	make	some	options	for	the	decision‐makers.		In	addition	to	[the]	
technical	role,	I	give	policymakers	some	options	to	choose:	“these	two,	for	example,	
are	the	most	practical	and	the	most	feasible.”		If	we	have	more	evidence	and	less	
uncertainty,	we	provide	policymakers	with	less	option	to	choose.		Conversely,	we	
have	more	uncertainty,	we	provide	more	options.		But	we	narrow	down	the	options	
using	our	own	judgments	for	decision‐makers	to	decide.	In	that	sense,	I	belong	to	
the	policymaker	group.414	
Policy	decisions	involve	the	weighing	up	of	complex,	and	often	highly	technical	issues,	
and	it	is	argued	here	that	this	is	where	the	key	WHO	officials	such	as	Heymann,	Rodier	
and	other	WHO	medical	officials	functioned	as	the	channels	of	advice.		Thus	the	ability	
to	straddle	different	worlds	of	the	technical	and	normative	provided	these	individuals	
with	ideational	power	which	conferred	upon	them	more	authority	in	how	the	problem	
should	be	defined	and	what	solutions	ought	to	be	prioritised.		This	supports	the	
epistemic	community	concept	which	suggests	that	the	application	of	shared	normative	
principles	to	policymaking	depends	on	the	ability	of	the	epistemic	community	to	
transmit	their	ideas	in	order	to	gain	and	exercise	bureaucratic	power.415	
Based	on	the	above	analysis,	it	can	be	argued	in	this	research	that	the	capacity	of	
Heymann	and	key	WHO	officials	to	influence	national	and	international	policy	making	
was	especially	strong	given	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	SARS	virus.		This	
uncertainty	provided	a	window	of	opportunity	for	the	epistemic	community	to	
effectively	exercise	policy	enterprising	behaviour.		As	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	Haas	
hypothesizes	that	the	ability	of	new	ideas	to	become	institutionalized	rests	principally	
on	the	legitimacy	of	their	source	in	times	of	crisis	or	shock.		In	Haas’s	framework,	a	
crisis	situation	can	enhance	the	policy	influence	of	an	epistemic	community	because,	
during	situations	of	perceived	urgency	or	where	significant	interests	are	at	stake,	
technical	experts	have	the	opportunity	to	define	what	would	be	preferable	in	terms	of	
national/international	interests,	determine	and	frame	the	issues	seen	as	available	for	
collective	debate,	and	delimit	the	policy	alternatives	deemed	possible.416		Broad	
consultation	can,	by	virtue	of	time	constraints,	be	curtailed	in	favour	of	reliance	on	
“recognised	experts”.		Thus,	in	times	of	crisis,	the	knowledge	of	recognised	epistemic	
communities	can	prevail	over	other	perspectives.	
In	line	with	Haas’s	assertion,	this	research	finds	that	the	SARS	outbreak	demonstrates	
the	privileged	policy	role	given	to	experts	with	specialist	knowledge	in	the	wake	of	the	
crisis.		During	the	outbreak,	policymakers	did	not	have	substantial	understanding	of	the	
clinical	or	epidemiological	aspects	of	SARS,	yet	they	had	to	make	decisions	accordingly	
in	response	to	the	outbreak.		As	a	Director	of	Medical	Services	in	Singapore	describes,	
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SARS	was	unknown	and,	in	the	context	of	an	era	of	rapid	globalisation,	perceived	as	
unprecedented	territory	for	decision	makers:		
SARS	was	the	first	nosocomial	outbreak	and	novel	infection	in	this	century.		It	was	
such	a	worldwide	scale.		It	demonstrated	the	frightening	attention	for	diseases	
spread	so	quickly.		If	you	think	about	it,	four	people	got	infected	in	Hong	Kong	and	
Guangzhou	and	then	the	outbreak	began.		The	speed	with	the	travel	is	also	
unprecedented.		The	really	frightening	impact	was	not	just	the	impact	on	health	or	
the	number	of	deaths.		It	also	paralyzed	trade	and	tourism.		Economic	impact	was	
severe.	In	so	many	ways,	it	was	unprecedented.		It	just	underlines	the	potential	
impact	of	infectious	diseases.		It	is	really	a	striking	demonstration	of	how	intensely	
interconnected	the	world	is.417		
A	key	informant	in	Hong	Kong	similarly	expressed	that	the	uncertain	and	unpredictable	
nature	of	SARS	created	unwarranted	public	anxiety:	“For	SARS,	there	was	no	treatment.		
We	used	to	treat	the	viral	with	Rivabirin	but	it	did	not	work.		It	caused	public	panic.	It	
spread	from	people	to	people,	and	had	an	enormous	impact	on	life	in	general.”418		While	
small	in	terms	of	overall	human	mortality,	SARS	created	a	situation	where	prior	policies	
were	made	irrelevant.		Given	early	unknowns	about	the	causal	agent,	mode	of	
transmission,	transmissibility,	virulence	and	lethal	nature,	public	health	practitioners	
still	had	to	reassure	the	public.		Such	circumstances	heightened	the	perceived	need	for	
authoritative	knowledge	claims	amongst	government	authorities	to	adopt	mitigation	
strategies.		In	this	vacuum,	they	turned	to	tried	and	tested	expertise.		The	demand	for	
particular	expertise	such	as	epidemiology	and	virology,	which	emphasised	scientific	
understanding	of	the	disease,	proved	therefore	timely	in	the	response	to	SARS.		The	
quote	below	illustrates	that	uncertainties	offered	a	favourable	ground	for	reception	of	
policy	ideas	articulated	by	key	actors	–	in	this	case,	the	WHO	officials.	
We’ve	had	some	of	the	infectious	disease	outbreaks	like	TB	or	HIV	or	Dengue	or	
other	infections	a	long	time	ago.		However,	we	didn’t	have	much	experience	or	
capacity	to	deal	with	SARS	at	the	beginning.		What	do	you	do	if	somebody	is	sick	on	
the	plane?	How	far	do	you	sit	apart?		How	you	disinfect	the	plane	after	that?	
Nobody	knew,	but	through	these	experts	at	WHO,	we	were	able	to	set	guidelines,	
formulate	the	standards,	and	implement	policies.		So	that	was	very	important,	and	
in	a	sense	having	these	individuals	such	as	Heymann	and	Rodier	working	through	
WHO,	you	will	be	able	to	have	a	more	coordinated	type	of	response.419	
Interestingly,	as	will	be	explored	in	Chapter	Five,	a	lot	of	technical	advice	followed	was	
in	fact	ineffective	(for	instance	screening	and	contact	tracing)	while	other	practices,	
which	might	have	been	more	effective	such	as	public	health	risk	communication,	were	
deemed	less	important.		This	suggests	that	technical	advice	that	has	achieved	most	
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prominence	and	political	support	are	not	always	those	that	could	feasibly	inform	an	
effective	global	response	to	infectious	diseases.		Nonetheless,	this	supports	the	above	
point	that	epistemic	communities	are	valued	when	existing	policies	are	unclear	and	a	
crisis	has	caused	new	levels	of	uncertainty	among	decision‐makers.	
4.4.	CONCLUSIONS	
 
This	chapter	began	with	the	research	objective	of	locating	the	transnational	epistemic	
communities	concerned	with	SARS	by	identifying	key	actors	and	their	linkages	to	each	
other.		In	order	to	fulfil	this	objective,	this	chapter	examined	the	context	within	which	a	
group	of	knowledge‐based	individuals	gradually	came	to	the	fore	in	the	global	response	
to	emerging	infectious	diseases.		Specifically,	the	chapter	interrogated	how	the	SARS	
epistemic	community	emerged,	who	were	its	members,	how	they	interacted	as	a	social	
group	or	a	community	(not	merely	as	a	discipline	or	profession),	what	factors	
facilitated	this	process,	what	type	of	a	knowledge	foundation	was	developed,	and	how	
they	exerted	influence	on	the	policy	process.		In	so	doing,	the	chapter	sought	to	
demonstrate	the	existence	of	a	group	of	key	agents	behind	the	formation	of	global	
health	policy‐making	on	SARS	and	their	central	attributes.		Indentifying	key	agents	
comprising	the	epistemic	community	enables	us	to	further	investigate	how	these	actors	
collectively	applied	policy	discourses	that	they	hold	together	to	the	global	response	to	
the	SARS	outbreak	(to	be	explored	in	Chapter	Five).	
	
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	suggests	that	a	small	number	of	experts	behind	the	global	
response	to	SARS	comprised	the	SARS	epistemic	community,	not	only	because	of	their	
authoritative	claim	to	policy‐relevant	knowledge	in	a	particular	domain	(biomedical	
science),	but	also	because	they	shared	a	sets	of	principled	and	causal	beliefs,	notions	of	
validity	and	a	common	policy	enterprise.		Below	are	the	specific	findings	derived	from	
the	analysis.	
First,	the	SARS	epistemic	community	evolved	along	with,	or	was	shaped	by,	the	policy	
environment	where	emerging	and	re‐emerging	infectious	disease	outbreaks	became	a	
growing	concern	for	the	international	community	in	the	mid	and	late	1990s.		A	small	
number	of	medically	trained	WHO	officials	who	spent	their	early	careers	in	infectious	
disease	control	in	the	developing	world	came	to	share	a	core	set	of	normative	beliefs	in	
how	the	problem	of	disease	outbreak	should	be	addressed,	to	what	ends	and	for	whose	
benefit	at	the	turn	of	21st	century.		The	SARS	outbreak	created	an	impetus	for	these	
individuals	to	bridge	other	experts	with	similar	mindsets	and	notions	of	validity	
(specialties)	and	to	exercise	their	policy	enterprise	on	a	new	way	of	working	to	tackle	
infectious	disease	outbreaks	in	an	increasingly	globalised	world.	
Second,	members	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	were	gradually	expanded	when	
there	was	an	imperative	to	mobilise	specialised	expertise	to	develop	global	SARS	
outbreak	knowledge	and	to	forge	a	focal	point	for	normative	consensus.		The	relative	
weight	of	the	knowledge	on	SARS	was	influenced	by	the	core	members	of	WHO	officials	
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who	determined	the	development	of	particular	expertise.		Thus,	experts	in	the	
specialised	fields	of	virology	and	epidemiology	dominated	the	global	inquisitions	on	
SARS.		These	experts	accumulated	further	authority	and	credibility	by	participating	in	
global	consultations,	workshops,	conferences,	and	committee	meetings.		With	the	
similar	notions	of	validity	derived	from	specialist	training	and	personal	or	professional	
relationship	with	the	core	members	of	WHO	officials	prior	to	SARS,	these	individuals	
began	to	promote	a	common	principled	and	normative	belief,	and	form	a	loosely	aligned	
community	of	episteme.	
Lastly,	the	policy	enterprise	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	was	led	by	a	few	
individual	leaders,	forming	what	this	study	refers	to	as	the	Heymann	centre,	which	
constituted	key	senior	WHO	officials.		These	individuals	together	with	other	actors,	who	
shared	a	set	of	technical	and	normative	views,	formulated	policy	strategies	and	created	
an	environment	of	collective	actions.		Policy	makers	recognised	the	role	of	the	Heymann	
centre	in	shaping	the	national	and	international	policy	response.		Evidently,	the	
uncertainty	and	complexity	surrounding	SARS	gave	them	a	privileged	position	to	
advance	their	policy	enterprise.	Furthermore,	their	positions	in	the	international	agency	
enabled	them	to	straddle	the	different	worlds	of	the	technical	and	normative,	conferring	
on	them	more	authority	and	policy	influence.		The	enduring	involvement	of	a	small	
number	of	individuals	who	shared	a	common	policy	enterprise	and	diffused	a	certain	
type	of	response	across	jurisdictional	boundaries	was	a	strong	indication	of	the	
existence	of	a	SARS	epistemic	community.	
Building	on	the	analysis	in	the	present	chapter,	the	next	chapter	will	explore	a	range	of	
policy	discourses,	advanced	by	the	members	of	the	epistemic	community,	in	the	global	
response	to	the	SARS	outbreak.		In	so	doing,	the	chapter	will	demonstrate	that	ideas	do	
not	simply	arise	as	governing	norms,	but	ideational	success	occurs	as	a	result	of	
collective	advancement	by	actors	who	are	coalesced	around	particular	policy	ideas.		
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CHAPTER	FIVE	
THE	CONSTRUCTION	OF	DISCOURSES	AND	GLOBAL	POLICY	
MAKING	ON	SARS	
 
5.1	INTRODUCTION	
	
Building	on	the	analysis	in	Chapter	Four,	this	chapter	addresses	the	question,	posed	in	
Chapter	One,	of	what	particular	ideas	shaped	the	global	response	to	SARS.		Specific	sub‐
questions	examined	are:		how	was	the	problem	of	SARS	framed?		How	did	each	
discourse	influence	policy	decisions	and	actions	on	SARS	over	time?		In	which	issue‐
areas	was	it	dominant?		To	achieve	this,	this	chapter	chronologically	recounts	the	key	
events	of	the	global	SARS	response.		However,	the	purpose	here	is	to	go	beyond	a	
detailed	descriptive	account	of	the	SARS	outbreak	which	can	be	found	elsewhere.420		
Instead,	the	chapter	focuses	on	the	evolution	of	policy	discourses	that	reflected	
particular	worldviews,	examining	how	each	discourse	framed	the	problems	
surrounding	SARS,	and	informed	policy	choices	at	various	points	in	time.		The	objective	
is	therefore	to	demonstrate	the	presence	of	competing	policy	discourses	and	how,	very	
often,	a	particular	discourse	triumphs	over	others	without	completely	extinguishing	the	
latter’s	influence.		
	
As	described	in	the	conceptual	framework	presented	in	Chapter	Two,	there	are	four	
ways	that	epistemic	communities	exert	influence	in	international	policy	making:		a)	
issue	framing	at	the	policy	innovation	stage;	b)	policy	selection;	c)	policy	diffusion	
through	transnational	links;	and	d)	regime	persistence.		Haas	and	Adler	pay	particular	
attention	to	framing,	stating	that,	“by	framing	the	context	in	which	new	data	and	ideas	
are	interpreted,	epistemic	communities	bound	the	range	of	collective	discourse	on	
policy	as	well	as	guide	decision	makers	in	the	choice	of	appropriate	norms	and	
appropriate	institutions	within	which	to	resolve	or	manage	problems.”421	This	argument	
offers	a	sound	entry	point	into	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	role	of	epistemic	
communities,	and	the	framing	of	ideas	in	the	formulation	of	policymaking.		It	is	the	
latter	which	this	chapter	focuses	on,	i.e.	the	framing	of	ideas	to	show	that	they	are	
important	determinants	of	policy	choices	on	the	SARS	response	over	time.		
	
The	SARS	story	can	be	divided	into	three	key	phases	in	terms	of	the	emergence	of	the	
outbreak	and	the	global	response.		While	the	SARS	virus	emerged	sometime	prior	to,	or	
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during	November	2002,	this	chapter	does	not	include	the	initial	stage	of	the	SARS	
outbreak	(November	2002	to	January	2003)	for	two	reasons.		First,	SARS	had	not	grown	
from	a	national	to	a	cross‐border	outbreak	during	this	period	and,	thus,	there	was	no	
concerted	international	response	to	the	disease	until	late	February	2003.		The	exception	
was	sporadic	and	largely	factual	outbreak	surveillance	and	reporting	by	the	Global	
Outbreak	Alert	and	Response	Network.		Second,	owing	to	the	aforementioned	reason,	
no	distinct	policy	discourses	surrounding	SARS	can	be	observed	until	the	outbreak	
spread	outside	of	China.	Thus	this	analysis	focuses	on	events	from	February	2003	
onwards.	
5.2.	PHASE	1:	THE	EARLY	RESPONSE	TO	SARS	(FEBRUARY	TO	MARCH	2003)	
5.2.1.	International	research	collaboration:	global	solidarity	
 
From	February	to	early	March	2003,	there	were	some	early	signs	of	competing	ideas	on	
SARS.		The	initial	international	response	(given	that	it	was	purely	intergovernmental	
response	via	WHO	at	an	initial	stage,	it	would	be	more	appropriate	to	use	the	term	
international	here	as	opposed	to	global)	to	the	reported	outbreak	primarily	focused	on	
scientific	discovery	due	to	its	unknown	nature	and	potential	global	reach.		The	lack	of	
knowledge	about	causal	factors,	together	with	the	lack	of	knowledge	about	prevention	
and	treatment,	created	important	immediate	challenges	for	national	and	international	
level	policy	makers.		Additionally,	the	apparently	cross‐border	nature	of	SARS	
demonstrated	the	international	relevance	of	the	outbreak,	and	a	realisation	that	there	
were	shared	vulnerabilities	across	the	world.		Accordingly,	these	two	factors	–	the	
unknown	nature	and	potential	novelty	of	the	virus,	and	the	potentially	global	scope	of	
the	SARS	epidemic	–	drove	the	WHO	to	organize	researchers	and	scientific	institutions	
to	confront	the	outbreak	with	scientific	and	public	health	tools.422		On	15	March	2003,	
the	WHO	mobilised	a	network	of	scientists	based	in	11	laboratories	around	the	world,	
“to	expedite	identification	of	the	causative	agent	of	SARS	and	rapidly	develop	a	robust	
and	reliable	diagnostic	test	[emphasis	added].”423		
	
Interestingly,	this	research	collaboration	was	largely	characterised	by	the	global	public	
goods	discourse	which	underpinned	calls	for	collective	action	in	the	form	of	scientific	
collaboration	among	laboratories.	The	core	idea	of	global	public	goods	discourse	is	that	
provision	of	health	care	should	be	based	upon	nonexcludability	and	nonrivalry.		
Therefore,	collective	defense	against	acute	public	health	risks	should	be	promoted.		The	
key	person	behind	the	global	public	goods	discourse	was	Klaus	Stohr,	a	WHO	medical	
officer.		Stohr	had	been	the	coordinator	and	project	leader	of	the	WHO’s	Global	
Influenza	Surveillance	Network	(GISN)	since	2001,	putting	him	in	charge	of	appointing	
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Respiratory	Syndrome,	1731.	
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the	SARS	laboratory	global	network.424		According	to	a	scientist	involved	in	the	SARS	
laboratory	network,	Stohr	led	calls	for	laboratories	to	collaborate	with	others	around	
the	world	on	identifying	SARS.		
Stohr	was	the	mastermind	behind	the	network.	He	invited	the	world’s	top	research	
laboratories	to	do	something	unprecedented	–	to	collaborate	in	a	virtual	global	
laboratory….Stohr	carefully	selected	which	laboratories	to	tap,	taking	into	account	
the	expertise	of	each	research	team…The	priority	for	the	virus	hunters	was	speed.	
With	the	virus	spreading	quickly,	Stohr	needed	answers	fast.	If	he	had	been	forced	
to	wait	for	each	research	team	to	come	up	with	its	own	results,	it	would	have	taken	
considerably	longer	than	if	the	teams	worked	together	[emphasis	added].425		
The	rationale	behind	the	global	public	good	discourse	was	“urgency”	for	the	sake	of	
shared	collective	interests.				
In	developing	emergency	plans	to	contain	the	outbreak	and	prevent	further	
international	spread,	WHO	worked	on	the	principle	that	the	unidentified	causal	
agent	could	lead	to	an	exceptionally	dangerous	outbreak.	Rapid	development	of	
scientific	knowledge	would	be	needed	to	reduce	opportunities	for	SARS	to	establish	
endemicity.	Identification	of	the	causal	agent	and	the	development	of	a	diagnostic	
test	were	given	paramount	importance	in	the	overall	containment	strategy	
[emphasis	added].426	
Stohr	stated,	“We	needed	people	to	share	data	and	set	aside	Nobel	Prize	interests	or	
their	desire	to	publish	articles”.427	This	statement	suggests	SARS	research	was	framed	as	
a	global	public	good,	rather	than	as	self‐interest	or	professional	egos	battling	for	
scientific	supremacy.	Constructing	SARS	as	an	immediate	yet	unknown	threat,	Stohr	
called	on	scientists	to	overcome	normal	incentives	within	the	scientific	community	
towards	secrecy	of	research	ideas	and	findings,	and	serving	their	own	careers	first,	to	
serve	a	collective	need.	
In	order	to	facilitate	research	progress,	a	password	protected	secure	website	for	the	
detection	of	the	SARS	agent	and	the	development	of	a	diagnostic	test	was	created.428		
The	secure	network	and	website	approach	that	was	implemented	was	unprecedented.		
Clinical	specimens	were	transferred	and	shared	among	several	reference	laboratories	in	
the	network.		For	example,	the	US	CDC	had	people	on	the	ground	in	Vietnam	as	part	of	
the	WHO	team,	so	they	took	samples	themselves	and	sent	them	back	to	Atlanta.	The	
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WHO	team	also	sent	samples	to	the	National	Institute	for	Infectious	Diseases	in	Japan.	
The	Institute	of	Pasteur	Paris	had	representative	in	Vietnam,	who	transported	samples	
back	to	France	with	them.		
The	global	public	goods	discourse	was	shared	by	other	WHO	officials	at	the	time.		For	
instance,	Hank	Bekedam,	the	WHO	China	representative	during	the	SARS	epidemic,	
stated	that	international	scientific	collaboration	embraced	the	notion	of	global	public	
good.	
We	had	this	global	network	–	laboratory,	epidemiology,	clinicians.	These	networks	
enormously	helped	in	speeding	up	our	understanding	about	the	disease.	Also,	it	was	
very	encouraging	that,	although	universities	involved	were	normally	using	their	
elbows	to	be	the	first	one	to	publish,	that	was	put	aside.	That	was	great.	This	is	a	
global	public	good.	We	need	to	put	all	our	brains	and	all	our	energy	together.	We	
need	to	focus	to	gather	information	[emphasis	added].		
Referring	to	the	research	collaboration	on	SARS	coordinated	through	GOARN,	David	
Heymann,	then	the	Executive	Director	of	WHO’s	Division	of	Communicable	Diseases,	
also	framed	scientific	collaboration	in	terms	of	global	solidarity.	He	stated	that,	
This	partnership	of	experts	from	over	120	public	health	institutions	throughout	the	
world	constantly	validates	information	about	health‐related	events,	and	ensures	a	
coordinated	international	response	should	one	be	necessary.	The	global	solidarity	
in	the	detection	and	validation	of,	and	response	to,	the	SARS	outbreak	has	blurred	
the	concept	that	states	are	sovereign	and	reign	supreme	over	their	territories	and	
peoples	[emphasis	added].429	
	
5.2.2.	Breaking	the	human	chain:	controlling	individual	risk		
	
Given	the	high	numbers	of	epidemiologists	and	biomedical	scientists	involved	in	the	
SARS	research	network,	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	early	policy	agenda	was	framed	in	
terms	of	the	biomedical	discourse.		One	of	the	notable	biomedical	constructions	of	SARS	
in	the	early	phase	of	the	SARS	outbreak	revolved	around	individual	risk	factors.	The	
tendency	to	attribute	global	health	problems	to	individual	risk	factors	is	not	new.		This	
perspective	generally	removes	an	individual	from	the	society	within	which	the	
individual	resides	and	makes	health‐related	choices.		As	Beaglehole	and	Bonita	
describe:		
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The	most	challenging	criticisms	of	epidemiology	stem	from	its	individualist	
philosophical	underpinnings	and	its	reluctance	to	place	individuals	in	their	
social	context.		In	particular,	the	risk	factor	approach	to	epidemiology	and	
prevention	does	not	give	adequate	weight	to	the	role	of	social	factors…The	
individualist	approach	also	runs	the	risk	of	blaming	the	victim	and	encouraging	
health	educating	strategies	at	the	expense	of	social,	economic,	and	environmental	
changes.	The	result	is	the	medicalisation	of	prevention	rather	than	its	
socialization	[emphasis	added].430	
What	Beaglehole	and	Bonita	term	the	“individualist	approach”	in	biomedicalism	was	
evident	in	the	intervention	strategies	advocated	during	the	early	phase	of	the	SARS	
outbreak.		For	instance,	if	one	closely	looks	into	the	classification	of	infections	posted	by	
the	WHO	and	affected	countries,	it	becomes	apparent	that	an	aggregate	of	individuals	
was	defined	as	“risk	groups”,	and	that	members	of	these	groups	were	immediately	
classified	as	“carriers”	of	SARS.		The	emphasis,	in	turn,	was	placed	upon	the	
management	of	individual	risk	in	terms	of	how	individuals	behaved,	to	minimise	their	
risk	of	infection,	and	how	infected	individuals	were	managed	to	minimise	onward	
transmission.	In	part,	this	was	a	reflection	of	the	prevailing	biomedical	model	of	
epidemics,	but	it	was	also	a	consequence	of	uncertainties	about	SARS	in	the	initial	stage	
of	the	SARS	outbreak.		
For	example,	the	PCR	(Polymerase	Chain	Reaction)	test	aimed	at	identifying	the	stages	
of	SARS	infection	tended	to	generate	false‐negatives,	making	it	unreliable	as	a	
diagnostic	tool.431		Further	adding	to	this	circumstance	was	a	rather	novel	term,	“super‐
spreader”,	referring	to	the	index	case	in	more	technical	language.	WHO	described	super‐
spreaders	as	“certain	individuals	with	atypical	pneumonia,	now	recognised	as	cases	of	
SARS,	who	have	been	implicated	in	spreading	the	disease	to	numerous	other	
individuals”432		The	scientific	puzzle	surrounding	super‐spreading	events	means	that	the	
transmission	mode	of	SARS	was	not	accurately	understood	at	an	early	phase	of	the	
outbreak.	Julie	Gerberding,	then	head	of	the	US	CDC,	describes	the	difficulties	in	
understanding	the	super‐spreader	events	in	mid‐April	2003.		
This	is	a	term	that	we	have	used	because	it	creates	a	plausible	explanation	for	the	
pattern	of	epidemiology	that	we’re	seeing,	but	it	still	is	really	speculation.	We	don’t	
know	whether	the	virus	is	associated	with	a	lot	of	spread	in	an	individual	cluster	
because	of	something	having	to	do	with	the	infected	person	or	if	it	has	to	do	with	
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the	type	of	containment	or	failure	of	the	containment	procedures	that	are	present	
there.433	
As	a	result	of	unresolved	scientific	enquiry,	the	prevailing	idea	in	relation	to	SARS	
containment	revolved	around	rapid	interventions	aimed	at	identifying	a	figure	that	
infected	multiple	people.		The	need	to	“break	the	human	chain”	of	transmission	(i.e.	an	
essential	step	in	pursuit	of	eradication)	was	of	prime	importance	to	containing	the	SARS	
outbreak,	and	this	could	be	achieved	through	“the	prompt	detection	and	isolation	of	
new	sources	of	infection	–	a	key	step	on	the	way	to	breaking	the	chain	of	
transmission”.434	435		The	super‐spreader	events	therefore	turned	into	identifying	
persons	that	carried	the	virus	and	modifying	individual	risk	behaviours	for	prevention.		
The	basic	assumption	of	the	biomedical	discourse	is	that	an	individual	can	prevent	
infection	by	altering	his/her	behaviour,	and	thus	he/she	has	a	strong	degree	of	personal	
responsibility	for	his/her	disease.436	In	the	early	stage	of	SARS,	this	sort	of	assumption	
was	pervasive.		Individuals	are	categorized	into	two	distinct	groups:	the	“potentially	at	
risk”	group	and	the	“already	infected”	group.		For	those	“carriers”	of	SARS,	individual	
responsibility	was	being	laden	not	to	contaminate	other	people	and	not	to	become	the	
source	of	a	new	chain	of	the	epidemic’s	spread.		Those	falling	under	the	potentially	at	
risk	group	were	not	completely	without	responsibilities.		They	were	seen	as	requiring	to	
voluntarily	reduce	unnecessary	movement	away	from	home	and	to	maintain	an	
enhanced	level	of	personal	hygiene.		For	both,	behavioural	changes	in	the	routine	of	
daily	life	were	required	which	included	increased	frequency	of	hand	washing	and	
temperature	checks.		Most	were	encouraged	to	wear	masks	and	to	increase	the	
cleanliness	of	their	environment	to	the	extent	of	sterilizing	public	areas	with	chemicals	
regularly.		It	required	one	to	contribute	to	the	eventual	containment	of	the	epidemic	by	
acting	responsibly	for	the	public	good	through	the	adoption	of	self‐isolation.		In	terms	of	
disease	prevention,	individual	risk	behaviours	and	responsibilities	were	extremely	
prioritized	at	this	stage,	thereby	conceptualizing	those	infected	as	irresponsible.	The	
logic	of	“prevention	=	individual	responsibility”	was	apparent	in	Heymann’s	statement	
at	a	press	briefing	in	March	2003.		
The	best	prevention	for	any	disease	is	information	and	understanding	by	people	
[about]	what	that	disease	looks	like	and	what	they	should	do	if	they	become	sick.		
With	that	information,	people	can	decide	whether	or	not	they	want	to	expose	
themselves	to	what	they	consider	as	risk….Public	health	can’t	do	a	lot	for	a	disease	
which	is	a	contact	diseases,	it	has	to	be	individuals	who	understand	what	the	
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disease	is…what	you	people	[media]	do	is	very	important	because	that	educates	
the	general	population	as	to	what	this	disease	is	and	how	individually	they	can	
prevent	themselves	from	becoming	sick.	So	it’s	an	educational	effort	[emphasis	
added].437	
He	further	emphasized:	
I	say	that	education	is	important	and	people	who	have	a	cough	and	fever	have	just	
as	much	responsibility	to	go	to	a	health	worker	as	do	people	who	are	standing	
near	them	to	protect	themselves.	So,	it’s	education,	education,	education,	
information,	information,	information.	If	everyone	understands	that	this	is	a	
disease,	and	everyone	works	together,	it	can	be	stopped	no	matter	how	close	people	
have	to	be	[emphasis	added].438		
Implicit	in	this	statement	was	that	an	effective	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	
would	be	chiefly,	but	not	entirely,	dependent	on	people	changing	their	individual	
behaviour.		Avoiding	contagion	voluntarily	was	assumed	to	be	one	of	the	most	effective	
measures	in	the	control	of	the	outbreak.	Even	though	there	are	top‐down	prescriptions	
such	as	health	etiquettes,	voluntary	quarantine,	social	distancing	and	so	on,	the	primary	
onus	was	seen	to	be	on	the	individual.		As	Heymann	argued,	“If	somebody’s	coughing,	
somebody	looks	like	they	are	sick,	the	best	would	be	for	the	person	to	be	avoided	by	others;	
so	that	if	you’re	standing	next	to	someone	on	an	escalator	who’s	coughing,	you	ought	to	
move	back	two	or	three	steps.”439	
The	framing	of	SARS	as	a	risk	arising	from	individual	behaviour	facilitated	the	idea	of	
mass	quarantine;	that	if	the	“carrier”	does	not	take	on	voluntary	responsibility,	then	the	
public	health	authority	has	the	right	to	impose	such	responsibility	coercively	on	those	
already	infected	in	the	interest	of	the	“public	good”	in	the	face	of	a	deadly	virus.	Mass	
and,	if	necessary	enforced,	quarantine	therefore	was	widely	justified	on	the	basis	of	
defining	SARS	as	a	consequence	of	individual	risk‐taking	behaviour.		On	12	March,	the	
WHO	announced	that	“patients	suspected	with	SARS	be	isolated	with	barrier	nursing	
techniques	and	treated	as	clinically	indicated	[emphasis	added]”.440		This	statement	
indicates	that	with	SARS	on	the	loose,	infected	individuals	posed	a	health	risk	to	the	
general	population.		Following	this	official	statement,	mass	quarantine	was	widely	used	
as	a	control	measure	for	SARS	in	affected	countries	and	was	seen	as	a	necessary	means	
to	benefit	the	wider	population.	
It	was	controversial,	however,	that	governments	were	prepared	to	mass	quarantine	
large	numbers	of	individuals	who	may	or	may	not	be	infected.	Framing	the	SARS	
outbreak	in	terms	of	individual	risk	factors	immediately	raised	tension	between	
                                                            
437	WHO	press	briefing,	27	March	2003,	available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/sars/2003_03_27/en/	
438	WHO	press	briefing,	27	March	2003,	available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/sars/2003_03_27/en/	
439	Ibid.	
440	WHO	press	briefing,	12	March	2003.	WHO	issues	global	alert	about	cases	of	atypical	pneumonia.	
Available	at	http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2003/pr22/en/	
143	
	
biomedical	discourse	and	human	rights	discourse.		The	question	of	proper	balance	
between	the	protection	of	the	population	and	respect	for	individual	rights	received	
different	answers	in	different	countries,	at	least	during	this	phase	of	the	outbreak.	For	
instance,	some	countries	such	as	Singapore	used	compulsory	and	tightly	monitored	
isolation	and	quarantine	from	the	beginning.441		Singapore	health	Minister	Lim	Hng	
Kiang	said	the	quarantine	signalled	that	a	“stronger	government	intervention	is	now	
created	to	break	the	chain	of	infection.”442		WHO	official,	Osman	Mansoor,	commented	in	
response,	“What	Singapore	is	showing	is	that	it	is	really	taking	the	problem	very	
seriously.”		He	further	pointed	out,	“With	no	known	cure	yet,	the	only	way	to	stop	the	
spread	of	the	disease	is	by	isolating	people	who	may	have	the	virus.”443		In	other	countries,	
such	as	Canada,	there	was	reliance	on	voluntary	isolation	and	quarantine	strategies	
rather	than	on	the	use	of	compulsion	at	this	stage.	In	places	such	as	Hong	Kong,	the	
government	initially	pursued	a	middle	ground,	stressing	that	the	curtailing	of	liberties	
should	be	practiced	with	the	greatest	caution.		Beyond	the	concern	of	infringing	upon	
civil	liberties,	government	officials	were	worried	that	attempts	to	quarantine	
individuals	would	simply	encourage	those	infected,	or	suspected	of	infection,	to	seek	to	
avoid	detection.444		This,	in	turn,	would	create	conditions	where	the	virus	could	spread	
more	readily.		Measures	such	as	compulsory	mass	quarantine	were	deliberately	avoided	
at	the	outset.		There	were	also	concerns	about	issues	of	human	rights	(i.e.	civil	liberty	
and	public	acceptability),	whether	or	not	such	control	measures	would	be	effective	(or	
might	aggravate	the	risk	of	the	spread	of	disease),	and	the	feasibility	of	enforcement.		
Yet,	when	fifteen	residents	of	Amoy	Gardens,	an	apartment	community,	were	suspected	
of	contracting	SARS	and	were	admitted	to	United	Christian	Hospital	on	March	26,	the	
Hong	Kong	government	decided	to	order	a	ten‐day	quarantine	of	Block	E	of	Amoy	
Gardens.	
This	was	welcomed	by	the	WHO,	especially	Guenael	Rodier,	then	Director	of	
Communicable	Disease	Surveillance	and	Response.		In	relation	to	Hong	Kong’s	
institution	of	mass	quarantine	measures,	he	stated,	“This	is	an	effort	of	Hong	Kong	to	
stop	the	spread	of	the	disease	internationally	and	we	believe	it	will	be	effective.”	445	
Rodier’s	belief	was	clear:	SARS	could	be	contained	through	a	rapid	isolation	of	not	only	
those	who	were	already	stricken	by	the	virus	but	also	more	importantly,	those	who	
might	already	be	infected	but	who	have	yet	to	develop	the	observable	symptoms	of	
                                                            
441	Chan	K	(2003),	SARS	and	Implications	for	Human	Rights,	Carr	Centre	Human	Rights	Case	Study,	
Kennedy	School	of	Government.	Available	at	
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/SARS.CaseStudy.(Final).pdf;	Jacobs	L	(2003),	Rights	and	
Quarantine	during	the	SARS	Global	Crisis:	Differentiated	Legal	Consciousness	in	Hong	Kong,	Shanghai	and	
Toronto,	Asia	Pacific	Program	on	Dispute	Resolution	Research.	Available	at	
http://www.apdr.iar.ubc.ca/publications/ejournal/APDR_1.1/APDR_1.1_LJ.pdf	
442	Singapore	takes	urgent	measures	as	experts	claim	breakthrough	in	SARS,	Agence	France	Presse,	24	
March	2003.		
443	Ibid.		
444	“SARS	in	Hong	Kong:	from	Experience	to	Action,”	SARS	Expert	Committee	Summary	Report,	October	
30,	2003.	Available	at	
http://www.sarsexpertcom.gov.hk/english/reports/summary/files/e_sumprt_fulltext.pdf							
445	WHO	press	briefing,	11	April	2003.	Available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/sars/Press_2003_04_11/en/	
144	
	
infection.	It	was	believed	that	the	latter	group	had	to	be	identified	quickly	and	placed	
under	quarantine.		The	“traced‐exposed”	were	thus	the	main	target	in	the	initial	
response	to	SARS.			
Vietnam	was	reportedly	one	of	the	countries	that	conscientiously	implemented	policies	
targeting	the	“exposed.”446		About	two	months	after	its	first	case	was	recorded,	Vietnam	
became	the	first	country	with	a	SARS	outbreak	to	be	removed	from	the	WHO	list	of	
areas	with	recent	transmissions	of	SARS.		Vietnam’s	apparent	success	in	being	lifted	off	
the	WHO	list	was	portrayed	as	“a	triumph	both	for	WHO	and	for	Vietnam”	in	the	WHO	
publication,	with	its	success	attributed	to	rapid	case	detection,	immediate	isolation,	
infection	control	and	vigorous	contact	tracing	[emphasis	added]”	that	was	put	in	
place.447	The	Health	Minister	Tran	Thi	Trung	Chien,	at	the	Opening	Ceremony	of	the	
Vietnam	Symposium	on	SARS,	echoed	Heymann’s	framing	of	the	outbreak,	attributing	
Vietnam’s	success	to	both	education	and	responsible	behaviour.			
[Members	of]	the	public	need	to	understand	how	to	protect	themselves	and	their	
help	is	needed	to	detect	suspected	cases	in	the	community	so	that	they	can	be	
quickly	isolated.	Public	education	also	reduces	the	chance	of	social	disorder	
[emphasis	added].448	
It	was	assumed,	in	other	words,	that	because	individuals	have	autonomy	over	their	
lives,	sufficient	public	education	would	change	behaviour	and	thus	break	the	human	
chain	of	transmission.		The	eminence	of	individual	risk	in	the	narrative	of	the	national	
and	global	response	to	SARS	illustrates	how	the	biomedical	discourse,	reflecting	what	
some	have	seen	as	the	reductionist	tendency,	defined	the	initial	phase	of	international	
response	to	SARS.	By	framing	individuals	as	being	in	need	of	behavioural	reform,	the	
biomedical	discourse	presented	individuals	as	agents	responsible	for	their	(disordered)	
behaviours,	and	positioned	them	as	central	to	the	prevention/intervention	approach	to	
be	adopted.		Conversely,	this	means	that	if	individuals	fail	to	modify	their	behaviours,	
they	could	be	blamed	for	their	indolence	in	seizing	opportunities	presented	to	them.		
Where	individual	choice	and	proximate	causation	came	to	dominate	the	response	to	the	
SARS	outbreak,	other	explanations	incorporating	the	recognition	of	socioeconomic	
determinants	were	given	less	attention.		As	can	be	witnessed	in	the	next	phase	of	the	
outbreak,	SARS	was	often	constructed	as	the	consequence	of	unhygienic,	filthy	and	
unregulated	behaviours,	which,	by	implication,	led	to	position	those	affected	by	SARS	as	
risking	people.		This	discourse	targeted	individuals	who	were	perceived	to	be	carriers	of	
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the	virus,	which	reflected	the	fear	of	risky	“others”	coming	into	contact	with	innocent	
people.	
5.2.3.	The	framing	of	SARS	as	a	national	and	global	security	issue	
In	the	early	phase	of	the	SARS	outbreak	described	above,	there	were	signs	that	the	
security	discourse	was	emergent,	albeit	in	a	nascent	form.		The	conceptualisation	of	
public	health	issues	of	international	importance,	particularly	infectious	disease	
outbreaks	as	security	issues,	is	not	a	recent	phenomenon.		As	described	in	Chapter	Two,	
the	threat	of	cross‐border	spread	of	disease	outbreaks	to	the	state	has	been	framed	as	a	
security	concern	since	the	first	International	Sanitary	Conference	in	1851.449		During	
this	period,	Western	governments	focused	on	diseases	emanating	from	Asia	and	other	
colonial	territories,	as	external	sources	of	contagion,	and	responses	focused	on	
attempting	to	protect	domestic	populations	and	economic	interests.		In	recent	decades,	
with	the	acceleration	of	economic	globalization,	the	security	discourse	has	become	a	
dominant	frame,	with	the	disease	“threat”	to	national	governments,	regional	stability	
and	the	international	system.450		Awareness	that	countries,	in	particular	Western	states,	
were	not	immune	to	this	threat	was	raised	by	a	series	of	outbreaks	including	SARS,	and	
accordingly	containment	at	the	source	has	been	increasingly	seen	as	the	best	
response.451				
How	SARS	was	framed	as	a	security	threat	in	the	early	phase	can	be	understood	by	
examining	the	narratives	during	this	period.		One	of	the	most	common	ways	by	which	
SARS	was	portrayed	was	through	the	use	of	security‐related	language,	with	the	disease	
defined	as	an	imminent	“threat”	or	“clear	and	present	danger”	to	national	and	global	
security	and	interests.		Framing	SARS	as	a	direct	threat	then	logically	requires	
emergency	action.	For	instance,	Julie	Gerberding,	then	Director	of	the	US	Centre	for	
Disease	Control	and	Prevention	(CDC)	and	an	infectious	disease	expert,	stated	on	19	
March	in	relation	to	the	country’s	SARS	preparedness,	
We	have	never	been	more	prepared,	and	I	think	the	fact	that	we	have	activated	our	
emergency	operation	centre	puts	us	in	very	good	shape	to	being	immediately	
ready	to	respond	to	any	new	threat	that	should	emerge.		Not	only	[are]	we	
activated,	we’ve	put	our	emergency	response	teams	on	readiness	call…We	have	
[a]	close	network	now	with	the	Georgia	emergency	management	group,	with	the	
Georgia	homeland	security	group.		We	are	linked	into	the	intelligence	network.	
And	all	systems	are	up	and	running,	and	we	are	–	we	are	as	prepared,	I	think,	as	an	
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agency	could	possibly	be	at	this	point	in	time	to	respond	to	what	may	be	in	store	
[emphasis	added].452		
There	were	a	few	like‐minded	WHO	officials	who	shared	the	“threat”	and	“emergency”	
conceptions.		One	of	such	figures	was	Gro	Harlem	Brundtland,	then	WHO	Director‐
General.		On	15	March	2003,	Brundtland	said	“due	to	the	spread	of	SARS	to	several	
countries	in	a	short	period	of	time,	the	World	Health	Organization	today	has	issued	
emergency	guidance	for	travellers	and	airlines.		This	syndrome,	SARS,	is	now	a	
worldwide	health	threat.		The	world	needs	to	work	together	to	find	its	cause,	cure	the	
sick,	and	stop	its	spread	[emphasis	added].”453		
Similarly,	Heymann	advocated	security	discourse.		He	stated	“many	behind‐the‐scenes	
efforts	needed	to	safeguard	public	health	often	go	unnoticed	and	are	inadequately	funded	
–	until	something	dramatic	goes	wrong.		High	profile	events	that	arouse	deep	popular	
concern	can	suddenly	bring	into	focus	the	need	to	strengthen	the	otherwise	invisible	
infrastructures	that	protect	public	health	on	a	daily	basis.”454		He	further	contended	“After	
the	terrorist	attacks	on	New	York	City	and	Washington,	DC,	questions	about	the	deliberate	
use	of	biological	or	chemical	weapons,	and	the	preparedness	of	the	world	to	respond,	have	
been	raised	with	great	urgency.”455		He	believed	that	investment	in	“defences”	
(surveillance)	could	safeguard	nations	and	international	communities	against	externally	
induced	“threats”	(emerging	disease	outbreaks).		
All	countries	are	vulnerable	to	outbreaks	either	because	they	emerge	within	
national	borders	or	present	external	threats	through	international	spread.		With	
the	international	release	of	anthrax	to	cause	harm	and	incite	terror	in	the	United	
States,	and	the	concerns	this	incident	raised	internationally,	microbial	agents	are	
now	more	than	ever	perceived	as	a	clear	and	present	danger	to	public	health	
security	nationally	and	globally.	At	the	same	time,	greater	investment	in	public	
health	defences	against	naturally	occurring	emerging	infections	contributes	
powerfully	to	the	detection	of,	and	public	health	response	to,	outbreaks	[emphasis	
added].456		
Clearly,	this	view	was	echoed	in	the	statements	of	WHO	official	Rodier	who	said	that	
“protection	against	the	threat	of	emerging	and	epidemic‐prone	diseases	requires	strong	
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defense	systems	at	the	national	as	well	as	international	levels	[emphasis	added]”.457		In	
relation	to	SARS,	Heymann	and	Rodier	unequivocally	argued	that,		
The	SARS	experience,	however,	made	one	lesson	clear	early	in	its	course:	
inadequate	surveillance	and	response	capacity	in	a	single	country	can	
endanger	national	populations	and	the	public	health	security	of	the	entire	
world	[emphasis	added].458	
Heymann	and	Rodier	further	contended	“many	states	were	not	quick	enough	in	
diagnosing	outbreaks	of	the	disease	and	containing	it	in	time	to	prevent	its	international	
spread”.459		Recognizing	that	the	response	to	disease	outbreaks	largely	relied	on	the	
affected	country’s	response	capacity,	and	that	there	was	disparity	among	countries	in	
terms	of	public	health	infrastructure,	they	stressed	the	importance	of	pre‐emptive	
informational	practices;	namely	to	identify	and	manage	diseases,	especially	before	they	
became	“threats”	to	other	countries,	presumably	high‐income	countries.		
This	belief	was	deeply	instilled	within	international	policy	making	on	SARS.		SARS	was	
described	as	posing	a	national	security	threat.	A	specific	solution	to	such	a	threat	was	to	
strengthen	the	existing	information	gathering	activities	pertaining	to	borders	and	
population	mobility	through	an	enhanced	variety	of	sources.		In	particular,	the	GOARN	
was	regarded	as	a	classic	illustration	of	the	paradigm	of	public	health	security	in	
practice.		Launched	formally	in	2000,	GOARN	is	a	voluntary	network	that	interlinks	
electronically	and	in	real	time	over	140	existing	laboratory	and	disease	reporting	
networks	to	rapidly	identify,	confirm	and	respond	to	infectious	disease	outbreaks.460		It	
was	established	to	deal	with	increasing	global	health	concerns	about	limitations	in	
national	infectious	disease	surveillance	and	response	capacity,	and	the	consequences	of	
delays	in	reporting	and	acting	on	outbreaks.		At	the	time	of	SARS,	GOARN	was	located	
under	WHO’s	Epidemic	and	Pandemic	Alert	and	Response	Programme.		As	founding	
members	of	GOARN,	Heymann	and	Rodier	believed	that	GOARN	was	vital	for	effective	
global	surveillance	and	containment	of	the	SARS	outbreak.461			
Heymann	was	keen	to	fully	utilize	the	GOARN	during	SARS.	He	argued	“the	real‐time	
information	made	it	possible	for	the	WHO	to	provide	specific	guidance	and	a	series	of	
recommendations	to	international	travellers”.462		Claiming	that	GOARN’S	function	during	
SARS	was	commendable,	Heymann	stated	that	with	the	use	of	GOARN,	“countries	are	
willing	to	forgo	the	exclusive	privilege	of	reporting	and	responding	to	infectious	diseases	
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occurring	in	their	own	territories	in	a	manner	over	which	they	have	supreme	control.”463	
Heymann	argued	that	the	vision	embraced	by	new	norms	and	standards	for	reporting	
and	responding	to	SARS	is	“of	a	world	on	the	alert	and	ready	to	respond	collectively	to	the	
threat	of	emerging	and	re‐emerging	infections	that	represent	an	acute	threat	to	public	
health	security	[emphasis	added]”.	464	465	
The	attempt	to	securitize	SARS	on	the	basis	of	pre‐emptive	surveillance	instruments	
was	not	the	whole	story.		There	was	a	general	belief	that	all	significant	responses	to	
SARS	should	be	carried	out	equally	by	the	command‐control	model	of	states.		This	was	
reflected	in	a	range	of	border	security	measures	recommended	by	the	WHO	which	were	
in	essence	state‐based.	On	27	March	2003,	the	WHO	recommended		
New	measures,	related	to	international	travel,	aimed	at	reducing	the	risk	of	further	
international	spread	of	severe	acute	respiratory	syndrome	(SARS).	The	
recommended	measures	include	screening	of	air	passengers	departing	from	a	small	
number	of	affected	areas	on	flights	to	another	country.		The	affected	areas,	where	
the	SARS	infectious	agent	is	known	to	be	spreading	in	a	human‐to‐human	chain,	are	
kept	under	constant	review	and	posted	each	day	on	the	WHO	website.466		 
What	this	statement	suggested	was	that	all	affected	governments	were	held	responsible	
for	the	rapid	identification	of	carriers	of	diseases	through	the	blockade	of	access	across	
and	within	national	borders.		Such	measures,	which	essentially	limited	the	movement	of	
certain	types	of	people	and	pathogens	across	borders,	were	framed	as	essential	steps	to	
protect	national	interests,	namely	domestic	populations	from	an	infectious	disease	
threat.		Heymann,	for	instance,	stressed	during	a	press	conference	that	“infectious	
diseases	know	no	borders	and	they	respect	no	borders”.467		As	we	will	see	in	the	next	
section,	this	disease	threat	perception	and	the	explicit	security	terms	became	more	
pervasive	when	the	SARS	crisis	deepened.		
5.3	PHASE	2:	GLOBAL	CRISIS	AND	LOCAL	EMERGENCY	(APRIL	TO	MAY	2003)	
5.3.1.	The	rise	of	economic	discourse	
	
5.3.1.1.	The	framing	of	SARS	as	cost‐benefit	calculations		
	
The	period	between	early	April	and	late	May	2003	saw	the	strong	emergence	of	the	
economic	discourse	as	SARS	came	to	be	perceived	as	an	imminent	risk	to	national,	
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regional	and	global	economic	interests.		The	neoliberal	economic	perspective,	in	
particular,	was	one	of	the	influential	motivations	behind	the	convergence	of	national	
policymaking	and	international	coordination.468		While	SARS	infected	more	than	8,000	
people	and	caused	1,707	deaths	worldwide,	its	mortality	rate	was	not	as	high	as	that	of	
other	diseases	that	afflicted	a	significantly	higher	percentage	of	the	global	population	
but	received	significantly	less	attention.	Some	tropical	diseases	endemic	to	poorer	areas	
of	Asia,	such	as	Ascariasis,	Lymphatic	filariasis,	and	Trachoma,	cause	an	estimated	
500,000	to	1	million	deaths	annually,	yet	receive	scant	donor	funding	and	attention.469	
Similarly,	the	annual	mortality	caused	by	malaria,	tuberculosis,	and	AIDS	are	in	the	
millions.470		This	begs	the	question	as	to	why	SARS	garnered	so	much	political	attention	
and	received	unprecedented	human	and	material	resources	to	combat	its	spread.		
Disease	outbreaks	have	historically	led	to	disruption	of	international	trade	and	
commerce.		A	1994	outbreak	of	plague	in	Surat,	India	clearly	demonstrates	the	extent	to	
which	a	disease	outbreak,	by	generating	panic	and	anxiety	within	and	across	countries,	
can	result	in	tremendous	economic	losses.		While	official	estimates	counted	52	
suspected	plague‐related	deaths	in	Surat,	the	international	perception	of	risk	appears	to	
have	become	much	greater,	coupled	with	the	lack	of	accurate	information	about	actual	
overall	infection,	fuelled	by	vivid	and	frightening	rumours	and	media	reporting.471		The	
consequent	economic	repercussions	of	these	fears	were	immediate	and	severe.		
Business	in	Surat	was	tremendously	affected	by	the	panic.472		Many	countries	in	Asia	
and	the	eastern	Mediterranean	region	stopped	flights	to	and	from	India.		Countries	also	
embargoed	imports	of	foodstuffs,	textiles	and	other	goods	from	India,	measures	that	
later	proved	unnecessary	from	a	public	health	perspective.		The	loss	of	exports	was	
estimated	to	be	at	least	US$420	million	at	1994	prices.		Such	effects	were	at	times	
exacerbated	by	erroneous	risk	communications	and,	as	later	found,	by	excessive	trade	
and	travel	restrictions	imposed	by	governments	in	other	countries.	
In	practice,	the	cost	of	a	major	outbreak	is	not	simply	resulted	from	direct	economic	
ramifications	such	as	the	cost	of	medical	treatment	or	loss	of	productive	capacity	due	to	
illness	and	death.		Indeed,	major	economic	impacts	of	outbreaks	arise	from	a	sense	of	
vulnerability,	reinforcing	a	tendency	for	the	market	to	overreact.473		This	is	primarily	
due	to	the	cost	of	preventive	actions	by	other	states	that	are	anxious	to	stamp	the	
possible	spread	of	contagion	into	their	territories.	From	the	perspective	of	government	
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officials	in	the	affected	countries,	reporting	a	disease	event	to	the	WHO	can	be	
financially	disastrous	as	a	result.	As	one	senior	national	public	health	official	noted,	
“Today,	if	you	are	a	good	guy	and	you	declare	the	problem,	you	are	essentially	punished	
for	it.	So	there	is	high	hurdle	for	the	national	policy	makers	to	do	just	that.”474		
WHO	officials	have	long	recognized	the	disincentives	to	notify	a	disease	event	
immediately	and	fully.		In	particular,	the	risk	of	prompting	an	overreaction	to	the	actual	
disease	risk	and	its	immediate	economic	ramifications	make	it	seem	that	non‐
compliance	on	the	part	of	national	governments	is	a	rational	response.		As	Heymann	
and	Rodier	described,		
Traditionally,	one	of	the	main	factors	undermining	the	effectiveness	of	infectious	
disease	surveillance	has	been	the	reluctance	of	countries	to	report	outbreaks	
due	to	fear	of	the	negative	impact	this	news	would	have	on	travel,	trade	and	
tourism.		Outbreaks	are	always	costly,	and	most	especially	so	when	reactions	
are	inflamed	by	sensational	media	coverage….countries	with	fragile	economies	are	
understandably	reluctant	to	admit	the	occurrence	of	outbreaks	that	are	almost	
certain	to	result	in	severe	economic	losses	[emphasis	added].475		
Heymann	further	noted	that	as	a	result	of	the	unwillingness	to	give	a	notification	of	the	
outbreaks	on	the	part	of	countries,	“the	majority	of	the	world’s	information	about	
infectious	disease	outbreaks	no	longer	comes	from	voluntary	reporting	by	countries.”476	
In	recognition	of	this,	Heymann	and	Rodier	claimed	that	the	“WHO	could	minimize	
unnecessary	reactions	that	cause	undue	panic	or	interference	with	travel	and	trade	by	
issuing	authoritative	public	statements	[emphasis	added]”	about	the	status	of	an	
outbreak	and	the	need	for	any	restrictions	on	travel	and	trade.477		Heymann	and	Rodier	
referred	to	the	case	of	the	Ebola	virus	outbreaks	as	evidence	of	success	in	the	WHO’s	
use	of	authoritative	statements:	“During	the	Ebola	outbreak	in	Uganda,	in	October	2000,	
WHO	issued	42	updated	reports	on	the	epidemic	via	its	website.	The	country’s	borders	
were	never	closed.”478	
With	respect	to	SARS,	Heymann	saw	the	economic	impacts	of	SARS	as	among	its	notable	
features.		He	argued	that	“with	fewer	than	9,000	cases,	the	outbreak	was	responsible	for	
sizable	economic	losses	and	insecurity	in	financial	markets	across	Asia	and	worldwide.”479		
SARS	“has	shown	how	in	a	closely	interconnected	and	interdependent	world,	a	new	and	
poorly	understood	disease,	with	no	vaccine	and	no	effective	cure	can	adversely	affect	
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economic	growth,	trade,	tourism,	business	and	industrial	performance,	political	careers	
and	social	stability”.480		At	the	ASEAN	Summit	on	SARS	held	on	28	April	2003,	Heymann	
articulated	that	protective	national	reaction	to	SARS	by	other	countries	amplified	social	
and	economic	costs.		He	added,	“The	perceived	risk	of	SARS	was	many	times	greater	than	
the	actual	risk,	a	factor	that	compounded	its	negative	social	and	economic	impact”.481			
In	comparison	with	other	outbreaks	that	have	occurred	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	
one	medical	scientist	involved	in	global	SARS	research	concisely	characterised	the	
particular	features	of	the	SARS	outbreak	in	terms	of	its	economic	impact:	
In	fact,	there	were	other	outbreaks	such	as	Nipha	or	Ebola	and	the	whole	bunch	of	
outbreaks	have	been	mysterious.		Then	why	is	SARS	more	mysterious?	I	think	because	
it	affected	wealthy	Asians,	i.e.	Singapore,	Hong	Kong,	Beijing	and	it	subsequently	
affected	Canada.		Only	then,	SARS	makes	itself	different	from	other	disease	outbreaks.	
The	other	aspect	was	how	it	killed	the	economy.		The	Nipha	outbreak	was	very	
serious	too	but	they	[the	governments	of	affected	countries]	contained	it	very	early	
and	it	looks	as	though	it	would	stay	in	the	farming	community.		For	Ebola,	it	
unfortunately	affected	Africa	mainly,	and	frankly,	the	West	couldn’t	care	less.		This	
was	usual	in	that	respect.		The	global	impact	of	SARS	on	economy	was	
unprecedented	and	SARS	affected	wealthy	engines	of	Asia.		It	was	unprecedented	
because	SARS	instantly	illustrated	the	danger	of	epidemic	that	could	lead	to	
unnecessary	economic	distress	across	the	world	[emphasis	added].482		
In	light	of	the	reluctance	of	some	countries	to	report	the	disease	event	and	the	major	
international	economic	repercussions	due	to	the	disproportionate	countermeasures	by	
many	states,	key	individuals	believed	that	the	WHO	should	take	concrete	and	daily	
actions	on	the	spread	of	SARS.		One	such	action	was	a	daily	release	of	public	statements	
about	SARS‐infected	zones	and	travel	notifications.	Heymann	stood	at	the	centre	of	this	
policy	enterprise.		As	Executive	Director	of	the	Communicable	Diseases	Division,	he	was	
able	to	align	the	organization’s	normative	role	(i.e.	as	a	technical	and	coordinating	body	
offering	medical	advice	and	technical	assistance)	with	the	belief	that	the	WHO	should	
assume	a	more	assertive	role	for	the	purpose	of	mitigating	economic	impacts.	
Therefore,	the	WHO’s	decision	to	post	regular	SARS	situation	updates	on	the	
organization’s	website,	and	publishing	Weekly	Epidemiological	Records	online	over	the	
course	of	the	outbreak,	can	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	views	held	by	several	
individuals	that	the	economic	impact	of	the	SARS	outbreak	needed	to	be	carefully	
managed.		
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One	WHO	official	noted	that	underreporting	(as	well	as	overreporting)	can	cause	
disproportionate	reactions	from	states.		She	explained	why	the	WHO	exercised	what	
Heymann	and	Rodier	called	authoritative	statements:		
I	think	the	WHO	learned	a	lot	by	publishing	advisories	during	SARS.	Actually	WHO’s	
real	role	is	to	carry	out	the	risk	assessment	for	the	respective	nations	in	order	for	
various	nationals	to	make	their	own	decisions.		But	during	SARS,	countries	were	
reluctant	to	notify	WHO	of	a	disease	event…Because	of	this	underreporting,	many	
countries	banned	imports	from	affected	countries	like	China	and	this	had	knock‐on	
effects	as	more	countries	reacted.		We	saw	unnecessary	negative	impact	on	
international	travel	and	trade	which	could	have	severe	economic	ramifications	for	
both	member	states	and	other	business	sectors.	So	we	had	to	still	express	our	
concerns.483	
It	should	be	noted	that	at	the	time	of	the	SARS	outbreak,	member	states	were	not	
obliged	to	notify	WHO	of	the	outbreak	events	occurring	in	their	own	territories	because	
the	old	IHR	(1969)	had	no	jurisdiction	over	SARS.		This	means	that	technically,	the	WHO	
could	not	insist	that	the	affected	countries	should	notify	them	of	an	outbreak	under	IHR.	
Notwithstanding,	given	the	potentially	large	economic	impact	of	SARS,	it	was	generally	
believed	that	countries	were	expected	to	report	disease	events	of	SARS	with	global	
implications.				
Max	Hardiman,	then	head	of	the	International	Health	Regulations	branch	within	the	
CSR,	and	the	key	person	behind	the	WHO’s	decision	to	issue	travel	advisories,	shared	
this	idea.		He	commented	that	the	cost	and	benefit	of	economic	concerns	was	one	of	the	
primary	motivating	factors	impelling	the	WHO	to	act	more	rapidly.		
Sometimes	it	seems	that	commerce	and	travel	is	bad	for	public	health	and	it	is	
competition	(sic)	[i.e.	trade	off]	between	commerce	and	public	health.		But	
economic	advancement	is	actually	going	to	be	good	for	the	nation’s	health	by	and	
large	so	health	measures	that	disrupt	or	prevent	that	[economic	
advancement]	will	not	be	good	for	health	[of	the	population]	in	the	long	run.		So	
the	WHO’s	role,	clearly	stated	in	the	purpose	of	International	Health	Regulations,	is	
trying	to	make	sure	countries	know	what	measures	are	justified	and	will	cause	
minimum	disruption	with	the	greatest	public	health	benefit.		That	was	very	
much	the	balance	that	was	in	our	minds	when	we	were	giving	advice	during	
[the]	SARS	crisis	[emphasis	added].484	
As	the	quote	above	implies,	this	WHO	senior	official	sought	to	integrate	the	economic	
discourse	into	public	health	policies.		The	decision	for	the	WHO	officials	to	proactively	
engage	in	the	issuance	of	travel	advisories,	which	was	seen	as	a	supra	sovereign	power	
of	the	WHO	in	some	literature,485	was	thus	primarily	emanated	from	the	idea	that	the	
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WHO’s	“authoritative	statements”	could	benefit	to	a	great	extent	the	adverse	economic	
effects	of	the	SARS	outbreak.		Hardiman	further	elaborated	the	economic	benefits	of	
prompt	actions	(i.e.	rapid	notification	of	disease	events)	in	the	outbreak	by	countries	in	
an	era	of	global	economy.486		
First	of	all,	it	won’t	be	successful	in	hiding	[an	outbreak].	Also,	if	you	are	hiding	
something,	the	consequences	generally	will	be	worse	than	[if]	you	transparently	
report	it	and	deal	with	the	problem.	There	are	consequences	internally	and	
externally.		Internally,	the	fact	is	that	such	an	event	won’t	get	controlled	if	you	hide	
it,	and	externally,	in	terms	of	both	trade	and	travel,	people	won’t	trust	you	and	they	
won’t	believe	that	you	are	doing	the	right	thing.	That	can	be	harmful	for	many	
countries.		Now	there	are	a	few	countries	which	could	be	an	exception	to	that.	But	
for	the	vast	majority	of	countries	now	because	of	globalization,	their	standing	
with	their	neighbours	and	the	rest	of	the	world,	particularly	[their]	trading	
partners	is	very	important.		There	is	a	very	strong	argument	that	being	seen	to	
be	doing	the	right	thing	in	terms	of	disease	control	in	public	health	protection	is	
going	to	improve	your	standing	with	your	trading	partners	and	the	opposite	will	
lead	to	distrust	[emphasis	added].487		
A	similar	rationale	was	given	by	Rodier.		When	asked	what	would	happen	if	a	member	
state	failed	to	notify	the	disease	events	out	of	economic	concerns,	he	mentioned	that	
“the	price	for	non‐compliance	will	be	damaged	image	and	potential	economic	losses,	
which	could	have	been	avoided.		A	country	that	knows	something	and	does	not	report	it	
may	make	a	short‐term	economic	gain	but	will	incur	long‐term	losses	when	it	gains	a	
reputation	as	being	unreliable	as	a	country	and	as	a	business	partner	[emphasis	
added].”488		
Beyond	the	international	reputation	associated	with	trade,	there	was	a	general	belief	
that	travel	advisories	would	prompt	the	countries	being	labelled	as	“contagious”	to	
respond	“more	efficiently”	to	the	outbreak	in	a	bid	to	minimize	economic	damages.	
Officials	at	the	WHO	noted	that	from	a	cost‐effective	perspective,	the	travel	advisories	
were	of	great	utility	in	terms	of	conjuring	up	the	motivation	and	determination	for	the	
governments	of	affected	countries	to	act	rapidly	because	“no	country	would	wish	to	be	
stigmatized	as	unsafe	or	contaminated.”489	
Beginning	in	April	2003,	findings	suggest	the	framing	of	the	issue	by	political	leaders	
was	shifting,	from	a	mainly	biomedical	problem	for	public	health	officials	to	solve,	to	an	
economic	problem	that	other	parts	of	government	needed	to	be	engaged	with.		The	
cancellations	of	major	airlines,	reduced	demand	for	services,	delays	in	foreign	
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investment,	loss	of	export	orders,	falls	in	the	stock	market	and	slumping	consumer	
confidence	all	contributed	to	compel	many	governments	of	the	affected	countries	to	act	
rapidly,	early	and	rigorously	in	order	to	uphold	their	standing	in	the	world	economy.	
Aggressive	media	coverage	also	provided	an	encouraging	environment	for	such	
developments.		For	example,	media	narratives	such	as	“Hong	Kong	turns	into	ghost	
town,	the	economy	is	another	casualty	of	SARS,”490	or	“Economies	sickened	by	the	virus,	
and	panic,”	491	presented	not	only	the	economic	impacts	of	the	outbreak	but	they	also	
constructed	what	is	expected	of	the	government	of	the	affected	nations	to	stop	the	
potential	economic	disaster.			
The	financial	sector	also	contributed	to	public	debate	about	SARS	using	a	strong	
economics	framing	of	the	issue.		It	was	argued	that,	unless	the	situation	was	brought	
quickly	under	control,	government	spending	could	be	diverted	from	investing	in,	
thereby	economic	development.		A	Citigroup	commentator	warned,	“Fiscal	deficits	are	
likely	to	widen	as	a	result	of	higher	health	care	spending	and	weaker	revenues.		If	the	
situation	gets	out	of	hand,	frankly	we	don’t	know	where	the	economic	bottom	is.”492	
Service	sectors	such	as	travel,	tourism,	restaurants	and	bars,	and	retailing	were	
struggling	to	cope	with	the	impacts	of	SARS:	“SARS	may	be	scary,	but	what	is	more	scary	
is	if	everyone	lost	confidence	and	stopped	spending.”493		Airlines	lamented,	“This	is	the	
worst	crisis	the	aviation	industry	has	seen.”494	
The	increasing	alarm	expressed	in	“economic	crisis”	narratives	by	the	business	sector	in	
the	region	led	to	the	emergence	of	a	“financial	contagion”	frame495	which	warned	that	
the	economic	crisis	emerging	in	Asia	would,	in	turn,	have	repercussions	for	the	rest	of	
the	global	economy.		A	JP	Morgan	economist	at	the	international	conference	in	Taiwan	
on	21	April	2003	argued,	“East	Asia	is	the	most	dynamic	region	in	the	global	economy,	so	
SARS	may	add	a	further	blow	to	the	net	performance	of	the	global	economy	at	large.”496		
Another	economist	said	that	if	the	outbreak	and	related	fears	proved	enduring,	one	
casualty	could	be	the	growing	integration	of	the	global	economy:		“[J]ust	as	business	got	
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used	to	the	idea	of	the	globe	being	a	village,	along	comes	a	virus	that	affects	something	as	
fundamental	to	business	as	travel	itself.”497	
Importantly,	the	“economic	crisis”	narrative	refocused	the	international	community’s	
attentions	so	much	that	the	economic	ramifications	of	SARS	began	to	dominate	as	
evidenced	in	statements	by	political	leaders	on	SARS.		The	core	idea	expressed	was	that	
international	trade	and	financial	flow	were	central	to	national	interests	and,	therefore,	
that	major	business	interests	should	be	prioritised	in	terms	of	the	policies	adopted.		
This	frame	also	held	that	what	is	good	for	business	and	the	nation’s	economic	interests	
is	good	for	everyone.		In	Singapore,	the	prime	minister	Go	Chok	Tong	maintained,	“If	we	
fail	to	contain	SARS,	it	may	well	become	the	worst	crisis	our	country	has	faced.	SARS	will	
knock	you	backward,	it	may	even	kill	you,	but	I	can	tell	you	SARS	can	kill	the	economy	and	
all	of	us	will	be	killed	by	the	collapsing	economy.”498		In	Hong	Kong,	Chief	Executive	Tung	
Chee	Hwa	appointed	Financial	Secretary	Anthony	Leung	to	lead	the	high‐profile	task	
force	in	a	bid	to	“restore	Hong	Kong’s	tarnished	international	image	and	revitalise	the	
economy.”499		He	added,	“We	need	to	get	the	economy	going	again.”500		In	China,	after	the	
Politburo	meeting	on	29	April	2003,	President	Hu	Jintao	and	senior	leaders	emphasised,	
“every	district	and	every	government	agency	must	use	a	high	degree	of	efforts	to	deal	with	
SARS	and	pay	particular	attention	to	its	impact	on	the	economy.	On	the	one	hand,	we	must	
grasp	SARS.	On	the	other	hand,	we	must	continue	our	economic	construction.”501	
Statements	following	the	issuance	of	travel	advisories	by	WHO	also	demonstrated	the	
primary	concern	by	country	to	their	standing	in	the	world	economy.	One	informant	in	
Hong	Kong	stated	that	the	government’s	initial	reaction	was	to	call	for	the	public	to	calm	
down	and	to	trust	authorities	to	handle,	what	they	described	as	“isolated	cases.”		As	
noted	in	the	previous	section,	other	than	issuing	alerts	to	hospitals,	the	Hong	Kong	
government	refused	to	implement	stringent	health	measures	in	the	early	phase	of	the	
SARS	outbreak,	precisely	because	officials	did	not	wish	for	the	outbreak	to	impact	the	
city’s	economic	prosperity.	The	informant	stated,		
There	was	a	big	political	agenda	here.		Government	officials	in	Hong	Kong	were	
frightened	of	the	media	and	they	were	frightened	about	the	economic	impact	in	
Hong	Kong.		There	was	[a]	tendency	to	try	and	smooth	out	all	these	issues	in	a	way	
that	created	the	impression	that	everything	was	under	control	and	the	epidemic	
will	be	short‐lived,	the	treatment	was	working	and	outcomes	were	not	too	bad.502		
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In	an	effort	to	prevent	economic	impacts,	the	Secretary	of	Health,	Welfare	and	Food,	Dr.	
Yeoh	Eng‐Kiong,	insisting	that	“Hong	Kong	is	very	safe.		It	is	no	different	from	going	to	
any	big	city	in	the	world”.503		Similarly,	Health	Canada	was	quick	to	declare	that	the	
country	was	safe	to	visit,	advising	that	“travel	to	any	destination	in	Canada	is	safe	and	
may	be	undertaken	in	the	same	manner	as	one	usually	would	with	respect	to	transport,	
accommodation,	meals,	entertainment,	business	and	family	engagements	whether	arriving	
from	overseas	or	travelling	domestically”.504		Despite	these	assurances,	the	travel	
advisory	was	followed	by	cancellations	of	conventions	and	losses	to	the	local	tourism	
industry,	which	employed	some	95,000	people.		Economists	estimated	that	SARS	cost	
the	country	Cdn$30	million	per	day	and	shaved	1%	off	economic	growth.	
The	Hong	Kong	and	Canadian	governments	then	worked	hard	to	have	the	WHO	travel	
advisories	lifted.		The	Hong	Kong	government	lobbied	hard	at	the	World	Health	
Assembly,	pointing	out	that	WHO’s	recommended	measures	such	as	temperature	
checks	at	border	points	had	been	instituted.505		Senior	Canadian	health	officials	
travelled	to	Geneva	on	28	April	to	try	to	persuade	the	WHO’s	senior	management	group	
–	the	DG,	the	executive	director	of	communicable	diseases,	the	heads	of	science,	
epidemiological	and	clinical	groups	and	their	support	staff,	along	with	regional	
directors	from	around	the	world	linked	by	phone	–	to	retract	the	advisory	that	visitors	
should	put	off	unnecessary	travel	to	Toronto.	As	a	concession,	Federal	Health	Minister	
Anne	McLellan	stated	that	the	government	was	willing	to	introduce	infrared	machines	
in	Toronto’s	international	airport	to	screen	passengers.506	
Findings	suggest	that	economic	framing	also	characterised	public	health	measures	
adopted	in	Taiwan.		A	WHO	official	on	a	mission	to	Taiwan	noted	that	travel	advisories	
had	prompted	the	government	to	take	prompt	action:		
Their	economy	was	dramatically	affected	by	the	outbreak.	The	shops	were	empty	
and	there	were	shop	keepers	really	suffering.	I	think	they	[Taiwanese	officials]	
recognized	that	if	they	did	not	control	this	[the	outbreak]	very	quickly,	not	only	
would	there	been	real	stress	on	the	health	system	but	there	would	have	been	
unbearable	consequences	as	the	economy	was	suffering.	So	they	recognized	that	
they	had	to	work	very	hard	and	act	promptly.	There	was	very	strong	
encouragement	for	collaboration.507	
Until	21	April	2003,	little	action	had	been	taken	regarding	the	sporadic	cases.	When	
WHO	changed	Taiwan’s	designation,	from	an	affected	area	to	an	area	with	limited	local	
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transmission,	Taiwan	hosted	an	international	conference	on	SARS	on	20‐21	April	to	
showcase	its	achievements.		However,	cases	escalated	sharply	after	22	April.508		WHO	
issued	a	travel	warning	on	Taiwan	on	2	May	2003	after	reviewing	information	about	the	
magnitude	of	the	outbreak.		Another	official	dispatched	to	Taiwan	from	the	WHO	
headquarters	explained	that	the	principal	concern	of	the	government	of	Taiwan	was	the	
potential	economic	impact	of	the	advisory.		Taiwanese	authorities	were	thus	strongly	
motivated	to	conform	to	WHO	policy	recommendations	in	order	to	have	the	advisories	
removed:				
They	[the	Taiwanese	government]	just	wanted	to	get	the	travel	advisories	removed.	
They	were	telling	me	the	Taiwanese	economy	was	losing	billions	of	billions	of	
dollars	because	they	couldn’t	trade.	Their	goods	even	couldn’t	move	around	the	
world	because	nobody	wanted	to	accept	the	containers	from	Taiwan.	They	had	
huge	political	problems.	Once,	the	head	of	SARS	Task	Force	and	the	Minister	of	
Health	wanted	to	invite	me	for	dinner.	I	told	them	that	I	could	not	join	because	I	
got	a	teleconference	8‐9	pm	[with	the	senior	WHO	HQ	medical	officials]	in	the	
evening.	Then	they	said	that	they	would	wait	for	me.	The	Minister	and	the	Deputy	
Minister,	the	Head	of	SARS	Task	Force	Team,	and	the	whole	cabinet	all	waited	for	
me	just	to	find	out	what	the	situation	was.	They	were	very	worried	about	what	the	
WHO	[officials]	was	going	to	say	about	the	travel	advisories.509		
This	statement	suggests	that	affected	countries	were	not	primarily	driven	by	a	sense	of	
collective	vulnerability,	or	a	desire	to	protect	the	population	from	the	spread	of	SARS,	
but	from	economic	concerns.		For	national	policy	makers	and	political	leaders,	it	was	
seen	as	important	to	reassure	WHO	officials	that	the	outbreak	was	contained.		A	senior	
government	official	in	Singapore	stated	that	forceful	public	health	measures	(e.g.	
screening	and	public	identification	of	index	case,	etc)	and	early	action	could	be	justified.		
He	stated	that	certain	interventions	would	avoid	“negative	feedback”	(i.e.	travel	
advisories	from	the	WHO	or	unilateral	travel	warnings	from	other	countries)	and	thus	
adverse	economic	consequences.		In	his	belief,	such	actions	were	justified	as	cost‐
effective.		Since	the	SARS	outbreak	was	perceived	by	national	policy	makers	as	an	
emergency,	both	in	terms	of	economic	and	security	consequences,	other	issues	such	as	
human	rights	of	the	people	did	not	receive	sufficient	attention	during	this	time.	
The	main	point	is	that	outbreak	is	not	just	a	medical	problem	or	a	public	health	
problem.	In	Singapore’s	case,	[the]	SARS	outbreak	was	a	national	crisis	because	it	
had	huge	effects	on	tourism,	trade,	and	economy	as	well	as	health.		We	
quarantined	everybody.	Let’s	say	we	didn’t	quarantine	people.	Once	we	start	seeing	
it	[outbreak]	after	one	or	two	weeks	here	and	there	with	cases	popping	up,	what	
policy	options	would	you	have	then?		Clearly	you	have	zero	[options]	unless	you	do	
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like	what	the	Chinese	did,	i.e.	everybody	stays	at	home	for	two	weeks.		So	the	cost	
of	quarantining	2,000	people	now	is	lower	than	not	doing	anything	and	
having	to	come	to	the	final	step	like	everyone	stays	at	home.		On	balance,	I	
think	it	is	better	to	move	before.	And	also	in	[the]	international	community,	it	is	
very	important	to	give	the	information	that	you	are	containing	it.		If	you	do	
nothing	and	if	you	hold	the	information,	the	situation	becomes	worse	like	Beijing.	
That’s	why	we	went	ahead	and	quarantined	everybody	[emphasis	added].510		
A	WHO	official,	on	mission	to	Singapore	during	the	SARS	outbreak,	believed	that	
countries	heavily	dependent	on	the	services	sector	such	as	Singapore	were	more	
forceful	in	measures	adopted	due	to	the	potentially	high	economic	impact.		She	stated,		
You	can	see,	in	Canada,	perhaps	the	US	and	Singapore,	the	mentality	to	obey	strict	
measures.	The	Singapore	government	was	convinced	by	the	economic	risks	as	they	
heavily	relied	on	trade	and	travel.	So	if	they	don’t	implement	strong	measures,	the	
economic	consequences	will	be	huge.511		
	
5.3.1.2.	Defensive	patenting:	a	market‐driven	mechanism	for	developing	vaccine		
	
During	April	and	May	2003,	the	neoliberal	economic	discourse	lay	behind	the	
development	of	a	SARS	vaccine.		As	described	in	Chapter	Three,	the	neoliberal	economic	
discourse	captures	strong	elements	of	economic	incentives	and	motivation.	The	
discourse	was	strongly	present	in	arguments	that	sought	to	legitimize	the	market‐based	
approach	to	SARS	vaccine	research	and	development.		Similarly	it	was	used	as	a	
rationale	for	the	advent	of	certain	measures	in	the	combating	of	SARS,	namely	
“defensive	patenting”	and	“patent	pooling”.	It	was	principally	driven	by	the	ideas	that	
public	health	challenges,	such	as	SARS,	should	be	tackled	within	existing	measures	and	
flexibilities	available	under	the	Agreement	on	Trade	Related	Intellectual	Property	
Rights	(TRIPS).		
	
The	basic	idea	advocated	by	this	discourse	was	that	drug	research	and	development,	
protected	under	IP	rights,	generates	the	necessary	economic	incentives	for	companies	
to	invest	in,	refine,	produce	and	market	necessary	medicines.		Efforts	to	develop	a	SARS	
vaccine	can	be	traced	back	to	when	the	WHO	announced	that	“a	new	pathogen,	a	
member	of	the	coronavirus	family	never	before	seen	in	humans,	is	the	cause	of	severe	acute	
respiratory	syndrome	(SARS).”512	After	the	coronavirus	was	identified,	there	was	an	
ongoing	interest	in,	and	high	hopes	for,	the	development	of	diagnostic	tools	and	a	
vaccine.		In	relation	to	the	development	of	new	SARS	vaccine,	Stohr	stated,	
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The	foundation	for	developing	a	vaccine	is	to	have	the	virus.	Therefore,	we	are	
really	proud	and	very	pleased	that	we	have	[mapped	out]	the	virus…we	know	now	
that	we	can	start	developing	a	vaccine	and	there	is	discussion	ongoing	in	the	US,	for	
instance,	about	the	development	of	the	vaccine…we	are	giving	characterized	virus	
to	vaccine	companies	and	there	is	serious	discussion	about	this”.513	
Similarly,	Gerberding	noted	in	the	New	England	Journal	of	Medicine	that	“there	is	a	
reason	to	be	optimistic	about	future	control	measures.	Vaccines	[have	been]	successful	in	
preventing	coronavirus	infection	in	animals,	and	the	development	of	an	effective	vaccine	
against	this	new	coronavirus	is	a	realistic	possibility.”514	
While	it	is	argued	that	international	collaboration	on	the	identification	of	the	SARS	virus	
was	framed	as	a	global	public	good,	some	scientists	reframed	subsequent	research	in	
terms	of	commercial	rights.		This	is	evidenced	by	the	battle	to	patent	the	coronavirus	by	
three	key	laboratories:	the	US	CDC,	the	British	Columbia	Cancer	Agency	(BCCA	in	
Canada)	and	Versitech	Limited,	the	commercial	arm	of	the	University	of	Hong	Kong.		
Although	enthusiasm	for	developing	and	patenting	a	vaccine	later	waned,	owing	to	the	
one‐off	nature	of	the	SARS	epidemic	and	thus	economic	returns	for	such	a	product,	the	
competition	sparked	concerns	about	equitable	access	to	medicines.	Initially,	the	three	
institutions	justified	their	patent	application	to	ensure	access	to	the	virus	for	research	
and	other	purposes.515		Director	of	the	US	CDC	Gerberding	said	during	a	telebriefing,	
The	concern	that	the	[US}	federal	government	is	looking	at	right	now	is	that	we	
could	be	locked	out	of	this	opportunity	to	work	with	this	virus	if	it’s	patented	by	
someone	else,	and	so	by	initiating	steps	to	secure	patent	rights,	we	assure	that	we	
will	be	able	to	continue	to	make	the	virus	and	the	products	from	the	virus	
available	in	the	public	domain,	and	that	we	can	continue	to	promote	the	rapid	
technological	transfer	of	this	biomedical	information	into	tools	and	products	that	
are	useful	to	patients.		So	from	our	standpoint,	it’s	a	protective	measure	to	make	
sure	that	the	access	to	the	virus	remains	open	for	everyone	[emphasis	added].516	
	
While	Gerberding	did	not	mention	motivations	of	profit,	her	statement	reflected	fears	
that	others	might	deny	the	CDC	from	accessing	the	vaccine	technology.		This	concern	
was	also	evident	in	the	words	of	the	Director	of	the	BCCA,	Samuel	Abraham,	who	argued	
that	defensive	patenting	was	the	best	means	of	protecting	public	benefits	from	research	
on	the	SARS	virus.517		In	collaboration	with	a	number	of	institutions	–	National	
Microbiology	Laboratory,	British	Columbia	Centre	for	Disease	Control,	University	of	
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British	Columbia	Centre	for	Disease	Control,	and	the	University	of	Victoria’s	Department	
of	Biochemistry	and	Microbiology	–	the	BCCA	completed	the	first	publicly	available	
draft	sequence	for	a	coronavirus	implicated	in	SARS.		The	research	was	published	in	
Science	with	the	conclusion	that	it	“will	assist	in	the	development	of	antiviral	
treatments,	including	neutralizing	antibodies	and	development	of	a	vaccine	to	treat	this	
emerging	and	deadly	disease”.518			The	BCCA	claimed	to	create	an	open	playing	field	for	
all	researchers	while	professing	not	to	lock	down	future	profits	from	tests	or	treatments	
for	SARS.		Abraham	also	remarked,		
	
Most	research	institutions	and	most	scientists	have	a	knee‐jerk	reaction	when	they	
hear	a	patent	has	been	filed.	They	read	it	as	someone	trying	to	corner	the	market.	
We’re	making	sure	the	market	is	not	cornered	[emphasis	added].519	
Scientists	at	the	University	of	Hong	Kong,	the	first	institution	to	identify	the	coronavirus	
as	a	possible	cause	of	SARS,	were	also	engaged	in	SARS	virus	research	led	by	Professor	
Malik	Peiris.	520		Peiris	claimed	not	to	be	interested	in	patenting	the	gene	sequence	but,	
when	others	sought	patents,	the	HKU	team	via	Versitech	did	so	too.521			In	a		Lancet	
commentary,	Richard	Gold	of	McGill	University	asserted	that	both	the	CDC’s	and	BCCA’s	
patent	option	served	the	“public	good”	and	“provide[d]	them	with	more	leverage	in	
dealing	with	the	University	of	Hong	Kong’s	[presumably	profit‐making]	Veritech	Ltd.,”522		
Vice‐Chancellor	of	the	University	of	Hong	Kong	Lap‐Chee	Tsui	rebutted,	
I	wish	to	make	clear	that	HKU	is	a	research‐led	institution,	committed	to	the	public	
cause	of	higher	education	and	benefiting	society.		Versitech	is	a	technology	transfer	
company,	established	in	accordance	with	good	practices	of	international	
universities	to	handle	HKU’s	intellectual	properties.		Neither	HKU	nor	Versitech	are	
profit‐seeking	organisations,	and	they	both	hold	the	same	view	as	CDC	and	BCCA	–	
namely,	to	serve	the	public.		HKU	is	committed	to	sharing	its	research	results	
with	society;	locally,	regionally,	and	internationally.		We	will	continue	to	build	
up	our	research	strength,	but	we	cannot	hope	to	share	the	benefits	of	our	newly	
found	knowledge	if	we	do	not	properly	manage	our	intellectual	property	rights	
[emphasis	added].523	
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On	the	surface,	the	University	of	Hong	Kong’s	application	does	not	seem	profit‐driven,	
but	intended	to	ensure	“further	research	and	development”.524		The	contest	to	patent	
the	SARS	virus	renewed	the	debate	about	the	notion	of	a	global	public	good	based	on	
human	rights	for	health	and	economic	incentives	surrounding	the	virus	under	the	broad	
label	of	neoliberal	intellectual	property	rights.	
While	these	institutions	argued	that	their	applications	were	intended	to	keep	SARS	
research	in	the	public	domain,	it	was	also	understood	that	patents	would	inevitably	
allow	researchers	to	protect	their	work	and	possibly	lead	to	pharmaceutical	drug	
royalties.		This	was	evidenced	by	one	of	the	applicants	who	conceded	that	the	discovery	
of	the	coronavirus	sequence	could	end	up	being	a	financial	bonus.		“The	royalties	were	
there	to	be	reaped	at	a	later	date,	and	these	royalties	would	come	back	to	basically	foster	
further	research	here.		That	would	be	a	goal	of	any	office	of	our	type”.525		His	
acknowledgement	was	further	supported	by	the	president	of	the	Canadian	Institutes	of	
Health	Research,	Alan	Berstein,	who	commented	that	“it	would	not	be	unreasonable	if	
the	discoverers	sought	to	make	a	profit”.526		The	commercialisation	of	SARS	research	was	
supported	by	pharmaceutical	manufacturers	and	biotechnology	companies	filing	
provisional	patents	with	reference	to	the	diagnostics,	vaccines	and	pharmaceutical	
drugs	relating	to	the	SARS	virus.		For	instance,	Roche	announced	in	July	2003	a	product	
designed	to	detect	the	SARS	virus	using	the	LightCycler	instrument	based	on	Roche’s	
patented	PCR	(polymerase	chain	reaction)	technologies.527		Viragen,	a	pharmaceutical	
company	collaborating	with	the	Genome	Institute	of	Singapore	(a	government	research	
organization),	filed	a	patent	application	in	the	hope	of	increasing	the	commercialization	
of	the	SARS	virus.		The	company’s	director	of	technology	and	projects	coordinator	
stated, 
We	are	positioning	our	patent	not	only	for	the	treatment	of	SARS,	but	also	to	
include	prophylactic	properties	which	may	prevent	infection	from	occurring.		We	
plan	to	use	this	data	as	a	platform	to	achieve	a	broad	proprietary	position	for	SARS	
in	many	international	jurisdictions	and	therefore	to	continue	to	enhance	Viragen’s	
growing	intellectual	property	portfolio”.528	
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This	suggests	moves	to	commercialise	medical	technologies	and	drugs	related	to	SARS.		
Commercial	imperatives	were	also	evidenced	by	the	rising	stock	prices	of	biotechnology	
companies	seeking	a	SARS	vaccine529			
As	a	result,	there	were	growing	concerns	raised	about	public	research	institutions	
seeking	to	commercialize	patents.		In	an	editorial	in	Nature,	for	example,	such	concerns	
were	expressed	as	follows:		
When	pre‐emptive	patenting	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	rapid	solutions	are	found	
to	an	important	health	problem,	something	seems	to	be	out	of	balance.		Policy‐
makers	should	investigate	what	checks	and	balances	are	necessary	to	ensure	that	
the	patent	system	continues	to	do	its	job	of	stimulating	innovation	for	the	public	
good.	530				
Importantly,	these	developments	illustrate	how	vested	interests,	within	an	economics	
frame,	have	shaped	SARS	vaccine	research.		While	key	scientists	defined	the	patenting	
issue	as	securing	public	access	to	scientific	information	based	on	the	GPG	approach,	
they	also	believed	that	scientific	research	should	be	given	incentives	and	
encouragement	through	an	appropriate	rewarding	system	such	as	the	patenting	of	
research.		As	the	competitive	pursuit	to	pre‐emptively	patent	the	SARS	virus	
progressed,	it	precipitated	a	commercialized	approach	towards	SARS	vaccine	research.		
This	is	still	the	case	even	as	concerns	were	raised	in	relation	to	equitable	access	to	
medicines,	especially	if	the	disease	continued	to	thrive	and	to	cause	a	huge	number	of	
deaths	in	the	least	developed	countries.		An	editorial	in	the	New	Scientist	further	
observed,	“We	could	even	develop	in	record	time…but	if	past	history	is	anything	to	go	by	
the	vaccine	will	then	be	sold	for	a	high	price	so	the	rich	get	it	and	the	poor	don’t.”531		
With	reference	to	these	debates,	WHO	issued	a	position	statement	on	29	May	2003	
asserting	that	defensive	patenting	was	essential	in	order	to	recognize	“the	researchers’	
efforts	and	to	reward	their	discoveries	(and	further	discoveries	derived	therefrom	by	other	
researchers	premised	on	earlier	works).	Therefore	it	is	in	the	best	collaborative	traditions	
of	biomedical	science.”532		This	statement	suggests	that	WHO	officials	accepted	the	
existence	of	competition	to	patent	a	SARS	vaccine,	and	the	offering	of	financial	rewards	
as	a	legitimate	motivation.		WHO	did	not	engage	in	deeper	philosophical	debates	about	
the	appropriateness	of	defensive	patenting	and	the	role	of	market	forces	in	vaccine	
development.			
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Brundtland	recognised	the	public	health	concerns	with	respect	to	potentially	
inequitable	access	to	the	SARS	vaccines	under	the	TRIPS	regime.		Yet	she	was	not	keen	
enough	to	push	the	access	issue	forward	to	address	the	potential	problem.		Instead,	she	
chose	to	highlight	to	the	community	at	large	that	competition	over	patenting	should	not	
undermine	research	innovation	and	international	research	into	SARS	vaccines.		In	her	
speech	to	the	2003	World	Health	Assembly,	Brundtland	asserted,		
In	our	fight	against	ill‐health,	we	do	not	have	all	the	tools	we	need.	Innovation	and	
the	protection	of	intellectual	property	are	closely	linked.	Ensuring	that	patent	
regimes	stimulate	research	and	do	not	hinder	international	scientific	cooperation	is	
a	critical	challenge	–	whether	the	target	is	SARS	or	any	other	threat	to	human	
health.533	
Likewise,	Marie‐Paule	Kienv,	Director	of	the	WHO	Initiative	for	Vaccine	Research,	
commented	that	“If	we	are	to	develop	a	SARS	vaccine	more	quickly	than	usual,	we	have	to	
continue	to	work	together	on	many	fronts	at	once	–	on	scientific	research,	intellectual	
property	and	patents	issues	and	accessibility”.534	By	publicly	accepting	that	the	TRIPS	
regime	was	an	essential	aspect	of	SARS	vaccine	development,	senior	officials	at	the	
WHO	evaded	wider	questions	about	equity,	access	and	affordability.	It	was	clear	that	
WHO	officials	remained	unwilling	to	take	a	role	in	challenging	this	status	quo,	at	that	
point,	and	thus	helping	to	address	the	issue	of	affordable	access	to	SARS	vaccines.		
In	contrast,	at	the	56th	World	Health	Assembly	held	in	May	2003	in	respect	to	
Intellectual	Property	Rights,	Innovation	and	Public	Health,	member	states	maintained,		
Taking	into	account	that	in	order	to	tackle	new	public	health	problems	with	
international	impact,	such	as	the	emergence	of	severe	acute	respiratory	syndrome	
(SARS),	access	to	new	medicines	with	potential	therapeutic	effect,	and	health	
innovations	and	discoveries	should	be	universally	available	without	
discrimination	[emphasis	added].535	
In	recognition	of	the	serious	threat	SARS	posed	to	global	health	security,	member	states	
also	requested	the	WHO	to	“mobilize	global	scientific	research	to	improve	understanding	
of	the	disease	and	to	develop	control	tools	such	as	diagnostic	tests,	drugs	and	vaccines	that	
are	accessible	to	and	affordable	by	Member	States,	especially	developing	countries	and	
countries	with	economies	in	transition”.536		
In	order	to	break	through	this	impasse,	a	WHO	SARS	consultation	group	was	set	up.		
The	main	concern	of	WHO	officials	was	that	the	numerous	patents	granted	would	
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adversely	affect	the	research	and	development	of	a	vaccine	for	the	SARS	virus.		The	
SARS	Consultation	Group	and	key	SARS	intellectual	property	owners	including	BCCA,	US	
CDC,	Veritech	Ltd.	and	CoroNovative	BV	–	a	company	spun	out	of	the	Erasmus	Group	
that	joined	the	patent	race	later	on	–	created	the	“SARS	IP	Working	Group”.		The	group,	
comprised	of	key	stakeholders,	filed	for	defensive	patenting,	suggesting	that	a	patent	
pool	should	be	established	to	promote	the	development	of	a	treatment	or	vaccine.		It	
proposed,	“A	strategy	be	developed,	in	consultation	with	stakeholders,	to	address	
potential	SARS	coronavirus	related	intellectual	property	issues	and,	thus,	enhance	
development	of	intervention	approaches”.537		The	potential	for	the	creation	of	the	patent	
pool	was	initially	discussed	in	2005	and	the	relevant	parties	have	been	identified.		One	
of	the	stakeholders,	the	Erasmus	Lab	(led	by	Professor	Albert	Osterhaus)	strongly	
promoted	the	idea	of	a	patent	pool	through	a	paper	published	in	the	Bulletin	of	the	
World	Health	Organization.		They	stated	that	a	patent	pool	would	ensure	the	
development	of	SARS	vaccines	by	driving	competition	away	from	access	to	IP	rights.	
Ironically	however,	they	noted	that	compulsory	licensing	–	which	allows	a	country	to	
issue	a	license	for	the	manufacture	of		drugs	without	the	consent	of	the	patent	owner	–	
undermines	investment	into	research	and	development.	They	claimed,		
Should	governments	interfere	with	this	system	[IP	rights]	in	any	but	the	most	
severe	of	emergencies,	they	risk	undermining	trust	in	the	patent	system	with	
resultant	detrimental	effects	on	investment	in	innovative	ideas.	It	would	be	better	
to	set	up	market‐driven	mechanisms	to	resolve	issues	where	possible.538	
What	the	above	statement	suggests	is	that	people	involved	in	the	working	group	were	
in	favour	of	a	market‐driven	framing	of	SARS	vaccine	development	under	the	broad	
label	of	a	patent	pool.		They	believed	that	joint	ownership	of	a	patent	among	those	
discoverers	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	monetary	investment	on	SARS	vaccine	
development	and	technologies.		Within	this	frame,	lower	priority	was	assigned	to	
concerns	such	as	the	affordability	of	drugs	in	developing	countries.		The	patent	pool	was	
a	strategic	framework	to	highlight	the	importance	of	the	advancement	of	innovative	
products	in	the	context	of	the	TRIPS	regime.		Yet	counter‐measures	and	flexibilities	
available	to	countries	were	largely	defined	as	a	barrier	to	innovation,	framing	it	as	
jeopardizing	trust.	
The	concept	of	a	patent	pool	received	support	from	WHO.539		The	WHO’s	official	policy	
was	that	any	discussion	of	vaccine	development	was	to	be	guided	by	“how	patents	and	
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intellectual	property	issues	and	their	safeguards	can	help	rather	than	hinder	the	
rapid	development	of	SARS	vaccines	[emphasis	added]”.540		Subsequently,	two	major	law	
firms	expressed	their	interest	in	providing	pro	bono	services	to	evaluate	the	suitability	
of	each	patent	application	for	incorporation	into	a	patent	pool.541	542		This	episode	sheds	
light	on	how	a	neo‐liberal	economic	discourse	triumphed	over	alternative	approaches	
to	SARS	vaccine	development	such	as	human	rights	and	global	public	goods	discourses.	
This	issue	reveals	the	tensions	between	the	two	different	discourses	of	human	rights	
and	economism	in	how	vaccine	research	should	be	approached.		
5.3.2.	The	Securitisation	of	SARS		
	
Alongside	the	ascendance	of	the	economic	discourse	during	the	first	two	stages	of	the	
outbreak,	this	research	finds	that	these	arguments	then	merged	with	the	security	
discourse.		As	SARS	came	to	be	increasingly	addressed	in	economic	terms,	with	impact	
most	frequently	quantified	by	monetary	measures,	SARS	also	began	to	be	framed	as	a	
clear	and	present	security	threat	to	countries	around	the	world	requiring	immediate	
and	pre‐emptive	actions.		At	a	press	briefing	on	11	April	2003,	Mike	Ryan	stated,	 
The	global	SARS	alert	was	a	direct	response	to	a	specific	threat	identified	by	the	
global	alert	and	response	system.		This	allowed	the	early	identification	of	cases	in	
other	countries	and	has,	to	a	great	extent,	allowed	those	countries	who	have	
imported	cases	to	immediately	contain	the	threat	of	local	transmission	in	their	
own	populations…	WHO	is	also	using	other	information	sources,	such	as	the	
media,	UN	organizations	and	partners	in	the	Global	Outbreak	Alert	and	Response	
Network	(GOARN)	to	identify	areas	in	which	new	cases	may	occur,	and	
immediately	and	actively	follows	up	with	those	countries	to	establish	whether	
cases	are	occurring	and	what	measures	countries	are	implementing	to	ensure	
containment	[emphasis	added].543	
By	means	of	sourcing	information	on	the	outbreak	from	various	sources,	WHO	posted	
travel	guidelines	entitled	“areas	with	recent	local	transmission	of	SARS”	on	its	website	
in	an	attempt	to	contain	certain	kinds	of	travellers	from	areas	that	were	associated	with	
the	SARS	virus.		Here,	the	asymptomatic	carriers	of	diseases	have	been	classified	as	
“suspects”	who	could	possibly	threaten	the	populations	concerned.		As	Heymann	noted,		 
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Cases	[infected	with	SARS]	have	been	on	airplanes.	People	sitting	near	those	
patients,	or	airline	crew	[who]	might	have	been	infected	by	those	people	are	now	
[viewed	as]	“suspects”	and	they	are	being	observed	[emphasis	added].544		
The	framing	of	disease	control	measures	as	a	security	matter	was	also	highlighted	by	
the	declared	need	for	more	“detectives”	in	regards	to	contact	tracing	in	a	search	for	
“suspects”	and	imposition	of	other	ways	of	intervention.	For	example,	with	reference	to	
the	Amoy	Garden	outbreak	in	Hong	Kong	during	a	press	conference	held	on	1	April,	
Heymann	argued,		 	
I	understand	from	you	and	from	others,	that	all	these	apartments	are	one	on	top	of	
the	other	–	the	known	patient	lives	in	one	apartment	and	the	others	all	live	in	that	
same	group.	So	this	is	where	epidemiological	detective	work	begins	[emphasis	
added].545		
In	this	case,	the	SARS	outbreak	was	commonly	constructed	through	military	rhetoric546	
in	which	public	health	experts	were	cast	as	playing	a	key	role.		The	role	of	surveillance	
and	scientists547	were	described	by	Rodier	as	follows:		  
Again	the	containment	of	these	exported	cases	is	properly	done	and	now	the	focus	
is	certainly	on	more	case	finding	and	contact	tracing	in	these	two	large	foci,	mainly	
Hong	Kong	and	Guangdong	province.		And	that	requires	a	lot	of	ground	troops,	
epidemiologists	in	the	field.	Interviewing	patients	and	possible	contacts	and	
following	these	contacts	is	a	large	task	requiring	discipline,	but	that,	I	think,	is	
going	well	and	at	the	moment	the	key	point	is	to	keep	surveillance	going	globally	
[emphasis	added].548	
Likewise,	one	WHO	official	who	was	an	advisor	to	WPRO’s	Division	of	Communicable	
Diseases	Surveillance	employed	military	language	to	describe	the	role	of	experts. 
They	[the	external	experts	invited]	were	working	in	a	university,	one	working	at	
UNICEF,	others	freelance.		All	those	staff	while	[it’s]	business	as	usual	but	when	it	
comes	to	the	war,	we	have	the	legitimacy	to	call	all	those	people	to	develop	the	
guideline	[emphasis	added].549 
In	order	to	detect	the	“suspects”	early,	proactive	detection	and	surveillance	were	
particularly	stressed.		Heymann	further	stated,	
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A	high	proportion	of	new	and	emerging	infectious	diseases	come	from	developing	
countries,	often	those	least	equipped	to	detect	and	respond	to	them	early,	and	to	
contain	them	before	they	spread	internationally.		But	all	countries	are	vulnerable	
to	outbreaks	either	because	they	emerge	within	national	borders	or	present	
external	threats	through	international	spread…Across‐the‐board	strengthening	of	
national	[surveillance]	mechanisms	for	outbreak	alert	and	response	is	the	only	
rational	way	to	defend	public	health	security,	not	just	against	SARS	but	against	all	
future	infectious	disease	threats	[emphasis	added].550		
One	official	in	the	WHO	shared	this	idea,	stating,	
Member	states	repeatedly	failed	to	report	the	existence	of	emerging	and	re‐
emerging	infectious	disease	threats	such	as	SARS.		We	need	to	strengthen	
programmes	of	active	surveillance	for	disease	threats	to	ensure	that	efforts	are	
directed	to	early	detection	and	prompt	identification	of	virus.		It	is	a	concern	for	
national	and	global	health	security.	You	don’t	want	the	disease	to	come	in	and	
harm	your	people	[emphasis	added].551	
It	was	the	concept	of	epidemic	intelligence	paralleled	with	an	idea	of	enhanced	
intelligence	apparatus	by	the	US	government	that	attempted	to	identify	possible	and	
more	importantly	perceived	threats	during	this	time	period.		As	discussed	below,	a	
parallel	narrative	of	a	“war	against	SARS”	mirrored	the	“war	on	terror”	prevalent	during	
this	period.		The	global	response	to	SARS,	in	this	sense,	was	an	extension	of	national	
security	concerns.	In	this	regard,	the	inclusion	of	biosecurity	in	the	revision	of	IHR	2005	
was	demonstrative	of	the	widespread	recognition	of,	and	rationale	for,	improved	
surveillance	for	pathogens	posing	perceived	security	concerns.		With	reference	to	the	
revised	IHR,	another	WHO	official	concurred	with	Heymann’s	idea	on	enhanced	
surveillance:		
We	need	to	heighten	the	detection	standard.		We	[WHO]	were	conscious	of	the	
limitations	of	and	problems	inherent	in	surveillance	system	during	SARS.		It	was	
clear	that	the	IHR	(1969)	was	not	effective	for	protecting	people	from	the	threats	
posed	by	SARS.		The	IHR	2005	is	clearly	intended	to	achieve	global	health	security	
by	providing	countries	with	criteria	for	events	that	may	constitute	a	public	health	
emergency	of	international	concern.		This	means	that	countries	are	required	to	
report	all	local	cases	that	occur	within	their	territories	regardless	of	whether	they	
are	infectious	diseases	or	bioweapon	use.552		
This	view	was	further	extended	to	the	linkage	of	bioterrorism	with	health	security.		In	a	
press	release	on	the	WHO	website,	it	was	noted,		
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SARS	presents	a	number	of	very	clear	imperatives	for	business	as	well	as	for	
governments.		Developing	stronger	public	health	infrastructure	will	not	only	
address	the	immediate	threat	of	SARS,	but	will	also	form	the	basis	of	a	future	
safety‐net,	protecting	the	world	from	future	epidemics	and	even	[potential]	
bioterrorist	threats	[emphasis	added].553	
This	framing	was	followed	by	the	WHO	Director‐General	Brundtland’s	speech	at	the	
WHA	on	19	May	where	she	asserted,		
Globalization	of	disease	and	threats	to	health	means	the	globalization	of	the	fight	
against	them.	SARS	has	been	a	wakeup	call.		But	the	lessons	we	have	learnt	have	
implications	that	go	way	beyond	the	fight	against	this	public	health	threat.	
Effective	surveillance	and	rapid	response	is	an	essential	pillar	of	both	national	and	
international	security	[emphasis	added].554	
Importantly,	the	global	framing	SARS	as	a	security	issue	was	not	merely	rhetoric,	but	
shaped	the	policy	measures	pursued	at	the	national	level.		As	shown	below,	there	
appeared	to	be	a	convergence	between	the	prevailing	rhetoric,	generated	by	key	actors	
engaged	in	security	framing,	and	the	national	SARS	response.		Many	national	authorities	
declared	a	“war	against	the	viral	enemy”555.		One	measure	adopted	involved	isolation	of	
suspected	infected	people,	quarantine	of	close	contacts,	and	closure	of	public	spaces.		
This	was	extended	in	some	instances,	such	as	in	Singapore	or	Hong	Kong,	to	the	use	of	
the	military	or	police	to	enforce	containment	measures.		Thus	a	public	health	issue	
became	a	public	order	issue. 
In	Singapore,	employing	largely	military	language,	national	authorities	adopted	various	
surveillance	instruments	such	as	video	surveillance	camera	systems	and	electronic	
bracelets	to	enforce	quarantine,	supervised	by	a	security	agency.		These	measures	were	
framed	as	the	state’s	responsibility	to	protect	the	security	of	citizens	from	viral	assaults.		
Government	officials	used	military	language	to	rationalize	pre‐emptive	measures	aimed	
at	maintaining	the	safety	of	the	public.		For	example,	on	24	April,	Deputy	Prime	Minister	
Lee	Hsien	Loong	declared	the	country	officially	“at	war,	with	battles	being	waged	on	
three	fronts	–	public	health,	the	economy	and	society”.556		Referring	to	the	fight	against	
SARS	in	society,	he	further	added,	“This	is	the	most	critical	battlefront.	If	we	lose	this	
front,	we	will	lose	all	the	other	fronts,	and	lose	the	war.”	Similarly,	Minister	of	State	Ng	
argued,	 
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Infected	people	are	carriers	of	bombs	attached	on	them	by	the	SARS	enemy	and	
these	explosives	can	go	off	if	they	do	not	seek	help…The	SARS	combat	unit	is	
prepared	to	fight	the	enemy,	but	Singaporeans,	please	don’t	shoot	and	kill	your	
own	troops	[emphasis	added].557	 
The	military	rhetoric	continued	into	May	2003	when	Prime	Minister	Goh	stated,	at	the	
end	of	his	visit	to	the	US, 
Every	single	Singaporean	is	a	soldier	in	the	fight	against	SARS.	We	have	armed	
every	household	with	a	thermometer.	That’s	a	weapon.	We	involved	them	in	this	
fight	against	a	common	enemy	[emphasis	added].558 
Measures	taken	to	contain	the	disease	were	even	carried	out	by	the	military	itself.		For	
example,	the	“Infectious	Disease	Act”	was	amended	to	give	the	military	the	power	to	use	
any	means	necessary	to	stop	the	spread,	to	monitor	and	control	the	population,	and	to	
make	temperature	checks.		The	militarization	of	contact	tracing,	by	trained	military	
forces,	was	enforced	to	ensure	the	subsequent	quarantine	of	the	exposed	to	prevent	
further	spread	of	outbreak	in	the	community.559		Violations	of	individual	privacy	and	
rights	were	justified	in	terms	of	public	good	in	the	face	of	a	national	crisis	and	the	
government’s	responsibility	to	protect	the	security	of	citizens	against	the	virus.		Prime	
Minister	Goh	called	for	community	cooperation: 
For	the	wider	good,	we	now	have	to	take	a	tougher	approach	in	enforcing	Home	
Quarantine	Orders.		We	simply	cannot	afford	to	have	those	on	home	quarantine	
breach	it,	and	run	the	risk	of	going	undetected	for	SARS,	or	worse,	infecting	others.	
For	once	SARS	spreads	through	the	community,	we	risk	losing	control	of	it,	and	will	
not	be	able	to	isolate	and	contain	it.		Therefore,	from	now	on,	when	a	person	on	
home	quarantine	does	not	answer	the	telephone	calls	from	our	officials,	CISCO	[a	
statutory	board	under	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	in	Singapore	assigned	to	carry	
out	quarantine	orders]	officers	will	immediately	proceed	to	electronically‐tag	them,	
whether	or	not	they	have	broken	the	quarantine.560	 
Violators	of	quarantine	were	brought	before	the	criminal	court,	fined	and	imprisoned	
according	to	the	provisions	of	the	Infectious	Disease	Act.561 
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As	implementation	progressed,	concerns	began	to	be	raised	about	the	potential	cost	to	
civil	liberties	and	human	rights.		Minister	of	Home	Affairs	Wong	dismissed	suggestions	
that	the	measures	infringed	civil	liberties:	 
What	is	more	important?		Public	health,	the	safety	of	all	Singaporeans	or	just	some	
of	these	concerns	about	lack	of	freedom,	liberty,	etc.,	when	you	quarantine	a	person?	
You	better	quarantine	him.		Otherwise,	he	will	get	more	freedom	after	that	but	he	
may	be	dead.	Or	he	is	infecting	other	people	and	causing	them	great	disasters.562		 
In	the	city‐state	itself,	many	felt	that	the	state	was	overstepping	its	boundaries	as	the	
policing	body	increasingly	impinged	on	people’s	privacy	the	installation	of	web	cameras	
and	tagging	surveillance.		One	family,	under	a	mandatory	government	quarantine	order,	
asked	that	“the	relevant	authorities	enlighten	[them	on]	why	CISCO	personnel	had	to	
call	at	my	home	at	the	ungodly	hours	of	2.00	am	on	the	first	day	and	2.30	am	on	the	
second.”563		Despite	these	concerns,	Heymann	described	Singapore’s	handling	of	the	
crisis	as	“exemplary”.		Upon	Singapore’s	removal	from	the	list	of	areas	with	local	
transmission	of	SARS	in	May	2003,	he	commented	that	“this	is	an	inspiring	victory	that	
should	make	all	of	us	optimistic	that	SARS	can	be	contained	everywhere.”564 
In	Hong	Kong,	the	bureaucracy	staffed	by	medical	professionals	was	reluctant	to	impose	
quarantine	and	home	confinement	measures	due	to	their	belief	that	frightened	patients	
and	their	relatives	would	refuse	or	hide,	thus	posing	a	larger	problem.565		However,	with	
the	outbreak	in	the	Amoy	Gardens	apartment	block,	and	WHO	subsequently	issuing	a	
travel	advisory,	the	government	quickly	imposed	measures	comparable	to	Singapore	to	
get	the	travel	advisory	removed.		The	Hong	Kong	government	announced, 
Hong	Kong	is	currently	facing	its	most	serious	contagious	disease	threat	in	the	past	
fifty	years.		The	Government	will	join	forces	with	the	community	at	large	to	make	
every	effort	to	win	the	battle	against	the	disease…and	the	government	is	
confident	[it	will]	win	this	battle	[emphasis	added].566 
The	police	department’s	electronic	tracking	system	was	thus	used	to	enforce	
quarantines	and	contact	tracing.		The	police	department	website	stated,	 
It	has	to	be	remembered	that	the	war	against	SARS	was	not	a	police‐led	operation.	
Ultimate	authority,	with	legislated	regulatory	powers,	was	vested	in	the	Director	of	
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Health	(DH).	The	Police	could	support	the	DH	only	insofar	as	an	individual	refused	
to	cooperate	with	or	obey	the	instructions	of	DH	staff	[emphasis	added].567	 
While	contact	tracing	was	time‐intensive,	socially	disruptive	and	far	from	cost‐effective,	
the	measures	were	perceived	to	be	essential	to	maintaining	security.568		 
In	China,	Qi	Xiaoqiu,	Director	General	of	the	Ministry	of	Health’s	Department	of	Disease	
Control,	stated	in	May	that	“Despite	the	arduousness	of	the	current	tasks	against	SARS,	
we	have	no	doubt	we	will	be	able	to	win	this	battle…we	have	taken	various	and	
vigorous	measures	to	prevent	SARS	spreading	into	the	countryside	[emphasis	added]”.569	
The	Chinese	government	quarantined	more	than	10,000	individuals,	with	the	threat	of	
execution	for	violators.	 
International	spreading	of	pathogens	in	sudden	epidemics,	endangering	public	
security,	causing	serious	injuries	or	public	properties	will	attract	a	sentence	of	
imprisonment	for	a	minimum	of	10	years,	or	life	imprisonment	or	death	sentence	
[emphasis	added].570		
In	support	of	this	statement,	Bekedam	(WHO	China	representative)	contended	that	
people	must	act	responsibly.	“I	think	it	sounds	very	tough	but	I	do	believe	that	people	
have	a	certain	responsibility	and	it’s	very	important	that	people	understand	what	that	
responsibility	is.”571		This	statement,	demonstrating	WHO’s	support	of	potentially	
coercive	measures,	reflected	a	perceived	priority	to	protect	the	security	of	all	even	at	
the	expense	of	civil	liberties.	 
The	framing	of	SARS	by	the	security	discourse	was	also	evident	in	the	issuance	of	travel	
restrictions	by	individual	governments	to	warn	their	nationals	not	to	travel	to	SARS‐
affected	areas.		For	national	health	authorities,	the	main	concern	was	the	potential	
importation	of	SARS	from	returning	nationals.572		While	the	WHO’s	travel	advisories,	
which	commenced	in	27	March	2003,	were	precautionary,	related	only	to	a	small	
number	of	countries,	and	addressed	to	international	travellers	to	those	countries,	
individual	governments	went	much	further.		For	instance,	the	US	government	advised	
all	nonessential	employees	and	their	families	to	leave	the	province	of	Guangdong.573	
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Japan	issued	travel	advisories	warning	their	citizens	not	to	travel	to	Canada.574		Two	
days	later,	Malaysia	stopped	almost	all	holders	of	Hong	Kong	and	Chinese	passports	
from	entering	the	country,	and	China	banned	organized	tours	to	Malaysia,	Singapore	
and	Thailand.		On	May	15,	2003,	Australia	and	New	Zealand	issued	travel	alerts	for	
several	countries	in	Southeast	Asia,	advising	travellers	to	be	especially	careful	in	
countries	such	as	Singapore,	Malaysia	and	Thailand.575		The	New	Zealand	Ministry	of	
Health	announced	that	“as	the	threat	of	terrorism	is	growing,	the	Ministry	of	Health	is	
reviewing	advice	for	travellers	to	Hong	Kong	and	Guangdong	province	in	China	because	of	
the	threat	of	SARS	[emphasis	added]”.576		The	Vietnamese	government	forbade	
Vietnamese	nationals	from	travelling	to	Taiwan	for	work.577		
Moreover,	the	travel	restrictions	issued	by	national	governments	included	preventing	
certain	populations	from	entering	their	sovereign	jurisdictions.		New	Zealand	turned	a	
Chinese	delegation	of	43	people	away	from	a	conference,	while	Italy	barred	people	from	
China,	Hong	Kong	and	Taiwan	from	a	Far	East	Film	Festival.	Meanwhile,	traders	from	
China,	Hong	Kong,	Singapore	and	Vietnam	were	barred	from	one	of	the	world’s	biggest	
jewellery	and	watch	fairs	in	Switzerland.		Various	countries	in	Asia	also	tightened	rules	
on	people	entering	their	borders.578		The	Malaysian	Health	Minister	stated	“All	SARS	
suspects,	as	well	as	probable	cases,	will	not	be	allowed	to	travel,	especially	beyond	their	
borders.		This	is	something	we	probably	have	not	seen	since	the	HIV/AIDS	epidemic.”579	
580		The	Vietnamese	government	indicated	that	it	was	considering	closing	its	land	border	
to	control	5,000	daily	travellers	from	China.		In	the	US,	President	Bush	issued	an	
executive	order	mandating	“the	prompt	isolation	and	quarantine	of	all	suspect	carriers	
of	SARS	who	arrived	in	the	US	aboard	international	flights	[emphasis	added]”.	
Subsequently,	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	announced	that	immigration	and	
customs	agents	were	authorized	to	detain	travellers	who	appeared	to	be	ill	with	SARS‐
associated	symptoms.581		
The	above	described	securitization	of	SARS	was	a	key	factor	behind	the	adoption	at	the	
ASEAN	+3	meeting	in	April	2003	of	a	multilateral	initiative	to	set	up	a	surveillance	
mechanism	to	identify	“foreign	nationals	suspected	of	carrying	SARS.”	582		At	the	Asian	
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Ministerial	Summit	held	on	26	April	2003,	framing	SARS	as	an	“unprecedented	threat,”	
Shigeru	Omi,	Regional	Director	of	the	WHO	Western	Pacific	Regional	Office,	used	
military	language	to	stress	the	importance	of	detecting	suspected	SARS	carriers:		
We	are	at	[a]	crossroads.	What	we	decide	today	and	at	the	Heads	of	States	meeting	
will	determine	the	future	course	of	this	outbreak.		We	must	be	absolutely	relentless	
in	our	search	for	every	possible	SARS	case.	We	must	use	every	weapon	at	our	
disposal.	The	world	is	watching	us	[emphasis	added].583	
The	rhetoric	on	border	defences,	with	language	reminiscent	of	intelligence	operations,	
spurred	national	governments	to	subject	foreign	“suspects”	potentially	carry	the	virus	
to	rigorous	screening.		For	instance,	when	it	was	discovered	that	the	index	case	
originated	from	Hong	Kong,	Singaporean	airport/seaport	screening	measures	were	
strengthened584	along	with	compulsory	thermal	screening	of	air	passengers.		Deputy	
Prime	Minister	Lee	gave	the	rationale	as	follows:		
We	must	expect	new	index	cases	to	enter	Singapore	from	time	to	time.		This	was	in	
fact	how	the	SARS	outbreak	in	Singapore	started.	We	cannot	shut	our	borders	and	
stop	the	movement	of	people	and	business	completely.	But	we	must	institute	
effective	border	controls	to	identify	people…We	have	built	thermal	scanners	that	
enable	us	to	scan	the	temperatures	of	large	numbers	of	people	efficiently…We	have	
already	started	screening	all	inbound	air	passengers	from	SARS‐affected	areas.585		
In	regard	to	thermal	scanners,	Singaporean	Minister	of	State	for	Health	Balaji	
Sadasivan	stated,	“We	do	what	we	have	to.	I	don’t	think	we’ve	seen	anything	like	this	
before	and	it	is	a	global	problem.	For	now,	this	is	a	battle	that	is	being	fought	with	the	
thermometer	and	quarantine	[emphasis	added]”.586		The	policy	was	subsequently	
adopted	by	other	affected	countries	in	Asia	and	Canada.		In	response	to	a	WHO	
comment,	that	concern	over	the	export	of	SARS	from	Canada	played	a	role	in	its	
decision	to	issue	a	travel	advisory,	Health	Canada	acquired	10	to	12	machines	from	
Singapore	for	airports	in	Vancouver	and	Toronto.		Blaming	the	federal	government	
for	not	introducing	the	thermal	scanners	sooner,	one	Canadian	politician	said,	
We	should	at	least	be	more	careful	about	the	kind	of	immigration	that	comes	
in;	I	think	we	should	look	at	it	closely,	yes,	absolutely,	because	of	SARS	and	
because	of	anything	else	we	might	run	the	risk	of	incurring.		The	first	person	to	
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come	down	with	SARS	in	Ontario	had	been	visiting	Hong	Kong	[emphasis	
added].587	
	
The	above	described	measures	point	to	the	securitisation	of	SARS	as	a	global	“battle”	
against	“suspects”	who	pose	“threats”	across	national	borders.		This	framing	is	perhaps	
most	evident	in	the	introduction	of	the	border	screening	measures.		For	example,	in	
Hong	Kong,	90	million	people	were	screened	at	border	crossings.		In	China,	thermal	
scanners	were	used	to	scan	13	million	people	travelling	to	and	from	Beijing.		In	other	
countries,	a	further	31	million	air	travellers	were	screened	for	SARS.588			
While	border	controls	may	have	assuaged	concerns	framed	by	the	security	discourse,	
it	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	practice	proved	to	be	ineffective	at	controlling	disease	
transmission.		Of	the	120	million	air	travellers	scanned,	26	probable	or	suspected	
cases	of	SARS	were	identified.589		This	was	partly	due	to	the	nature	of	the	virus	in	that	
early	presentation	of	the	disease	made	its	symptoms	(i.e.	fever)	impossible	to	
differentiate	from	a	range	of	other	illnesses.		One	retrospective	study	concluded	that	
the	majority	of	measures	implemented,	particularly	thermal	scanners,	were	
ineffective.		Funds	used	could	have	been	spent	more	productively	on	other	health	care	
needs	such	as	hospital	resources.590		
	
The	findings	suggest	that	the	security	discourse	not	only	shaped	the	response	to	SARS,	
but	moved	public	health	concerns	into	the	realm	of	broader	national	security	policy.		
For	instance,	the	Malaysian	health	minister	said	during	a	press	briefing	on	5	April	2003,		
The	killer	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	disease	has	now	become	a	national	
security	matter.		It	was	recommended	by	the	National	Committee	on	SARS	that	
matters	related	to	the	killer	disease	be	treated	as	national	security	to	ensure	
information	is	properly	transmitted	and	all	rumour‐mongering	about	SARS	is	
stopped	[emphasis	added].591	
In	China,	Chinese	Communist	Party	Central	Committee	Secretariat	member	Zhou	
Yongkang	stated	on	28	May	2003,		
Public	security	organs	at	all	levels	must	insist	on	using	both	hands	to	grasp	
without	relaxing	work	on	the	prevention	and	control	of	atypical	pneumonia	on	the	
one	side	and	without	slackening	work	on	the	protection	of	social	stability	on	the	
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589	Ibid.	
590	Wilder‐Smith	A	(2006),	“The	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome:	Impact	on	travel	and	tourism,”	
Travel	Medicine	and	Infectious	Diseases,	4	(2):	53‐60.	
591	BBC	Monitoring	International	Reports,	April	5	2003	
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other	in	order	to	make	new	contributions	towards	work	to	prevent	and	control	
disease	and	the	protection	of	social	stability	[emphasis	added].592	
Similarly,	the	Taiwanese	President	called	a	“national	security”	meeting	on	1	May	to	
tackle	the	deteriorating	SARS	situation,	and	to	discuss	the	possible	impacts	of	SARS	on	
Taiwan’s	national	interests.		President	Chen	Shui‐bian	said	that	“all	citizens	should	
stand	united	and	work	hand‐in‐hand	to	combat	the	potentially	deadly	disease	
[emphasis	added]”.593		As	one	informant	involved	in	the	WHO‐led	SARS	research	
collaboration	recalled,	
[The]	SARS	crisis	was	a	watershed	moment	for	Singapore	science.		Prior	to	2003,	
the	entire	scientific	effort	was	for	economic	development.		For	example,	when	and	
from	where	are	we	going	to	get	[more]	money	through	scientific	endeavours?		But	
after	2003,	the	biomedical	mission	was	for	national	security.		There	were	no	
longer	questions	of	whether	scientific	inquiry	was	useful.		This	is	part	and	parcel	of	
the	[national	mission]	in	order	to	defend	our	borders	[emphasis	added].594		
5.3.3.	A	focus	on	responsible	behaviour	and	public	hygiene	
 
During	April	and	May	2003,	when	the	origin	and	early	transmission	of	SARS	were	
becoming	known,	additional	public	health	measures	and	recommendations	were	
introduced.		Framing	SARS	as	an	individual	risk	behaviour,	based	upon	the	biomedical	
discourse,	continued	albeit	in	a	more	elaborated	form.		Beyond	focusing	on	individual	
risk	factors,	biomedical	framing	extended	to	ideas	of	personal	hygiene	requiring	
changes	in	the	way	people	behave.		These	ideas	appear	to	have	been	triggered	by	the	
Amoy	Garden	outbreak	in	Hong	Kong.		Prior	to	this	outbreak,	SARS	was	believed	to	be	
transmitted	by	respiratory	droplets	through	close	person‐to‐person	contact.	Amoy	
Garden	puzzled	epidemiologists.		The	dominant	epidemiological	hypothesis	was	sewage	
contamination	advanced	by	the	WHO	study.595		The	report	suggested	that	the	index	
patient	may	have	passed	a	large	quantity	of	virus	in	his	excreta	during	his	visit	to	Amoy	
Gardens	on	19	March	which	contaminated	the	sewage	system	in	Block	E.		It	was	
speculated	that	virus‐laden	droplets	were	transported	to	other	apartments	via	U‐traps	
connected	to	floor	drains.		There	were	also	signs	of	cockroach	infestation	around	drain	
openings,	and	rodents	around	refuse	collection	chambers,	food	premises,	and	car	parks.		
On	1	April,	in	response	to	the	question	of	whether	the	Amoy	Garden	outbreak	was	
related	to	the	sewage	system,	Heymann	suggested,	
So	what	appears	is	that	there	is	now	some	environmental	factor	–	it’s	not	the	air,	
but	some	other	factor,	possibly	the	water	but	it	could	be	sewage	and	it	could	also	be	
                                                            
592	BBC	Monitoring	International	Reports,	May	28	2003	
593	BBC	Monitoring	International	Reports,	May	1	2003	
594	Interview	with	Liu,	Singapore	
595	Other	hypotheses	which	emerged	at	that	time	include	passive	distribution	of	virus	by	pets,	person‐to‐
person	transmission,	oral‐faecal	transmission,	and	the	rat	vector	theory.	These	explanations	were	
discounted	when	the	WHO	research	group	claimed	the	sewage	contamination	theory.		
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many	different	things	–	which	is	taking	this	disease	from	one	human	to	another.	It	
could	even	be	such	a	thing	as	a	door	handle,	where	someone	with	SARS	has	
coughed	and	left	some	droplets	which	contain	the	virus,	and	then	the	next	person	
that	opens	the	door	gets	these	virus	in	them	on	their	fingers,	touches	their	eyes	or	
their	mouth,	and	becomes	infected…if	you’re	not	washing	your	hands,	you’re	
probably	not	protected	because	coronavirus	is	transmitted	very	easily	from	
person	to	person	through	a	handshake,	and	then	a	touching	of	a	mucus	membrane	
[emphasis	added].596	
In	view	of	possible	environmental	contamination	as	a	primary	mode	of	transmission,	
WHO	official	Mark	Salter	recommended	changes	in	personal	hygiene	habits	and	public	
sanitation.		He	stated,	
We	would	anticipate	that	if	people	were	to	wash	their	hands,	wipe	their	toilet	
seats	down	with	the	normal	disinfectants	and	disinfect	the	things	that	they	
normally	disinfect	at	home	in	exactly	the	same	way,	this	virus	would	be	rendered	
unviable	[emphasis	added].597	
The	concept	of	individual	risk	behaviour,	alongside	the	notion	of	public	hygiene,	
was	emphasized	by	WHO	officials	and	other	attendees	at	the	WHO’s	Global	
Meeting	on	the	Epidemiology	of	SARS,	held	in	May	2003.		The	meeting	document	
noted	that	“Where	SARS	is	present	or	there	is	a	reasonable	suspicion	that	an	
individual	is	infected,	the	effective	cleaning	of	residential	buildings	is	good	enough	
to	prevent	the	transmission	of	SARS‐CoV	[emphasis	added]”.598			
The	findings	suggest	that,	by	this	period,	SARS	was	increasingly	depicted	as	evidence	of	
lax	attitudes	towards	personal	and	public	hygiene.		In	Hong	Kong,	when	SARS	cases	had	
risen	to	998	on	11	April,	the	Chief	Executive	of	Hong	Kong	SAR	Tung	Chee‐Hwa	stated	
that	“the	most	effective	way	to	avoid	the	disease	is	to	maintain	good	personal	and	public	
hygiene”,	and	suggested	“Cleaning	Hong	Kong	Action	Day”.599		On	17	April,	the	
Department	of	Food	and	Environmental	Hygiene	issued	a	guideline	entitled	“Atypical	
Pneumonia:	Guidelines	on	Inspection	and	Disinfection	of	Common	Parts	of	Building”.		
Similarly,	on	22	April,	the	Department	of	Health	issued	another	guideline	which	carried	
the	title	“Prevention	Atypical	Pneumonia:	For	Health	to	be	Bright,	Get	the	Hygiene	
Right”.600		As	the	community	mobilised,	one	of	the	governments’	most	remarkable	
responses	was	the	introduction	of	public	hygiene	campaigns.		In	Hong	Kong,	a	public	
hygiene	taskforce	team	known	as	“Team	Clean”	was	launched	on	May	5	under	the	Home	
Affairs	Department	and	supervised	by	senior	civil	servant	Donald	Tsang,	later	
appointed	as	Chief	Executive	of	the	Hong	Kong	SAR	in	the	aftermath	of	the	SARS	
                                                            
596	WHO	press	briefing,	1	April	2003.	Available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/sars/press2003_04_01/en/	
597	WHO	press	briefing,	11	April	20003.	Available	at.	
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598	WHO	Available	at	www.who.int/csr/don/2003_05_07a/en/	p.	4	
599	Available	at	http://www.dh.gov.hk/ap.htm	
600	Available	at	http://www.dh.gov.hk/ap.htm	
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outbreak.		The	Team	Clean’s	mission	was	“to	establish	and	promote	a	sustainable,	cross‐
sectional	approach	to	improve	environmental	hygiene	in	Hong	Kong”.601		The	Interim	
Report	on	Measures	to	Improve	Environmental	Hygiene	in	Hong	Kong,	argued,	
We	need	brave	and	novel	approaches	to	tackle	long‐standing	problems	such	as	
spitting	and	littering,	filthy	rear	lanes,	poorly	maintained	old	tenement	buildings,	
unhygienic	food	handling	practices,	smelly	restaurant	toilets,	etc.		The	
administration	is	prepared	to	break	new	grounds,	abandon	traditional	demarcation	
of	responsibilities	in	Government,	and	try	new	approaches	to	solve	old	problems.602	
The	Hong	Kong	government’s	report	further	highlighted	the	importance	of	individual	
responsibility	for	risky	behaviours:	
A	clean	and	healthy	city	is	built	on	a	community	of	citizens	who	observe	high	
standards	of	hygiene	and	are	keen	to	keep	it	that	way.		Everything	starts	with	the	
individual.		The	outbreak	of	SARS	has	heightened	public	awareness	of	the	
important	role	played	by	the	individual,	both	in	maintaining	a	clean	and	healthy	
environment	and	in	preventing	the	spread	of	diseases	in	the	community	[emphasis	
added].603	
The	framing	of	SARS	in	this	way	led	to	the	adoption	of	policy	measures	designed	to	
achieve	individual	behavioural	change.		In	Singapore,	a	“socially	responsible	citizen”	
was	described	as	one	willing	to	comply	with	government	measures	taken	to	combat	
SARS.		A	SARS	Task	Force	was	set	up	in	every	community	and	neighbourhood	to	spread	
the	message	of	public	hygiene,	under	the	management	of	Wong	Kan	Seng,	the	Minister	
for	Home	Affairs.		The	Singapore	National	Environment	Agency’s	director‐general	Wang	
Nan	Chee	said,	
We	have	always	emphasized	the	need	for	good	public	hygiene,	so	we	decided	to	
use	this	opportunity	to	remind	Singaporeans	of	the	importance	of	public	hygiene	
[emphasis	added].604	
On	22	April,	Prime	Minister	Goh	justified	the	closure	of	Pasir	Panjang	Market	in	the	
South‐western	part	of	the	city‐state,	and	placement	of	1000	people	under	quarantine,	as	
follows:	
Once	SARS	spreads	through	the	community,	we	risk	losing	control	of	it,	and	we	will	
not	be	able	to	isolate	and	contain	it…These	measures	may	be	harsh,	but	they	are	
necessary.		Taking	a	lenient	attitude	will	not	help	us	break	the	cycle	of	infection.		
                                                            
601	Team	Clean	(2003),	Interim	report	on	measures	to	improve	environmental	hygiene	in	Hong	Kong.	Hong	
Kong:	Home	Affairs	Office.	May.	
602	Team	Clean	(2003),	Interim	report	on	measures	to	improve	environmental	hygiene	in	Hong	Kong,	p.	5	
603	Ibid.,	p.	9	
604	Chua	MH	(2004),	A	Defining	Moment:	How	Singapore	Beat	SARS,	Ministry	of	Information,	
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Instead,	it	may	undermine	the	stringent	infection	controls	we	have	painstakingly	
put	in	place	to	protect	Singaporeans	from	SARS.605		
On	3	May,	during	the	press	conference	led	by	Prime	Minister	Goh,	National	
Development	Minister	Mah	Bow	Tan	and	Environment	Minister	Lim	Swee	Say	stated	
that	their	ministries	were	increasing	the	frequency	of	cleaning	in	public	areas	in	view	of	
the	fact	that	the	SARS	virus	was	spread	in	Hong	Kong’s	Amoy	Gardens	due	to	
“unsanitary	conditions.”606		Prime	Minister	Goh	stated	that,	
In	the	early	days,	we	did	not	understand	how	SARS	was	transmitted,	so	individuals	
went	out,	and	spread	the	disease	without	knowing	that	they	were	doing	so.		But	
from	now	on,	there	is	no	excuse	for	anyone	in	Singapore	not	to	know	the	part	he	
has	to	play…so	the	message	is	a	simple	one.	All	of	us	as	ordinary	citizens,	you	and	I,	
have	a	part	to	fight	SARS	and	keep	Singapore	cool…Beyond	acting	responsibly,	
people	must	take	steps	to	stop	any	irresponsible	person	from	spreading	SARS	
[emphasis	added].607	
Deputy	Prime	Minister	Lee	Hsien	Loong	stated,	“Singapore	is	clean	because	of	extensive	
cleaning	rather	than	[the]	results	of…[citizens]’	own	efforts.”608		He	further	added,	“Life	
will	not	be	the	same	as	it	was	before	SARS.		We	must	adjust	our	habits	and	behaviour	
patterns	so	as	to	tackle	this	new	disease	and	adapt	to	the	changed	environment”.609		On	6	
May,	the	headline	of	a	local	Singaporean	newspaper	stated	that	“Not	washing	your	
hands?	It	could	cost	you	your	life	if	you	have	not	been	washing	your	hands	religiously;	
new	findings	on	the	SARS	virus	are	a	stark	reminder	that	good	personal	hygiene	could	
save	your	life	[emphasis	added]”.610			
Similarly,	when	the	first	wave	of	the	SARS	outbreak	was	over	in	Canada,	authorities	
commented	that	“SARS	was	contained,	at	least	temporarily	–	not	by	the	genomic	
revolution,	not	by	advanced	pharmaceuticals,	but	by	old‐fashioned	public	health	measures	
like	hand‐washing,	infection‐control	procedures,	isolation	of	cases,	and	tracing	and	
quarantine	of	contacts”.611		The	emphasis	on	individual	hygiene	practices	is	evidenced	
by	the	sharp	increase	in	demand	for	hand	sanitizer	products.612		Despite	criticisms	of	
underlying	structural	factors	or	systemic	failures	during	the	outbreak	such	as	the	
limited	surge	capacity,	lack	of	transparency,	inconsistent	policy	measures,	and	violation	
of	civil	liberties,	the	focus	remained	on	individual	behaviour	change,	information,	and	
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hygiene	practices.		Personal	success	in	confronting	SARS	was	attributed	to	one’s	level	of	
education	about	the	potential	source	of	danger	and	the	unfolding	epidemic,	and	the	
ways	of	using	these	barriers	to	good	effect.		In	this	way,	it	is	argued	that	responsibility	
was	shifted	from	governments	to	individuals.	Overall,	however,	the	effectiveness	of	the	
self‐motivated	preventive	actions	remained	unclear.		
5.4.	PHASE	3:	SARS	SUBSIDING	(JUNE	2003	AND	BEYOND)	
5.4.1.	Preponderance	of	biomedical	evidence	
	
By	June	2003,	the	number	of	reported	SARS	cases	was	steadily	declining.		As	new	
infections	dwindled,	it	is	argued	that	the	prevailing	discourse	shifted	to	the	biomedical	
discourse	with	its	emphasis	on	clinical	evidence	and	interventions.		As	Brundtland	
asserted	that,	
	
SARS	will	continue	to	menace	the	global	public	health	system.		It	is	possible	that	
new	SARS	cases	will	appear.	SARS	could	be	a	seasonal	disease	and	return	later	in	
the	year	–	a	possibility	based	on	what	we	know	about	other	members	of	the	
coronavirus	family.		Further,	the	original	source	of	this	SARS	outbreak	may	still	be	
in	the	environment	and	could	ignite	a	new	outbreak	in	the	coming	months.		For	
example,	it	is	possible	the	virus	still	circulates	in	an	animal	reservoir	and	may	cross	
into	humans	again	when	conditions	are	right.		To	answer	these	and	other	
questions,	research	into	SARS	must	continue.	Scientific	evidence	will	be	crucial	
for	our	ability	to	best	handle	another	SARS	outbreak	should	there	be	one	
[emphasis	added].613	
Shigeru	Omi,	then	regional	director	of	WPRO,	asserted,	“Although	this	[SARS]	was	a	
public	health	problem	that	affected	large	groups	of	people,	we	have	to	reach	each	and	
every	contact	if	we	were	to	stop	the	outbreak	from	spreading.”614		What	was	required	for	
this	mission	was	to	create	a	scientific	definition	for	SARS	cases	so	that	the	uniform	
criteria	could	be	applied	across	the	countries	in	a	bid	to	eradicate	the	disease	as	early	as	
possible.	On	the	WHO	website,	the	global	case	definition	for	SARS	was	updated	based	on	
the	following	criteria:	
 Suspect	Case:	A	person	presenting	after	1	November	2002	with	a	history	of	high	
fever	(>38	C)	AND	one	or	more	respiratory	symptoms	including	cough,	
shortness	of	breath,	difficulty	breathing	OR	close	contact	with	a	person	who	had	
been	diagnosed	with	SARS	OR	history	of	travel	to	an	area	with	local	transmission	
of	SARS.		
 Probable	Case:	A	suspect	case	with	radiographic	evidence	of	infiltrates	
consistent	with	pneumonia	or	respiratory	distress	syndrome	on	chest	X‐ray	OR	a	
                                                            
613	http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2003/pr56/en/		
614	http://www.cdcmoh.gov.kh/sars/ASEAN+3_Health_Minister_meeting.pdf	
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suspect	case	with	an	unexplained	respiratory	illness	resulting	in	death,	with	an	
autopsy	examination	demonstrating	the	pathology	of	respiratory	distress	
syndrome	without	an	identifiable	cause.615	
	
WHO	stated	that	the	surveillance	case	definition	was	based	on	“available	clinical	and	
epidemiological	data	supplemented	by	laboratory	tests.”		Similarly,	the	US	CDC	laid	
out	the	clinical	criteria	for	SARS	infection.		The	epidemiological	criteria	include	travel	
(including	transit	in	an	airport)	within	10	days	of	onset	of	symptoms	to	an	area	with	
current	or	recently	documented	or	suspected	community	transmission	of	SARS	and/or	
close	contact	within	10	days	of	onset	of	symptoms	with	a	person	known	or	suspected	to	
have	SARS	infection.616		
As	observed,	the	SARS	case	definition	offered	by	the	two	leading	organisations	was	
based	upon	clinical	evaluation	and	epidemiological	criteria	rather	than	laboratory	tests.	
This	is	because	the	laboratory	diagnosis	methods	for	SARS	during	that	period	were	not	
sensitive	enough	and	sometimes	not	readily	accessible.		For	example,	laboratory	
diagnosis	methods	for	SARS	such	as	Reverse	Transcription‐Polymerase	Chain	Reaction	
can	be	used	only	10	days	after	the	detection	of	clinical	symptoms.		For	this	reason,	the	
case	definitions	provided	by	the	two	organisations	were	consequently	non‐specific,	
meaning	that	all	patients	with	febrile	respiratory	illnesses,	regardless	of	aetiology,	
should	be	classified	as	SARS	cases	if	they	have	any	history	of	exposure.617		The	rationale	
for	using	such	a	broad	case	definition,	albeit	scientifically	proven,	was	given	by	WHO	
medical	officer	Mike	Ryan:	
	
The	WHO	case	definition	takes	a	“wide	net”	approach,	and	is	intended	to	assist	in	
the	identification	and	prompt	isolation	of	any	person	who	might	have	been	exposed	
to	the	SARS	virus.		WHO	continues	to	recommend	that	suspect	cases	be	immediately	
isolated	and	remain	so	until	either	a	probable	diagnosis	is	made	or	another	agent	
is	determined	to	be	the	cause.		Pending	the	development	of	a	reliable	point‐of‐care	
diagnostic	test,	case	definitions,	based	on	an	evaluation	of	symptoms	and	history	of	
possible	contact	with	a	SARS	patient,	[this]	remained	the	only	way	to	find	
possibly	infected	persons	and	reduce	opportunities	for	further	spread	[emphasis	
added].618 
 
Heymann	gave	support	for	the	WHO’s	criteria	by	arguing,	“The	next	influenza	season	will	
result	in	a	large	number	of	patients	with	symptoms	easily	confused	with	SARS.		SARS	
                                                            
615	WHO	(2003),	Case	definition	for	surveillance	of	SARS.	Available	at	
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surveillance	will	need	to	continue	for	at	least	a	year.”619		Here,	the	case	definition	was	
presented	in	a	way	to	demonstrate	the	scientific	basis	of	policy	making,	but	more	
importantly	to	increase	normative	consensus	of	what	must	be	done	to	prevent	SARS	
from	spreading.		Hence,	narratives	such	as	“no	guarantee,”	“redouble,”	“the	only	way	to	
find”	were	used	to	underscore	the	significance	of	a	massive	mobilisation	of	the	WHO’s	
criteria	for	identifying	and	monitoring	people	with	SARS.	
	
The	basic	idea	was	that,	with	what	are	considered	“effective”	scientific	tools	(in	this	
case,	epidemiologically	and	clinically	proven	case	definition),	interventions	will	lead	to	
the	eradication	of	SARS,	and	what	was	needed	were	the	institutional	and	technocratic	
bases	for	achieving	collective	actions	on	an	international	level.		This	idea	underpinned	a	
range	of	rapid	contact	tracing	and	isolation	policies	across	countries	during	the	late	
phase	of	the	outbreak.		In	Shanghai,	China,	Mayor	Han	Zheng	indicated	that	as	a	
responsible	government,	Shanghai	was	dedicating	itself	to	effectively	engaging	in	the	
identification	of	SARS	cases	according	to	WHO	criteria.		He	stated,	“All	kinds	of	medical	
means	and	resources	within	Shanghai	have	been	fully	utilized	in	the	prevention	and	
treatment	work.	Shanghai’s	disease	monitoring	and	reporting	system	is	strong	and	high‐
powered,	and	its	follow‐up	and	investigation	on	people	who	have	had	close	contact	with	
the	disease	has	been	carried	out	in	an	orderly	manner.”620		In	Hong	Kong,	Secretary	for	
Health	EK	Yeo	commented	that	the	government	was	acting	according	to	the	“scientific	
and	clinical	evidence.”	He	said	Hong	Kong	introduced	the	enhanced	computer	
surveillance	system	specially	developed	to	enable	“swift	contact	tracing	of	confirmed	
and	suspected	SARS	cases.”621	In	response,	Salter	praised	the	Hong	Kong	government’s	
installation	of	facilities	at	the	international	airport	to	screening	for	the	passengers,	
commenting	how	“this	should	be	really	disseminated	to	other	countries	in	the	world	[that]	
can	then	also	put	in	such	systems	to	reduce	the	risk	of	having	problems	of	SARS	in	[the]	
future.”622		The	scientific	achievement	was	further	extended	in	Singapore	to	the	
development	of	fever	scanners.	
	
Once	again,	thermal	image	scanners,	namely	the	Infrared	Fever	Screening	System,	
jointly	developed	by	the	Defence	Science	and	Technology	Agency	(DSTA)	and	Singapore	
Technologies	Electronics	Ltd.,	were	deployed	at	key	border	points	of	entry	in	a	large	
number	of	countries	to	screen	suspected	carriers	of	SARS.623		Marketed	at	a	cost	of	
US$90,000,	more	than	160	scanners	were	sold	to	organizations	in	various	countries.624	
                                                            
619	http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_06_20/en/		
620	Shanghai	mayor	meets	WHO	experts	outlined	efforts	against	SARS,	BBC	Monitoring	International	
Reports,	20	June	2003.	
621	China:	WHO	officials	praise	Hong	Kong	government’s	exemplary	anti‐SATS	policy,	BBC	Monitoring	
International	Reports,	14	June	2003.	
622	Ibid.	
623	Defense	Science	and	Technology	Agency	(2003),	Singapore’s	IFSS	on	Time	Magazine’s	coolest	
invention	list,	DSTA	news.	Available	at	
http://www.dsta.gov.sg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3091&Itemid=167	
624	Menon,	K	(2006),	“SARS	revisited:	managing	outbreaks	with	communications,”	Annals	Academy	of	
Medicine,	35(5):	361‐367.	
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Such	key	measures	resulted	in	very	large	numbers	of	individuals	being	quarantined	or	
placed	under	surveillance,	yet	most	of	those	quarantined	eventually	turned	out	not	to	
have	SARS.		For	instance,	in	Singapore,	4,044	travellers	were	detected	to	have	fever	
through	screening	at	the	airport	and	sea	terminals.	Of	these,	327	were	referred	to	
designated	hospitals	for	assessment	and	39	were	admitted	for	further	evaluation	and	
isolation.		However,	no	case	of	SARS	was	ever	detected.625		In	Taiwan,	more	than	
130,000	individuals	were	placed	in	quarantine	for	10	or	more	days	with	fines	and	jail	
time	for	violators.626		In	Toronto,	nearly	30,000	people	had	been	quarantined	but	only	
27	legal	orders	had	been	required	to	ensure	compliance.	
5.4.2.	Strong	vigilance	as	a	health	security	measure		
	
The	period	from	early	June	2003	onwards	saw	the	continued	domination	of	the	security	
discourse.		Brundtland	remained	an	ardent	proponent	of	the	security	discourse.627		On	
17	June,	she	described	the	disease	using	military	and	intelligence	language	at	the	first	
global	conference	on	SARS	held	in	Kuala	Lumpur:	
	
We	are	dealing	with	a	new	disease,	striking	a	globalized	society.	We	have	seen	its	
rapid	international	spread…But	we	have	also	seen	unprecedented	international	
solidarity	against	a	shared	microbial	threat	of	unknown	dimensions.		SARS	has	
changed	the	perception	of	the	infectious	disease	threat.		It	has	also	raised	public	
health	to	a	new	level	of	importance…health	care	workers	–	the	frontline	troops	at	
risk	–	were	themselves	frequent	victims	of	the	disease	[emphasis	added].628				
She	went	on	to	argue	that	effective	outbreak	containment	immensely	hinged	on	a	strong	
outbreak	information	gathering	system.	
Monitoring	the	evolution	of	SARS	has	been	hindered	by	the	weak	capacity	of	many	
national	surveillance	systems	to	provide	detailed	information	daily.	When	
surveillance	in	individual	countries	is	strengthened,	it	generates	the	knowledge	
needed	to	support	sound	control	measures,	and	thus	enhances	prospects	for	global	
containment…It	is	in	the	enlightened	self‐interest	of	us	all	to	strengthen	our	
defenses	against	the	infectious	disease	threat	in	all	its	dimensions	[emphasis	
added].629	
                                                            
625	Tan	CC	(2006),	“SARS	in	Singapore	–	key	lessons	from	an	epidemic,”	Annals	Academy	of	Medicine,	
35(5):	345‐49.	
626	Centre	for	Disease	Control	(2003),	Use	of	quarantine	to	prevent	transmission	of	Severe	Acute	
Respiratory	Syndrome	–	Taiwan,	Morbidity	and	Mortality	Weekly	Report,	52:	680‐683.	
627	Brown	TM,	Cueto	M	and	Fee	E	(2005),	“The	World	Health	Organization	and	the	transition	from	
international	to	global	public	health,”	American	Journal	of	Public	Health,	96(1):	62‐72.	
628	Speech	of	Dr.	Gro	Harlem	Brundtland,	Director	General,	WHO.	Available	at	
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/conference/june_2003/materials/presentations/brundtland/en/index.ht
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629	Ibid.	
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On	7	July,	Brudntland	said,		
SARS	is	a	warning.	SARS	pushed	even	the	most	advanced	public	health	systems	to	
the	breaking	point.	Those	protections	held,	but	only	barely…we	have	an	opportunity	
now.	We	[now]	see	the	need	clearly	to	rebuild	our	public	health	protections.	They	
will	be	needed	for	the	next	global	outbreak,	if	it	is	SARS	or	another	new	infection.630		
The	WHO	press	briefing	further	clarified	that	“preparing	for	the	next	outbreak”	would	
require	“restoring	and	strengthening	the	public	health	infrastructure.		More	
epidemiologists	and	other	public	health	specialists	are	needed.		Better	surveillance	and	
response	systems	must	be	established	which	include	strong	national,	regional	and	
global	linkages	in	reporting.”631		Thus	strong	surveillance	to	rapidly	detect	and	respond	
to	the	outbreak	was	once	again	highlighted.	
Brundtland’s	propensity	to	securitise	public	health	issues	was	not	limited	to	SARS.		
During	her	term	in	office	(1998‐2003),	she	had	consistently	used	the	concept	of	“global	
health	security”	in	order	to	call	for	wealthy	countries	to	spend	more	on	a	range	of	
issues.		In	so	doing,	she	favoured	highlighting	the	security	aspect	of	public	health	and	
skewed	away	from	the	traditional	public	health	notion	of	humanitarianism.		She	warned	
that	the	“most	sophisticated	societies	are	vulnerable	to	bioterrorism,	but	armed	conflicts	
and	other	crises	in	Africa	and	elsewhere	present	just	as	great	a	threat.”632		Framing	
infectious	diseases	in	terms	of	global	health	security,	Brundtland	sought	to	achieve	a	
broader	objective,	which	was	to	regain	prominence	for	the	WHO	in	the	global	public	
health	arena.633		Thus,	in	a	paper	published	in	the	European	Journal	of	Public	Health,	
SARS	was	associated	with	the	notion	of	terrorism,	both	of	which	were	conceptualized	as	
external	threats.		
We	also	face	threats	from	the	environment	and	what	humans	can	do	to	
manipulate	it.	We	have	already	had	one	anthrax	scare.	Each	of	us	in	this	room	
[has]	probably	considered	the	threat	of	bioterrorism.	SARS	jumped	from	nature	to	
humans	–	a	rare	occurrence	requiring	perfect	conditions.	And	while	far	from	a	
simple	undertaking,	bioterrorism	is	controlled	by	people,	not	nature.	How	to	
counter	this	threat?	The	tools	are	in	fact	the	same.	Boosting	capacity	for	
disease	surveillance	is	key	to	detecting	all	disease	–	whether	created	by	nature,	
or	humans.	Currently,	the	system	is	not	strong	enough.	Our	experience	with	SARS	
                                                            
630	http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2003/pr56/en/index.html	
631	WHO	(2003),	SARS	outbreak	contained	worldwide,	WHO	press	briefing,	5	July	2003.	Available	at	
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international	to	global	public	health,”	American	Journal	of	Public	Health,	96(1):	62‐72.	
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exposed	the	weaknesses.	Globally,	including	in	developing	countries,	we	must	
strengthen	disease	surveillance	and	control	[emphasis	added].634		
Controlling	disease	outbreaks,	in	her	point	of	view,	could	be	achieved	by	developing	a	
strong	surveillance	system.		She	argued	that	a	key	to	containing	the	threat	is	“a	system	
where	infectious	diseases	are	found,	reported,	and	stopped.”635		This	idea	was	enshrined	
in	an	interview	with	the	media	in	June	2003.		
I	think	generally	it	is	a	very	important	thing	that	all	countries	have	an	efficient	and	
sufficient	reporting	system	and	that	our	international	health	regulations	as	they	
now	are	improved	and	negotiated	in	a	new	century	that	they	will	be	much	more	
up‐to‐date;	that	openness	and	transparency	will	prevail,	and	that	member	states	of	
the	World	Health	Organization	will	agree	in	2005	on	updated	and	improved	health	
regulations.		Meanwhile,	with	the	help	of	the	press,	with	the	help	of	NGOs,	with	the	
help	of	anyone	who	can	inform	or	report,	as	was	happening	around	the	world,	we	
get	a	lot	of	information	to	our	global	alert	and	response	network	which	has	helped	
us	even	when	countries	are	not	obliged	in	a	legal	sense.		People	report	and	the	press	
reports	and	then	we	can	inquire	and	get	additional	information.		So	this	is	a	more	
general	comment	on	how	the	world	should	be	working	and	how	it	needs	to	be	
improved	based	on	our	experiences.636 
Military‐themed	language	was	also	used	by	other	conference	participants.		Urging	
continued	surveillance	on	SARS,	Heymann	asserted,	“We’d	had	killer	outbreaks	of	new	
disease	before	like	Ebola,	but	they	have	never	spread	internationally…In	SARS,	there	is	no	
place	for	complacency.		We	cannot	be	wooed	into	false	security	over	the	successful	
containment	efforts	that	have	interrupted	human	transmission,	as	false	security	could	
become	our	worst	enemy	[emphasis	added].”637		Paul	Gully,	Senior	Director	General	of	
Health	Canada,	similarly	argued	in	his	presentation,	“Human	security	can	be	threatened	
by	the	infectious	disease	threats,”	and	suggested	that	“Strong	public	health	
infrastructure	is	essential	within	the	health	care	systems,	in	the	community	and	at	
borders	[emphasis	added].”638	Jim	Hughes,	Director	of	the	US	National	Centre	for	
Infectious	Diseases,	had	expressed	similar	views,	“[In	order	to]	address	SARS	and	other	
global	microbial	threats,	we	should	enhance	global	response	capacity	and	strengthen	
surveillance	systems	[emphasis	added].”639	Gao	Qiang,	Executive	Vice	Minister	of	
China’s	Ministry	of	Health,	described	SARS	in	his	speech	as	a	“common	disaster	for	
mankind”,	adding	that	“The	international	community,	through	unity	and	cooperation,	has	
                                                            
634	Brundtland,	G	(2005),	Public	health	challenges	in	a	globalizing	world,	European	Journal	of	Public	
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waged	an	unprecedented	war	against	SARS	and	made	significant	progress	[emphasis	
added].”640		Emphasising	the	importance	of	national	vigilance,	Julie	Gerberding	of	the	US	
CDC	stated	that	“It	is	so	difficult	to	keep	people	vigilant	once	the	immediate	threat	has	
subsided	[emphasis	added].”		
Shigeru	Omi,	one	of	strongest	proponents	of	securitizing	SARS,	used	a	wartime	analogy	
to	describe	the	global	response	to	SARS.		He	commented,	
At	a	turning‐point	in	the	Second	World	War,	someone	asked	Winston	Churchill	
whether	the	battle	marked	the	beginning	of	the	end.		He	replied,	“No,	but	it	might	
be	the	end	of	the	beginning”.		The	same	could	be	said	of	the	war	against	SARS.	The	
first	half	of	this	year,	2003,	will	have	a	unique	place	in	the	annals	of	international	
public	health…SARS	mercilessly	exposed	weaknesses,	even	in	countries	that	we	
thought	had	good	surveillance	and	outbreak	response	systems.		Seriously	
inadequate	hospital	infection	control	practices	were	laid	bare.		Among	the	most	
important	lessons	that	we	learned	are	the	need	for	stronger	surveillance	
systems	and	transparent	information	sharing	[emphasis	added].641	
There	appeared	to	be	convergence	between	the	vigilance	narratives	mainly	derived	
from	security	discourse	and	the	affected	countries’	operational	practices	on	SARS.		In	
the	US,	President	Bush	instructed	the	Federal	departments	to	review	their	efforts	and	
find	new	ways	to	secure	America	form	bioterrorist	attacks.		The	initiative	integrated	
various	communities	including	national	security,	medical	and	public	health,	intelligence,	
diplomatic	and	law	enforcement	into	a	focused	national	effort	against	bioweapon	
threats.		The	White	House	commented,	“The	across‐the‐board	improvements	to	the	
nation’s	biodefense	capabilities	have	vastly	increased	day‐to‐day	security	for	all	Americans	
not	only	against	threats	posed	by	terrorists	but	for	medical	response	in	the	wake	of	
natural	catastrophes	and	in	response	to	naturally	occurring	biological	hazards	such	as	
SARS.”642		In	Macau	Special	Administrative	Region,	the	government	carried	out	a	cross‐
sectoral	rehearsal	of	“emergency	actions”	in	a	quick	response	to	potential	future	SARS	
outbreaks.	The	rehearsal	was	jointly	conducted	by	the	Health	Services	and	Public	
Security	force.643		In	China,	the	central	government	emphasised	“continuity	in	foreign	
affairs	to	formulate	rapid	response	policies	through	[the]	two	working	groups	of	external	
affairs	and	national	security	[emphasis	added].”		It	was	also	identified	that	SARS	
presented	the	first	non‐traditional	security	challenges	to	the	working	groups.	644		In	
Singapore,	the	Defense	Minister	Teo	Chee	Hean	maintained	that	a	psychological	
response	will	ensure	that	governments	and	security	agencies	can	help	their	respective	
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societies	develop	the	mindsets	needed	to	face	up	to	challenges	like	an	epidemic	
outbreak	or	a	terrorist	threat.		He	noted	that	information	management	was	a	critical	
component	of	the	overall	SARS	battle	plan	adding,	“While	battling	the	SARS	outbreak,	
Singapore	was	cognisant	of	the	fact	that	the	battle	was	a	full‐scale	of	rehearsal	for	a	
bioterrorist	attack	[emphasis	added].”645	In	Canada,	following	the	SARS	outbreak	in	
December	2003,	the	Department	of	Public	Safety	and	Emergency	Preparedness	was	
created,	similar	to	US	Homeland	Security,	to	deal	with	terrorism	and	other	emergencies	
including	the	risk	of	disease.646		The	report	produced	by	the	Department	highlighted	
strong	vigilance,			
The	past	several	years	have	seen	an	increase	in	emergencies	caused	by	terrorism,	
the	environment	or	humans.		Events,	such	as	[the]…2003	SARS	outbreak	in	Toronto,	
and	the	continuing	global	spread	of	Avian	influenza,	all	remind	us	that	there	are	
persistent	and	credible	threats	to	the	safety	and	health	of	Canadians.	These	
threats	reinforce	the	importance	of	working	with	all	jurisdictions	to	enhance	
national	response	capabilities….Interoperability	ensures	that	government	
organizations	can	and	do	share	critical	information	with	the	right	people	at	the	
right	time,	strengthening	the	ability	of	these	organizations	to	address	threats	to	
the	safety	and	security	of	Canadians.	The	absence	of	interoperability	was	clearly	
evident	in	the	wake	of	events	such	as	the	Toronto	SARS	outbreak	[emphasis	added].	
647	
James	Young,	then	Chief	Coroner	and	Commissioner	of	Public	Security	in	Ontario,	
Canada	concurred	by	saying	that	SARS	represented	a	potential	form	of	bio‐terrorism.		
He	went	on	to	maintain,	“It	definitely	was	not	bio‐terrorism.		However,	if	you	think	of	bio‐
terrorism	as	the	wilful	introduction	of	a	bug	into	a	society,	then	SARS,	like	anthrax,	could	
be	made	to	play	that	role	in	a	particularly	insidious	way…The	problem	with	SARS	is	the	
problem	with	bio‐terrorism	in	general:	you	are	obliged	to	chase	it	after	the	fact,	trying	to	
figure	out	–	not	where	it	is	now	–	but	rather,	where	it	has	been.	And	you	must	do	this	
without	the	benefit	of	obvious	destruction.”648	
Regionally,	Asia	Pacific	health	ministers	gathered	on	2	June	in	Bangkok	to	hold	
discussions	about	effective	health	screening	along	national	borders.		The	importance	of	
the	meeting	was	“as	high	as	it	was	when	the	epidemic	was	at	its	peak.		The	vigilance	that	
brought	SARS	under	control	must	continue	[emphasis	added].”		Among	several	objectives,	
the	first	was	to	become	prepared	for	the	next	emerging	disease.649		At	the	ASEAN	
regional	forum	held	in	2003,	member	states	agreed	that	transnational	issues	such	as	
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SARS	required	serious	attention,	recognising	that	“It	is	a	commentary	of	the	globalised	
nature	of	our	world	that	the	Sept	11	attacks	on	the	twin	towers,	as	well	as	the	outbreak	of	
SARS,	saw	a	common	denominator	–	the	use	of	aircraft	or	spread	of	virus	by	air	travel.”650	
The	forum	also	promoted	transparency	through	exchanges	of	information,	all	of	which	
have	contributed	to	the	maintenance	of	“peace,	security	and	cooperation	in	the	
region.”651	
5.5.	CONCLUSIONS	
 
This	chapter	has	analysed	the	presence	of	various	discourses	as	framing	responses	to	
the	SARS	outbreak	at	the	national	and	global	levels.		To	more	fully	understand	the	role	
of	ideas	in	policy‐making	surrounding	SARS,	this	chapter	has	organised	the	SARS	
outbreak	into	three	phases,	and	identified	the	policy	measures	taken	to	address	
perceived	challenges	at	each	stage.		From	this	analysis,	it	is	argued	that	different	
discourses	competed,	each	of	which	held	assertions	about	what	should	be	the	
appropriate	response	to	SARS.		This	chapter	described	how	each	discourse	manifested	
and	competed	for	influence,	and	illustrated	that,	even	though	different	discourses	might	
have	exerted	a	dominant	influence	at	different	phases,	these	discourses	could	not	
completely	marginalise	other	discourses	which	emerged	both	in	scope	and	application.		
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	draws	out	findings	about	the	construction	of	discourses	and	
global	health	policy	making	on	SARS.	
	
First,	over	the	course	of	the	outbreak,	different	discourses	operated	simultaneously	to	
provide	ideational	basis	for	understanding	the	SARS	outbreak.		In	the	early	phase	of	the	
outbreak,	the	global	response	to	SARS	was	informed	by	individually	focused	prevention	
strategies	founded	on	biomedical	discourse.		Predictably,	biomedical	research	into	the	
cause,	mode	of	transmission,	and	prevention	became	at	the	centre	of	the	response.		The	
human	right	discourse	advocating	global	solidarity	then	entered	in	support	of	the	
international	scientific	collaboration.		The	early	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	also	had	
a	security	dimension	and	linked	to	concerns	of	a	potential	threat	posed	by	the	
coronavirus	to	states.		During	the	second	phase	of	the	outbreak,	a	further	set	of	
discourses	entered	the	equation	as	the	scale	of	the	outbreak	grew	rapidly.		The	global	
response	to	SARS	was	strongly	driven	by	the	economism	during	this	phase	when	the	
perceived	economic	losses	arising	from	decreased	capital	flows	and	restrictions	on	
trade	and	travel	became	politically	salient.		At	the	same	time,	this	phase	witnessed	the	
rise	of	neoliberal	economic	discourse	advocating	TRIPS	based	intellectual	property	of	
the	SARS	vaccine	development.		The	security	discourse	also	played	a	significant	role	by	
drawing	attention	to	the	potential	effects	of	SARS	on	the	stability	of	states	and	regions.		
The	biomedical	discourse	on	the	other	hand	continued	its	prominence	advocating	
rigorous	public	hygiene	practices.		In	the	third	phase	of	the	outbreak,	the	security	and	
                                                            
650	“Go	beyond	regional	matters	to	global	issues:	terrorism	threats,	the	SARS	contagion	and	maritime	
security	underline	the	need	for	a	more	transnational	perspective,”	The	Strait	Times,	19	June	2003.	
651	Ibid.	
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biomedical	discourses	persisted	to	alert	the	world	of	increased	vigilance.		In	brief,	the	
global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	embodies	a	range	of	elements	drawn	from	various	
discourses.		
Second,	some	discourses	were	amenable	to	being	combined.		While	the	biomedical	
discourse	was	preeminent	over	the	course	of	the	outbreak,	it	was	sometimes	aligned	
with	security	discourse.		Focusing	on	health	risk	behaviours	and	personal	responsibility,	
the	biomedical	discourse	supported	policy	measures	on	identifying	people	potentially	at	
risk	and	isolating	them.		Likewise,	the	security	discourse	emphasised	the	detection	of	
possible	threats	to	national	stability	and	regional	security.		Where	the	biomedical	
discourse	and	security	discourse	came	together	was	through	their	identification	of	
possible	risks	posed	by	‘the	other’	and	emphasis	on	dealing	with	them	before	they	
became	a	common	health	problem.		Another	instance	was	the	alignment	of	security	
discourse	with	economic	discourse.		The	economic	discourse	attempted	to	circumvent	
the	cost‐benefit	analysis,	which	previously	undermined	voluntary	reporting	of	a	disease	
event	on	the	part	of	national	governments.		The	economic	discourse	emphasised	
negative	effects	of	non‐reporting	(of	a	disease	outbreak)	on	a	country’s	international	
standing	in	terms	of	trade	and	commerce.		The	security	discourse	on	the	other	hand	
encouraged	states	to	protect	national	security	interests	from	external	disease	threats.		
Where	both	security	and	economic	discourses	were	combined,	they	were	able	to	
galvanise	attention	to	security	and	economic	interests	on	national,	regional	and	
international	agendas,	calling	for	and	supporting	efforts	towards	decisive	government	
actions	and	international	health	cooperation.	
	
Third,	certain	discourse	was	not	impactful	across	different	phases	of	the	outbreak.		The	
health	and	human	rights	discourse	briefly	featured	when	mandatory	screening,	
quarantine	and	isolation	measures	were	adopted	on	national	security	grounds	to	
contain	the	transmission	of	the	disease.		The	discourse	was	presented	as	an	argument	
for	the	right	to	privacy,	violation	of	the	principle	of	freedom	of	movement,	and	even	
discrimination	on	the	basis	of	ethnicity	(i.e.	Chinese).		Yet,	the	right	of	individuals	to	free	
movement	and	association	was	not	sufficiently	persuasive	when	the	collective	right	to	
health	of	societies	was	deemed	most	worthy	of	support.		This	indicates	that	where	a	
particular	discourse	privileges	certain	lines	of	inquiry,	the	discourse	is	also	bound	to	
marginalise	other	discourses	and	interests.		Given	the	short	timeframe	of	the	SARS	
outbreak,	which	lasted	approximately	ten	months,	one	cannot	observe	the	longer‐term	
evolution	of	each	discourse.		It	is	thus	difficult	to	identify	the	far‐reaching	impact	of	each	
discourse.		Nevertheless,	the	analytical	focus	on	ideas	examined	in	this	chapter	sheds	
light	on	the	pivotal	role	that	discourses	played	in	the	construction	of	social	realities	
pertaining	to	the	SARS	outbreak.			
In	conclusion,	the	global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	over	three	phases	was	shaped	
by	contestation	among	various	discourses,	which	framed	the	perceived	priority	issues	
and	policy	responses	pursued.		The	chapter	presented	evidence	of	how	different	
discourses	supported	certain	assertions	or	sets	of	ideas,	which	defined	the	ways	the	
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SARS	outbreak	was	understood	and	addressed.		Importantly,	policy	ideas	did	not	
emerge	in	a	vacuum	but	stemmed	from	actors	who	embodied	them.		The	idea‐agency	
nexus	and	the	role	of	discourses	in	the	global	health	policy	making	on	infectious	
diseases	will	be	more	fully	discussed	in	Chapter	Six.			
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CHAPTER	SIX	
DISCUSSION:		THE	SOCIAL	CONSTRUCTION	OF	THE	GLOBAL	
HEALTH	GOVERNANCE	OF	SARS	
	
6.1.	INTRODUCTION	
 
As	Chapter	One	describes,	beginning	with	the	argument	that	infectious	disease	outbreak	
responses	are	socially	constructed,	the	key	question	underlying	this	study	is	why	the	
Global	Heath	Governance	(GHG)	surrounding	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	and	
specifically	SARS,	was	conducted	in	the	way	it	was.		In	seeking	to	answer	this	question,	
this	research	has	put	forward	two	key	arguments.		First,	the	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	
is	more	fully	understood	if	one	analyses	GHG	as	arising	from	different	sets	of	ideas	that	
frame	collective	action.		This	requires	analysis	which	brings	ideational	factors	more	
prominently	into	view.		The	analytic	inquiry	of	ideas	or	worldviews	within	GHG	has	led	
this	study	to	uncover	the	process	through	which	normative	frameworks	underpin	
policy	decisions	and	action.652		Using	the	SARS	outbreak	as	a	case	study,	this	research	
has	investigated	the	formation	of	a	community	of	technical	actors	whose	control	over	
the	generation	of	recognised	knowledge	gives	them	a	privileged	location	to	define	the	
rationale	for	certain	policy	actions	(Chapter	Four).		This	research	has	further	explored	
the	ways	this	community	of	key	actors	constructed	sets	of	ideas	or	frames	which	have	a	
significant	impact	upon	prioritisation	of	policy	outcomes	in	GHG	of	SARS	(Chapter	Five).		
Rather	than	focusing	on	analysis	of	the	institutional	mechanisms	by	which	cooperation	
was	achieved	for	GHG,	this	study	sought	to	understand	the	way	in	which	GHG	of	SARS	is	
derived	from	shifting	sets	of	ideas	which	frame	the	forms	of	governance	that	gain	
legitimacy.		
	
Following	the	empirical	analysis	presented	in	Chapters	Four	and	Five,	this	chapter	
draws	together	these	findings	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	global	response	to	the	
SARS	outbreak	as	socially	constructed,	and	draws	broader	implications	for	GHG	of	
infectious	diseases	more	generally.		The	chapter	is	organised	into	four	sections.		The	
first	section	identifies,	drawing	on	empirical	chapters	and	using	the	concept	of	idea‐
agency	nexus,	the	association	of	key	actors	with	discourses	constructed	through	them.		
In	so	doing,	it	clarifies	the	nature	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community.		The	second	section	
explains	why	certain	discourses	came	to	the	fore	or	receded	at	different	points	in	time	
and	places	during	the	SARS	outbreak.		The	section	also	identifies	factors	that	influence	
the	cooperation	and	contestation	of	different	discourses.		In	so	doing,	it	underscores	the	
                                                            
652	Shiffman	J	(2009),	“A	social	explanation	for	the	rise	and	fall	of	global	health	issues,”	Bulletin	of	World	
Health	Organisation,	87:	608‐613;	Lee	K	(2009),	“Understanding	global	health	governance:	the	contested	
landscape,”	in	Kay	A	and	Williams	O	(eds.),	Global	Health	Governance:	Crisis,	Institutions	and	Political	
Economy,	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan;	McInnes	C,	Kamradt‐Scott	A,	Lee	K,	Romer‐Mahler	A,	Rushton	S,	
Williams	OD	(2014),	The	Transformation	of	Global	Health	Governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	McMillan.	
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importance	of	discourses	in	the	formation	and	legitimation	of	interests	in	the	GHG	of	
SARS.		The	third	section	examines	the	extent	to	which	the	SARS	epistemic	community	
confirms	or	challenges	the	conventional	epistemic	communities	framework	and	offers	
constructive	suggestions	to	increase	its	utility	and	explanatory	power.		At	the	same	
time,	this	section	discusses	why	other	actors	do	not	assert	comparable	discursive	
power.		This	suggests	that	the	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	cannot	simply	be	
understood	as	solely	a	response	to	material	realities	or	derived	from	value‐neutral	
public	health	facts,	but	from	how	the	facts	were	understood	and	interpreted	by	a	
community	of	key	technical	experts.		Given	the	above,	the	fourth	section	discusses	how	
the	GHG	of	SARS	reflects	on	GHG,	more	broadly,	and	what	insights	can	be	drawn	from	
the	findings.		Explanations	of	the	achievements	and	shortcomings	of	GHG	to	date	have	
largely	focused	on	the	characteristics	of	individuals,	institutional	arrangements,	
resources	or	technical	knowledge.		This	research	argues	that	the	architecture	of	global	
SARS	governance	was	the	result	of	interplay,	sometimes	competitive	and	sometimes	
cooperative,	among	diverse	ideas,	interests	and	actors.	
6.2.	MULTIPLE	WORLDVIEWS	WITHIN	A	SARS	EPISTEMIC	COMMUNITY		
	
One	of	the	important	components	that	Haas	identifies	as	holding	an	epistemic	
community	together	is	shared	worldviews	underpinned	by	a	set	of	normative	beliefs.		
This	is	because,	according	to	the	epistemic	communities	concept,	facts	are	subject	to	
multiple	interpretations	and	the	theories	that	might	fit	these	facts	are	numerous.		The	
consensual	beliefs	held	could	serve	to	hold	key	actors	together	cognitively,	in	order	to	
create	and	maintain	a	common	interpretation	of	the	facts,	and	to	build	a	shared	
discourse	which	incorporates	these	normative	beliefs	with	policy	enterprises.		This	
section	explores	the	normative	beliefs	and	worldviews	of	the	actors	identified	in	
Chapter	Four	as	comprising	the	SARS	epistemic	community.		To	fulfil	this	task,	this	
section	draws	on	Chapter	Two	which	examined	the	various	discourses	that	have	
characterised	the	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	and	their	core	assertions.		This	section	also	
draws	on	Chapter	Five	which	analysed	the	evolving	policy	discourses	that	reflected	
particular	worldviews,	examining	how	each	discourse	framed	the	problems	
surrounding	SARS,	and	informed	policy	choices	at	various	points	in	time.	
	
Drawing	on	Chapters	Two	and	Five,	this	thesis	applied	the	analysis	of	discourses	to	the	
community	of	key	actors	identified	in	Chapter	Four,	by	grouping	these	key	actors	
according	to	the	similarity	of	their	policy	discourses	for	understanding	SARS.		Table	6.1	
summarises	four	overarching	discourses	(biomedical,	economic,	security,	and	human	
rights)	to	which	identifiable	individuals	can	be	linked,	along	with	how	they	framed	the	
nature	of	the	SARS	outbreak	which,	in	turn,	informed	policy	decisions.		Importantly,	as	
discussed	in	Chapter	Two	(within	a	Social	Constructivist	approach),	the	set	of	ideas	
comprising	each	discourse	were	not	simply	a	reflection	of	factual	or	technical	
knowledge,	i.e.	deriving	from	their	professional	expertise	on	how	SARS	should	be	dealt	
with,	but	a	reflection	of	the	wider	social	context	within	which	these	key	individuals	
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operated.		In	short,	identifying	discourses,	and	the	individuals	that	hold	them,	invariably	
concern	normative	values	and	causal	beliefs	produced	and	shared	by	individuals	within	
given	social	contexts.	
From	Table	6.1,	two	notable	features	can	be	identified	from	this	research.		First,	each	
discourse	was	not	associated	with	a	particular	individual	or	a	set	of	individuals.		Instead	
of	a	discrete	individual	contributing	to	the	construction	and	dissemination	of	a	
particular	worldview	or	discourse,	individuals	or	groups	of	individuals	hold	multiple	
discourses	at	the	same	time.		This	means	that,	while	a	range	of	discourses/worldviews	
were	generated	to	gain	consensus	on	the	way	the	issues	surrounding	SARS	were	
interpreted	and	responded	to,	the	ideas	that	framed	these	different	discourses	primarily	
stemmed	from	a	relatively	small	circle	of	individuals.		In	particular,	if	one	looks	closely	
at	the	profiles	of	these	individuals,	it	can	be	noted	that	the	majority	of	discourses	turned	
out	to	have	been	associated	with	several	senior	WHO	medical	officials,	what	is	termed	
in	this	research	as	the	Heymann	centre	(Heymann,	Rodier,	Ryan,	Hardimann,	and	Stohr).		
This	finding	indicates	that	those	technical	experts,	who	were	well‐positioned	to	exercise	
agenda	setting	power,	had	a	greater	capacity	to	affect	the	generation	of	multiple	
discourses/worldviews.		They	were	the	boundary	spanners	moving	across	different	
professional	circles,	bridging	the	practice,	academic	and	policy	worlds.		At	the	same	
time,	they	shifted	around	their	roles	from	technical	experts	to	the	sources	of	policy	
ideas.	This	gave	them	unprecedented	authority	as	a	result.		
Second,	the	fact	that	four	different	worldviews	were	advocated	by	these	core	actors	
does	not	necessarily	suggest	that	there	existed	four	separate	epistemic	communities	
during	SARS.		Haas	argues	that	one	epistemic	community	is	made	up	of	discrete	
individuals	that	share	the	same	worldview.		This	leads	to	an	interesting	assumption	that	
if	multiple	epistemic	communities	exist	in	a	certain	issue	area,	each	epistemic	
community	should	comprise	different	members	that	come	to	share	different	normative	
beliefs	and	interpret	the	problem	in	fundamentally	divergent	manners.		This	research	
finds	that	this	appears	not	to	have	been	the	case.		To	be	sure,	there	was	no	one	unifying	
worldview	upheld	by	all	members	in	comparison	to	the	core	knowledge	consensus	(i.e.	
shared	causal	belief	system)	reached.		However,	this	may	be	attributed	to	the	members’	
involvement	in	different	issue	areas	or	a	single	member’s	association	with	multiple	
policy	agendas,	which	essentially	require	differing	worldviews	to	call	for	decision	
makers’	attention	and	priority	support.		Moreover,	there	was	little	indication	that	the	
emergence	of	one	discourse	constructed	by	a	fraction	of	an	epistemic	community	was	
met	with	overt	dissent	and	contention	by	the	remaining	members	of	this	epistemic	
community.		This	suggests	that	the	generation	of	multiple	worldviews	did	not	
undermine	the	cohesion	of	one	epistemic	community.		In	this	sense,	the	findings	of	this	
research	indicate	a	more	complex	relationship	between	epistemic	communities	and	
discourses	than	Haas	describes	in	his	framework.		The	inability	of	the	conventional	
framework	to	accommodate	the	multiplicity	of	worldviews	held	within	a	single	
epistemic	community	that	influences	the	norms	of	decision	makers	at	various	junctures	
will	be	discussed	more	fully	in	section	6.3.	
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Table	6.1.	SARS	epistemic	community	and	discourses	
Discourse	 Individual Extract	
Biomedical	discourse	 Heymann,	Rodier “It	has	to	be	individuals	who	
understand	what	the	disease	
is	and	how	individually	they	
can	prevent	themselves	from	
becoming	sick.	So	it’s	an	
educational	effort.”	
Ryan “Until	another	agent	is	
determined	to	be	the	cause,	
case	definitions	based	on	
history	of	possible	contact	
with	SARS	remained	the	
only	way	to	find	a	possibly	
infected	person.”	
Economic	discourse	 Peiris	 “We	cannot	hope	to	share	
the	benefits	of	our	newly	
found	knowledge	if	we	do	
not	properly	manage	our	
intellectual	property	rights.”	
Osterhaus “Should	governments	
interfere	with	this	system	
[IP	rights]	in	any	but	the	
most	severe	of	emergencies,	
they	risk	undermining	trust	
in	the	patent	system	with	
resultant	detrimental	effects	
on	investment	in	innovative	
ideas.”	
Gerberding “From	our	standpoint,	it’s	
[patenting]	a	protective	
measure	to	make	sure	that	
the	access	to	the	virus	
remains	open	for	everyone.”	
Heymann,	Rodier “Outbreaks	are	always	
costly,	and	most	especially	
so	when	reactions	are	
inflamed	by	sensational	
media	coverage.”	
Hardiman “Sometimes	it	seems	that	
commerce	and	travel	is	bad	
for	public	health	and	it	is	
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competition	(sic)	[i.e.	trade	
off]	between	commerce	and	
public	health.”	
Security	discourse	 Heymann “Microbial	agents	are	now	
more	than	ever	perceived	as	
a	clear	and	present	danger	
to	public	health	security	
nationally	and	globally.”	
Rodier “The	SARS	experience,	
however,	made	one	lesson	
clear	early	in	its	course:	
inadequate	surveillance	and	
response	capacity	in	a	single	
country	can	endanger	
national	populations	and	
the	public	health	security	of	
the	entire	world.”	
Ryan “The	global	SARS	alert	
issued	was	a	direct	response	
to	a	specific	threat	identified	
by	the	global	alert	and	
response	system.”	
Brundtland “Effective	surveillance	and	
rapid	response	is	an	
essential	pillar	of	both	
national	and	international	
security.”	
Human	rights	discourse	 Stohr “We	needed	people	to	share	
data	and	set	aside	Nobel	
Prize	interests	or	their	
desire	to	publish	articles.”	
Heymann “The	global	solidarity	in	the	
detection	and	validation	of,	
and	response	to,	the	SARS	
outbreak	has	blurred	the	
concept	that	states	are	
sovereign	and	reign	
supreme	over	their	
territories	and	people.”	
	
In	summary,	the	SARS	epistemic	community	consisted	of	technical	expert‐cum‐norm	
purveyors	who	had	the	ability	to	generate	multiple	worldviews	in	a	bid	to	develop	
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consensus	and	strategically	turn	their	normative	beliefs	into	concrete	measures	in	
different	policy	areas.		They	came	to	hold	and	even	support	more	than	one	discourse	
simultaneously	(which	can	be	competing)	that	shaped	the	understanding	of	the	
problems	pertaining	to	SARS	and	advanced	what	was	seen	as	the	appropriate	response.		
In	the	next	section,	a	discussion	of	what	discourses	operated	to	inform	policies,	why	
certain	discourses	came	to	the	fore	or	receded	at	different	points	in	time	and	place,	and	
what	factors	enable	discourses	to	cooperate	or	conflict,	is	provided.	
6.3.	THE	ROLE	OF	FRAMES	IN	GLOBAL	SARS	POLICY	MAKING	
6.3.1.	Discourses	and	the	framing	of	SARS		
 
As	shown	in	the	previous	section,	issues	surrounding	SARS	were	framed	broadly	in	four	
particular	ways	‐	biomedical,	human	rights,	security	and	economic	discourses	‐	in	an	
attempt	to	generate	or	legitimise	specific	responses	to	the	issues.		While	each	discourse	
has	its	own	window	onto	the	worldviews	which	motivate	action	in	GHG	of	SARS,	there	
are	some	notable	common	insights	into	the	use	of	frame	in	global	health	policy	making	
arising	from	this	research.		These	findings	are	discussed	below.		
	
First,	findings	from	this	study	demonstrate	that	multiple	discourses	were	at	play	from	
the	beginning	to	the	end	of	the	SARS	outbreak	simultaneously	and	over	time.		This	is	in	
line	with	previous	studies	that	revealed	that	other	health	issues	often	involve	the	
operation	of	multiple	discourses.653		In	the	early	phase	of	SARS	outbreak,	during	the	
period	between	February	and	March	2003,	global	policies	were	largely	driven	by	
biomedical	discourses	and	individual‐based	prevention	strategies.		Understandably,	
biomedical	research	into	the	nature,	causes	and	treatment	of	the	SARS	virus	were	given	
a	high	priority.	Human	rights	discourse	entered	as	an	argument	for	achieving	global	
solidarity	in	scientific	research	collaborations.		Alongside	these	were	education	
measures	aimed	at	promoting	responsible	behaviours	of	not	infecting	others	given	the	
absence	of	the	information	about	the	mode	of	transmission	and	effective	intervention.	
Yet,	these	were	certainly	not	the	only	discourses	in	play	during	this	phase.		An	early	
form	of	security	discourse	also	played	a	significant	role,	largely	due	to	the	concerns	that	
SARS	might	potentially	threaten	the	state	via	massive	social	and	economic	disruption.		
During	the	period	between	April	and	May	in	2003,	the	governance	of	SARS	gave	way	to	
a	second	phase	in	which	the	international	dimensions	of	the	looming	crisis	came	to	the	
fore.		A	further	set	of	discourses	entered	the	fray	as	the	issue	became	more	globalised.		
As	the	scale	of	the	outbreak	grew,	SARS	began	to	be	viewed	as	an	economic	issue.		Of	
                                                            
653	Reubi	D	(2012),	“Making	a	human	right	to	tobacco	control:	expert	and	advocacy	networks,	framing	
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key	importance	of	this	phase	was	the	emergence	of	macroeconomic	discourse	in	
support	of	international	collaboration	and	government	actions	by	highlighting	
quantifiable	measurements	such	as	job	losses,	percentages	in	tourism	decline	and	
economic	losses	statistics,	which	made	the	disease	a	lot	more	quantifiable	and	
apparent.654		Interestingly,	another	economic	discourse	meshing	with	the	neoliberal	
intellectual	property	under	TRIPS	was	deployed	in	support	of	the	need	to	maintain	
incentives	for	developing	SARS	vaccines.		The	phase	also	witnessed	the	strengthening	of	
biomedical	and	security	discourses	framing	SARS	largely	as	infringing	the	rights	of	the	
healthy	and	intruding	territorial	space.		In	the	third	phase	of	the	SARS	outbreak,	
approximately	June	2003	onwards,	the	biomedical	and	security	discourses	continued	to	
prevail	in	support	of	increased	vigilance.		In	brief,	it	is	possible	to	read	the	global	
response	to	SARS	through	the	lens	of	the	various	discourses	which	characterise	the	
global	governance	of	this	issue	area.		Discourse	manifested	at	various	phases	of	the	
outbreak	and	they	changed	in	emphasis	or	continued	to	influence.		The	significance	is	
that	multiple	discourses	can	lead	to	confusion,	with	no	single	underlying	logic,	and	to	a	
range	of	sometimes	competing	policy	recommendations	and	priorities.		The	variety	of	
discourses	to	be	operational	reflects	not	only	the	absence	of	a	coherent	norm	guiding	
members	in	collective	action	for	the	purpose	of	achieving	agreed	goals,	but	it	also	
creates	a	range	of	competing	policies,	principles,	and	regulations.			
Second,	the	empirical	analysis	supports	the	argument	presented	in	Chapter	Two	that	
discourses	favoured	or	privileged	certain	policy	actions.		Discourses	are	deployed	to	
suggest	a	potential	policy	route,	what	McInnes	and	colleagues	term	the	“pathways	of	
response.”655		This	is	owing	to	the	fact	that	each	discourse	is	characterised	by	particular	
forms	of	underlying	logic	that	motivates	certain	interests	and	policy	goals.		Since	the	
idea	underpinning	the	biomedical	discourse	was	the	intent	on	moulding	or	reforming	
individuals	who	were	unregulated,	this	discourse	informed	policy	measures	such	as	the	
introduction	of	public	education	about	constant	hand	washing,	avoiding	crowds,	
cleaning	up	of	the	environment,	and	sneezing	etiquettes	in	a	bid	to	cultivate	self‐
motivation	of	individuals.	The	SARS	case	definition	–	the	potentially	at	risk	group	and	
already	infected	group	–	also	emphasised	that	individuals	were	attributed	a	singular	
responsibility	not	to	contaminate	or	infect	other	people.656		From	an	economic	
viewpoint,	SARS	was	consistently	seen	costly	and	in	this	sense,	policy	measures	in	
favour	of	cost‐effective	calculations	seemed	appropriate.		In	the	cost‐benefit	
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understanding	of	SARS,	the	practice	of	notifying	the	WHO	of	a	disease	event	was	viewed	
as	being	associated	with	the	resultant	economic	benefits	of	doing	so.		Hence,	the	price	of	
non‐compliance	was	contrasted	with	the	potential	economic	loss	in	international	trade	
and	economy	incurred.		The	security	discourse	presented	SARS	as	a	potentially	serious	
threat	to	national	and	even	global	security	and,	thus,	just	like	national	military	
preparedness,	public	health	resources	should	be	stockpiled	and	in	a	constant	state	of	
readiness	to	fight	against	the	disease.		Dominant	policy	actions	arising	from	the	security	
discourse	included	strict	border	control,	monitoring	of	population	movements	by	
means	of	military	and	security	forces,	and	compulsory	screening	of	air	passengers.		A	
pre‐emptive	exercise	of	outbreak	surveillance,	as	intelligence,	to	mobilise	faster	
outbreak	information	through	unofficial	sources	came	to	prevail	as	a	new	institutional	
form	of	international	cooperation.		The	health	and	human	rights	discourse	was	
presented	as	an	argument	against	the	use	of	stringent	public	health	measures	such	as	
compulsory	quarantine,	mandatory	medical	examinations,	isolation	of	persons	with	
infectious	conditions,	contact	tracing	of	persons,	and	travel	restrictions.		The	human	
rights	discourse,	however,	was	not	visibly	explicit	during	the	outbreak.		In	short,	the	
operation	of	discourses	informing	health	policies	on	SARS	indicates	that	discourses	are,	
not	simply	sets	of	ideas,	but	a	window	onto	how	worldviews	can	shape	particular	
actions.		This	demonstrates	that,	in	explaining	health	policy	outcomes,	what	matters	is	
not	only	who	holds	material	power,	but	how	different	worldviews	also	further	
particular	interests	and	outcomes	(Table	6.2).	
Third,	discourses	can	be	more	fully	understood	through	the	closer	analysis	of	speech	
acts	in	health	policy.657		Speech	acts	are,	by	definition,	verbal	enunciations	of	specific	
and	uncommon	or	extraordinary	words	in	an	effort	to	elevate	an	issue	into	sphere	of	
high	politics	and	to	call	for	emergency	measures	to	deal	with	it.		Speech	acts	include	
reports,	articles	and	other	written	documents	as	well	as	speeches	and	other	oral	
statements.658		Analysing	SARS	and	the	process	of	framing,	this	research	found	that	
some	speech	acts	were	given	legitimacy	over	others	in	the	global	health	policy	making.		
During	the	outbreak,	public	addresses	by	WHO	officials	such	as	press	briefings,	weekly	
epidemiological	records	and	updates	or	publications	examining	reproductive	numbers,	
potential	mutation	of	the	coronavirus,	and	clinical	attack	rates	in	high‐ranking	journals	
seemed	to	have	acquired	a	significantly	greater	communicative	power	because	making	
reference	to	professional	opinions	enhanced	the	credibility	of	speech	acts,	persuading	
decision	makers	more	convincingly.		Some	of	these	speech	acts	were	widely	
broadcasted	through	mass	media,	shaping	public	opinion	and	subsequently	creating	an	
impetus	for	decision	makers	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	ways	in	which	the	health	
issues	surrounding	SARS	were	understood	by	the	speech	acts.		This	suggests	that	
speech	acts	are	a	kind	of	currency	of	ideational	power	which,	equals	to	or	more	than	
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material	resources,	can	influence	real	world	outcomes	in	GHG.		What	is	noteworthy	is	
that	speech	acts	did	not	only	assert	information	per	se	but	they	disseminated	a	broader	
set	of	ideas,	values	and	norms	about	the	world	or	“socially	constructed	reality”	across	
geographical	boundaries.		In	short,	the	findings	of	this	research	suggest	that	in	framing	
issues	surrounding	SARS,	speech	acts	were	the	principal	means	used,	and	speech	acts	
proved	to	open	up	the	dimension	to	raise	an	issue	on	national	and	international	agendas	
during	the	SARS	outbreak.							
Lastly,	the	findings	confirm	that	in	an	era	of	globalisation,	ideas	are	not	tied	by	national	
boundaries;	each	discourse	was	global	in	reach	although	there	was	variation	in	which	
discourse	was	dominant	across	different	geographies.		To	begin	with,	there	was	a	
universal	inclusion	of	the	economic	discourse	in	the	realm	of	government	policy	that	
economic	imperatives	paralleled	with	or	even	preceded	public	health	concerns.		
However,	countries	that	experienced	significant	negative	effects	on	the	demand	side	
(export	of	services	related	to	tourism	and	air	travel)	such	as	Singapore	tended	to	deploy	
the	economic	discourse	more	intensely	in	an	attempt	to	prevent	the	outbreak	from	
damaging	their	economies	further.		The	biomedical	discourse	was	commonly	observed	
in	SARS	policies	across	regions	yet	its	translation	into	policies	appeared	to	have	been	
divergent.		Countries	in	the	Asian	region,	where	there	appeared	to	be	relatively	closed	
decision‐making	and	high	levels	of	political	centralisation,	emphasis	was	placed	on	the	
regulation	of	individual	behaviours	not	to	infect	others	even	at	the	expense	of	human	
rights.		In	contrast,	in	other	regions	such	as	North	America,	a	middle	ground	that	
attempted	to	reconcile	individual	rights	with	the	protection	of	public	health	was	
pursued	(e.g.	voluntary	compliance	to	quarantine	order).		While	the	security	discourse	
was	commonly	found	in	policies	dealing	with	SARS,	the	mobilisation	of	this	discourse	
was	more	evident	in	the	developed	countries	given	that	portraying	health,	notably	
infectious	diseases,	as	a	national	security	concern	was	primarily	emanated	from	the	
developed	countries.		Securitisation	of	SARS	required	unprecedented	and	urgent	policy	
measures	and	therefore	it	would	be	logical	to	see	that	powerful	states	such	as	the	US,	
Australia	and	Switzerland	implemented	stringent	border	control	measures	(entry	
restrictions	of	certain	nationals)	at	the	early	phase	of	the	outbreak.		Subsequently,	
countries	in	the	Asian	region	followed	a	similar	policy	path	emphasising	the	importance	
of	pre‐emptive	policy	actions.	In	short,	discourses	were	powerful	in	encouraging	policy	
convergence	across	countries,	but	the	impact	of	each	discourse	seemed	to	have	been	
mediated	by	political,	economic	and	cultural	factors	in	different	regions	and	countries	
concerned.		It	is	also	noted	that	formulating	government	policies	required	squaring	
national	interests	with	global	health	agendas,	or	balancing	competing	priorities.		Thus,	it	
might	be	important	to	take	into	account	the	differences	in	the	interests	of	states	when	
measuring	the	impact	of	discourses.			
	
Table	6.2.	Four	discourses	and	global	health	response	to	SARS	
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Discourse	
	
Policy	outcomes	during	SARS	
Biomedical	discourse	  Wide‐net	case	definition	on	the	basis	of	
presence	of	fever	(potentially	at	risk	
group	VS	already	infected	group)	
 Public	education	including	hand	
washing,	avoiding	crowds,	cleaning	up	
of	the	environment,	sneezing	etiquette,	
and	use	of	masks	
 Isolation	of	persons	with	infectious	
conditions	
 Contact	tracing	of	persons	based	on	
reproductive	numbers	and	clinical	
attack	rates	
Economic	discourse	  The	price	of	non‐compliance	VS	
potential	economic	loss	in	
international	trade	and	economy	
 Elicit	government	actions	and	
international	collaboration	by	
highlighting	quantifiable	economic	
measures	(i.e.	costs	to	national	and	
regional	economy)	
 Intellectual	property	rights	in	the	
development	of	SARS	vaccine		
Security	discourse	  Strict	border	control	(e.g.	entry	
restrictions	of	certain	nationals)		
 Monitoring	of	population	movements	
by	means	of	military	and	security	
forces	
 Compulsory	air	passenger	screening	
 Pre‐emptive	exercise	of	surveillance	
 Compulsory	quarantine	
 Mandatory	medical	examinations	
 Use	of	police	force	in	the	isolation	of	
persons	with	infectious	conditions		
 Contact	tracing	of	persons	
 Travel	restrictions	
 Use	of	thermal	screening	device	
Health	and	human	right	discourse  Scientific	research	collaboration	
 Civil	liberty	and	rights	of	individuals	
who	were	unlawfully	quarantined	
	
6.3.2.	Factors	determining	the	success	of	discourses	
	
Having	discussed	how	the	SARS	response	was	socially	constructed	over	the	course	
of	the	outbreak,	which	particular	discourses	informed	policy	actions,	how	speech	
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acts	operated,	and	to	what	extent	discourses	affect	policymaking	across	specific	
geographies,	what	remains	to	be	understood	is	why	and	under	what	conditions	
certain	discourses	come	to	the	fore	or	recede	at	particular	points	in	time	and	
place.		This	section	discusses	the	factors	affecting	the	ascendance	of	discourses	at	
particular	points	in	time	and	place.	
	
The	first	of	these	factors	concerns	the	changing	nature	of	the	risk	posed	by	SARS.		
In	the	initial	phase	of	the	outbreak,	SARS	was	an	unknown	disease	caused	by	a	
novel	coronavirus.		It	took	advantage	of	opportunities	for	rapid	international	
spread	made	possible	by	the	unprecedented	volume	and	speed	of	air	travel.	The	
emergence	of	biomedical	discourse	was	spurred	by	this	perceived	urgency	amid	
the	absence	of	effective	diagnosis	and	treatment	in	the	prevention	and	control	of	
the	disease.		The	need	to	break	the	chain	of	transmission	was	the	focus	as	a	result,	
which	was	believed	to	be	achieved	mainly	through	the	control	of	people’s	
movement	and	the	regulation	of	individual	behaviours.		To	be	sure,	there	were	
immediate	cost	of	treatment	and	prevention,	but	cost	appeared	to	be	less	of	a	
concern	to	decision	makers	in	view	of	the	perceived	uncertainty	and	the	extent	of	
outbreak	spread.		However,	when	the	outbreak	showed	no	sign	of	slowing	down	
and	appeared	to	be	a	spiralling	epidemic,	the	economic	discourse	came	to	the	fore	
as	policymakers	came	to	realise	that	there	were	other	costs	potentially	at	stake.		
Increasingly,	the	costs	to	the	national	and	regional	economy	were	factored	in	
which	motivated	governments	to	react	more	decisively.		The	travel	advisories	
were	interesting	in	this	respect.		The	governments	of	affected	countries	such	as	
Hong	Kong	and	Canada	sought	to	get	the	advisories	lifted	largely	for	economic	
ramifications	rather	than	biomedical	imperatives.		This	demonstrates	that	
perceived	risks	concerned	with	the	disease	and	their	political,	social	and	economic	
ramifications	have	altered	the	environment	in	which	particular	discourse	came	to	
the	fore	and	receded.			
A	second	factor	is	the	prevailing	political	context	which	arguably	influences	which	
discourse	can	frame	the	contextual	circumstance	most	persuasively.		SARS	
emerged	in	the	context	of	post	Cold	War	geopolitics,	which	shaped	concerns	about	
new	security	threats,	and	a	neoliberal	world	economy	which	prioritised	concerns	
about	open	markets	and	the	private	sector.		The	end	of	Cold	War	generated	a	
permissive	environment	allowing	for	a	wider	range	of	new	risks	to	replace	the	
military	threat	of	the	Soviet	Union.		Towards	the	end	of	a	decade,	the	spread	of	
infectious	diseases	began	to	be	considered	as	a	direct	threat	to	health	and	well‐
being	of	the	people	of	a	state.		In	particular,	the	high‐income	countries	
increasingly	viewed	themselves	vulnerable	to	new	health	risks	including	
resurgence	of	disease	outbreaks	that	had	largely	retreated	over	the	past	few	
decades.		The	11	September	terrorist	attacks	in	2001	and	the	deliberate	release	of	
anthrax	spores	in	the	same	year	allowed	the	security	concerns	to	rise	further	
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bringing	it	to	the	top	of	the	decision‐makers’	agendas.659	Additionally,	the	
realisation	that	a	large‐scale	epidemic	may	contribute	to	economic	decline	
encouraged	many	countries	at	the	centre	of	globalisation	to	focus	their	policy	
attention	on	common	fears	that	erode	economic	globalisation	and	trade	
liberalisation.		Crucially,	the	SARS	outbreak	emerged	at	a	time	when	governments	
of	high‐income	countries	became	aware	of	novel	security	risks	and			neoliberal	
trade	relations.		In	brief,	the	political	context	changed	with	the	end	of	the	Cold	
War,	and	as	economic	context	changed	as	well,	so	perceived	interests	of	states	
changed,	allowing	security	and	neoliberal	discourses	to	prevail	when	SARS	
outbreak	occurred.	
A	third	factor	is	the	nature	of	the	specific	disease	event	over	the	course	of	the	
outbreak	that	renders	a	favourable	condition	for	a	particular	discourse	to	become	
readily	acceptable.		It	should	be	noted	here	that	the	specific	disease	event	by	itself	
did	not	prompt	the	discourse	to	acquire	policy	attention	but	through	a	process	of	
social	construction	during	which	those	events	were	interpreted	as	constituting	a	
particular	dimension	of	problems.		For	example,	the	super‐spreader	event	in	the	
initial	phase	of	the	outbreak	opened	up	a	condition	for	the	biomedical	discourse	to	
elevate	the	importance	of	individual	risk	behaviour.		The	fact	that	the	super‐
spreader	could	infect	more	than	dozens	of	people	within	a	short	period	of	time	
and	that	the	mode	of	transmission	is	unknown	seemed	to	have	played	a	crucial	
role	for	the	biomedical	discourse	to	ascend	precipitating	states	to	adopt	a	policy	of	
health	education	and	behavioural	changes.		Similarly,	the	Amoy	Gardens	outbreak	
in	Hong	Kong	in	the	second	phase	of	the	outbreak	opened	up	the	space	for	
subsequent	progress	in	policies	underpinning	biomedical	discourse.		Prior	to	the	
Amoy	Gardens	outbreak,	infections	had	been	largely	confined	to	close	contacts	
mostly	in	hospital.		When	a	particularly	large	number	of	cases	occurred	in	a	single	
housing	estate,	environmental	sources	were	increasingly	viewed	as	the	main	
cause	of	the	explosive	outbreak.		Under	such	circumstance,	the	biomedical	
discourse	that	framed	SARS	as	a	symptom	of	personal	and	collective	unhygienic	
issues	gained	a	considerable	policy	attention.	Subsequently,	broad	clean	up	of	the	
way	people	live	was	strongly	advocated	in	Asian	countries.		From	the	findings	of	
the	present	research,	it	is	not	instantly	clear	whether	these	events	were	
deliberately	used	to	prompt	government	actions	by	the	proponents	of	biomedical	
discourse.		However,	the	above	cases	illustrate	that	framing	a	health	issue	that	
resonates	with	a	particular	event	played	a	crucial	role	in	maintaining	or	
reinforcing	policies.							
Finally,	the	existing	distribution	of	structural	power	shapes	the	capacity	of	certain	
interests,	over	others,	to	articulate	and	advocate	how	policy	issues	are	framed.		
Structural	power	confers	to	the	power	to	decide	how	things	shall	be	done,	the	
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power	to	shape	frameworks	within	which	states	relate	to	each	other,	relate	to	
people,	or	relate	to	corporate	enterprises.660		The	existence	of	structural	
conditions	does	not	mean	that	structural	power	simply	determines	the	manner	in	
which	things	are	done.		Rather,	it	is	argued	that	the	structural	power	limits	the	
range	of	ideational	and	policy	spaces	that	are	conceivable	in	dealing	with	the	
issues	concerned	with	outbreaks.		During	SARS,	it	became	apparent	that	both	
neoliberal	and	security	discourses	prevailed.			These	two	discourses	were	
powerful	not	merely	because	they	were	ubiquitous	in	informing	policies	related	to	
SARS,	but	they	embodied	dominant	interests	in	global	political	economy	and	thus	
set	agendas	and	parameters	within	which	states	formed	their	identities	and	
interests.		In	other	words,	the	manner	in	which	problems	are	understood	in	global	
structures	of	economy	(or	security)	can	set	the	policy	templates	which	are	readily	
applied	to	other	problems	concerning	how	problems	should	continue	to	be	
understood.		For	instance,	meshing	neatly	with	intellectual	property	regimes	
under	TRIPS	in	other	areas	of	health	(e.g.	HIV/AIDS),	the	neoliberal	economic	
discourse	emphasised	the	need	to	maintain	incentives	for	pharmaceutical	
manufacturers	to	continue	its	R&D	effort	in	SARS	vaccine	development.		In	short,	
the	neoliberal	discourse	helped	maintain	the	existing	global	production	structure	
for	drugs.		Likewise,	the	securitisation	of	SARS	mirrors	concerted	attempts	by	
some	powerful	states	in	harnessing	particular	health	issues	(e.g.	HIV/AIDS,	
biological	weapon	use	and	pandemics)	to	foreign	and	security	policy.		The	framing	
of	SARS	as	a	threat	to	national	security	and	regional	stability	continue	to	serve	
some	powerful	states’	interest.		These	two	discourses	did	not	entirely	exclude	
debates	over	appropriate	policies	and	approaches	(discussed	in	the	next	two	sub‐
sections).		Yet,	they	in	some	sense	structurally	limited	the	range	of	options	open	to	
the	development	of	alternative	structures.		Indeed,	a	discourse	founded	on	deeper	
structural	explanation	for	disparity	in	health	(e.g.	capacity	for	manufacturing	
vaccines	or	for	strengthening	disease	surveillance)	did	not	effectively	ascend,	as	it	
did	not	sufficiently	appeal	to	the	most	powerful	interests	in	structural	terms.		This	
suggests	that	the	influence	of	discourses	can	be	attenuated	or	conversely	
strengthened	by	the	structural	power	as	implied	by	accepted	discourses.		
6.3.3.	Contestation	between	and	within	discourses	
 
The	findings	from	Chapter	Five	suggest,	not	only	that	discourses	evoked	particular	
policy	responses	to	the	SARS	outbreak,	but	that	there	was	contestation	among	and	
within	specific	discourses.		First,	the	framing	of	SARS	issues	was	not	merely	about	
cognition,	interpretation	and	presentation;	it	was	also	about	selection,	emphasis	and	
exclusion.		Thus,	what	has	happened	(i.e.	the	topics	and	issues	being	merely	presented)	
is	not	as	important	as	how	it	has	happened	(i.e.	particular	ways	in	which	issues	are	
presented	and	which	aspects	of	issues	are	highlighted	over	others).		This	suggests	that	
                                                            
660	Strange	S	(1998),	States	and	markets,	2nd	ed,	London:	Continuum.	
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discourses	competed	between	them	to	shape	policymakers’	perceived	interests,	
resulting	in	the	inclusion	(or	exclusion)	of	particular	policies	over	others.		Second,	each	
discourse	was	not	homogeneous	and	ideationally	monolithic	in	the	process	of	
formulating	policies	on	SARS.		Rather,	it	often	exhibited	internal	divisions	and	
alteration.		This	means	that	contestation	within	discourses	can	occur	to	justify	different	
types	of	policies	at	a	particular	time	and	in	a	particular	issue.		This	sub‐section	discusses	
some	of	contestation	between	and	within	discourses	that	played	out	in	the	global	
response	to	SARS.		
	
To	begin	with,	the	deployment	of	the	biomedical	discourse	contested	other	discourses	
in	two	ways.		First,	constructing	individuals	as	at	risk	and	in	need	of	behavioural	reform	
functioned	to	effectively	depoliticise	the	phenomenon	of	infectious	diseases,	
downplaying	the	importance	of	the	socioeconomic	and	political	contexts	founded	on	
human	rights	discourse.		Specifically,	the	privileging	of	the	epidemiological	connection	
between	SARS	and	individual	risk	behaviour	appears	to	have	opened	the	possibility	for	
discrimination	against	those	who	did	not	live	up	to	hygiene	expectations	for	reasons	of	
collective	risk	mentality	or	information	disparity.		In	particular,	highlighting	individual	
responsibility	inadvertently	brought	about	the	blaming	of	“others”	and	stigmatising	
certain	ethnic	groups	–	namely,	Chinese	people.		As	explained	in	the	previous	section,	
the	perceived	uncertainty	about	the	course	of	the	disease	progression	enabled	the	
biomedical	discourse	to	ascend	shaping	policymakers’	interest	to	contain	the	
unknowns.		Under	this	circumstance,	human	rights	discourse	such	as	rights	of	
individuals	who	were	unduly	treated	or	unlawfully	quarantined	had	little	room	to	
advance.		Second,	the	biomedical	discourse	was	in	conflict	with	the	cost‐benefit	
economic	discourse	when	it	comes	to	a	preoccupation	that	the	biomedical	solutions	
would	bring	about	‘effective’	containment	of	SARS.		The	policy	of	standardised	SARS	
case	definition	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	presence	of	fever	stemmed	from	the	
technological	assumption	that	rapid	detection	and	immediate	isolation	would	result	in	
the	control	of	SARS.		At	the	national	level,	such	a	wide‐net	case	definition	prompted	
national	authorities	to	identify	every	suspect	disease	carriers	according	to	the	definition	
provided.		In	doing	so,	the	authorities	hastily	isolated	them	regardless	of	the	economic	
and	social	cost	that	may	incur.		The	discourse	also	influenced	the	global	demand	for	a	
novel	thermal	screening	device	especially	developed	to	assist	in	the	detection	of	SARS.		
The	implications	were	that	such	a	policy	resulted	in	a	very	large	number	of	individuals	
being	quarantined	or	placed	under	surveillance,	and	this	subsequently	proved	to	be	a	
huge	waste	of	resources.				
The	economic	discourse	has	its	own	internal	division	which	supported	different	
interests.		For	example,	the	market‐based	economic	discourse	was	the	key	motivation	
for	the	entire	process	of	the	SARS	patent	pool.		By	framing	intellectual	property	rights	as	
need	to	create	incentives	for	the	development	of	new	SARS	medicines,	the	discourse	
promoted	the	interests	of	pharmaceutical	manufacturers.		This	neoliberal	discourse	was	
contested	with	public	goods	discourse	that	saw	global	intellectual	property	rights	as	an	
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obstacle	to	health	and	development.		Although	the	essential	underlying	logic	behind	
these	two	discourses	is	based	on	the	efficient	deployment	of	scarce	resources,	deep	
divisions	are	apparent	on	how	to	most	efficiently	allocate	the	limited	resources.		
Another	variant	of	the	economic	discourse	became	apparent	when	the	SARS	outbreak	
was	disrupting	the	flow	of	trade	and	travel	tremendously,	and	wrought	severe	damage	
on	the	economies	of	affected	nations.		The	discourse	that	aimed	to	promote	national	and	
regional	economic	interest	contested	with	human	rights	discourse	(or	human	security	
discourse	since	both	share	the	idea	that	people	matter)	that	advocated	the	
improvement	of	health	of	populations.		The	neoliberal	discourse	featured	prominently	
in	the	government	efforts’	to	remove	the	travel	advisories	in	a	bid	to	minimise	the	travel	
and	trade,	at	the	expense	of	violating	rights	to	people	and	rights	to	health.			
Like	the	economic	discourse,	the	security	discourse	was	similarly	internally	contested.		
The	security	discourse	during	SARS	captured	strong	elements	of	sovereignty	and	
national	interests	and	thus	it	contested	with	longer‐term	issues	and	common	
vulnerabilities	founded	on	human	security	discourse.		The	use	of	the	term	“security”	
was	in	the	context	of	identifying	a	foreign	threat	to	the	state’s	peace	and	stability	and	in	
reference	to	bioterrorism	as	opposed	to	alleviating	risks	(e.g.	freedom	from	concerns,	
fears	or	other	forms	of	oppression)	to	individuals	and	communities.		Framing	SARS	as	a	
clear	and	present	danger	to	the	state	circumscribed	ranges	of	policies	–	monitoring	and	
surveillance	of	SARS,	collecting	and	sharing	information	and	at‐the‐border	measures	to	
prevent	the	spread.		In	particular,	the	national	security	discourse	justified	the	seemingly	
forceful	measures	as	being	instrumental	to	the	“security	of	citizens”	within	countries.		
When	the	nature	of	the	disease	was	portrayed	as	an	imminent	threat	to	the	collective,	it	
naturally	gives	little	attention	to	the	rights	of	individual.		During	SARS,	not	only	were	
healthy	individuals	often	mistaken	to	be	carriers	of	the	SARS	virus,	they	were	put	at	risk	
of	serious	infection	on	occasions	because	they	were	put	in	the	company	of	infected	
people.		This	created	fears	of	detention	among	the	public	and	consequently	delayed	
diagnosis	and	treatment.		The	paucity	of	the	human	security	perspective	resulted	in	the	
neglect	of	broader	social	causes	of	insecurity	such	as	economic	deprivation	and	well‐
being	of	individuals	and	community	in	the	face	of	a	disease	risk	and	of	the	need	for	
strengthening	the	provision	of	appropriate	health	care	(e.g.	vaccines)	according	to	need.		
There	was	also	a	concern	that	policy	agendas	being	dominated	by	national	security	
discourse	might	distort	the	public	health	priorities	in	resource	poor	countries.661		It	was	
only	aftermath	of	the	SARS	that	support	for	the	development	of	surveillance	capacity	in	
developing	countries	became	a	key	political	question.662		Overall,	the	human	security	
discourse	failed	to	shake	the	dominance	of	national	security	discourse	since	national	
security	interest	was	prioritised	by	powerful	states.		
                                                            
661	Davis	S	(2008),	“Securitizing	infectious	disease,”	International	Affairs,	84(2):	295‐313;	Fidler	D	(2004),	
SARS,	Governance	and	the	Globalization	of	Disease,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
662	Médecins	Sans	Frontières	(2003),	Press	Release,	G‐8	Offers	World	an	‘Inaction’	Plan	on	Health,	2	June	
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The	health	and	human	rights	discourse	were	contested	in	terms	of	ethical	and	
legal	basis	of	understanding	SARS.		The	human	rights	discourse	manifested	
primarily	as	an	argument	against	the	use	of	stringent	public	health	measures	
implemented	during	SARS.		Thus,	the	discourse	was	promoted	mainly	by	those	
who	perceived	that	the	public	health	policies	violated	the	rights	for	individuals.		
This	conception	of	human	rights	was	based	on	narrowly	focused	liberal	view	of	
individual	rights	as	legally	or	institutionally	guaranteed.		As	a	result,	the	debate	
has	been	confined	to	whether	policies	enacted	during	SARS	such	as	quarantine	
measures	and	restriction	on	immigration	were	acceptable	under	international	
human	right	law.663		A	more	fundamental	conception	of	human	rights	such	as	the	
structural	factors	that	systematically	erode	the	rights	of	human	health	has	not	
emerged	as	a	key	argument	to	challenge	the	political	and	economic	priorities	and	
powerful	interests	often	derived	from	security	and	neo‐liberal	discourses.		Overall,	
the	human	rights	discourse	gained	little	political	purchase	during	the	outbreak.		
The	limited	influence	of	human	rights	discourse	is	attributed	to	the	lack	of	
powerful	vested	interest	behind	the	discourse	(unlike	neoliberal	and	security	
discourses).		In	addition,	such	rights‐based	concerns	were	seen	as	irrelevant	at	the	
level	of	policymaking	since	these	concerns	were	effectively	countered	by	other	
discourses	that	highlighted	impending	economic	and	political	perils	posed	by	
SARS.	
To	summarise,	this	sub‐section	demonstrated	how	the	processes	of	contestation	
between	and	within	discourses	played	out	in	the	global	health	policy	making	on	
SARS.			What	we	can	observe	is	the	fundamental	divisions	and	internal	
contestations	in	perspective	on	how	SARS	should	be	understood	and	responded	
to.		Together,	the	processes	of	contestation	among	and	within	discourses	illustrate	
that	there	are	key	differences	in	each	discourse	resulting	in	tensions	in	GHG	of	
SARS.			
6.3.4.	Cooperation	across	different	discourses		
 
As	discussed	above,	how	problems	are	socially	constructed	shapes	the	choice	of	policy	
actions	and	outcomes.	This	can	be	the	result	of	contestation	among	and	within	
discourses.		At	the	same	time,	this	research	finds	that	effective	policy	action	requires	a	
degree	of	cooperation	across	different	discourses	amid	diverse	interests	to	achieve	
sufficient	political	leverage	for	policy	action.		Under	what	circumstances	do	discourses	
cooperate	rather	than	compete?		There	were	two	conditions	in	which	at	least	two	
different	discourses	were	aligned	with	one	another.				
	
First	of	all,	discourses	cooperate	when	there	is	a	compatibility	of	underlying	logics	in	
the	operation	of	policy.		The	biomedical	discourse	was	the	necessary	starting	point	for	
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global	health	action	on	SARS.		Arguably,	without	biomedical	discourse	and	the	public	
health	science	and	interventions,	action	cannot	be	possibly	initiated.		During	SARS,	the	
biomedical	discourse	focused	on	risk	behaviours	and	thus	the	discourse	supported	
policy	measures	aiming	to	identify	and	isolate	people	with	risks,	which	entailed	active	
surveillance,	compulsory	screening,	monitoring	and	quarantine.		It	became	apparent	
that	the	stress	on	risk‐prevention	found	in	biomedical	discourse	resonated	with	the	
equally	dichotomised	threat‐defence	logic	in	security	discourse.		Where	the	biomedical	
discourse	sought	to	recognise	the	potential	risks,	did	the	security	discourse	aim	to	
identify	the	possible	threats	before	they	become	a	local	and	global	problem.		In	terms	of	
policy	operation,	the	biomedical	discourse	suggested	to	classify	individuals	by	
potentially	infected	versus	uninfected.		Likewise,	the	security	discourse	aimed	to	
categorise	individuals	in	terms	of	foreign	suspects	versus	citizens.		The	biomedical	
discourse	used	a	range	of	evidence	to	legitimise	such	policy	operation	as	proven	to	be	
effective.664		Although	the	biomedical	discourse	shaped	the	overall	policy	ideas,	the	
discourse	alone	was	not	enough	to	elicit	actions.		The	security	discourse	then	entered	
the	equation	bringing	with	it	the	unprecedentedly	novel	apparatus	to	offer	visible	policy	
actions.		The	security	apparatus	such	as	police	and	military	forces	enabled	governments	
to	execute	policy	actions	and	to	further	reinforce	the	evidence	supported	by	the	
biomedical	discourse.		Thus,	the	common	underlying	logic	in	policy	operation	shared	by	
these	two	discourses	led	them	to	align	with	one	another	in	new	powerful	ways	in	
support	of	early	detection	and	pre‐emptive	surveillance.		
Second,	it	appears	discourses	cooperate	when	there	is	an	ultimate	policy	goal	to	achieve	
together	even	though	discourses	differ	over	the	operation	of	policy	measures.		While	
both	the	economic	and	security	discourses	have	differences	in	the	ways	in	which	health	
issues	are	interpreted	and	responded	to,	they	were	in	cooperation	during	SARS	as	they	
shared	an	overarching	policy	goal.		The	economic	discourse	recognised	the	major	
shortcomings	of	the	IHR	at	the	time	of	SARS	that	the	balance	of	cost	and	benefit	in	terms	
of	compliance	was	weighted	towards	non‐compliance.		It	framed	SARS	as	a	cost‐benefit	
calculation	not	in	terms	of	encouraging	concealment	of	outbreaks,	which	had	commonly	
occurred	in	outbreaks	prior	to	SARS,	but	stressing	the	benefits	of	cooperation	to	the	
national	economy	(e.g.	nation’s	standing	for	trade	and	commerce	in	international	
economy).		Thus	the	economic	discourse	urged	diligent	government	actions	in	prompt	
identification	of	the	disease	events	and	notification	to	the	WHO	and	the	international	
community.		The	security	discourse	on	the	other	hand	saw	the	need	to	protect	citizens	
from	foreign	disease	threats.		The	discourse	was	deployed	to	highlight	that	it	was	the	
responsibility	of	the	national	governments	to	ensure	that	health	security	of	nationals	
were	protected	from	the	imminent	threat	posed	by	SARS.		Again,	the	security	discourse	
required	decisive	government	actions	as	it	emphasised	foreign	policy	interests	in	
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international	relations.		The	interplay	of	economic	and	security	discourses	were	
mutually	beneficial	and	mutually	reinforcing	because	both	discourses	promoted	policies	
grounded	in	improving	countries’	international	image,	supporting	traditional	foreign	
policy	objectives,	and	ultimately	projecting	the	primacy	of	power	and	influence	in	global	
political	economy.					
In	summary,	drawing	on	the	evidence	of	the	empirical	chapters,	this	section	has	
illustrated	several	interesting	features	of	discourses.		First,	it	is	possible	to	read	the	
global	response	to	SARS	through	the	lens	of	four	discourses,	which	also	characterise	the	
global	governance	of	(acute)	infectious	diseases.		As	has	been	discussed	above,	
discourses	rise	and	fall	over	time	with	some	discourses	dominating	in	certain	periods.		
The	causes	of	this	variation	can	be	many	and	varied.		In	some	instances,	they	can	be	due	
to	the	changing	nature	of	the	SARS	outbreak	itself.		In	other	cases,	prevailing	political	
contexts	or	a	particular	disease	event	maintains	or	alters	the	terms	of	debates.		In	still	
other	cases,	material	power	and	its	long	lasting	influence	constrain	the	range	of	policy	
discourses	being	advanced.		All	these	point	to	the	ability	of	discourses	shaping	policy	
agendas	related	to	issues	surrounding	SARS.		This	study	demonstrates	that	debates	over	
appropriate	governance	arrangements	are	not	simply	about	material	power	or	a	lack	of	
coordination	but	rather	are	the	product	of	far	more	fundamental	ideational	
commitments	that	interplay	with	power	and	material	interests.		This	finding	is	in	
contrast	with	much	of	the	existing	GHG	literature.665		Treating	GHG	as	a	distinct	sphere	
of	activity	leads	us	to	miss	the	importance	of	a	wider	range	of	interests.			
Second,	as	a	result	of	multiple	discourses	being	at	play	at	particular	points	in	time	and	
places,	discourses	inevitably	conflict	with	one	another	that	lead	to	tension.	Additionally,	
discourses	are	not	only	in	contestation	between	them	but	there	are	internal	divisions	
and	conflicts	within	them.		Therefore	it	is	important	to	understand	the	sub‐frames	and	
how	these	sub‐frames	mutate	and	are	subject	to	power	and	influence.		In	the	case	of	
SARS,	the	contestation	was	contingent	on	a	range	of	factors,	some	of	which	were	specific	
to	the	issue	at	hand.		In	others,	the	governance	response	is	determined	less	by	the	
innate	characteristics	of	the	issue	or	the	particular	compelling	logic	of	an	appropriate	
response	and	more	by	compelling	interests	and	the	operation	of	power.				
Third,	it	is	clear	that	discourses	are	not	only	in	contestation	but	they	can	and	did	
cooperate	with	one	another	and	inform	policy	choices.		Thus	while	some	discourses	are	
themselves	a	powerful	representation	of	interests	(as	with	the	neoliberal	discourse	
representing	a	marketised	and	liberalised	economy	and	the	security	discourse	
embodying	security	concerns	of	wealthy	nations),	they	have	not	acted	solely	according	
to	their	logic	and	were	in	cooperation	with	other	discourses	and	interests.		Cooperation	
occurred	when	there	is	compatibility	in	underlying	logic	at	the	level	of	policy	operation	
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(biomedical	and	security	discourses)	or	two	disparate	discourses	were	in	need	of	
reinforcement	under	the	same	policy	goals	(economic	and	security	discourses).			
Given	the	above,	the	social	construction	of	SARS	means	that	the	global	response	to	the	
outbreak	is	beyond	a	simple	technical	exercise	in	the	efficient	delivery	of	biomedical	
solutions.		While	the	biomedical	discourse	did	shape	policy	choices	in	a	range	of	issues	
on	SARS,	and	were	clearly	important,	it	has	been	greatly	strengthened	in	its	policy	
influence	when	aligned	with	other	discourses.		Conversely,	other	discourses	appeared	to	
be	successfully	taken	up	if	they	were	aligned	with	the	biomedical	discourse	since	the	
‘scientific’	evidence	supported	by	the	biomedical	discourse	renders	them	more	
compelling	and	persuasive.			
6.4.	THE	ROLE	OF	THE	EPISTEMIC	COMMUNITY	IN	POLICY	EVOLUTION		
	
One	of	the	main	contributions	of	this	study	is	to	reveal	the	utility	of	the	epistemic	
communities	framework	for	enhancing	understanding	of	GHG.		Although	many	existing	
studies	explore	the	role	of	certain	types	of	actors	such	as	CSOs,	intergovernmental	
organisations,	and	private‐for‐profit	actors	in	advancing	particular	frames,666	few	
studies	were	undertaken	on	the	role	of	epistemic	communities	for	GHG.		This	study	
sought	to	demonstrate	the	role	epistemic	communities	played	in	the	process	of	global	
health	policy	making	on	SARS.		The	analytical	framework	draws	particular	attention	to	
how	epistemic	communities	emerged,	what	elements	cohered	with	each	other,	and	how	
they	facilitated	the	creation	and	subsequent	implementation	of	certain	policies	on	SARS.		
This	section	discusses	the	key	analytic	elements	that	characterised	the	SARS	epistemic	
community.	
6.4.1.	Characterising	the	SARS	epistemic	community	
 
The	findings	in	Chapter	Four	suggest	the	central	role	and	influence	of	a	community	of	
technical	experts	in	the	process	of	global	policy	making	on	SARS.		The	SARS	epistemic	
community	was	not	demarcated	by	formal	institutional	or	organizational	links.	Rather,	
three	criteria	characterise	the	SARS	epistemic	community.		They	include	shared	
normative	belief(s)	(ideational),	mutual	engagement	(relational)	and	common	policy	
enterprises	(policy	process).			
	
At	the	ideational	level,	a	set	of	shared	normative	beliefs	holds	key	actors	together.		It	is	
noted	here	that	Haas	does	not	explicitly	theorise	‘how’	members	of	an	epistemic	
community	are	delineated	by	their	common	ideas	about	causal	relations,	notions	of	
validity	and	policy	goals	to	pursue.		In	this	research,	the	methodological	complexity	of	
                                                            
666	Reubi	D	(2012),	“Making	a	human	right	to	tobacco	control:	expert	and	advocacy	networks,	framing	and	
the	right	to	health,”	Global	Public	Health,	7(S2):	S176‐S190;	Woodling	M,	Williams	OD	and	Rushton	S	
(2012),	“New	life	in	old	frames:	HIV,	development	and	the	‘AIDS	plus	MDGs’	approach,”	Global	Public	
Health,	7(S2):	S144‐S158;	Williams	OD	(2012),	“Access	to	medicines,	market	failure	and	market	
intervention:	a	tale	of	two	regimes,”	Global	Public	Health,	7(S2):	S127‐S143.	
209	
	
operationalising	Haas’s	framework	was	significantly	resolved	by	employing	the	work	of	
social	constructivism.		That	is,	in	order	to	locate	core	members	of	the	SARS	epistemic	
community	who	played	a	central	role	in	the	creation	of	a	set	of	ideational	grounds	
(worldviews),	the	researcher	identified	the	four	distinct	discourses	that	prevailed	
during	SARS.		Core	individuals	that	coalesced	around	a	particular	discourse	are	then	
identified.		As	shown	in	section	6.2,	there	is	an	apparent	linkage	between	the	ideas	and	
the	actors	who	promoted	them.	
Notably,	the	finding	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	epistemic	community	framework667.		Hass	
noted	that	traditional	epistemic	communities	undergo	a	protracted	contestation	
process	whereby	the	discourses	compete	for	dominance	or	where	one	single	dominant	
consensus	emerges	from	a	clearly	distinct	group	of	technical	actors.		In	contrast,	results	
from	this	study	demonstrate	that	there	existed	four	sets	of	consensual	and	normative	
beliefs	(i.e.	discourses)	often	associated	with	the	same	individuals.	In	other	words,	a	few	
individuals	were	involved	in	multiple	discourse	construction.		The	researcher	argue	that	
this	was	not	viewed	as	the	existence	of	four	multiple	epistemic	communities.		Rather,	
this	study	sees	multiple	discourse	construction	attributable	to	the	ability	of	a	set	of	
individuals	in	a	single	epistemic	community.		Their	ability	to	exert	influence	in	a	
number	of	global	priorities	related	to	SARS	and	their	impact	on	governance	outcomes	
needs	fuller	explanations.		Since	this	sub‐section	focuses	on	elements	characterising	the	
SARS	epistemic	community,	this	point	will	be	elaborated	further	in	section	6.4.2.		
At	the	relational	level,	collective	identity	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	is	formed	
through	formal	and	semi‐formal	club‐like	interactions	among	key	individuals.		The	
evidence	illustrates	sources	of	interaction	that	produced	cohesion	among	individuals.		
The	first	of	these	sources	is	the	professional	training	and	expertise.		The	members	of	
epistemic	community	commonly	received	a	degree	in	biomedical	science	followed	by	
postgraduate	training	in	infectious	diseases.		They	started	their	careers	as	researchers	
at	academic	institutions	or	international	health	organisations	before	moving	on	to	the	
WHO	as	medical	officers	or	external	advisors.		The	highly	technical	and	specialist	
language	possessed	and	the	shared	experience	in	the	area	of	infectious	diseases	enabled	
these	individuals	to	develop	a	sense	of	cohesion.		Second,	institutionalised	exchanges	
increase	the	sense	of	collective	identity.		The	setting	up	of	the	GOARN	enabled	a	small	
group	of	WHO	officials	to	build	ties	with	other	technical	experts	whose	expertise	lay	in	
the	biomedical,	epidemiological	and	laboratory	science,	allowing	these	technical	experts	
to	work	towards	a	similar	policy	goal.		Formal	meetings	and	forums,	often	organised	by	
the	WHO,	also	allow	members	of	epistemic	community	to	generate	expert	knowledge,	
establish	authority,	cultivate	common	culture,	and	solidify	normative	worldviews.		
Finally,	social	and	professional	relationships	with	elements	of	exclusivity	and	
informality	increase	the	consensus	building	when	some	members	act	as	connectors.		In	
the	case	of	SARS,	a	few	individuals	within	the	WHO	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	shaping	
                                                            
667	Haas	P	(1992),	“Introduction:	epistemic	communities	and	international	policy	coordination,”	in	Haas	P	
(ed.),	Knowledge,	Power	and	International	Policy	Coordination,	Columbia:	World	Peace	Foundation.		
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of	the	membership	through	their	role	as	a	coordinator.		In	short,	the	results	of	this	study	
demonstrate	that	like‐minded	norms	among	key	individuals	were	developed	and	
reinforced	by	virtue	of	specialised	training	and	professional	acculturation,	expert	
meetings,	and	personal	and	professional	relationships.				
The	“social”	process	is	therefore	at	the	heart	of	internal	cohesion	of	epistemic	
communities	and	an	indispensible	element	in	defining	epistemic	communities.		That	is,	
the	worldviews	held	by	members	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	might	become	
dispersed	without	mutual	engagements	among	key	members.		In	a	similar	vein,	mutual	
engagements	among	members	might	not	bring	about	consensual	beliefs	in	the	absence	
of	normative	worldviews	held	by	key	individuals.										
At	the	policy	level,	the	SARS	epistemic	community	exercised	policy	enterprises	in	
formulating	and	diffusing	particular	policies	and	actions	underpinning	different	
discourses.		Findings	suggest	particular	circumstances	under	which	the	members	of	the	
epistemic	community	are	more	likely	to	be	persuasive	and	therefore	influence	policy	
outcomes.			
First,	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	epistemic	community	posits	that	when	decision	
makers	are	faced	with	uncertainty,	they	often	seek	particular	scientific	and	technical	
advice.	668		The	findings	of	this	research	support	and	further	clarify	this	proposition	that	
not	only	the	uncertainty	surrounding	SARS	but	also	the	political	salience	arising	from	
the	uncertainty	provided	a	favourable	ground	for	the	reception	and	propagation	of	the	
epistemic	community’s	policy	ideas.		Although	a	small	group	of	technical	experts	within	
the	WHO	acted	as	a	source	of	policy	advice	on	issues	around	emerging	infectious	
diseases	in	early	2000s,	their	policy	enterprise	was	not	sufficiently	discernible	prior	to	
the	SARS	outbreak.		However,	the	perceived	socioeconomic	and	political	ramifications	
caused	by	the	SARS	outbreak	precipitated	national	authorities	and	decision	makers	to	
rely	on	“scientific	rationality”,	giving	major	opportunities	for	these	actors	to	proliferate	
their	policy	ideas.		Their	ability	to	articulate	the	cause‐and‐effect	relationships	of	
complex	problems	related	to	SARS,	through	professional	expertise,	privileged	their	role,	
drove	common	beliefs	and	legitimised	specific	policies.		Thus	the	results	of	this	research	
extend	the	epistemic	community	framework’s	proposition	that	if	uncertainty	arising	
from	crisis‐like	events	is	reinforced	by	political	salience,	epistemic	communities	are	
more	likely	to	serve	as	a	source	of	policy	ideas,	a	channel	through	which	policies	
diffused,	and	a	catalyst	in	policy	implementation	and	global	collective	actions.			
The	second	circumstance	that	offered	a	receptive	environment	for	the	community’s	
success	in	policy	influence	was	the	administrative	and	policy‐related	positions	that	key	
                                                            
668	Peterson	MJ	(1992)	“Whalers,	Cetologists,	Environmentalists,	and	the	International	Management	of	
Whaling”,	International	Organization,		46:	147‐186;	Haas	P	(2000),	“International	institutions	and	social	
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the	UK”.	British	Journal	of	Politics	&	International	Relations,	11(4):	613‐633.	
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members	held	at	the	WHO.		In	particular,	what	the	study	has	termed	the	Heymann	
centre,	comprised	of	a	few	core	WHO	officials,	played	a	very	important	role.		Their	
power	and	influence	were	not	merely	derived	from	the	technical	expertise	they	
possessed,	but	also	stemmed	from	the	institutional	positions	held.		This	supports	Haas’s	
epistemic	community	approach	that	the	more	an	epistemic	community	consolidates	
bureaucratic	power,	the	more	it	is	able	to	institutionalise	its	influence	and	insinuate	its	
views	into	broader	international	politics.669		Referring	to	the	bargaining	power	of	the	
epistemic	communities,	Haas	maintains	that	policy	influence	of	the	community	
increases	if	members	can	access	to	key	decision‐makers.		The	results	of	this	study	lend	
support	to	and	further	extend	this	proposition.		The	SARS	epistemic	community	was	not	
only	a	norm	purveyor	connecting	experts	with	decision	makers	but	they	became	active	
norm	creators	and	diffusers	wielding	influence	upon	decision	makers	according	to	the	
rules	and	principles	they	had	themselves	conceived	and	developed.670		Heymann,	in	
particular,	was	recognized	as	the	single	most	influential	policy	entrepreneur.			His	
capacity	in	influencing	a	community	of	technical	experts	to	come	together	in	pursuit	of	
common	goals,	mobilising	political	will	and	support	for	a	number	of	policy	outcomes,	
and	reinforcing	or	challenging	ideas	of	what	the	global	agendas	should	look	like	
indicates	that	certain	members	of	the	epistemic	community	are	able	to	exert	more	
influence	than	others	–	those	that	are	institutionalised	in	international	organisations.				
6.4.2.	The	ability	to	engage	in	multiple	policy	issues		
 
As	indicated	in	the	section	above,	the	idea–agency	nexus	requires	a	fuller	explanation,	
since	the	findings	from	this	study	are	different	from	the	traditional	epistemic	
communities	framework.		One	of	the	premises	that	this	research	begins	with	is	the	
rather	straightforward	and	uncomplicated	delineation	of	epistemic	communities,	as	
discourses	promoted	by	members	of	these	communities	would	presumably	be	radically	
different.		Implicit	in	this	premise	is	the	assumption	that	distinct	epistemic	communities	
compete	with	one	another	for	influence	through	the	articulation	of	discrete	norms,	
ideas	and	interests.		Yet,	this	research	has	shown	that	individuals	adhered	to	different	
discourses	over	time	but	also	sometimes	held	more	than	one	discourse	at	the	same	
time,	indicating	their	association	with	multiple	discourse	generation.		Additionally,	
there	is	little,	if	not	any,	indication	that	a	set	of	actors	involved	in	the	ascendance	of	
discourse	“A”	attempted	to	subvert	or	challenge	discourse	“B”,	legitimised	by	another	
set	of	actors	who	often	tended	to	also	appear	in	the	generation	of	discourse	“A”.		All	
these	points	suggest	the	potential	for	the	pliability	of	the	epistemic	community,	allowing	
members	to	engage	in	different	aspects	or	interpretations	of	problems.		
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This	could	also	indicates	the	ability	of	prominent	actors	involved	in	multiple	issue	areas	
which	might	require	different	worldviews	to	gain	support	from	policymakers.		This	
would	partially	explain	why	the	Heymann	centre	was	considerably	influential	in	the	
policy	making	process.		They	identified	and	promoted	particular	ideas	at	certain	stages,	
yet	they	also	continuously	refined	their	assumptions	and	methods	of	defining	issues	in	
order	to	persuade	audiences	of	the	centrality	of	the	problems	at	hand.		For	example,	
when	faced	with	a	constant	risk	of	transmission	with	no	known	treatment,	the	
biomedical	discourse	subsumed	in	the	policies	of	behavioural	change	and	public	
education	might	be	persuasive.	When	dealing	with	interstate	interests	and	reticence	in	
cooperation,	the	idea	of	the	potential	economic	cost	of	inaction	(or	noncompliance)	in	
the	international	economy	would	naturally	concern	even	the	most	inattentive	and/or	
unconcerned.		When	speaking	to	decision	makers	about	the	urgent	need	for	pre‐
emptive	surveillance	and	early	alert,	dressing	up	the	issue	as	a	security	problem	might	
be	“appropriate”	to	motivate	them.			
In	short,	the	ascendance	of	a	particular	policy	does	not	only	come	about	as	a	result	of	
how	strongly	the	policy	is	advocated,	but	it	is	also	contingent	on	the	extent	to	which	the	
rationale	behind	the	policy	convincingly	and	collectively	appeals	to	important	audiences	
(decision	makers)	that	need	winning	over	to	achieve	policy	action.		In	this	regard,	it	may	
not	be	surprising	that	multiple	policies	underpinning	different	discourses	were	
strategically	put	forth	by	the	same	set	of	individuals	to	call	attention	to	an	issue,	
influence	decision	makers’	perceptions	and	convince	them	of	the	legitimacy	and	
appropriateness	of	their	preferred	policy	choices.		This	concurs	well	with	the	findings	in	
section	6.2	which	suggest	that	discourses	change	over	time	and	that	there	is	a	potential,	
and	indeed	need	for,	the	complementarity	of	different	discourses,	to	achieve	an	agreed	
policy	goal.		Thus	contrary	to	the	initial	expectation	at	the	beginning	of	the	study,	the	
SARS	epistemic	community	promoted	diverse	(and	often	competing)	discourses	and	
effectively	combined	them	to	inform	policy	choices.		
This	finding	challenges	Hass’s	framework	of	epistemic	communities.		This	study	argues	
that	shared	normative	belief	by	members	of	the	epistemic	community	is	not	always	
contingent	on	a	single	issue.		At	least	for	complex	health	issues	like	the	SARS	outbreak,	
shared	normative	belief	emerges	on	a	series	of	issues	over	time	following	a	stream	of	
changes	in	the	nature	of	the	outbreak.		In	light	of	the	findings	from	this	research,	a	
conceptual	refinement	is	required	to	improve	the	viability	of	the	epistemic	communities	
framework.		In	particular,	the	notion	of	consensual	belief	in	the	epistemic	communities	
framework	needs	a	conceptual	expansion	to	embrace	the	notion	of	multiple	consensual	
belief(s)	held	by	a	single	epistemic	community	so	that	analysis	can	explain	the	presence	
of	multiple	issues	on	which	consensus	may	arise	in	a	given	policy	realm.		This	
conceptual	reconstruction	would	be	useful	for	more	nuanced	understanding	of	activities	
and	impact	of	epistemic	communities	when	studying	global	health	policy	issues	such	as	
disease	outbreaks	which	typically	entail	constantly	evolving	and	dynamic	nature.			
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6.4.3.	The	power	of	the	epistemic	community	and	ideational	hegemony		
	
Through	the	idea–agency	nexus,	this	study	shows	that	the	epistemic	community,	
comprised	of	a	small	number	of	technical	experts,	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	
introduction,	acceptance	and	diffusion	of	policy	discourses.		They	acted	not	only	as	
experts	who	constructed	the	understanding	of	reality,	but	as	actors	who	combined	
technical	expertise	with	the	capacity	to	promote	their	policy	preferences.		When	looking	
at	the	composition,	the	SARS	epistemic	community	was,	to	a	certain	extent,	a	reflection	
of	the	existing	and	well‐known	form	of	leadership	and	dominance	in	the	area	of	global	
infectious	diseases.		Indeed,	it	is	not	new	that	technical	and	medical	experts	acquire	and	
maintain	considerable	political	authority	in	addressing	concerns	arising	from	infectious	
diseases.		
Yet,	it	raises	questions	about	health	governance,	in	particular,	how	the	process	by	which	
policy	debates	being	carried	out	contributes	to	policy	outcomes.		In	the	key	policy	
debates	on	SARS,	there	is	a	notable	absence	of	other	actors,	such	as	CSOs	or	technical	
experts	in	areas	other	than	biomedical	science.		The	preponderance	of	biomedical	
science	in	the	epistemic	community	is	not	obviated	by	observing	the	language	used	by	
the	community	is	based	on	scientific,	ostensibly	universal	epistemologies.		Scholars	
problematise	the	authority	accorded	to	scientific	inquiry	as	a	rationalist	epistemology	
that	delegitimizes	worldviews	based	on	other	epistemologies.671		A	similar	assertion	
may	adhere	to	the	SARS	epistemic	community.		
The	absence	of	the	input	of	other	actors	is	likely	to	circumscribe	what	is	sayable	and	
make	GHG	less	about	equally	diffused	authority	but	more	about	concentration	of	
ideational	power.		A	concentration	of	ideational	power	in	GHG	promotes	similar	policy	
ends	in	how	infectious	diseases	should	be	responded	to	as	it	discounts	alternative	
voices	for	action.		In	this	regard,	GHG	of	SARS	is	much	more	complex	and	political	than	
technocratic	enterprise.		While	not	wanting	to	be	presumptuous,	it	might	be	reasonable	
to	postulate	that	in	the	GHG	of	SARS,	the	epistemic	community	gained	ideational	
hegemony,	diminishing	other	possible	avenues	for	defining	the	problems	surrounding	
SARS	and	advancing	policy	solutions.			
In	summary,	this	section	discusses	key	features	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	and	
explores	their	implications	for	global	health	policy	making.		First,	it	has	provided	key	
elements	characterising	the	SARS	epistemic	community	and	reviewed	the	epistemic	
communities	framework	in	light	of	findings	from	SARS.		While	the	findings	of	this	study	
largely	confirm	and	lend	support	to	the	epistemic	communities	framework,	Haas’s	
original	conception	of	defining	epistemic	communities	has	proved	insufficient	to	
explaining	the	SARS	epistemic	community.		Notably,	this	study	has	challenged	the	
notion	of	the	shared	normative	belief	in	the	epistemic	communities	framework	by	
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illustrating	the	co‐existence	of	multiple	consensual	beliefs	held	by	a	single	epistemic	
community	over	different	issue	areas	at	different	points	in	time.										
Second,	given	the	defining	features	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	and	the	manner	in	
which	global	health	policymaking	on	SARS	was	carried	out,	this	research	has	contended	
that	the	privilege	accorded	to	particular	expertise	or	actors	is	likely	to	lead	to	
prioritisation	of	particular	policies	over	others.		The	general	absence	of	CSOs,	which	
often	alter	the	terms	of	debate	in	the	terrain	of	other	global	health	policy,	and	the	
potential	of	ideational	hegemony	acquired	by	the	SARS	epistemic	community	warrant	
more	reflections	on	how	agreed	goals	are	achieved	in	the	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	
outbreaks.	
6.5.	THE	NATURE	OF	GLOBAL	HEALTH	GOVERNANCE	OF	SARS	
	
As	described	in	Chapter	One,	GHG	can	be	understood	as	part	of	a	larger	architecture	of	
global	governance	that	constitutes	a	number	of	different	domains	with	substantially	
overlapping	(often	competing	or	conflicting)	agendas	and	interests.		At	the	same	time,	
GHG	is	the	governance	of	a	broad	array	of	issues	comprising	global	health.		Under	each	
global	health	issue,	GHG	is	a	contested	policy	space	characterised	by	complex	interplay	
of	diverse	range	of	ideas,	interests	and	institutions.		This	study	sets	out	to	explore	why	
the	GHG	of	SARS	emerged	the	way	it	did.		It	is	argued	that	it	is	the	very	combination	of	
ideas,	interests	and	institutions	that	shapes	what	and	why	policy	actions	surrounding	
SARS	emerged	the	way	it	did.		The	findings	of	this	study	show	that	in	many	ways,	the	
GHG	of	SARS	mirrors,	albeit	subtle	differences,	the	GHG	of	other	global	health	issues	in	
terms	of	framing	of	issues	and	the	actors	in	the	formation	of	and	justification	for	
interests	in	global	health.		This	section	draws	out	observations	about	how	the	GHG	of	
SARS	illuminates	the	nature	of	GHG	more	broadly,	and	what	insights	can	be	drawn	from	
the	findings	of	this	research.	
The	first	observation	is	that	the	presence	of	four	discourses	in	the	GHG	of	SARS	is	
reflected	in	other	areas	of	global	health	issues.		Each	of	these	discourses,	based	on	a	set	
of	norms,	helps	to	construct	problems	in	global	health	by	promoting	particular	
understandings.		Importantly,	they	serve	a	purpose	in	privileging	certain	interests	and	
certain	ways	of	interpreting	the	problems	over	others.		For	example,	the	neoliberal	
discourse	that	was	used	to	prioritise	the	TRIPS‐based	SARS	vaccine	development	is	
readily	found	in	access	to	medicine	in	which	pharmaceutical	companies	based	primarily	
in	Northern	states	justify	the	global	IPR	protection	as	necessary	for	the	development	of	
new	drugs.672		Correspondingly,	just	like	SARS	was	framed	as	a	national	security	
concern,	one	would	note	that	the	pandemic	influenza	and	HIV/AIDS	are	framed	as	an	
existential	threat	to	state	and	society	(of	certain	powerful	states),	spurring	enormous	
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regimes,”	Global	Public	Health,	7(S2):	S127‐S143.	
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political	attention	and	massive	increase	in	funding.	673		The	framing	of	SARS	as	a	
product	of	an	individual’s	risk	behaviour	can	be	seen	in	other	areas	of	global	health	such	
as	tobacco	control	in	which	a	similar	underlying	logic	was	used	by	the	tobacco	industry	
to	protect	and	retain	the	market‐based	private	interest.674		The	human	rights	discourse	
that	drew	attention	to	civil	liberty	of	individuals	during	SARS	features	in	travel	
restrictions	for	people	living	with	HIV.675		What	the	observation	above	tells	us	is	that	the	
GHG	of	SARS	largely	resonates	with	the	trend	and	developments	in	the	GHG	of	other	
health	issues	in	that	a	similar	set	of	normative	frameworks	defines	governance	
arrangements	in	different	global	health	issues.		This	indicates	that	at	the	normative	
level,	GHG	is	comprised	of	diverse	domains	including	infectious	disease	outbreaks,	and	
the	boundaries	between	each	are	porous	and	their	terrains	overlapping.		At	the	same	
time,	it	is	worth	noting	the	ability	of	discourses	to	construct	social	realities	based	on	
intersubjective	understandings	across	all	areas	of	GHG.		The	fact	that	particular	
interests	‐	national	security,	financial	imperative,	or	social	determinants	of	health	‐	are	
at	stake,	when	it	comes	to	certain	forms	of	GHG,	challenges	much	of	the	academic	GHG	
literature	that	GHG	is	simply	a	product	of	rational	response	to	exogenous	developments.		
The	present	study	on	SARS	underlines	the	need	to	have	fuller	understanding	on	how	the	
interplay	of	competing	ideas,	interests,	and	institutions	shapes	GHG.	
A	second	observation	to	be	drawn	from	this	study	is	that	multiple	visions	of	GHG	result	
in	not	only	contestation	but	also	consensus.		As	such,	there	is	a	potential	for	the	
development	of	coalition	of	different	parties	whose	interests	overlap	but	at	times	pull	in	
different	directions.		As	seen	in	the	present	study,	different	interests	–	biomedical,	
economic	and	national	interests	‐	have	been	at	times	aligned	in	certain	circumstances	as	
opposed	to	being	politically	contested.		This	indicates	that	different	interests	are	
prepared	to	reconcile	with	one	another	to	gain	support	from	decision	makers,	and	that	
even	some	of	the	most	powerful	interests	required	alignment	with	other	interests	in	
pursuit	of	achieving	their	policy	goals.		This	resonates	with	other	global	disease	issue	
areas	such	as	HIV/AIDS	and	pandemic	influenza.		When	the	biomedical	facts	were	not	
enough	to	elicit	concerted	action	on	HIV/AIDS,	the	economic	and	security	interests	have	
come	into	play	to	reinforce	and	support	the	efficient	delivery	of	biomedical	solution	
through	market‐based	global	supply	of	patented	antiretroviral	treatment.676		This	is	also	
evident	in	the	pandemic	influenza	where	the	biomedicalism	has	been	complemented	by	
the	security	interest.		Instead	of	challenging	the	primacy	of	biomedicine,	the	security	
                                                            
673	Kamradt‐Scott	A	(2012),	“Changing	perceptions	of	pandemic	influenza	and	public	health	response,”	
American	Journal	of	Public	Health,	102(1):	90‐98;	Kamradt‐Scott	A	and	McInnes	C	(2012),	“The	
securitisation	of	pandemic	influenza:	framing,	security	and	public	policy,”	Global	Public	Health,	7(S2):	
S95‐S119;	Labonte	R	and	Gagnon	M	(2010),	“Framing	health	and	foreign	policy:	lessons	for	global	health	
diplomacy,”	Globalisation	and	Health,	6:	14.	
674	Reubi	D	(2012),	“Making	a	human	right	to	tobacco	control:	expert	and	advocacy	networks,	framing	and	
the	right	to	health,”	Global	Public	Health,	7(S2):	S176‐S190.	
675	Rushton	S	(2012),	“The	global	debate	over	HIV‐related	travel	restrictions:	framing	and	policy	change.	
Global	Public	Health,	7(S2):	S159‐175.		
676	McInnes	C,	Kamradt‐Scott	A,	Lee	K,	Romer‐Mahler	A,	Rushton	S,	Williams	OD	(2014),	“HIV/AIDS,”	
Chapter	2,	In	The	Transformation	of	Global	Health	Governance.	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
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has	supported	and	reinforced	it	and	served	to	highlight	the	importance	of	
pharmaceutical‐based	policy	interventions	via	government	controlled	stockpiling	and	
distribution.677		The	resonance	of	this	study	with	the	existing	GHG	literature	leads	to	a	
broad	conclusion	that	different	interests	can	be	complemented	to	generate	a	new	
normative	basis	on	which	to	legitimise	cooperation.		On	a	positive	note,	the	potential	of	
co‐opting	multiple	interests	via	framing	and	reframing	suggests	a	possibility	that	what	
is	seen	as	marginalised	interests	in	GHG	may	advance	their	interests	through	a	process	
of	intersubjective	negotiations	with	other	interests	that	have	different	and	competing	
normative	understandings.		While	this	may	inevitably	involve	trading	some	of	one’s	
interests	off	against	the	other’s	interests,	such	interpretive	approach	may	help	generate	
a	more	convergent,	deliverable	and	balanced	global	health	agenda.		
A	third	observation	concerns	the	policy	influence	of	epistemic	communities	in	GHG.		The	
social	construction	of	SARS	has	underscored	the	ideational	power	of	actors	in	global	
health	policy.		They	exerted	normative	influences	in	terms	of	its	ability	to	assert,	
legitimise	and	win	over	particular	approaches	and	solutions.		Its	appeal	to	expertise,	
scientific	rationalism	and	impartiality	all	bestowed	upon	it	the	power	to	convince	
audiences	(decision	makers).		This	finding	has	resonance	with	the	GHG	of	other	
domains	in	which	(a	network	of)	technical	experts	wield	policy	influence	across	a	range	
of	health	issues	from	non‐infectious	disease	issues	such	as	health	care	financing	
reform678	and	tobacco	marketing.679	to	policies	pertaining	to	infectious	diseases	such	as	
HIV/AIDS	680	and	TB.681		While	not	all	studies	applied	the	epistemic	communities	
framework,	they	invariably	demonstrate	that	a	group	of	technical	experts	with	
recognised	authority	has	contributed	to	the	development	of	preferences	and	
worldviews	of	states	and	international	regimes.		Similar	to	the	findings	of	this	study,	the	
degree	of	their	success	in	policy	outcomes	and	persuasiveness	rest	largely	on	their	
shared	understanding	of	problems	at	hand	and	the	degree	of	internal	cohesion.		Thus	
overt	disagreement	about	how	problems	are	understood	and	interpreted	appears	to	
result	in	the	formation	of	multiple	or	even	competing	epistemic	communities	in	a	given	
global	health	domain.682		Yet	despite	varying	degrees	of	consensus	and	contestation	
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678	Lee	K	and	Goodman	H	(2002),	“Global	Policy	Network:	the	Propagation	of	health	care	financing	reform	
since	 the	 1980s”,	 in	 Lee	 et	 al.	 (eds.),	 Health	 Policy	 in	 a	 Globalising	 World,	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
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tuberculosis	control,”	Social	Science	and	Medicine,	57(1):	179‐188.	
682	For	example,	Youde	identifies	the	emergence	of	both	an	epistemic	community	and	a	counter‐epistemic	
community	offering	fundamentally	different	understandings	of	HIV/AIDS	and	radically	different	policy	
prescriptions.		A	similar	phenomenon	is	observed	in	TB	where	branding	of	a	new	TB	policy	DOTS	
(Directly	Observed	Therapy,	Short‐course)	was	hotly	contested	in	the	TB	epistemic	communities.			
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between	epistemic	communities	across	cases,	epistemic	communities	are	central	to	
explaining	why	particular	collective	action	in	GHG	has	achieved	the	way	it	does	–	
desired	or	otherwise.		There	is	an	important	and	growing	linkage	between	globalisation	
and	epistemic	communities.		As	global	health	issues	become	increasingly	complex,	
ushering	in	conditions	of	ongoing	uncertainty	such	as	infectious	outbreaks,	the	need	for	
knowledge	and	expertise	will	be	ever	more	increasing.			
In	summary,	this	section	has	discussed	how	the	GHG	of	SARS	enhances	our	
understanding	of	the	nature	of	GHG	in	general.		GHG	of	SARS	is	not	a	coherent	set	of	
rules	and	norms	but	is	comprised	of	a	range	of	interests	and	ideas	which	are	at	times	
complementary	or	conflicting.		It	is	argued	that	any	account	of	GHG	has	to	be	drawn	
from	a	full	examination	of	intersubjective	understandings	of	underlying	norms	on	which	
collective	actions	are	based.		Such	an	exercise	will	contribute	to	more	reflective	and	
critical	debates	about	the	strengthening	of	GHG.			
6.6.	CONCLUSIONS	
	
This	chapter	has	discussed	the	characteristics	of	global	response	to	SARS	to	draw	
broader	implications	for	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	more	generally.		The	central	
argument	of	this	chapter	was	that	the	dominance	of	government	arrangements	
surrounding	SARS	was	not	merely	the	result	of	material	realities,	real	world	events	or	
“rational”	decision	making,	but	socially	constructed	around	particular	discourses	which	
privileged	certain	actions	and	outcomes,	interests,	ideas	and	institutions	over	others.		It	
is	argued	that	an	epistemic	community	was	the	means	by	which	certain	discourses	
shaped	policy	responses.		Specifically,	the	findings	of	this	study	underline	the	following	
points.	
First,	the	SARS	epistemic	community	is	comprised	of	technical	expert‐cum‐norm	
purveyors	who	had	ability	to	generate	multiple	worldviews	in	a	bid	to	develop	
consensus	and	strategically	turn	their	normative	beliefs	into	concrete	measures	in	
different	policy	areas.		They	came	to	hold	and	even	support	more	than	one	discourse	
simultaneously	that	shaped	the	understanding	of	problems	pertaining	to	SARS	and	
advanced	what	was	seen	as	the	appropriate	response.		
Second,	discourses	underpinning	particular	policies	rose	and	fell	during	the	outbreak	
over	time	with	some	discourses	dominating	at	particular	points	in	time	and	places.		
Importantly,	the	ascendance	(and	decline)	of	discourses	occurred	under	certain	
circumstances.			The	changing	nature	of	the	outbreak	itself	renders	a	significant	scope	
condition	for	the	influence	of	certain	discourses.		The	prevailing	political	context	allows	
a	particular	discourse	to	frame	issues	more	persuasively.		Another	condition	is	a	major	
disease	event	over	the	course	of	the	outbreak	that	offers	receptive	environment	for	
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certain	discourse	to	succeed.		Finally,	if	the	discourse	is	in	line	with	the	existing	
structural	power,	it	is	more	likely	to	maintain	its	influence.		
Third,	as	a	result	of	multiple	discourses	being	at	play	at	particular	points	in	time,	
discourses	inevitably	conflict	with	each	other	and	lead	to	tension.		Additionally,	
discourses	are	not	only	in	contestation	between	them	but	there	are	internal	divisions	
and	conflicts	within	them.		The	contestation	of	discourses	is	contingent	on	a	range	of	
factors,	some	of	which	are	specific	to	the	issue	at	hand.	In	others,	the	governance	
response	is	determined	less	by	the	inherent	features	of	the	issue	or	the	particular	
convincing	logic	of	an	‘appropriate’	response	but	more	by	compelling	interests	and	the	
operation	of	power.		
Fourth,	while	some	discourses	are	themselves	a	powerful	representation	of	interests	(as	
with	the	neoliberal	discourse	representing	a	marketised	and	liberalised	economy	and	
the	security	discourse	embodying	security	concerns	of	powerful	nations),	they	have	not	
acted	solely	according	to	their	logic	but	have	been	in	cooperation	with	other	discourses	
and	interests.		The	evidence	suggests	that	cooperation	of	discourses	occurred	under	
certain	circumstances	such	as	when	there	is	compatibility	in	underlying	logic	at	the	
level	of	policy	operation	or	when	there	is	a	need	to	achieve	an	ultimate	policy	goal	
together.		
Fifth,	this	research	has	largely	confirmed	and	lent	support	to	the	epistemic	communities	
framework.		Yet,	the	empirical	findings	have	suggested	an	elasticity	of	concepts	or	
conceptual	sophistication	in	the	epistemic	communities	framework.		Notably,	this	
research	has	challenged	the	notion	of	shared	normative	belief	in	the	framework	by	
demonstrating	the	possible	existence	of	multiple	consensual	beliefs	affecting	the	policy	
paradigm	of	the	community	across	different	issue	areas	over	time.		Such	refinement	
would	ensure	meaningful	examination	of	the	multiple	“realities”	at	large	in	one	policy	
realm	and	why	certain	“reality”	prevails	under	particular	conditions.		This	finding	fits	
well	with	the	existence	of	multiple	discourses	as	well	as	the	complementarity	of	
different	discourses	identified	above.		
Sixth,	the	findings	of	this	study	demonstrate	that	in	many	ways,	the	GHG	of	SARS	
mirrors,	the	GHG	of	other	global	health	issues	in	terms	of	framing	of	issues	and	the	
actors	in	the	formation	of	and	justification	for	interests	in	global	health.		The	manner	in	
which	the	four	discourses	operated	in	other	areas	of	global	health,	the	reconciliation	of	
different	interests	behind	the	agreed	goals,	and	the	role	and	authority	given	to	
knowledge‐based	actors	in	highly	technical	areas	of	global	health	all	attest	that	GHG	of	
SARS	is	reminiscent	of	GHG	in	general.										
To	conclude,	through	interrogation	of	the	nature	of	the	global	policymaking	process	on	
SARS,	one	sees	where	normative	preferences	lie	in	the	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	
related	to	SARS.		Conversely,	one	begins	to	understand	why	particular	policies	become	
prioritised	or	marginalised.		This	research	does	not	make	a	judgment	as	to	whether	
which	discourse(s)	are	good	or	which	ones	are	bad.		Rather,	the	rise	of	certain	
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worldviews	may	be	understood	as	constituting	health	governance,	as	it	acts	to	
symbolically	and	pervasively	shape,	privilege	or	bolster	particular	interests	and	
arrangements	against	the	others.		Scrutinising	the	process	behind	the	ascendance	and	
decline	of	an	underlying	normative	framework	and	identifying	actors	responsible	for	
such	evolution	allows	for	a	fuller	understanding	of	why	GHG	of	infectious	diseases	has	
evolved	the	way	it	has	to	date.	
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CHAPTER	SEVEN	
CONCLUSIONS	
	
7.1.	 INTRODUCTION	
	
The	starting	point	of	this	research	is	to	more	fully	explain	the	emerging	nature	of	GHG,	
through	detailed	analysis	of	SARS,	and	how	insights	might	be	drawn	to	strengthen	
collective	action	on	shared	health	needs.		A	review	of	the	existing	literature	on	GHG,	as	
set	out	in	Chapter	One,	shows	that	analysis	to	date	has	largely	focused	on	problems	
defined	in	terms	of	poorly	designed	or	implemented	institutional	arrangements,	
inadequate	resources,	lack	of	technical	knowhow,	or	political	shortcomings.			These	
problems	are	assumed	to	be	addressable	by	better	institutional	arrangements,	
increased	resources,	and	the	development	of	technical	solutions	or	measures	to	
strengthen	“good	governance”.		It	is	argued	that	these	approaches	largely	emphasise	
material	reality	as	definitive	of	global	health	policy	action	and	outcomes.	
	
While	there	is	a	degree	of	evidence	that	there	is	some	merit	in	all	of	these	approaches,	
this	research	seeks	to	contribute	to	emerging	understandings	of	GHG	as	socially	
constructed.		This	research	argues	that	dominance	of	particular	policies	and	global	
collective	action	does	not	occur,	merely	because	of	material	conditions,	but	are	also	
shaped	by	ideational	factors.		Collective	action	in	global	health,	in	brief,	is	the	product	of	
a	multiplicity	of	ideas,	interests	and	institutions	which	shape	what	should	be	the	
universe	of	possible,	the	most	acceptable	and	the	most	feasible	course	of	policy	action.		
Through	the	concepts	of	framing	and	epistemic	communities,	the	research	explains	the	
global	response	to	the	SARS	outbreak	as		interplay	between	particular	normative	
frameworks	or	discourses,	advanced	by	an	epistemic	community,	which	facilitates	or	
constrains	certain	policy	actions.		In	this	way,	this	research	seeks	to	understand	GHG	in	
a	way	which	brings	together	the	material	and	the	ideational	more	fully	into	account	for	
the	nature	of	GHG.	
This	concluding	chapter	is	structured	in	five	sections.		The	first	section	summarises	the	
empirical	findings.		The	second	section	considers	the	scholarly	and	policy	contributions	
of	the	research.		The	third	section	then	evaluates	the	limitations	of	this	research	
followed	by	the	fourth	section	which	proposes	suggestions	for	further	research	
directions.		Lastly,	a	brief	reflection	on	the	approach	taken	in	this	research	is	provided.	
7.2.	SUMMARY	OF	THE	MAIN	FINDINGS	
	
This	research	posed	two	central	research	objectives	along	with	several	questions.		The	
central	research	objectives	are	to:		(a)	locate	the	transnational	epistemic	community	
concerned	with	SARS	by	identifying	key	actors	and	their	linkages	to	each	other;	and	(b)	
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analyse	the	discourses	constructed	by	this	epistemic	community	in	order	to	understand	
how,	and	to	what	extent,	the	discourses	impacted	on	the	practical	policy	response	to	
SARS.	
	
The	primary	empirical	findings	of	this	research	are	provided	below.		The	first	three	
points	are	relevant	to	the	first	central	research	objective.		The	remaining	four	points	
deal	with	the	second	central	research	objective.			
First,	the	research	finds	that	the	SARS	epistemic	community	evolved	along	with	and	was	
shaped	by	the	policy	environment	where	emerging	and	re‐emerging	infectious	disease	
outbreaks	became	a	growing	concern	for	the	international	community	in	the	mid	and	
late	1990s.		A	small	number	of	medically	trained	WHO	officials	who	spent	their	early	
careers	in	infectious	disease	control	in	the	developing	world	came	to	share	a	core	set	of	
normative	beliefs	in	how	the	problem	of	disease	outbreaks	should	be	addressed,	to	
what	ends	and	for	whose	benefit	at	the	turn	of	21st	century.		
Second,	the	research	shows	that	members	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	were	
gradually	expanded	when	there	was	an	imperative	to	mobilise	specialised	expertise	to	
develop	global	SARS	outbreak	knowledge	and	to	forge	a	focal	point	for	normative	
consensus.		The	relative	weight	of	the	knowledge	on	SARS	was	influenced	by	the	
abovementioned	core	WHO	officials.		Thus,	experts	in	the	specialised	fields	of	virology	
and	epidemiology	dominated	the	global	inquisitions	on	SARS.		These	experts	
accumulated	their	authority	and	credibility	further	by	participating	in	formal	and	
informal	global	meetings.		The	similar	notions	of	validity	derived	from	specialist	
training	and	personal	or	professional	relationships	with	the	core	members	of	WHO	
officials	gave	further	impetus	for	these	individuals	to	form	a	collective	identity	and	
shared	normative	beliefs.	
Third,	the	research	identifies	that	the	policy	enterprise	of	the	SARS	epistemic	
community	was,	led	by	a	few	individuals	who	constituted	the	key	senior	WHO	officials,	
forming	what	this	study	refers	to	as	the	Heymann	centre.		These	individuals,	together	
with	other	actors,	formulated	policy	strategies,	created	and	shaped	an	environment	of	
collective	actions.	Policy	makers	came	to	recognise	and	identify	with	the	role	of	the	
Heymann	centre	in	shaping	the	national	and	international	policy	response.		Evidently,	
the	uncertainty	and	complexity	surrounding	SARS	provided	the	opportunity	for	this	
group	to	earn	a	privileged	position	to	advance	their	policy	enterprise.		Furthermore,	
their	positions	in	the	international	agency	enabled	them	to	straddle	the	different	worlds	
of	the	technical	and	normative,	conferring	them	with	authority	and	policy	influence.		
Fourth,	the	operation	of	four	discourses	–	biomedical,	economic,	security	and	human	
rights	–	was	identified	as	primary	discourses	that	have	arisen	in	the	global	response	to	
SARS.		It	is	clear	from	empirical	observation	that	these	discourses	rose	and	fell	over	
time,	but	some	of	them	remained	more	influential.		The	causes	of	this	variation	are	
varied.		In	some	instances,	they	can	be	due	to	the	changing	nature	of	the	SARS	outbreak	
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itself.		In	other	cases,	prevailing	political	contexts	or	a	particular	disease	event	
maintains	or	alters	the	terms	of	debates.		In	still	other	cases,	material	power	and	its	long	
lasting	influence	constrain	the	range	of	policy	discourses	being	advanced.		All	these	
point	to	the	ability	of	discourses	shaping	policy	agendas	related	to	issues	surrounding	
SARS.	
Fifth,	as	a	result	of	multiple	discourses	being	at	play	at	particular	points	in	time	and	
places,	discourses	inevitably	conflict	with	one	another	that	lead	to	tension.	Additionally,	
discourses	are	not	only	in	contestation	between	them	but	there	are	internal	divisions	
and	conflicts	within	them.		Therefore	it	is	important	to	understand	the	sub‐frames	and	
how	these	sub‐frames	mutate	and	are	subject	to	power	and	influence.		In	the	case	of	
SARS,	the	contestation	was	contingent	on	a	range	of	factors,	some	of	which	were	specific	
to	the	issue	at	hand.		In	others,	the	governance	response	is	determined	less	by	the	
innate	characteristics	of	the	issue	or	the	particular	compelling	logic	of	an	appropriate	
response	and	more	by	compelling	interests	and	the	operation	of	power.	
Sixth,	discourses	are	not	only	in	contestation	but	they	can	and	did	cooperate	with	one	
another	and	inform	policy	choices.		While	some	discourses	were	themselves	a	powerful	
representation	of	interests	(as	with	the	neoliberal	discourse	representing	a	marketised	
and	liberalised	economy	and	the	security	discourse	embodying	security	concerns	of	
powerful	nations),	they	did	not	act	solely	according	to	their	logic	but	were	in	
cooperation	with	other	discourses	and	interests.		The	evidence	suggests	that	
cooperation	of	discourses	occurred	under	certain	circumstances	such	as	when	there	
was	compatibility	in	underlying	logic	at	the	level	of	policy	operation	or	when	there	was	
a	need	to	achieve	an	ultimate	policy	goal	together.		
Lastly,	this	research	finds	evidence	that	the	SARS	epistemic	community	consisted	of	
technical	expert‐cum‐norm	purveyors	who	had	ability	to	generate	multiple	worldviews	
in	a	bid	to	develop	consensus	and	strategically	turn	their	normative	beliefs	into	
concrete	measures	in	different	policy	areas.		They	came	to	hold	and	even	support	more	
than	one	discourse	simultaneously	(which	can	be	competing)	that	shaped	the	
understanding	of	problems	pertaining	to	SARS	and	advanced	what	was	seen	as	the	
appropriate	response.	
7.3.	CONTRIBUTIONS	OF	THIS	RESEARCH	
	
This	research	aimed	to	contribute	to	the	emerging	body	of	GHG	literature	through	in‐
depth	empirical	engagement	in	tandem	with	theoretical	reflection	and	deliberation.		
The	findings	of	this	research	make	several	distinct	contributions	in	the	theoretical,	
empirical	and	policy	realms.	
	
This	research	has	challenged	much	of	the	current	literature	that	largely	cast	problems	
facing	global	health	in	terms	of	lack	of	political	will,	lack	of	inter‐agency	coordination	
and			insufficiency	of	resources.		Undoubtedly,	the	existing	literature	has	provided	a	
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wealth	of	insights	into	the	operation	and	power	in	GHG,	but	it	failed	to	grasp	more	
fundamental	reasons	as	to	why	there	is	an	apparent	disjuncture	between	global	health	
needs	and	governance	response.		In	contrast,	this	research,	located	largely	within	Social	
Constructivism,	argues	the	contemporary	architecture	of	GHG	as	far	wider	and	more	
far‐reaching	than	much	of	the	existing	literature	suggested.		This	research	began	with	
the	recognition	that	plurality	of	interests,	ideas	and	institutions	shapes	governance	
arrangements	in	terms	of	priority	setting	in	GHG.		It	has	illustrated	the	origins	and	
significance	of	the	multiplicity	of	ideas	shaping	collective	action	on	SARS	by	means	of	
four	overarching	discourses.		The	operation	of	four	discourses	throughout	the	course	of	
the	outbreak	illustrates	that	GHG	of	SARS	is	not	merely	the	“rational”	response	to	
exogenous	developments	to	the	real	world	but	is	the	product	of	a	complicated	process	
of	contestation	over	how	reality	is	constructed.		In	this	sense,	this	research	
complements	and	adds	value	to	the	emerging	body	of	literature	that	problematises	
current	approaches	to	the	study	of	GHG.		It	also	enhances	our	understanding	of	how	
discourses	play	out	in	actual	institutional	settings	and	health	policies.	
	
This	research	has	elaborated	and	advanced	our	understanding	of	the	dynamic	of	
discourse	operation	in	GHG	of	infectious	diseases.		The	research	illustrates	why	
particular	discourses	come	to	the	fore	and	recede	in	the	context	of	infectious	disease	
outbreaks.		It	also	explains	that	under	certain	circumstances,	discourses	are	not	only	
contested	but	they	are	also	in	cooperation.		Importantly,	the	findings	of	this	research	
highlight	that	even	some	of	the	most	powerful	discourses	required	additional	support	
from	a	different	set	of	discourses	at	certain	points	to	garner	enough	support	for	
resources	and	policies	to	gather.		The	cooperation	of	various	discourses	in	terms	of	
policy	outcomes	opens	up	the	space	for	coalition	of	interests,	consensus,	and	
coordination	of	separate	institutions,	which	previously	championed	certain	discourses	
(and	thus	interests),	in	GHG.		This	finding	may	inform	future	policy	debates	in	search	for	
commonly	agreed	goals	for	global	health	needs.		Policymakers	may	gain	insights	into	
ways	to	reconcile	different	worldviews	underpinning	health	policies	and	provide	
channels	for	different	types	of	agents	shaping	GHG	to	coordinate.		This	research	also	
contributes	to	further	discussions	on	how	discourses	can	be	used	to	yield	a	consensual	
logic	in	policy	response.		
One	of	the	original	theoretical	contributions	this	research	makes	is	the	approach	that	
this	research	adopts	for	analysing	normative	basis	of	GHG.		Drawing	on	Social	
Constructivism	and	the	epistemic	communities	framework,	this	research	develops	an	
analytical	framework	that	allows	for	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	
the	discourse	defining	global	health	problems	and	solutions,	and	the	actors	who	
produce	them.		At	the	same	time,	the	research	brings	the	insight	from	the	emerging	GHG	
literature	that	a	diverse	range	of	ideas,	interests,	and	institutions	is	at	play	in	the	
resolution	(or	lack	thereof)	of	health	problems	on	a	global	scale.		Linking	the	epistemic	
community	with	GHG	thus	requires	not	just	paying	attention	to	the	normative	
frameworks	advanced	by	the	community	but	also	understanding	the	mediation	of	
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competing	interests	shaping	GHG	in	the	prioritisation	of	policy	goals.		This	research	
illustrates	that	worldviews	of	the	epistemic	community	are	more	likely	to	be	influential	
if	they	are	in	line	with	decision	makers’	interests,	and	that	how	problems	are	framed	
often	seems	a	conscious	choice	of	the	epistemic	community.		Thus	while	a	shared	
worldview	is	a	core	element	that	characterises	the	epistemic	community,	the	
congruence	of	the	epistemic	community’s	worldviews	and	political	preferences	of	a	
given	time	period	proves	central	to	predicting	when	epistemic	communities	exercise	
policy	influence.		The	analytical	framework	developed	in	this	study	contributes	to	a	
more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	complex	and	political	context	within	which	
epistemic	communities	operate	in	GHG.			
The	contribution	of	this	research	can	also	be	seen	in	the	theoretical	elaboration	of	the	
epistemic	communities	framework.		The	findings	of	this	research	challenge	and	
complement	Haas’s	theory	of	epistemic	communities,	which	defines	the	community	
though	a	shared	consensual	belief,	mutual	engagement	through	common	notions	of	
validity,	and	common	policy	enterprise.		Hass	contends	that	shared	consensual	belief	
(worldview)	holds	the	community	together.		This	research	has	shed	light	on	an	
interesting	question	within	epistemic	communities	research,	in	particular	the	existence	
of	multiple	consensual	beliefs	shared	by	a	single	epistemic	community.		This	research	
shows	that	multiple	“realities”	can	be	constructed	by	the	epistemic	community	over	
time	in	the	policy	process,	illustrating	that	the	epistemic	community’s	core	belief	system	
could	embrace	a	range	of	worldviews	which	then	broadens	the	policy	paradigm	of	the	
community.		Through	empirical	understanding	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community,	this	
research	offers	conceptual	refinements	for	improving	the	explanatory	power	of	the	
epistemic	communities	framework.						
Lastly,	this	research	has	elucidated	the	actual	process	through	which	policy	discourses	
are	translated	into	health	policies	through	epistemic	communities.		It	is	well	known	that	
the	biomedical	community	has	significant	influence	over	international	health	policy	
making,	not	least	in	the	manner	in	which	the	WHO	is	driven	and	governed	by	medical	
professionals.683		Little	is	known,	however,	about	how	exactly	global	health	policy	
making	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	takes	place	in	practice,	and	what	role	technical	
experts	and	their	expertise	play	in	that	process.		This	research	fills	this	gap	by	exploring	
what	core	knowledge	surrounding	SARS	was	generated,	how	the	relative	weight	of	
knowledge	was	determined,	and	what	mechanisms	facilitated	a	community	of	medical	
and	technical	experts	to	come	at	the	forefront	of	policymaking	on	SARS.		The	research	
illustrates	that	the	influence	of	the	SARS	epistemic	community	was	profound	both	in	
terms	of	shaping	normative	basis	of	policies	and	global	spread	of	responses.		This	
finding	serves	to	illuminate	the	detailed	workings	of	global	health	policy	making	
concerned	with	an	infectious	disease	outbreak.				
                                                            
683	Lee	K	(2009),	The	World	Health	Organisation,	London:	Routledge.	
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7.4.	LIMITATIONS	OF	THIS	RESEARCH		
	
The	present	research	has	a	few	methodological	and	theoretical	constraints.		
	
First,	this	research	intended	to	identify	key	discourses	that	have	defined	the	problems	
of	SARS	and	shaped	policy	decisions	using	both	inductive	and	deductive	approaches.		
That	is,	key	discourses	are	identified	not	only	on	the	basis	of	pre‐conceptualised	
discourses	suggested	by	the	existing	analyses	on	GHG	as	departing	themes	but	also	
through	an	iterative	process	of	exploring	emergent	themes	using	a	grounded	theory	
approach.		The	research	has	identified	four	key	discourses	–	biomedical,	economic,	
security,	and	human	rights	discourses	–	that	are	dominant	in	the	GHG	of	SARS.		They	are	
not	unique	to	GHG	of	SARS	in	the	sense	that	they	are	essentially	emanated	from	the	
existing	GHG	analyses	and	that	no	additional	new	discourse	is	identified.		This	can	be	
explained,	in	part,	by	the	fact	that	GHG	of	SARS	is	part	of	the	very	fabric	of	GHG	in	
general.		That	is,	the	key	discourses	identified	in	GHG	of	SARS	are	inextricably	linked	to	
other	areas	of	global	governance.		Indeed,	the	research	finds	similar	coherent	
underlying	logic	and	narratives	that	reflect	each	of	the	four	discourses	identified	
elsewhere.		Nonetheless,	there	is	a	possibility	that	this	research	might	have	missed	out	
some	potential	discourses.		In	this	respect,	discourses	presented	in	this	research	may	
not	represent	the	entirety	of	ideas	that	informed	policy	outcomes	in	GHG	of	SARS.		
Second,	while	all	infectious	diseases	have	potentially	significant	impacts	on	governance	
issues,	whether	local	or	global,	some	might	argue	that	different	governance	
arrangements	or	instruments	are	required	for	different	infectious	disease	issues	or	even	
other	global	health	issues.		In	other	words,	one	should	caution	against	
overgeneralisations	of	the	present	analysis	to	a	broader	GHG	architecture	since	special	
circumstances	and	conditions	can	facilitate	and	inhibit	collective	action	across	different	
types	of	infectious	diseases	in	GHG.		Indeed,	the	notion	and	account	of	GHG	in	this	
research	has	been	mainly	confined	to	the	type	of	infectious	diseases	that	have	the	
features	of	potential	uncertainty,	rapid	transmission	within	a	short	period	of	time	and	
global	geographical	reach.		Hence,	this	study	on	the	SARS	outbreak	recognises	that	
conclusions	emanating	from	the	study	might	not	be	analytically	and	operationally	
applicable	to	the	larger	literature	on	GHG	itself,	or	even	GHG	around	infectious	diseases	
as	a	whole.		Nonetheless,	this	study	has	endeavoured	to	make	an	intellectual	and	
practical	contribution	to	the	development	of	current	GHG	debates	on	infectious	disease	
outbreaks,	and	provide	useful	insights	into	the	complexity	of	GHG.		
Third,	in	terms	of	data	collection	and	analysis,	although	considerable	efforts	were	made	
to	ensure	that	the	fieldwork	used	a	robust	and	rigorous	research	methodology,	there	
were	some	challenges,	especially	with	regard	to	fieldwork	interviews.		For	example,	
informants	affiliated	with	formal	organisations	such	as	the	WHO	and	government	
bodies	tended	to	develop	attachments	and	justifications	to	their	organisations	and	roles,	
and	were	often	exceedingly	cautious	and	defensive	with	their	responses.		These	issues	
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might	have	been	mitigated	to	a	certain	extent	by	cultivating	a	deeper	rapport	with	
respondents	over	a	longer	period	of	interaction.		Data	collection	processes	including	
field	site	visits,	however,	did	not	always	allow	for	maximum	rapport	building,	which	is	
best	done	over	a	long	period	of	intense	interaction.		The	systematic	application	of	a	
process	of	triangulation	and	verification	connecting	up	with	findings	from	an	archival	
literature	review,	however,	has	significantly	helped	to	mitigate	these	issues	and	
challenges.			
7.5.	FUTURE	RESEARCH	DIRECTIONS	
	
One	way	in	which	future	research	could	build	on	this	research	is	by	examining	the	role	
of	discourses	in	other	global	health	issues	in	GHG.		The	social	constructivist	approach	
used	in	this	research	has	been	shown	to	offer	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	constitutive	
element	of	GHG	related	to	infectious	diseases.		As	such,	social	constructivism	might	be	
usefully	applied	to	other	issue	areas,	notably	where	policy	action	has	been	contested	or	
intransigent.		In	recent	years,	a	number	of	scholars	have	been	identifying	new	research	
questions	and	agendas	around	the	role	of	ideas,	applying	this	approach	to	new	
empirical	contributions	to	GHG	in	areas	such	as	pandemic	influenza	preparedness,	
tobacco	control,	access	to	medicines	and	HIV/AIDS.684		Nevertheless,	this	body	of	work	
remains	less	prominent	that	approaches	focusing	on	material	conditions.		GHG	
scholarship	would	benefit	from	the	expanded	application	of	a	social	constructivist	
approach	to	a	wide	variety	of	specific	global	health	issues	to	make	sense	of	the	interplay	
between	ideas	and	material	reality,	and	how	this	shapes	the	governing	of	specific	health	
issues	or	“pathways	of	response”.		For	example,	this	type	of	research	might	explain	the	
limited	presence	of	the	human	rights	discourse	in	areas	of	non‐communicable	diseases,	
apart	from	tobacco	control,	(diet	and	nutrition,	for	example).685		The	emergence	of	a	
new	discourse	that	shapes	the	governance	response	to	a	specific	health	problem	(for	
example,	harm	reduction	approach	to	alcohol)	could	also	be	an	interesting	topic	to	
explore.	686	
	
Related	to	the	above,	one	of	the	interesting	questions	arising	from	the	analysis	was	how	
discourses	work	together,	how	some	are	more	compatible	with	each	other	than	others,	
and	under	what	conditions	they	come	together.		This	research	has	introduced	the	
manner	in	which	different	interests	can	coalesce	with	each	other	by	drawing	on	the	
discourses	at	hand,	and	the	circumstances	under	which	discourses	are	most	likely	to	be	
in	cooperation	in	the	context	of	an	infectious	disease	outbreak.		Further	consideration	of	
why,	where	and	how	well	discourses	cooperate	and	reconcile	across	different	global	
                                                            
684	McInnes	C,	Kamradt‐Scott	A,	Lee	K,	Romer‐Mahler	A,	Rushton	S,	Williams	OD	(2014),	The	
Transformation	of	Global	Health	Governance,	New	York:	Palgrave	McMillan.	
685	Sridar	D,	Brolan	CE,	Durrani	S,	Edge	J,	Gostin	L,	Hill	P,	McKee	M	(2013),	“Recent	shifts	in	global	
governance:	implications	for	the	response	to	non‐communicable	diseases,”	PLOS	Medicine,	10(7):	
e1001487.		
686	Anderson	P,	Moller	L,	Galea	G	(2012),	Alcohol	in	the	European	Union:	consumption,	harm	and	policy	
approaches,	Copenhagen:	World	Health	Organisation	Regional	Office	for	Europe.		
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health	domains	could	enhance	our	understanding	of	the	political	dynamic	of	the	
coalition	of	interests	examined	here.			
	
A	future	research	area	that	was	briefly	touched	upon	in	the	research,	but	would	benefit	
from	further	examination,	is	how	particular	discourses	intensify	or	differentiate	policy	
responses	to	health	problems	at	the	regional,	national	and	sub‐national	levels.		For	
example,	the	security	discourse	has	been	manifested,	to	a	certain	extent,	differently	
across	different	jurisdictions	during	SARS.		How	does	the	delineation	of	boundaries	in	
terms	of	territory	frame	specific	priorities	or	agendas	at	other	level	of	governance?	Why	
do	global	ideas	wield	a	different	degree	of	influence	across	multiple	sites?		This	line	of	
questioning	would	require	more	targeted	analysis	at	the	local	level	to	clarify	how	
intersections	between	the	local	and	global	occur,	and	how	local	actors	challenge	or	
circumvent	global	norms.	Future	research	could	also	focus	on	investigations	into	an	
exact	pathway	by	which	global	ideas	and	norms	are	diffused.		
	
Another	avenue	for	further	research	is	to	examine	the	presence	and	role	of	epistemic	
communities	in	different	policy	domains	in	GHG.		For	example,	in	which	domains	are	
epistemic	communities	most	likely	to	form	and	assert	influence?		Among	these	domains,	
in	which	ones	have	epistemic	communities	impacted	policy	choices?	In	which	domains	
have	epistemic	communities	failed	to	make	an	impact?	If	an	epistemic	community	has	
failed	to	contribute	towards	policy	change	in	some	domains,	what	could	be	the	potential	
causes	for	this	failure?		Such	an	examination	would	assess	the	broader	role	of	epistemic	
communities	in	the	process	of	global	health	policy	making.		An	interesting	further	line	of	
enquiry	is	to	investigate	the	persistence	of	epistemic	communities.		According	to	the	
epistemic	communities	literature,	an	epistemic	community	is	a	self‐organised	social	
structure	which	typically	has	a	tendency	to	disband,	especially	after	achieving	policy	
success	on	a	particular	issue	that	it	has	been	engaged	in.687	An	epistemic	community	
may	also	disband	for	other	reasons	such	as	a	failure	to	achieve	consensus	among	its	
members,	or	an	inability	to	sustain	itself	in	the	wake	of	the	emergence	of	rivalling	
epistemic	communities	or	the	departure	of	certain	members.688		Persistence	may	enable	
epistemic	communities	to	achieve	long‐term	consensus,	retain	legitimacy,	and	
institutionalise	the	normative	beliefs	they	promote.	Scholars	may	focus	on	this	aspect.	
	
Another	intriguing	line	of	research	is	to	clarify	how	epistemic	communities	and	
discourses	interact	together	and	how	the	former	uses	the	latter	strategically	to	(or	not	
to)	further	certain	policy	actions.		This	research	has	recognised	that	the	SARS	epistemic	
community	was	not	only	cognizant	of	the	nature	of	the	issues	surrounding	the	outbreak	
through	the	knowledge	they	possessed,	but	appeared	to	have	been	capable	of	
responding	and	adapting	to	the	context.		The	SARS	epistemic	community	deployed	
                                                            
687	Adler	E	and	Hass	P	(1992),	“Conclusion:	epistemic	communities,	world	order,	and	the	creation	of	a	
reflective	research	programme,”	International	organisation,	46(1):	367‐390.	
688	Cetina	K	(1999),	Epistemic	Cultures:	How	the	Sciences	Make	Knowledge,	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	
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certain	discourses	according	to	the	changing	nature	of	the	outbreak,	prevailing	
economic	and	political	circumstances,	and	other	real	world	events	to	be	resolved.		The	
question	remains	as	to	whether	the	use	of	‘appropriate’	discourses	was	a	deliberate	
rhetorical	strategy	for	persuading	and	gaining	support	of	audiences	to	achieve	the	
policy	goals	or	it	was	merely	a	coincidental	outcome	of	the	interplay	between	framing	
and	context.		Future	research	might	usefully	elucidate	whether	epistemic	communities	
have	shared	motivations	to	tactically	(or	even	opportunistically)	deploy	and	combine	
discourses	to	advance	their	policy	preferences.											
	
One	of	the	interesting	points	that	this	research	briefly	touched	on	but	could	explore	
further	is	when	epistemic	communities	are	more	likely	to	be	persuasive	and	thus	
influence	policy	outcomes.		The	SARS	epistemic	community	appears	to	be	influential	
under	particular	circumstances	such	as	during	times	of	political	uncertainty	spurred	by	
technical	uncertainty	and	complexity	of	the	problem	at	stake,	and	when	members	of	the	
epistemic	community	are	institutionalised	into	international	organisations.		While	this	
research	did	not	extend	to	investigating	the	relative	importance	of	different	conditions	
that	have	a	path	to	influence,	it	would	be	important	to	research	into	the	context	within	
which	epistemic	communities	and	the	norms	they	espouse	are	more	likely	to	impact	
state	behaviour	and	regime	formation	through	comparative	case	studies.	
	
Lastly,	the	analytical	framework	of	epistemic	communities	guided	investigation	into	the	
role	of	a	community	of	technical	experts	in	the	introduction,	acceptance,	and	diffusion	of	
policies	on	infectious	disease	outbreaks	at	the	global	level	–	a	hitherto	unexplored	area.		
Yet,	one	of	the	limitations	with	the	framework	is	its	assumption	that	epistemic	
communities	are	the	only	influential	actors	or	set	of	interests	at	play.		Partly	due	to	the	
focus	of	the	role	of	epistemic	communities,	this	study	has	not	extensively	explored	the	
role	and	interests	of	other	important	agents	that	might	have	contributed	to	the	policy	
process.		For	example,	the	media	was	an	important	diffusion	outlet	and	agent	of	
discourse	construction	in	that	it	highlighted	certain	policy	issues	(over	others)	during	
the	outbreak,	facilitating	or	hindering	the	ascendance	(or	decline)	of	particular	
discourses	and	overall	policy	debates	related	to	SARS.		In	effect,	GHG	of	infectious	
diseases	involves	a	bewildering	array	of	actors	and	configurations	that	extend	beyond	a	
community	of	technical	experts.		An	examination	of	the	perspectives	of	a	broader	array	
of	actors	on	the	issues	of	infectious	disease	outbreaks	and	the	relative	importance	of	
epistemic	communities	against	other	types	of	actors	would	elucidate	deeper	
understandings	of	GHG.		
7.6.	CONCLUSIONS	
	
This	research	has	examined	the	implications	of	specific	sets	of	ideas	through	the	
epistemic	communities	concept	with	regard	to	the	nature	of	global	SARS	governance.		It	
is	possible	that	objections	may	be	made	against	the	arguments	put	forth	herein	by	
pointing	out	that	the	reason	why	certain	ideas	surrounding	SARS	gained	prominence	is	
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simply	that	the	ideas	underpinning	policies	were	better	than	others	available	at	the	
time	of	the	outbreak	in	meeting	the	challenges.		In	other	words,	critics	may	argue	that	
global	SARS	governance	is	a	rational	(and	thus	value‐free)	response	to	international	
health	crisis,	with	the	aid	of	technical	experts,	in	order	to	address	the	collective	risks	
posed	by	the	outbreak,	on	the	basis	of	impartial	and	objective	evidence.		This	research	
argues	that	such	a	view	is	inadequate.	Indeed,	the	perceived	crisis‐like	situation	
privileges	technical	experts	during	the	outbreak.		Yet,	it	does	not	explain	fully	why	the	
very	form	of	governance	of	SARS	evolved	the	way	it	did.		The	introduction	and	
acceptance	of	particular	discourses	over	others	still	requires	explanation	–	why	certain	
ideas	prevail	and	why	certain	policy	decisions	are	chosen.		This	is	especially	true	when	
there	are	a	number	of	ways	to	define	problems	and	address	them.		
	
The	ideational	understanding	of	GHG	–	in	particular,	the	discourse	contributing	to	GHG	
of	infectious	diseases	–	leaves	this	thesis	open	to	the	criticism	that	it	does	not	provide	a	
definitive	policy	solution	from	a	positivist	perspective.		In	effect,	the	ideational	
understanding	of	GHG	does	not	directly	offer	a	prescriptive	solution	to	the	perceived	
existing	“deficit”	in	governance	arrangements.		However,	identifying	the	dynamic	
process	of	the	contestation	and	cooperation	of	ideas	is	arguably	a	first	step	to	
understand	a	deeper	causal	factor	for	the	configuration	of	a	particular	form	of	GHG.		The	
findings	of	this	research	do	not	intend	to	highlight	the	governance	deficit,	nor	are	they	
to	pinpoint	negative	effects	of	specific	policies	surrounding	SARS.		Rather,	the	intent	is	
to	elucidate	the	policy	process	of	GHG	of	SARS	through	an	interpretive	and	reflective	
approach.		Such	an	exercise,	it	is	believed,	speaks	to	the	possibility	of	being	other	than	
how	we	are	constructed,	of	opening	up	the	space	to	understand	global	health	problems	
in	a	number	of	ways,	and	perhaps	of	evolving	alternative	approaches	to	the	existing	one.		
At	the	beginning	of	this	research,	the	researcher	laid	out	a	series	of	research	questions	
to	be	addressed	throughout	the	thesis.		Before	concluding,	one	core	research	question	to	
be	answered	here	is	what	this	analysis	tells	us	about	the	notion	of	GHG	of	infectious	
diseases.		The	story	of	SARS	unveils	that	GHG	of	SARS	is	vitally	linked	to	the	wider	
landscape	of	GHG	and	global	governance,	not	least	in	the	manner	in	which	the	dominant	
political	and	economic	interests	increasingly	define	it	over	a	range	of	issue	areas	and	
policies.		By	engaging	in	account	of	key	discourses,	we	begin	to	understand	that	
discourses	from	other	areas	in	global	governance	cross	over	into	the	domain	of	GHG	of	
SARS.		Thus,	it	is	not	surprising	that	discourses	aligned	with	prevailing	interests	within	
the	emerging	global	political	economy	such	as	trade	flows,	intellectual	property,	
scientific	progress	and	national	security	primarily	inform	the	governance	arrangements	
surrounding	SARS.		This	suggests	that	understanding	GHG	of	SARS	is	only	viable	in	the	
context	of	recognition	of	the	inter‐linkages	and	lines	of	force	which	impact	upon	it.		
Significantly,	this	configuration	coincides	with	the	growing	dissatisfaction	with	the	
current	state	of	GHG,	which	is	seen	as	highly	flawed	and	disjointed.		Now	seems	to	be	a	
right	point	at	which	to	take	a	step	back	and	ask	why	GHG	has	evolved	the	way	it	does,	
and	what	really	drives	global	response	to	health	problems.		The	present	research	from	
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the	story	of	SARS	underscores	that	governance	response	in	terms	of	policy	outcomes	is	
the	product	of	reconciling	health	with	a	plethora	of	competing	priorities	and	political	
economic	goals	via	social	construction	of	reality.		Interrogating	the	normative	basis	of	
GHG	will	not	only	elucidate	the	existing	governance	arrangements	and	their	normative	
orientations,	but	it	will	also	contribute	to	more	reflective	and	critical	debate	about	how	
to	strengthen	collective	action	on	shared	health	needs.			
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Immunization	
Dr.	Takeshi	Kasai	 Senior	advisor,	CSR Senior	advisor,	CSR	
Dr.	Yoshikuni	Sato	 Medical	officer,	Expanded	
Programme	on	
Immunization	
Medical	officer,	Expanded	
Programme	on	
Immunization	
Mr.	Peter	Cordingley	 WHO	Spokesperson WHO	public	information	
officer	
Dr.	Henk	Bekedam WHO	China	Representative Medical	officer,	Health	
System	Development,	
WHO	Western	Pacific	
Regional	Office	
	
Hong	Kong,	China		
	
Name	 Affiliation	during	SARS Position	at	the	time	of	
interview	
Dr.	Malik	Peiris	 Professor,	Department	of	
Microbiology,	University	of	
Hong	Kong		
Professor,	Department	of	
Microbiology,	
University	of	Hong	Kong		
Dr.	Tak‐Sun	Ignatius	Yu	 Professor,	Chinese	
University	of	Hong	Kong	
Professor,	School	of	Public	
Health,	Chinese	University	
of	Hong	Kong	
Dr.	Stephen	Ng	 Invited	investigator	on	
SARS/Lecturer	in	
Epidemiology,	Columbia	
University		
President,	Asia	Molecular	
Diagnostics	Limited.	
Dr.	Sui	Hung	Lee	 Professor,	School	of	Public	
Health,	Chinese	University	
of	Hong	Kong	
Professor	Emeritus,	School	
of	Public	Health,	Chinese	
University	of	Hong	Kong	
Dr.	Anthony	Johnson	 Professor	of	Community	 Chair	Professor	of	
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Hedley	 Medicine,	University	of	
Hong	Kong		
Community	Medicine,	
School	of	Public	health,	
University	of	Hong	Kong		
Dr.	Tze	Wai	Wong	 Professor,	Chinese	
University	of	Hong	Kong	
Professor,	School	of	Public	
Health,	
Chinese	University	of	Hong	
Kong	
Dr.	Nelson	Lee	 Senior	consultant,	Prince	of	
Wales	Hospital,	Hospital	
Authority	
Senior	consultant,	Prince	of	
Wales	Hospital,	Hospital	
Authority	
	
Singapore	
	
Name	 Affiliation	during	SARS Position	at	the	time	of	
interview	
Dr.	Goh	Kee	Tai	 Director,	Quarantine	&	
Epidemiology	Department,	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Senior	Consultant,	Ministry	
of	Health	
Professor	Tan	Chorh	Chuan	 Director	of	Medical	
Services	
President	of	National	
University	of	Singapore	
Dr.	Teo	Kwang	Joo	 Chief	Army	Medical	Officer	
Colonel,	Singapore	Armed	
Forces	
International	SOS	
Dr.	Stefan	Ma	 Officer,	Ministry	of	Health Acting	Deputy	Director	
(Biostatistics	&	Research),	
Ministry	of	Health	
Professor	Leo	Yee	Sin	 Clinical	Director,	Singapore	
CDC	
Director,	Singapore	CDC
Dr.	KU	Menon	 Ministry	of	Information,	
Communication	and	Arts	
Ministry	of	Information,	
Communication	and	Arts	
Dr.	WH	Yak	 General	Practitioner,	Bedok General	Practitioner,	Bedok
Dr.	Chew	Suok	Kai	 Epidemiology	and	Disease	
Control	Division,	Ministry	
of	Health	
Epidemiology	and	Disease	
Control	Division,	Ministry	of	
Health	
Dr	Edison	Liu	 Director,	The	Genomic	
Institute	of	Singapore	
Director,	The	Genomic	
Institute	of	Singapore	
Dr.	Aiee	Ling	 Senior	consultant,	
Singapore	General	Hospital	
Senior	consultant,	
Singapore	General	Hospital	
	
UK	
	
Name	 Affiliation	during	SARS Position	at	the	time	of	
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interview	
Dr.	Steven	Riley	 Post‐doctoral	Fellow,	The
University	of	Hong	Kong	
Reader,	Infectious	Disease	
Ecology	and	Epidemiology,	
School	of	Public	Health,	
Imperial	College		
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APPENDIX	II	
	
	RESEARCH	OBJECTIVES	and	INTERVIEW	QUESTIONS	
	
Objectives	 Interview	Questions	
To	 critically	 review	 the	
existing	 literature	on	GHG	of	
infectious	disease	outbreaks	
	
To	 develop	 a	 conceptual	
framework	 to	 analyse	 the	
SARS	outbreak	based	on	 the	
concepts	 of	 epistemic	
communities	 and	
transnational	 managerial	
class	
	
To	 locate	 the	 transnational	
epistemic	 communities	
concerned	 with	 SARS	 by	
identifying	 key	 actors	 and	
their	linkages	
 Can	 you	 tell	 me	 firstly	 a	 little	 about	 your	 own	
background	 and	 your	 position	 when	 the	 SARS	
outbreak	occurred?	
 Can	you	describe	how	you	came	to	be	 involved	 in	the	
SARS	response?	
 Can	you	describe	your	role	during	the	outbreak?		What	
function	did	you	perform?	
 Do	 you	 see	 yourself	 predominantly	 as	 a	 technical	
expert	 or	 a	 policy	 maker?	 	 Do	 you	 think	 that	 these	
roles	are	distinct	and	separate?	
 Which	institutions/individuals	do	you	think	played	the	
most	 important	 role	 during	 the	 outbreak	 and	 why?	
What	 kind	 of	 influence	 did	 these	
institutions/individuals	exert?	What	determines	which	
institutions/individuals	 are	 influential/powerful	 in	
your	eyes?	
 (For	participants	in	the	WHO	networks)	How	were	the	
virtual	 networks	 for	 SARS	 (aetiology,	 clinicians,	 and	
epidemiology)	 organised?	 How	 did	 you	 come	 to	 be	
involved	in	the	networks?	Prior	to	SARS	outbreak,	did	
you	 have	 any	 formal/informal	 interaction	 with	 other	
experts	 participated	 (or	 with	 the	 WHO)?	 Which	
institution	or	individual	do	you	think	was	distinct	and	
why?	
 (For	participants	in	the	global	meetings)	How	were	the	
advisors	 of	 global	 meetings	 selected	 and	 appointed?	
(How	 did	 you	 come	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 global	
meetings?)	 Did	 you	 have	 any	 formal/informal	
interaction	with	other	 advisors	 attended	 (or	with	 the	
WHO)	prior	 to	outbreak	of	SARS?	Which	 individual,	 if	
any,	 do	 you	 think	was	 influential	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	
SARS	outbreak	and	why?	What	do	you	think	were	the	
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major	 outcomes	 of	 the	meetings?	 To	what	 extent	 the	
meetings	 were	 important	 in	 guiding	 the	 global	 SARS	
response?	
 (For	WHO	HQ	 officials)	 Can	 you	 talk	me	 through	 the	
process	 of	mobilising	 experts	 in	 a	 global	 response	 to	
an	outbreak	such	as	SARS?		Can	you	describe	the	actual	
mechanics?	
 (For,	 WPRO	 officials,	 national	 policy	 makers,	 and	
others)	How	did	you	 interact	with	people	 involved	 in	
the	global	SARS	response	in	general?		
 	(For	 WHO	 HQ	 and	 WPRO	 officials)	 How	 were	 the	
guidelines,	 recommendations,	 protocols,	 and	 fact	
sheets	 drafted?	 Who	 was	 involved	 in	 preparing	 the	
documents	 and	who	were	 the	 individuals,	 if	 any,	 that	
provided	 the	 expertise?	 	 To	 what	 extent	 did	 these	
individuals	help	guide	the	documents?	
 (For	 national	 policy	 makers)	 How	 were	 the	 national	
measures	 and	 policies	 implemented	 in	 your	 country?	
Who	 decided	 how?	 Who	 were	 the	 individuals	 that	
provided	 advices	 to	 the	 national	 authority?	 Did	 the	
WHO	officials	and	other	technical	experts	play	a	part	in	
national	policy‐making?	If	so,	how	and	to	what	extent	
their	advices	were	influential?	
 (For	 national	 policy	 makers)	 To	 what	 extent	 the	
WHO’s	 guidelines/recommendations	 contributed	 to	
the	national	policy‐making?			
To	 explore	 the	 discourses	
constructed	 by	 this	
epistemic	community	
 Do	you	think	SARS	was	unprecedented	in	terms	of	the	
nature	of	outbreak?		
 If	so,	to	what	extent	it	was	exceptional?		
 What	 do	 you	 think	 of	 the	 media	 attention?	 Do	 you	
think	 the	media	 attention	was	 appropriate	 in	 level	 to	
outbreak’s	seriousness?		
 Why	 do	 you	 think	 SARS	 garnered	 unprecedented	
media	attention?	
 What	 do	 you	 think	 was	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	
(specific)	policies?	To	what	extent	do	you	think	it	could	
be	legitimized	given	the	(specific)	concerns?	
 To	what	 extent	 do	 you	 think	 the	 SARS	 response	was	
successful?	 If	 so	what	 factors	 explain	 the	 success	 (or	
failure)?	
To	 understand	 how,	 and	 to	
what	 extent,	 the	 discourses	
put	 forth	 by	 the	 epistemic	
communities	 impacted	 on	
the	practical	policy	response	
to	SARS	
	
 To	what	extent	do	you	think	WHO	played	an	important	
role	in	averting	a	major	global	outbreak?	
 What	 role	 do	 you	 think	WHO	 played	 compared	 with	
other	 health	 organizations	 for	 example	 the	 US	 CDC?		
Do	you	think	it	played	an	appropriate	role?			
 How	would	you	describe	 the	role	of	 technical	experts	
in	policy	making	during	the	outbreak?	
To	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 	
270	
	
the	 nature	 of	 emerging	
forms	of	GHG.	
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	INFORMATION	SHEET	AND	CONSENT	FORM	
	
London	School	of	Hygiene	&	Tropical	Medicine	
(University	of	London)	
Keppel	Street,	London,	WC1E	7HT	
Switchboard:		+44	(0)20	7636	8636		Telex	8953474	
	
	
Study	Information	Sheet	
	
Study	Title:	The	role	of	epistemic	communities	 in	 the	global	response	 to	Severe	
Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS):		Implications	for	global	health	governance	
	
Dear	_____________,	
I	am	writing	to	invite	you	to	take	part	 in	PhD	research	to	analyse	the	role	of	technical	
experts	in	the	global	response	to	SARS.		This	research	seeks	to	understand	the	extent	to	
which	a	“community”	of	experts	came	together,	what	was	the	nature	of	their	expertise,	
and	how	they	interacted	to	influence	policy	making.	 	 In	the	political	science	 literature,	
the	term	“epistemic	communities”	is	used	to	describe	such	a	group.		
Given	 your	 expertise	 in	 infectious	 disease	 control,	 and	 understanding	 of	 the	 SARS	
outbreak,	I	would	be	grateful	 if	you	would	agree	to	be	interviewed.	 	My	questions	will	
seek	 to	 understand,	 from	 your	 perspective,	 who	 the	 key	 individuals	 and	 institutions	
involved	in	the	response	to	SARS,	what	specific	roles	they	played,	how	they	interacted	
with	other	actors	and,	perhaps	most	challenging,	what	factors	motivated	their	actions.			
It	is	hoped	that	the	findings	of	this	research	will	contribute	to	a	fuller	understanding	of	
emerging	forms	of	global	governance	of	infectious	diseases.	
My	aim	is	to	conduct	about	30	interviews.	If	you	agree	to	participate	in	this	study,	the	
semi‐structured	interview	will	be	conducted	by	myself	and	is	likely	to	last	around	30‐60	
minutes.		I	would	like	to	tape	record	the	interview	to	ensure	accuracy.		Please	inform	me	
if	 this	 is	 not	 acceptable	 to	 you.	 	 After	 the	 interview,	 I	 will	 transcribe	 the	 tapes	 and	
analyse	their	content	alongside	policy	documents,	statements,	speeches	and	mass	media	
coverage.	
WHO collaborating	Centre	on	Global	
Change	and	Health			
Department	of	Public	Health	&	Policy	
E‐Mail:	sung‐won.yoon@lshtm.ac.uk		
Tel:	+44	(0)77	6538	8883 
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If	you	are	willing	 to	participate,	 I	would	be	grateful	 if	you	would	complete	and	return	
the	brief	consent	form	below	by	email	or	post.	Then	I	will	arrange	an	interview	at	a	time	
which	 suits	you.	 	Your	participation	 is	 entirely	voluntary	and	you	are	not	 required	 to	
provide	a	 reason	 if	 you	decide	not	 to	 take	part.	All	 interviews	 from	 this	 research	will	
only	be	used	 for	 this	 thesis	and	outputs	 (e.g.	peer	 reviewed	articles)	deriving	 from	 it.	
Any	 additional	 use	 will	 only	 be	 undertaken	 with	 your	 expressed	 permission.	 Quotes	
taken	 from	 the	 interview	 will	 be	 identified	 by	 name,	 position	 and	 institution	 of	 the	
interviewee.	 Please	 inform	 me	 if	 you	 would	 prefer	 that	 your	 interview	 remain	
anonymous.	
This	project	has	been	approved	by	the	Ethics	Committee	of	London	School	of	Hygiene	
and	Tropical	Medicine.	 	 If	you	require	any	 further	 information	about	 the	study,	either	
prior	to	or	following	participation,	please	do	not	hesitate	to	contact	me.	
Thank	you	for	your	consideration	of	this	project	and	I	look	forward	to	hearing	from	you.	
	
	
	
	
Sung‐Won	Yoon,	PhD	candidate	
Centre	on	Global	Change	and	Health	
London	School	of	Hygiene	and	Tropical	Medicine	
Keppel	Street,	London	WC1E	7HT	
email:	Sung‐Won.Yoon@lshtm.ac.uk	
Tel:	+44	07765	388	883	
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Consent	Form	
	
	
Study	Title:	The	role	of	epistemic	communities	 in	 the	global	response	 to	Severe	
Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS):	Implications	for	global	health	governance	
	
	
Please	delete	as	appropriate	
	
 	I	have	read	the	study	information	provided	and	I	understand	what	will	be	required	of	
me	if	I	take	part	in.																																																													 	 	 	
Yes/No	
	
 I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	at	any	
time	without	providing	a	reason.																																																						
Yes/No		
	
 	All	my	questions	have	been	answered	by	the	researcher.	
Yes/No	
	
 	I	 agree	 to	permit	 the	 researcher	 to	 contact	me	via	 email	 or	 letter	 in	order	 to	make	
arrangements	for	the	interview.	
Yes/No	
	
 	I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	above	study.	
Yes/No	
	
	
	
	
Signed	_____________________										 	 Date	_____________________	
